

The Barons' Crusade

A
Call to
Arms and Its
Consequences



Michael Lower

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A Call to Arms and Its Consequences

Michael Lower

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For Peter and Triene Lower

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Introduction

Medieval and modern writers alike cite crusading as a model of common Christian endeavor in the Middle Ages.¹ In many ways, this characterization makes sense. Crusades were preached by the pope, the acknowledged head of Christendom. They attracted recruits across the Latin West, who put aside differences of background and language to join together in a common cause. They were fought against religiously defined enemies, who sharpened the crusaders' sense of themselves as Christians and of religion as the most important feature of their identity. Describing the army that assembled for the First Crusade in 1095, Fulcher of Chartres reported that in it "a countless multitude, speaking many languages and coming from many regions, was to be seen."² William of Malmesbury noted the diverse local activities and values Christians left behind to unite in the common cause of the crusade: "Then the Welshman abandoned his forests and neglected his hunting; the Scotchman deserted the fleas with which he is so familiar; the Dane ceased to swallow his intoxicating draughts; and the Norwegian turned his back upon his raw fish."³ In Robert of Reims's famous account, the crusade allowed Christians, whatever their differences, to speak with one voice. When Pope Urban II preached the First Crusade, Robert says, "he so influenced to one purpose the desires of all who were present, that they cried out 'God wills it! God wills it!'"⁴

To enthusiasts like Fulcher, William, and Robert, the First Crusade was a stunning example of Christian unity in action. In actual fact, the expedition was nothing like a mass movement. It was supposed to be a devotional activity for knights, not the population at large; and only a small portion of Latin Christians participated directly in the crusade.⁵ Throughout the following century, crusading remained a minority activity. In the thirteenth century, however, the papacy worked to make the ideal of Christian unity a reality of crusading. It introduced a variety of ways for all Christians, not just practiced fighters, to become involved in crusades. Noncombatants were encouraged to participate through vow redemption, whereby the crusade indulgence could be earned through cash payments rather than fighting in person; through ecclesiastical taxation; through donations to crusade armies; through spiritual support that included specially prepared liturgies as well as individual prayers; and through respect for the papacy's call for peace across Christendom as a necessary pre-condition for a successful crusade.⁶

The material ways the papacy attempted to expand crusading to embrace all Christians thus emphasized the common religious purpose of the crusade and necessarily provided outlets for crusade piety that did not involve taking

sword in hand. In this expanded form, crusading had much in common with other penitential activities. For some, crusading involved making amends for wrongs they had done; for some, it involved financial support of the church; for all, it involved prayer. Despite these commonalities with other devotional forms, however, crusading differed from them in one fundamental respect: it used warfare to accomplish its earthly aims. Crusades were launched in order to recover Christian holy sites or defend Christian peoples from perceived threats. Although these goals might in theory be accomplished peacefully, in practice they seldom were. Crusades, unlike other penitential acts, inevitably involved warfare.

A crusade was the pope's call for physical force against those he defined as enemies of the faith. The proliferation of peaceful means of supporting crusades in the thirteenth century should not obscure this fact. When Thibaut de Pissiacco took a crusade vow and then redeemed it in 1239, he received a crusade indulgence and never personally took part in any fighting.⁷ This does not, however, change the fact that the redemption fee went not to feed the hungry or heal the sick but to fund soldiers in his place. Similarly, the faithful who participated in a crusade liturgy or said prayers for the crusade might not wield a sword. Their prayers, however, were prayers for victory on the battlefield. Even with the peaceful involvement of noncombatants, a crusade remained an act of warfare against enemies of the faith.

This book examines a call for holy war and its consequences everywhere it was heard. Its subject is the Barons' Crusade (1234–1241), which in many ways represents the high point of papal efforts to make crusading a universal Christian undertaking.⁸ It traces Pope Gregory IX's call for a crusade and its results in Hungary, France, England, the Latin empire of Constantinople, and the Holy Land. The call resulted in two separate crusades, one to the Holy Land and one to the Latin empire of Constantinople. Within Christendom, the crusade call transformed relations between Christians and non-Christians in many of the places where it was heard. In some cases it unleashed interfaith violence the pope did not seek; in other cases it unleashed no violence at all; in other cases it seems to have improved relations between Christians and non-Christians. By highlighting the different responses medieval Christians gave to a single crusade appeal, the Barons' Crusade calls into question the idea that crusading embodies the religious unity of medieval society.

The story of the Barons' Crusade begins with Pope Gregory IX. Gregory is best known today as the first cardinal protector of the Franciscans, the inventor of the medieval inquisition, and the promulgator of the definitive medieval collection of canon law, the *Liber extra*.⁹ He was also a wholehearted proponent of crusading. Expeditions of one kind or another occupied an enormous amount of his attention, first as a cardinal under Pope Innocent III, then as pope from 1227 to 1241. Due to the distractions of Italian politics and a quarrel with the German emperor Frederick II, Gregory did not preach a crusade to the Holy Land until 1234. In September of that year, however, he

launched an all-out effort to unite the Christian people behind the cause of defending the crusader settlements there.

Gregory preached the cross throughout Christendom. Every ecclesiastical province received an identical crusade appeal, the papal bull *Rachel suum videns*. Using the bull as their preaching text, mendicant friars sought to promote the crusade to every segment of Christian society. No one was excluded from their appeal: not the sick, weak, poor, nor aged. To help the friars reach this universal audience, Gregory made attendance at crusade sermons mandatory for all Christians, something no previous pope had done. At these sermons the faithful were urged to support the crusade by keeping peace with their neighbors, praying for the success of the army, and donating to the campaign one penny every week for a decade, an enormous sum at the time. Mainly, though, they were encouraged to take the cross. The plan was that those subsequently deemed unfit for combat would redeem their vows for money to subsidize soldiers. Christian society was to be transformed into a society of crusaders.

It is doubtful whether a pope had ever before demanded such a deep and uniform commitment to a crusade. The response was enthusiastic, but far from universal. The preaching campaign failed to catch fire in Italy, Germany, or Spain. In Hungary, though, a small group of nobles and churchmen seemed likely to mount a campaign to Jerusalem, while in England and France two major expeditions of knights and nobles began to take shape. No sooner had these plans been hatched, however, than they were thrown into doubt. Crusades were often disrupted by the allure of internecine wars or the pressure of domestic politics on crusade leaders. But the Barons' Crusade was interrupted by Gregory IX himself.

In December 1235 news reached Rome of a crisis in the Latin empire of Constantinople. Beleaguered since its foundation in 1204, the empire seemed on the verge of collapse as local rivals besieged its capital. The empire had not prospered during its brief existence, but its survival was important to Gregory. The emperor at the time was John of Brienne, probably the pope's closest ally among secular rulers. John's shaky hold on power in Constantinople allowed a Latin patriarch to reside there. The patriarch did not command the loyalty of Greek Orthodox Christians, but his residence in Constantinople kept open at least the possibility of unity between the eastern and western churches. The crisis, therefore, was not only one of an ally in trouble but also one that threatened papal ambitions to head a united Christian church.

In such cases, Gregory did have an instrument at his disposal. He could call a crusade. The thirteenth century had seen the expansion of crusading to encompass targets beyond the Holy Land and reasons beyond the recapture of holy sites. The crusade became a more general defense of Christendom against its enemies wherever and whenever they happened to be. By 1235 Gregory himself had already called for holy warfare against pagans in the

Baltic, Muslims in the Iberian peninsula, Stedinger peasants in northern Germany, heretics in Croatia, supporters of heretics in Germany, opponents of Cuman Christianization, and political enemies in Italy.¹⁰ What may have given Gregory pause, then, was not that John of Brienne's enemies were Greek Christians in the Aegean, but rather that the crusade appeal for the Holy Land was already underway. The pope had called upon Christians to unite in redressing Christ's injuries in the Holy Land. Yet John's problems threatened the very unity he was trying to achieve.

In 1235 Gregory tried to divert the Holy Land crusaders to Constantinople and to encourage those who had not yet taken crusade vows to campaign there. In attempting this diversion Gregory took a risk. On one hand, if he succeeded he might go some way toward keeping open the possibility of a unified Church. He would also be acting on his responsibility as head of Christendom to defend Latin Christians everywhere. At the same time, to the extent that some might resist the diversion, he created the possibility of exposing or engendering divisions in Christendom as it already stood. This risk, however, seems one Gregory was prepared to take as he employed every means at his disposal to make the diversion a reality.

Although the pope addressed all crusaders as Christians, their situations and the likelihood that they would campaign in the Latin empire varied widely. Hungary was the Latin empire's nearest Catholic neighbor. The pope planned to mobilize the Hungarian military elite against Constantinople's attackers, John Vatatzes of Nicaea and John Asen of Bulgaria. He also tried to persuade Hungary's king, Bela IV, to attack these two powerful threats to the Latin empire. After four years of negotiations and remarkable papal concessions, both the Hungarian military elite and Bela declined. The aristocracy of Champagne had extensive ties to the Latin empire. Gregory used bribes and threats, both religious and economic, to persuade them to defend Latin Greece. They nevertheless rejected his plans and went to the Holy Land. The pope enjoyed initial success with Peter of Brittany, who agreed to go to the Latin empire, despite his lack of ties to the area. In the end, however, Peter changed his plan and went to the Holy Land instead, taking with him, it appears, some of the money Gregory had raised for him to campaign in the Latin empire. The English had no connections to the Latin empire and had previously exhibited reluctance to crusade anywhere but Jerusalem. Rather than trying to persuade them to fight for Constantinople, the pope attempted to have them redeem their vows so that others could fight. They refused and went to the Holy Land instead. Despite the most strenuous efforts, therefore, the pope had failed to unite the Christian people behind his crusading plans. Forced to choose between two ways of defending Christendom, most crusaders rejected the papal plan to save Constantinople in favor of the Jerusalem expedition.

The results of Gregory's crusade appeal not only differed from what he wanted, they also differed from each other. Gregory had called for a crusade

first against the Muslims and then against the schismatics Vatatzes and Asen. His appeal had dramatically different consequences for Christian relations with non-Christians in the various regions where it was heard. In western France, crusade preaching for the Holy Land spurred looting, theft, and a massacre in which as many as 2500 Jews perished. Rather than fighting against the targets Gregory had selected, these crusaders attacked a community that enjoyed papal protection. Four years later, the survivors of this attack, their value as financial assets now reduced, were expelled from Brittany by ducal decree. Between them, the massacre and the expulsion effectively eliminated the Breton Jewish population. The Jewish community of Champagne was older and better established than the one in Brittany. They survived the build-up to the Barons' Crusade, but paid a high price to do so. Before setting out for Acre, Thibaut IV, count of Champagne, seized from Jewish moneylenders all the interest Christians had paid them. Heretics in Champagne, by contrast, lost their property and their lives. Although Thibaut refused Gregory's invitation to crusade against heretics in Greece, he executed more than 180 of them at Mont-Aimé on the eve of his departure overseas.

The preaching campaign that sparked violence against Jews in France did not have the same effect in England. Whereas in France Jews were under the power of secular lords, in England they were under royal control. They suffered some financial exploitation, to the extent that King Henry III, who was not a crusader, allowed. They endured no other financial exploitation and no physical violence as far as we can tell. In Hungary both the initial situation and the outcome for local minority populations was different again. While France and England were surrounded by Christian neighbors, Hungary was on the Catholic Christian frontier. Another difference was that Hungary had minority populations of Muslims and Cumans as well as Jews. At the time Gregory called for the crusade and its diversion, King Bela IV was under considerable internal pressure, much of it of the papacy's making. Gregory objected to what he saw as overly preferential treatment of Hungary's non-Christian populations and had been trying for years to separate them from Christian society. Bela used negotiations over the possibility of aiding the Latin empire as a way to gain concessions for the treatment of Hungarian non-Christians. In Hungary, the diversion attempt thus eased pressure on local non-Christian populations to conform to prejudicial regulations.

Gregory had asked Latin Christians everywhere to unite against the enemies of the faith. By the spring of 1239, however, two separate crusades were on the march. While Baldwin of Courtenay, the heir to the Latin empire, was leading an expedition to Constantinople, an army about three times the size was on its way to Acre. Although the Holy Land crusaders shared a determination to defend the kingdom of Jerusalem, they lacked cohesion from the start. The French and English crusaders traveled separately. The English contingent arrived in the East a year later than the French. The French

expedition was wracked by internal divisions during its campaign: one after another leading barons broke away from the main army to pursue their own strategies, with military defeat the unsurprising result. The English crusaders divided into three contingents before they ever crossed the Channel. Not even Richard of Cornwall and Simon of Montfort, who were brothers-in-law, were willing to crusade in each other's company.

Just as the Barons' Crusaders refused to act like a unified Christian fighting force, so too they refused to treat non-Christians as a unified threat to Christendom. They clearly distinguished among the "enemies of the faith." Although Gregory urged them to equate fighting Greek schismatics with Muslims, most showed an unwillingness to see the two groups as equal enemies. They were willing to fight Muslims in the Holy Land but not schismatics in Latin Greece. Even among the Muslims, often portrayed as the quintessential "other" for medieval Christians, the crusaders made distinctions. They forged alliances with some Muslim powers against others, exploiting political divisions in the Near East to gain treaties. Through this policy of selective alliances, the crusaders regained the great bulk of the lands the kingdom of Jerusalem had lost to Saladin fifty years earlier.

The Barons' Crusade shows how one call for violence against non-Christians played out in different societies. Christians had not responded in a uniform way to the papal crusade appeal. Instead, political leaders had decided for themselves when and where and against whom to conduct their expeditions. While many crusades were marked by divisions, those that emerge from the Barons' Crusade are particularly important in the way that they exhibit an absence of Christian unity of action or identity. They are important because no pope went further than Gregory IX to make the ideal of Christian unity through crusading a reality. They are important because the crusade took place at the time the papacy's power and hold on Christendom is regarded as its strongest. They are important because the diversion attempt acted as a test of this power, claimed alike by the papacy and many later historians. They are important, too, because in deciding how to react to the diversion attempt and what to do once they had decided, the crusaders and potential crusaders exhibit an absence of common response both to the pope and to non-Christians. The variety of responses we see here could not emerge if the only decision to which we had access was whether or not to crusade at all. The diversion attempt thus raises the question of Christian unity in action and identity in starker forms than other crusades.

The variations in response to the crusade appeal call into question the widespread assumption that crusading, in the words of a recent survey of medieval church history, "gave ... concrete reality to the notion of the Christian people united under the pope for some great cause."¹¹ The idea that the crusades were an expression of a common Christian identity is not just a staple of textbooks. It underpins the two main ways scholars have studied the crusades for the past generation or so. On the one hand, historians have

focused on the individual crusader, asking what motivated him or her to take the cross. On the other, they have tried to comprehend the crusading movement as a whole, concentrating especially on the role of the papacy, the authorizer and justifier of crusades. Because they rely on a determinative notion of unified Christian identity, neither of these approaches proves useful for understanding the Barons' Crusade.

In the years after the Second World War, historians tended to take a cynical view of crusader motives.¹² They saw the prospect of material gain in this world, not paradise in the next, as the driving force behind countless individual decisions to take the cross. Over the past twenty-five years this traditional account of crusader motives has come under attack from scholars who stress the pious idealism of crusaders. The view that now prevails among specialists in the subject is that crusaders were genuinely pious people who would not gain but would instead lose money and land by going on crusade, who knew of these losses, and who nevertheless took the cross out of their deep beliefs.¹³

The Barons' Crusade gives us no evidence to challenge this characterization of crusaders and much to support it. It shows crusaders' deep commitment, in the face of huge odds and at enormous financial cost, to crusade to the Holy Land. Characterizing crusaders as pious, however, is different from seeing their piety as the determining characteristic of their actions. The framework of pious idealism depends upon the idea that actions can be explained by religious beliefs. It privileges Christian identity over all other factors as the determining one in crusader action.¹⁴ Upon hearing the crusade appeal, the pious Christian would take up arms, not as a Breton or landholder or father but as a Christian. In this case the pious Breton would act the same way as the pious Hungarian because both identified themselves as Christian.

The events of the Barons' Crusade cannot be understood within this framework of pious idealism, even if they support a picture of crusader piety. The sources available for this crusade demonstrate crusader actions, not beliefs. Any decision we make about motives must be extrapolated from the actions. The fact that these actions differed across Christendom, however, leaves us with no firm basis for discussing motives other than a definition of piety determined prior to studying the crusade. Are we, for example, to say that Baldwin of Courtenay was more pious than Thibaut of Champagne because Baldwin followed the papal injunction to crusade in Latin Greece and Thibaut did not? Or are we to say that Thibaut was more pious than Baldwin because Thibaut clung to the idea of crusading in the Holy Land, despite papal opposition? Perhaps more importantly, we have no way, beyond our predetermined definitions, for deciding that any one crusader was more pious than any other. If all were equally pious, however, and piety were the determining factor in what actions a person took when the pope called upon him or her to take the cross, then the actions of all of the barons should have

been the same. But they were not, which means we have to turn elsewhere, and to other questions.

The second common paradigm sees the crusade as an instrument of papal policy in the thirteenth century, when papal power and prestige were at their height. By mobilizing Christian society behind the crusades and launching expeditions wherever Church interests seemed to be threatened, the thirteenth-century papacy, in the view of many crusades historians, was able to transform the crusade into an effective instrument of its power.¹⁵ This paradigm equally depends upon the idea of action based upon common Christian identity and equally fails to offer us a way of understanding the Barons' Crusade. In order to understand the crusade as an instrument of papal policy, we must posit people who identified themselves as a group with the pope at their head. This body is often referred to as Christendom. In order for the crusade to work instrumentally, Christians had to identify the papacy's interests as their own and respond to the appeal when a crusade was launched. This account, one the papacy itself favored, privileges Christian identity as the determining feature of crusaders' actions. Whether English or French they would respond alike as Christians who acknowledged the papal appeal. The Barons' Crusade, however, did not work that way. When Gregory IX tried to use the crusade as a policy instrument to aid the Latin empire, he found that little help was forthcoming. Despite his assertions that Christians should fight schismatics in Latin Greece, few actually did. Because most of the crusaders acted differently from the way the pope called upon them to act, the idea of the crusade as an instrument of papal policy is not a helpful one for understanding the Barons' Crusade.

All of this points to the need to understand the papal call for a crusade in a different framework, one which does not depend upon an idea of determinative Christian identity. This is not because Christian identity was unimportant. It was very important—only Christians, after all, would respond to the crusade appeal. Rather it is because Christian identity alone does not allow us to understand what happened in the course of the Barons' Crusade. The variety of responses dictates that the frameworks of pious idealism and crusading as an instrument of papal policy be here replaced with narrative history that compares the various responses to the crusade appeal and their different contexts. Such comparative history provides the best opportunity to answer the question of what happened when, in this particular case, the pope called for a crusade. There was not a single Christian response. A clear papal call to crusade not only went largely unheeded, it was not followed in a variety of different ways.

The format of comparative local history is best suited to bringing out the variety of responses to the crusade appeal because it allows us to view the way a large number of people across a wide geographical span reacted to that appeal. A thematic study of interfaith violence alone, for example, would have limited the responses it records by its very subject. The lack of violence in

some places is as important to the study as the violence in others. As part of both the narrative and the argument, the account of what happened when the crusaders reached the Holy Land and the Latin empire is essential because this was the action that actually followed from the pope's preaching campaign.

Because violence differentiates a crusade from other pious acts, it is unfortunate that scholars who study medieval violence against non-Christians and those who study the crusades have tended to work separately from each other.¹⁶ Despite the paucity of conversation between the two fields, studies of violence, like those of the crusades, have tended to depend upon the assumption of uniform Christian identity. Studies of medieval violence against non-Christians have largely followed one of two different models. The first model explains violence in Christendom-wide terms. It posits a persecuting society that directed its energies indiscriminately against any and all threats to the faithful by engaging in a homogenizing discourse of the "other." This model is sometimes presented more historically, tying the rise of this persecuting society to state formation in the twelfth century, when there was a sudden surge of violence against marginal groups of all kinds.¹⁷ It is sometimes presented more psychologically, seeing Christian violence as a result of anxiety over a non-Christian "other," defined in terms of religious or sexual deviancy.¹⁸ This model, whether it emphasizes politics, religion, or sexual identity, posits a generalized Christian identity that acted violently against all who were not part of it. It asserts a double uniformity, first in the way that Christians perceived threats (they did not distinguish among Jews, Muslims, heretics, homosexuals, lepers), and second in the way that Christians acted upon these threats (as Christians, regardless of where they lived, how they sustained themselves, or their other relations).

This model has recently come under scrutiny by scholars who have found that the particular events they study do not fit into its totalizing picture. They have instead called, more or less explicitly, for local history. Richard Kieckhefer, for example, writes of inquisitors and inquisitions rather than the Inquisition in order to highlight the absence of centralizing control in the way the papal campaign against heresy played out across Europe.¹⁹ Nora Berend argues that Hungarian Jews were not subject to the restrictions the papacy called for against non-Christians because the Hungarian monarchy often did not follow papal instructions about how to treat its minority populations.²⁰ David Nirenberg, in a powerful and explicit critique of the first model, finds that the situation in the Iberian peninsula cannot be understood in terms of a society that persecuted a generalized "other," and so, extrapolating from his local findings, instead proposes that medieval interfaith violence was systemic, often employed strategically, and frequently a stabilizing force in society.²¹ Nirenberg's conclusion shows the potential difficulty of local history that is not comparative.²² He moves from demonstrating that in the first half of the fourteenth century interfaith violence in the Iberian peninsula—a geographically and culturally unique example—was systemic, strategic,

and often stabilizing to asserting a “fundamental interdependence of violence and tolerance in the Middle Ages.”²³ In this extrapolation from one place (the Iberian peninsula) at one time (the first half of the fourteenth century) to “the Middle Ages” as a whole, Nirenberg asserts a homogeneity of Christian action and experience hardly less totalizing than the model of the persecuting society he rejects.

It is important, when studying themes so broad, that history be not only local but comparative. Comparison itself provides a useful check upon the tendency to see particular examples as representative of entire peoples across large historical periods. Although studies of crusades and medieval violence against non-Christians have remained far apart for many years now, I believe that examining the Barons’ Crusade points to a way beyond that impasse even as it highlights the way larger concerns about violence and the crusades speak to each other. In the case of the Barons’ Crusade, the pope’s diversion call was rejected across most of Christendom. By comparing how it was rejected, we come to see that the calls for engaging in physical violence against some groups and refraining from violence against others were opposed in a variety of ways and for a variety of reasons. These variations highlight the way comparative local history can prevent false generalization. If we generalized from official writing, we might conclude that the pope controlled crusading by right and that he implemented that right by centralizing crusade funding and recruitment, a conclusion very much like the first model of the persecuting society. The results of this campaign, however, show that in the Barons’ Crusade such was not the case. At the same time, if we instead generalized from a single case history, we might conclude, if we looked to England, that the preaching campaign had no effect on the local minority population, or, if we looked to western France, that it resulted in cataclysmic violence against the local minority population. Neither of these extrapolations on the basis of local history would be accurate. In showing the variety of responses to the papacy’s crusade appeal, the Barons’ Crusade illustrates the importance of comparative local histories to complement generalizations based on both large systemic study and single local cases.

Comparative history thus always entails a certain breadth of coverage. In the case of the Barons’ Crusade the coverage has to be very broad indeed. Telling the story of this crusade requires following the crusade appeal and the crusaders into England, France, Germany, Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, the Latin empire of Constantinople, Nicaea, Egypt, and the Holy Land. This breadth has made it seem at times that there was good reason no one had previously attempted a monograph on the Barons’ Crusade.²⁴ It certainly meant that as I traced the consequences of the crusade appeal from place to place I drew (in some cases heavily) on the work of local experts. These scholars will no doubt feel that I did not do sufficient justice to the complexity of the particular place they know best. In recompense I can only say that my goal has been not to tell the history of any one place, but of the consequences of the crusade as it

touched many places on three continents. I hope that what is lost in depth is made up for in the scope that allows us to see the great diversity of Christian identity and action the crusade reveals.

The Preaching of the Holy Land Crusade: The Plan

During the fall of 1234 Pope Gregory IX turned his full attention to launching an expedition in aid of the Holy Land, devising a preaching campaign that was ambitious in scope and novel in conception. The campaign was an unprecedented attempt to transform crusading into a universal Christian activity. It tried for the first time to make taking the cross a general practice appropriate and desirable for all members of Christendom. What most distinguished the campaign was its appeal to a mass audience. Gregory's preachers exhorted everyone to swear a crusade vow: women as well as men, the old as well as the young, the sick as well as the healthy, the poor as well as the rich. The idea was not to send the *populus Christianus* on the march. Gregory had no intention of allowing everyone who took the cross to serve in the crusade army. Instead those deemed unsuitable to participate in a military campaign would be made to redeem, or buy back, their vows for a cash payment, in return for the full indulgence of sins granted to those who went on the crusade in person. The money raised from these redemptions would help fund a force of expert fighters. What Gregory had in mind was a mass mobilization of Christian purses, not arms.

In the twelfth century, popes had taken a more straightforward approach to crusade recruitment. They encouraged men of military inclination to go on crusade and encouraged everyone else to remain at home.¹ Papal letters consequently stressed that prospective crusaders should seek ecclesiastical advice or approval before taking the cross.² It is not clear how many crusaders followed this advice, nor how many preachers used it as a basis to refuse the cross to someone who wished to receive it. Once sworn, though, the vow was strictly enforced. Only in rare cases, when an unforeseen impediment (debilitating illness, for example) made fulfillment of the vow impossible, could it be delayed, commuted to the performance of an equivalent service (such as crusading in Spain instead of Syria) or redeemed for a cash payment.³ Fundraising played no part in papal recruitment efforts at this time. Participants were expected to cover their own expenses, although by midcentury papal privileges were in place to help them do so.⁴ Preaching campaigns of the era focused primarily on recruiting crusaders, not generating funding for crusades.

But this approach to promoting crusades was not as successful as the popes would have liked. Papal admonitions did not prevent inexperienced fighters from setting out for the East. Large numbers of them took part in the Second

and Third Crusades. When these expeditions failed, noncombatants received more than their fair share of the blame.⁵ Another problem with traditional crusade recruitment was that its “pay your own way” method of financing expeditions proved insufficient, since crusades, like most kinds of military activity, stretched the normal revenues of lords, magnates, and even monarchs to the limit. Kings, in fact, took the lead in searching out supplemental funding. Henry II of England and Philip Augustus of France, for example, levied the “Saladin Tithe” on their subjects for the Third Crusade.⁶ Eventually the papacy decided to act as well. For the Fourth Crusade Innocent III imposed a modest tax on ecclesiastical revenues.⁷ But the levy was unpopular and receipts from it came in slowly if at all.⁸ As it turned out, the Fourth Crusade suffered the gravest financial crisis yet. Having reached the bottom of its coffers before it set sail from Venice, the expedition never managed to make it to the Holy Land, let alone provide it with effective aid.

In the wake of more than half a century of unsuccessful crusades to the Holy Land, with none having failed quite as dramatically as the one he himself had launched, Innocent made a change in the way crusades were recruited. He announced the new measure in *Quia maior*, his crusade bull of 1213 for the Fifth Crusade:

Since it happens that aid to the Holy Land is much impeded or delayed if each must be examined prior to taking the cross as to his fitness and ability to fulfill the vow in person, we allow that anyone who wishes, except persons bound by religious profession, may take the cross, on the assumption that when dire necessity and or plain usefulness may so require, the vow may be commuted, redeemed, or postponed by apostolic command.⁹

With one stroke, the new policy provided a mechanism to both limit noncombatant participation and raise funds. Anyone who wished to swear a crusade vow might do so, regardless of aptitude for warfare; but the pope had exclusive authority to determine how best that votive obligation might be fulfilled: it could be executed as promised, delayed, commuted, or redeemed as he saw fit. It was the last of these powers over the vow that offered the greatest potential as an instrument of recruitment and fundraising. By redeeming vows *en masse*, Innocent could prevent incapable crusaders from swelling the ranks of the crusade army. At the same time, he could use the money they paid to buy back their vows to subsidize the practiced fighters he wanted for his expedition.

Despite the financial advantage of doing so, Innocent never exploited vow redemption to its full potential. It was, in fact, just one of many new methods he devised to channel enthusiasm for crusading into aid for the Holy Land. *Quia maior* and *Ad liberandam*, the decree for the crusade he issued at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215, seem to offer every segment of Latin Christian society an appropriate way to contribute to the crusade.¹⁰ Clerics would pray and pay a tax: a twentieth of their income for three years. Innocent

and his cardinals would pay a full tithe, while Innocent himself would contribute 30,000 pounds and a ship for the Roman crusaders. Maritime cities would also supply transport, while Christian merchants would refrain from trading in weapons, iron, or wood with their Muslim counterparts. Magnates unwilling to join the crusade themselves would send contingents at their expense, as would the great princes of the church and the elites of the cities. Those of lesser means could contribute alms to the crusade: chests were placed in churches to receive the offerings. Everybody would pray for the success of the crusade; Innocent composed liturgical rites for the purpose.¹¹

Certainly vow redemption had a place among these new techniques for supporting the crusade; but it was not a predominant one. Innocent may have called upon all Christians to contribute to the crusade in one fashion or another;¹² but he did not call upon all Christians to take the cross and redeem their vows. On the whole, as James Powell has shown, the recruitment campaign for the Fifth Crusade retained a traditional emphasis on facilitating the participation of the military elite.¹³ Innocent seems to have backed away from his new vow redemption policy, moreover, when it encountered criticism in northern France.¹⁴ There is no mention of it in *Ad liberandam*, which he issued just two years after announcing the new approach in *Quia maior*.¹⁵ Innocent died in 1216, before preparations for the Fifth Crusade were complete; but his successor Honorius III (1216–1227) followed Innocent's plans for that expedition and over the course of his pontificate adhered to the Innocentian approach to crusade recruitment, emphasizing other methods of revenue gathering and not calling for vow redemption in his crusade bulls.¹⁶

Gregory, however, did not follow Honorius's approach. In his time as a cardinal, Pope Gregory IX, then Ugolino of Ostia, had worked as a legate in Lombardy promoting the Fifth Crusade.¹⁷ Preaching his own Holy Land expedition, Gregory placed a greater emphasis on vow redemption than his mentor Innocent had, setting aside ecclesiastical taxation and instead making the collection of vow redemption fees the centerpiece of his fundraising plan. *Rachel suum videns*, Gregory's crusade bull, is the first since *Quia maior* itself to include Innocent's policy statement on vow redemption;¹⁸ and the promotional campaign that *Rachel suum videns* launched represents the first papal attempt to exploit Innocent's vow redemption policy fully.

Historians have generally acknowledged that there was a shift in emphasis toward vow redemption in the thirteenth century, but they have tended to disagree about precisely where, when, and how it took place. Some have dated it to the pontificate of Innocent III,¹⁹ but others have seen it as a more gradual development that unfolded over the course of the century.²⁰ Still others have brought a regional perspective to the question. Christopher Tyerman and Simon Lloyd, for example, have argued that preachers introduced vow redemption *en masse* to England in 1234, but not necessarily to the rest of Europe.²¹ A closer examination of Gregory's campaign will

help to delineate more precisely the chronological development of this practice as a papal fundraising and recruitment technique.

More immediately, Gregory's drive for redemption fees influenced the structure of his preaching campaign. It made it desirable for as many people as possible to take the cross. The sum demanded of crusaders to redeem their vows was typically set at the amount they would have spent if they had actually gone overseas.²² The fee, in effect, was pegged to the crusader's economic standing: a magnate would incur greater expense crusading to Syria than would his retainer. In theory, then, it might seem most efficient to appeal to those with considerable resources, who would pay high fees to redeem their vows. This approach was not viable, however, because Gregory needed most wealthy cross-takers to fulfill their vows in person. It was from this "high-end" market that he hoped to draw the most highly esteemed fighters: the men who commanded the leisure and resources necessary to master mounted combat. In Gregory's day the correlation between reputed military prowess and high economic status was still strong; the merchant elites of the cities were just beginning to break it down. His decision to rely upon vow redemption, therefore, meant that he would need to solicit many small vow redemption fees, rather than a few large ones. The result was a preaching campaign that, in order to achieve success, needed to persuade as many people as possible to swear crusade vows.

This requirement helped structure the plan for the preaching campaign. In this chapter I detail Gregory's plans to reach a universal audience, to appeal to them, and to translate the enthusiasm he hoped to generate into tangible support for the crusade. Gregory took measures to ensure peace in Christendom, so that fighters would not be occupied in the West and travel would be easier. He employed mendicant friars as crusade preachers for the first time on a wide scale, sending them into the towns that had concentrations of population and audiences that seemed sympathetic to their preaching style. He took the unprecedented step of authorizing spiritual sanctions to compel attendance at crusade sermons. He created propaganda for the crusade, in some cases recalling time-honored traditions for appealing to fighters, in others devising novel images and arguments for taking the cross. Finally, he attempted to translate the enthusiasm that he hoped to rouse for cross-taking into action through vow redemption, other fundraising schemes, and a series of privileges for crusaders. The next chapter will examine the response to these ambitious plans.

Reaching the Audience

The first step for the preaching campaign was to reach the newly expanded audience that Gregory had identified. Chronicle accounts testify to papal plans to preach the cross to every segment of medieval society. Matthew Paris reported with astonishment that preachers urged the cross upon "people of

every age, sex, condition, and strength, sick men and women even, as well as those rendered feeble and deficient by old age.” The “Life of Gregory IX” talked about crowds of men and women gathering to hear the word of the cross proclaimed to them. Roger of Wendover was careful to note that both men and women attended crusade preaching in England. Although preachers would still need to recruit young, able-bodied, and affluent men, since they were to be the core of the “new model” crusade army, the drive for vow redemption fees meant that they now needed the old, the not so able-bodied, and the less than affluent to take the cross as well. According to a Dominican chronicler, preachers in France exhorted “many barons and knights and also people in countless numbers” to take the cross. In the Low Countries, Philip Mouskes, who wrote a rhyming chronicle in the vernacular, saw “men of both high and low estate” taking the cross in response to the preaching. Matthew Paris believed the new approach was aimed at those of lower social and economic status. He called vow redemption a device intended to strip the “simple people” of their goods. Matthew was no advocate of social justice *avant la lettre*, but he hated to see anyone, voluntarily or not, handing over money to Rome. Secular clergy appear to have been another intended target. Philip Mouskes claimed that many clerics took the cross in the Low Countries. Turning from social and occupational groups to age groups, the new strategy opened the way to the elderly or dying taking crusade vows. Indeed, the death-bed was a good place to purchase a full indulgence of sins, since the chance of rising up from it to commit further indiscretions might be remote. Later in the century there were aged or dying people who swore crusade vows and then redeemed them after death by means of a testamentary bequest, or legacy, to the church. Legacies appear to have provided significant revenue to the Barons’ Crusade, but we do not know whether they were solicited in this fashion. Children, finally, did not interest the preachers, as the canonists insisted that minors could not swear binding vows.²³

Reaching every Christian required a Christendom-wide preaching campaign. Gregory addressed the bull announcing the expedition, *Rachel suum videns*, to “all the faithful” in England, to “all the faithful” in France, to the “diverse [ecclesiastical] provinces” and to “the archbishops and their suffragans throughout all the provinces” of the church. The orders to preach the cross that he issued around the same time also suggest that he sought wide coverage of Christendom. Churchmen in Ireland, Lombardy and Tuscany, the German lands (including Trier, Mainz, Cologne, and Salzburg) and France (including Rouen, Sens, and Troyes, “and other various provinces of France”) were sent copies of these orders. Contemporary chroniclers took up this idea of a universal preaching campaign. The anonymous author of the “Life of Gregory IX” spoke of preachers sent throughout the world to preach the cross. Roger of Wendover claimed that the preaching covered “the entire earth distinguished by the Christian faith,” while Matthew Paris stated that *Rachel suum videns* was made known to all the Christian lands.²⁴

A Christendom-wide preaching campaign required peace in Christendom. Gregory considered war to be bad for the business of the cross.²⁵ Arguments supporting this view are not hard to find. Large-scale conflict made it hard for preachers to travel from one stop on the preaching tour to the next and difficult to gather an audience once they arrived there, since the portion of it they needed as fighters might be away on campaign. War, or even rumors of war, also made secular rulers less likely to grant access to their subjects, since they could fear losing recruits for their own armies to the crusade. And if the papacy itself were party to a conflict, its agents might be barred from entering certain regions altogether. Finally, it was thought that the most desirable crusaders, the members of the military elite, would be unwilling to leave their lands and possessions behind during wartime; in any case they were likely to be involved in any conflict that was underway.

So Gregory called for a four-year truce throughout the Christian world in *Rachel suum videns*, just as Innocent III had done a generation before in *Quia maior*.²⁶ Gregory also focused on some areas and individuals of concern. England and France were prime recruiting grounds for Holy Land expeditions, but they were not at peace. A truce between the two kingdoms had expired in July 1234.²⁷ In November Gregory wrote to Louis IX of France, enjoining him for the sake of the Holy Land to seek a permanent arrangement with the king of England; failing that, he should take steps to renew the recently lapsed truce.²⁸ Although no agreement rewarded the pope's efforts, the situation was stable enough over the following year to allow preaching in both countries.

Frederick II posed a graver threat still to the preaching campaign and any expedition that might result from it. In Germany and northern Italy he could disrupt the propaganda campaign; in southern Italy he could block access to ports usually regarded as the best departure points for crusader fleets; and in the kingdom of Jerusalem he could make life difficult for the crusaders once they arrived there. The emperor, moreover, had cause to be concerned about the proposed expedition. The truce he had made on Jerusalem's behalf with al-Kamil of Egypt in 1229 still had five years left to run; and the agreement would be abrogated if a crusade were to reach the East before it expired.²⁹ Conciliatory gestures were in order if Gregory wanted imperial approval for a preaching campaign in 1234.

The pope intensified his efforts to defend the emperor's interests in the kingdom of Jerusalem. Frederick was locked in conflict there with a movement of baronial opposition to his rule. The dispute went back to his crusade of 1228–29, when his attempts to restore what he believed were the rights of the crown met with armed resistance from the leading nobles of the kingdom. By the end of 1233 a coalition of magnates under the leadership of the Ibelin family, together with the commune of Acre, had fought Frederick's lieutenant in the East to a stalemate, with the Ibelins and their sympathizers holding Acre and many of the kingdom's important lordships, and the

imperial forces controlling Tyre and Jerusalem. In August 1234, one month before issuing *Rachel suum videns*, Gregory met with Frederick in an attempt to break the impasse. He won Frederick's agreement to a settlement and dispatched a legate to the East to present it to the leading barons. But they rejected it, forcing negotiations to begin anew. These dragged on through 1236, by which time Gregory's enthusiasm for the talks had waned. In the meantime, though, he had linked the preaching campaign to his support for a settlement in the Holy Land. Gregory never disguised his motives for intervening on Frederick's behalf in the crusader states. He wrote to John of Ibelin, the leader of the barons, that "great injury would be borne by us with regard to the emperor, if any detriment to his rights was allowed [in the kingdom of Jerusalem], especially since whatever prosperity comes to him [there], will be considered to have come from us."³⁰

A problem Frederick was having closer to home presented an occasion for another goodwill gesture in the summer of 1234. Dissatisfied with the rule of his son Henry (VII), king of the Romans, in Germany, and anticipating rebellion, Frederick requested the pope's assistance in deposing the young king. Gregory seems to have been quite willing to provide it; on 5 July he excommunicated Henry, referring to him in a letter only as the "son of the emperor." In March 1235, once Henry had declared himself the rebel his father had predicted him to be, Gregory wrote sternly to the German princes warning them not to support the rebellion and dissolving any oaths sworn to Henry against Frederick's interests. The emperor received the staunchest papal support in this matter.³¹

Gregory's final act of conciliation toward Frederick was to set a departure date for the expedition that fell after the emperor's truce with al-Kamil expired in 1239. Respecting the treaty was essential to securing the emperor's approval for the preaching campaign, but it ran the risk of making the expedition difficult to promote. How urgent could the crisis in the Holy Land be, a prospective crusader might ask, if help was not needed for another five years?³² Gregory found an elegant way around this difficulty in *Rachel suum videns*. He implied that the crusade would not set out until the truce expired, but did not mention the distant expiration date:

For some time now this city [Jerusalem], with the exception of the Temple of the Lord, has been returned to the emperor; nevertheless, because omnipotent God had decided not to grant a more magnificent gift still to his Christian people, the emperor had to conclude a truce with the sultan. The deadline at which it expires is so close, that the time which separates us from it appears hardly sufficient for what is needed with promptitude, hope, and fervor of faith.³³

By being vague about the departure date, Gregory was able to remove one of Frederick's possible objections to the crusade without compromising recruitment efforts. In any case, the pope could always advance the departure

date once the preaching campaign was well underway. This is exactly what he did in 1237, when he announced that the expedition would set sail a year earlier than originally planned.³⁴ By then preachers had already spread word of the crusade throughout Christendom, imperial territory included.

One of Gregory's signal innovations was to call upon preachers who seemed ideally suited to conducting the kind of mass recruitment campaign his efforts to secure peace in Christendom had made possible. These were the mendicant friars. Their expertise in preaching to lay people made them valuable to the promotional campaign. Previous popes had been able to call upon talented individuals to preach the cross; Gregory had at his disposal an entire religious movement devoted to popular preaching. Besides vocational expertise, the mendicants brought to the preaching campaign an admired form of spiritual life, centered on a commitment to evangelization and voluntary poverty that drew inspiration from the *vita apostolica*, the way of life of Jesus and his companions as it was described in the Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles.³⁵ By employing Dominicans and Franciscans as crusade preachers, Gregory tangibly linked their popular brand of religiosity to crusading. When a friar spoke of following in Christ's footsteps by taking up the cross, he spoke as one committed to apostolic imitation. When he extolled the crusade as a way of devotion open to all, he spoke as one committed to preaching repentance to everyone.

Although the friars had a universal appeal, they were especially popular in the cities and towns, where mendicancy had its roots and, as of the mid-1230s, continued to thrive.³⁶ In the densely populated urban milieu, the friars could readily attract large crowds to their sermons.³⁷ Preaching to these audiences, moreover, promised to be as lucrative as it was efficient. Participants in the commercial economy such as merchants, artisans, and craftspeople may not have had the time, inclination, or expertise to go on crusade themselves, but they stood a better chance than their neighbors in the countryside of having access to the ready cash needed to redeem a crusade vow. The friars were thus well-poised to reach an audience that might be receptive to the idea of vow redemption. Gregory's biographer spoke of papal preachers going into the "greater streets of the cities" to proclaim the word of the cross: that was where the money was, after all, and that was where the friars had made their home.³⁸

The aim of associating crusading with the spirituality espoused by mendicants was not original to Gregory. During the lead-up to the Fifth Crusade Innocent III had ordered his preachers to conform their behavior to the ideals of the *vita apostolica*.³⁹ They should, he declared, conduct themselves in a modest and unostentatious fashion, accept no money for themselves, but only food and other necessities, and limit their entourage to four mounts and six attendants at the most, "so that you ... show by your actions that you bear in your hearts the stigmata of Jesus Christ."⁴⁰ The provisions regarding mounts and attendants represented a compromise with

what Innocent elsewhere called “the evils of the time.”⁴¹ But the injunctions regarding behavior, food, and money approximated the mendicant notion of apostolic imitation; and the reference to the stigmata spoke to Franciscan interest in emulating Christ.

As much as Innocent may have wanted his crusade preachers to follow the *vita apostolica*, he did not, indeed he could not, call upon friars to preach the cross. At the time he launched the Fifth Crusade, mendicants were still too few in number, too concentrated in a few regions of Europe, too loosely organized, and too weakly integrated into the Church’s institutional structures to promote the expedition. As Christoph Maier has shown, over the next two decades all of this changed, and a good deal of the credit or blame (depending upon one’s point of view) for their transformation into religious orders that were large enough in number, spread widely enough through Christendom, regulated closely enough by written constitutions, and obedient enough to the Apostolic See to take the lead in a mass crusade preaching campaign, must be laid at the feet of Cardinal Ugolino of Ostia. As the first cardinal protector of the Franciscans, for example, he helped draft their rule, the *Regula bullata*, which committed them to absolute obedience to the Apostolic See. Once the Dominicans had bound themselves to Rome as well, members of both orders could be counted on to follow papal instructions and collect papal money. During his time as a cardinal Ugolino also promoted the expansion of the friars throughout the Latin West. By the mid-1230s they were in position to conduct the large-scale propaganda campaign that their patron turned pope now had in mind for them.⁴² Gregory, therefore, had done more than simply identify the mendicant brother as the embodiment of the ideal crusade preacher Innocent had described. He had helped mold him into that ideal.

About six weeks after issuing *Rachel suum videns*, the curia began to commission mendicants to preach the crusade. The commissions came in the form of a standard appointment letter, *Pium et sanctum*. On 17 October Gregory sent copies of *Pium et sanctum* to the provincial prior of the Dominicans of Tuscany and the provincial minister of the Franciscans of Lombardy, ordering each of them to assign two brothers to preach the cross. We know that the latter official, Leo of Perego, followed the instruction because he passed along copies of it and the crusade bull to the Franciscan community at Verona. About a week later Gregory sent *Pium et sanctum* to the provincial minister of the Franciscans in Ireland. In the autumn of 1235 he ordered Franciscans in Austria to preach the crusade. Mendicants in other regions beside Ireland, Italy, and Austria must also have been receiving papal preaching commissions from the fall of 1234 to 1235, even though their appointment letters have not come down to us. By the latter date Franciscans were preaching the expedition in France, with the leading role going to Brother William of Cordelle, a former papal penitentiary. And around Easter 1235, as several chroniclers report, Franciscans and Dominicans began to preach the crusade in England. They were joined by a master of theology,

John of St. Quintini, whose appointment shows that churchmen from outside the mendicant orders preached the cross as well. For the first time, though, the curia had given the friars a major role in promoting a Holy Land crusade.⁴³

In case the attractions of mendicant preaching were not enough to draw in the faithful, Gregory introduced a measure to compel attendance at crusade sermons. He instructed preachers in Mainz to call upon local clergy (parish priests, rectors, and the like) to gather audiences by means of the threat of ecclesiastical censure.⁴⁴ Preachers in England apparently received the same power: there the penalty for nonattendance was a sentence of anathema.⁴⁵ By placing this sanction at the disposal of his preachers Gregory enhanced their ability to convene an audience. Preachers in Innocent III's day had offered partial indulgences to those who came to hear their sermons.⁴⁶ Gregory's preachers distributed partial indulgences as well: in England, Ireland, and the German lands they offered remissions of ten to thirty days to those who came to their sermons twice in a week.⁴⁷ But now the preachers could complement that positive inducement with a coercive sanction.

A miracle story told first by Roger of Wendover and then repeated by Matthew Paris brings together the various tactics Gregory deployed to preach the cross widely. The Franciscan Roger of Lewes came to the town of Clare to preach the crusade. Not wanting to be punished, a townswoman who had lost the use of her limbs paid a neighbor to carry her to his sermon. She listened to what he had to say, weeping and lamenting all the while, so much so that he approached her afterward and asked her why she had come. Upon learning that she had done so only because she feared excommunication, he told her to go home, still unaware of her incapacity. When a passerby explained her situation, Roger invoked divine aid to heal her, and she walked home under her own power. The story illustrates every aspect of the new dynamic at work: the mendicant preachers, the appeal to nontraditional audiences, and the attempt to force them to listen to crusade preaching, even, to the chroniclers' evident dismay, the penniless disabled women among them.⁴⁸

Appealing to the Audience

The faithful could be compelled to attend sermons, but no one could be compelled to take the cross. The crusade vow was valid only if freely made.⁴⁹ All the measures we have been discussing may have helped Gregory's crusade preachers gather an audience, but once it had been assembled, they still needed to persuade people to take the cross. None of their sermons survive, so we cannot know what the preachers said or even planned to say. But we do have the promotional materials that Gregory's officials assembled for the preachers, and these provide evidence of what he wanted them to say. He instructed them to draw their arguments from *Rachel suum videns*, the crusade bull, "transmitting carefully and effectively everything you will see has been included in that letter for the aid of the Holy Land."⁵⁰

Rachel suum videns was clearly envisioned as the major propaganda document for the crusade. With any piece of propaganda, it is perhaps natural to wonder about its effect: whether it was successful and how its audience reacted. It is important to stress, therefore, that in the case of *Rachel suum videns* these questions about effect cannot be answered. The absence of evidence on the dissemination of *Rachel suum videns*—on the extent to which preachers adhered to papal instructions to incorporate its arguments into their sermons, on where, when, and to whom the preachers delivered their sermons, and on how audiences responded to the particular sermons they did hear—renders any attempt to forge a causal link between propaganda and response speculative. We can, however, ask what intention shaped this particular piece of propaganda.

In *Rachel suum videns*, Gregory and his officials offered an appeal that, while presented in a traditional framework, nonetheless departed in important ways from the aims and methods of traditional papal crusade propaganda. The bull is divided into three sections: the first section sets forth the reasons for calling the crusade; the second exhorts the faithful to take the cross; and the third declares the privileges to be enjoyed by those who did so. The bull begins with Mother Church, personified as the Old Testament matriarch Rachel, lamenting over the deplorable state of the Holy Land. She cries because that land is now polluted by Muslims, who, as a result of Frederick II's truce with Egypt, continue to occupy the Temple of the Lord in Jerusalem, even though the rest of the city has "for some time now" been restored to Christian control. Once the truce expires, a crusade will be needed to restore the city to religious purity and the land around it to "the strength and vigor of a kingdom." Christians ought to take the cross in order to imitate Christ's sufferings, avenge his injuries, and expiate their sins. Those who did so would win "by a happy exchange ... eternal rest."⁵¹ While traditional in its tripartite structure and focus on the *imitatio Christi*, in other respects the bull breaks new ground. In the first place, it presents two images new to crusade propaganda: representing Mother Church as Rachel and Jerusalem as a menstruating woman.

Rachel suum videns begins not with the voice of the pope crying out to the faithful, as crusade bulls were wont to do, but instead with the voice of Rachel, whose name, as its Latin title indicates, is the first word of the bull:

Like Rachel formerly seeing her beginning in the knowledge of the true faith increase in salvation, so also the pious mother of her sons ... the Holy Roman Church, whose sorrow is as great over the mutual destruction of her children, has sent forth and still sends forth sighs and groans.⁵²

The biblical allusion is to Jeremiah 31.15: "A voice was heard on high of lamentation, of mourning, and weeping, of Rachel weeping for her children, and refusing to be comforted for them, because they are not."⁵³ Acknowledged in the Hebrew Bible as a matriarch to the people of Israel, in

Rachel suum videns she is likened to the institution that stands as mother to the new Chosen People in the New Covenant: she represents the Holy Roman Church, her sons the faithful. Just as she lamented over her children, so Mother Church now mourns the plight of the faithful in the Holy Land.⁵⁴

The bull uses its second novel image, that of Jerusalem as a menstruating woman, to explain the cause of Rachel's grief. "Rachel cries," we are told:

because, where the multitude of the heavenly host sang songs of peace, there the oppression of a most impure people has stirred up offenses, concealed malice and schisms, and, stirring up war, has put forth its hand and expelled from the Temple of the Lord the ordinances of the priest, and the laws of nature itself, that filth and abomination may be introduced in their place; and thereupon Jerusalem, mocked in her Sabbaths, has become soiled like a menstruous woman among her enemies [Et ideo Jerusalem in suis derisa sabbatis obsorduit quasi polluta menstruis inter hostes].⁵⁵

In linking ritual impurity in Jerusalem with menstruation, Gregory was drawing upon Lamentations 1.17:

Sion hath spread forth her hands, there is none to comfort her: the Lord hath commanded against Jacob, his enemies are round about him: Jerusalem is as a menstruous woman among them.

Lamentations 1.17, in turn, draws upon the book of Leviticus, which describes menstruating women as unclean and prohibits contact with them. In Lamentations 1.17 the comparison of Jerusalem to a menstruating woman evokes the city's spiritual defilement by Babylon, whose forces occupied the city in the 580s B.C. In *Rachel suum videns* it instead evokes the city's spiritual defilement by Islam, whose religious authorities occupied the Temple Area in the 1230s.⁵⁶

The bull presents this Muslim religious pollution as the reason why the crusade is necessary. By the early thirteenth century defending Jerusalem had come to be seen as a perennial obligation for the Latin West. Nevertheless, if a crusade appeal in its aid were to spur a response, it still had to address the question: why does the city need help now, at this particular moment? This was no easy question to answer in 1234, when Jerusalem was in Christian hands and seemed likely to remain that way until the end of the decade, if the truce with Egypt held. With no present or looming crisis to relate, Gregory had to make the worst of a good situation. He focused his attention on the one area of Jerusalem that had not been restored to Christian control in 1229, the Temple Mount, home to an important Muslim site, the Dome of the Rock.⁵⁷ Believing that it stood on the site of Solomon's Temple, the Latin settlers of Jerusalem called the Dome of the Rock the Temple of the Lord and had it consecrated as a Christian church. Saladin had it rededicated as a mosque in 1187, and it was this, according to *Rachel suum videns*, which had caused the

Temple to be filled with the “filth and abomination” that was now polluting all Jerusalem. The image of the city as a menstruating woman thus performs a critical function in the bull: in its representation of religious pollution lies the *casus belli* for the crusade.

If we look more closely at the image, we can see how it might perform the task Gregory assigned it rather well. It allowed him to compare, implicitly at least, the city’s current travails to one of the great catastrophes in its Old Testament history, the Neo-Babylonian conquest in 587/6 B.C. Lending some credence to this hyperbolic comparison was the thirteenth-century practice of referring to Muslim Egypt as Babylon.⁵⁸ The play on words suggested that Jerusalem was suffering now under the same oppressors as it had during one of its lowest moments.

The bull’s main innovation, however, lies not in any single image but in its emphasis on nonviolent means of participating in the crusading movement. Previous crusade bulls had highlighted the value of military service on Christ’s behalf. *Rachel suum videns* balances such language with appeals to shed tears of lamentation and contrition, express love and compassion, endure pain and suffering, and offer good will in divine service. In order to understand why Gregory might have chosen to add this novel dimension to his propaganda, I will argue that it must be placed in the context of his novel intention of funding the crusade primarily through the collection of vow redemption fees.

As we have seen, it was Innocent III who, among the many new steps he took to encourage involvement in crusading on the “home-front,” first made it a policy to allow those who would not or could not fight to swear crusade vows and then redeem them for cash. But in *Quia maior*, the bull which introduced this practice, he seems to direct his exhortations primarily toward would-be Christian soldiers. At one point in the text, he reiterates the old argument that they should abandon combat among themselves for armed struggle with the infidel: “So rouse yourself, most beloved sons, transforming your quarrels and rivalries, brother against brother, into associations of peace and affection; gird yourselves for the service of the Crucified One ...”⁵⁹ At another, he draws an analogy between the military service such warriors owe to temporal lords as their faithful men and the military service they owe to Christ as His followers. The only way to avoid punishment as an unfaithful follower of Christ is to set out in defense of His patrimony without delay.⁶⁰ The action demanded in these passages is fighting, and those asked to perform it are fighters. Innocent may have permitted noncombatants to take the cross, called on them to pray for the success of the expedition, and encouraged them to donate alms in its aid, but his propaganda in *Quia maior* does not seem tailored toward eliciting these forms of support.

In *Rachel suum videns* there is still an appeal for military aid from fighting men—there had to be, because they were the ones the pope was counting on to do the fighting. Borrowing an argument from St. Bernard, for example,

Gregory claims that Christ himself had allowed the “hands of the impious” to prevail in the Holy Land in order to provide an opportunity for Christians to enter his service and avenge his injury.⁶¹ This was an important theme for the pope. In his instructions to the preachers he ordered them to induce the faithful “to revenge the injuries of the Crucified One, as is contained in the general letter.”⁶²

But alongside this appeal for military action in *Rachel suum videns* there are requests for services that require no aptitude in warfare. In the bull, Rachel “sends forth her wailings, her afflictions, and the voice of her lamentations, which we hope may be heard in heaven, that the faithful may day and night not cease to spill the tears of sadness, until the Lord has shown his mercy.”⁶³ The response called for here, weeping tears of sorrow and contrition, is available to and appropriate for fighters, of course. A crusader needed to depart in a contrite state in order to win the indulgence. It is also, however, a response equally available to and appropriate for noncombatants. In this passage Gregory asks all the faithful to “spill the tears of sadness.”

Rachel appears in medieval religious literature as an image of the contemplative. This interpretive tradition had its roots in the Hebrew etymologies of Jerome, who suggested that her name should be taken to mean “seeing the beginning” (*videns principium*), while her sister Leah’s name should be rendered “laborious” (*laboriosa*). Following this proposal Augustine saw in Rachel, the clear-sighted one, a positive example of the contemplative life in contrast to Leah, the laboring one, whom he saw as an example of the active life. Medieval monastic authors, many of them dedicated to a life of contemplation, naturally found this typology attractive. So too did the early mendicant Clare of Assisi, who, in a letter dated to the mid-1230s encouraging her colleague Agnes to contemplate Christ’s poverty, exhorted her to be “like another Rachel always seeing your beginning.” It was right around this time, of course, that Gregory made a similar allusion in *Rachel suum videns*: in the bull’s opening sentence, Rachel is described as “seeing her beginning in the knowledge of the true faith increase in salvation.” Gregory had strong institutional links with mendicants, Clare included, and was known to be sympathetic to their spiritual concerns. Nonetheless, it is still surprising to find a reference to an exegetical tradition that extolled contemplation over activity in his crusade bull, one of the main purposes of which was to encourage people to go on crusade, or, in other words, to take direct action. Incongruous as it may seem at first glance, though, the presentation of the contemplative life (in the figure of Rachel) as an ideal to be emulated would actually appear consistent with one of the bull’s main concerns, underscoring the value of supporting the crusade by means that were less directly violent, and thus more passive, than personal participation in the campaign. The allusion to *videns principium* may have been a reminder that spiritual merit could lie not only in the laborious activity of a Leah, but also in the contemplative passivity of a Rachel.⁶⁴

Penance alone, however, did not a successful crusade make. It had to be followed up by combat with the infidel. One would expect a demand for fighting to follow a demand for tears. *Rachel suum videns* does not disappoint in this regard, but it asks for more than just physical violence from military men. “Let there be no delay,” Gregory urges,

in undertaking the pilgrimage in aid of this land, to fight for the Fatherland with the hope of victory, to die for the crown and for life, to suffer fatigue and sadness for a time on behalf of Him, who, despising contempt, endured to be spit upon, beaten with the fists of his persecutors, scourged and crowned with thorns, who stood before Pilate as if he were guilty of many crimes, and finally was nailed to the cross where he was given gall to drink, pierced with a lance, and giving up his breath with a loud cry, he thus closed his earthly career overwhelmed with insults, in order to preserve the human race.⁶⁵

All the activities described here—pilgrimage, fighting, dying, and suffering fatigue and sadness—can be related to crusading violence. At that time the term “pilgrimage” could describe both peaceful and non-peaceful journeys to a holy site. Dying, as well as fatigue and sadness, were frequent consequences of fighting. But it is possible to experience pain or loss without “fighting for the Fatherland.” The main focus of the passage is in fact on passive suffering, which anyone, regardless of military aptitude, can undergo. Christ’s passion provides the model for submitting to physical pain and humiliation. A series of passive verb constructions stress what is done to him: he is spit upon, beaten, scourged, crowned with thorns, nailed to the cross, given gall to drink, and pierced with a lance. This emphasis on the physical pain and humiliation of the Crucifixion accords well with the kind of affective piety that was popular at the time.⁶⁶ Just as Christ’s suffering redeemed the entire “human race,” so too it is presented here as an ideal for all people to emulate.

Farther on in the bull, Gregory solicits still another nonmartial response from the faithful. Christ himself, the pope insists, “requires from men the graces of love and compassion, to display the final consummation and fulfillment of the law.”⁶⁷ Love and compassion, in the eyes of many medieval commentators on the crusades, could legitimate Christian violence, even make it meritorious.⁶⁸ But there is no indication here that love and compassion are meant to inspire only a martial response. Rather Christ demands them in fulfillment of God’s plan for humankind as expressed in divine law: as broad a context for their expression as a medieval ecclesiastical author could provide. The contrast with what Christ demands of the faithful in *Quia maior*, a service equated narrowly with the military aid vassals owe lords, is striking.

The clearest appeal for nonviolent action comes just before the offer of the crusade indulgence. Gregory describes the indulgence as a short-cut to salvation, a plank offered by Christ out of the sea of evils in which sinners drown, a reward that, given its magnitude, is easily won: “For many, desiring to behold the lands where our Lord stood, have reached the goal without the

labor of a race, the crown without the ordeal of the sword, through him who rewards his faithful soldier, and looks only for good will in his service.”⁶⁹ The phrases “reached the goal without the labor of a race, the crown without the ordeal of the sword” define what the new vow redemption policy offered, which was the opportunity to win the spiritual reward accorded to crusaders without going on crusade. All that is needed now to enter Christ’s service, *Rachel suum videns* declares, is good will. Later in the thirteenth century Matthew Paris would describe vow redemption in much the same way, as a reward that reckoned “a ready will [as good as] the deed.”⁷⁰ Good intentions were something every Christian had the potential to offer.⁷¹

Translating Enthusiasm into Action

Once enthusiasm for the crusade had been generated, the next step was to translate it into effective military action. In the first instance, this entailed converting most of it into cash. Vow redemption was clearly envisioned as the chief conversion mechanism, but there were others as well. Before turning to these, however, it will be worthwhile to describe the vow redemption process, in order to gain a sense of how complex a fundraising mechanism it was to administer.

Gregory’s preachers seem to have redeemed vows shortly after they were sworn. Matthew Paris, who observed the friars preaching in England, complained that they encouraged people to take the cross one day and redeem their vow the next.⁷² Immediate redemption would have set the collection process in motion and discouraged any hope an “unsuitable” crusader might have of participating in person. Fixing the sum to be paid was no easy matter. Since, as we saw, an appropriate fee was considered to be what the cross-taker would have spent if he or she had actually gone on crusade, the sum demanded could vary according to the means of the individual crusader. Moreover, fees could also be set lower or higher than this “natural rate” of redemption. Magnates who would have brought a retinue with them on crusade were expected to fund a squad of equivalent size with their redemption fees. Poor crusaders, on the other hand, might pay less than what it would have cost them to go on crusade, if that amount was beyond their means. So in theory something like an audit into the financial circumstances of every cross-taker was required. In practice a rough approximation of the cross-taker’s wealth probably sufficed to determine the appropriate fee, which was calculated as either a percentage of total assets (such as 1/100th) or a fixed sum (such as one pound).⁷³

Collecting, storing, and disbursing the fees may have been even more difficult than determining them in the first place. In an era when few had substantial sums of ready cash on hand, many cross-takers found themselves unable to pay on the spot, and return visits were often required to collect the money, whether by the preachers themselves, or by specially-assigned

collection agents.⁷⁴ The collection process could be lengthy. Sometimes it dragged on for years after the crusade had been recruited and fought.⁷⁵ If the money was gathered in good time, the next task was to transfer it to a storage facility until it was needed. Often the choice was a local site, such as a monastery; occasionally a central location, like the New Temple in London, acted as a depository for funds raised from several regions.⁷⁶ The final step was to distribute the money to crusaders. Gregory did not like to distribute redemption proceeds until he was certain they would be used for their intended purpose. Often his agents handed over a portion of the money collected when a crusader set out and the rest when he reached his destination.⁷⁷ This was a sensible precaution, but to effect it required an international financial transaction. Somehow, whether by means of a promissory note delivered to the Templars, or perhaps to Italian merchants, the money had to be moved a long distance.

As crucial as vow redemption was to Gregory's plan for financing the crusade, he explored other means of fundraising as well. Following Innocent's example, he requested the elites of church, city, and countryside to sponsor contingents of troops; exhorted maritime cities to provide naval assistance; and offered partial indulgences to those who donated a fitting portion of their goods to the crusade. Those who did not go personally on campaign, but paid to send "suitable men" in their stead, as well as those who did go personally on campaign, but at another's expense, were to receive the full indulgence.⁷⁸

There was one new fundraising measure, however. In June 1235 Gregory announced an additional way to make universal participation a reality. He declared that every Christian, male or female, cleric or layperson, subordinate or prelate, should pay an aim in aid of the Holy Land of one penny per week for ten years. Only those who were planning to crusade in person were exempt from the request. To collect the funds, two officials were to be appointed in every city and village, one a cleric, chosen by the local bishop, the other a layman, chosen by the local lord, rector, or commune. At the end of each month the collectors were to account publicly for the sums received, all the while distributing funds to local crusaders setting off for the Holy Land. At the end of each year the local bishop would supervise a general account taking. He was to inform the curia of the amount collected in his diocese and send along any undisbursed money. Contributing to the fund was voluntary. Those who did so would receive a spiritual reward: for every year of penance hitherto enjoined on them two would be relaxed. The measure was not a tax, then, but rather an appeal for charitable giving at a fixed rate for a fixed reward.⁷⁹

Today a political campaign will routinely offer a photograph with the candidate for one hundred dollars, and dinner for a thousand; but in the 1230s Gregory's fundraising scheme was a novelty. The closest precedent to it was Innocent's request that lay people give alms to the Fifth Crusade in return for partial indulgences proportionate to "the amount of their aid and the depth of

their devotion.”⁸⁰ The two schemes were alike in offering partial indulgences for money donations, but the similarities ended there. Innocent had specified neither the amount of money to be given, nor the quality of indulgence to be received in return, nor the length of time contributions were to be collected; he had called on the clergy to pay a tax rather than alms; and he had linked the donations to the performance of liturgical rites that had no part in Gregory’s plan.

In the letter announcing the measure, Gregory argued that the shortcomings of conventional means of support for the Holy Land justified proposing a decade-long, fixed-rate subvention. Christian support for the crusader states, he claimed, was too sporadic to be effective. Crusading expeditions provided welcome aid, but on an intermittent basis. When crusading ardor cooled, the crusader states were left to defend themselves alone. A ten-year subsidy would provide a more continual means of defense, funding building projects, the refortification of strongholds, and long-term troop deployments.⁸¹

Although well-meaning, the 1235 subsidy was impractical. In the first place the sum demanded of one penny per week was enormous, and probably beyond the means of most of those asked to pay it. A comparison with Gregory X’s request for a Holy Land subsidy in 1274 is instructive. He asked western European rulers to levy a tax on their subjects of one penny *a year*.⁸² Secondly, and this was perhaps an even graver difficulty with the scheme, there was no enforcement mechanism. Gregory urged the faithful to contribute in the strongest possible terms, offered a spiritual reward to those who did so, but ultimately allowed the decision to contribute to be a matter of conscience. This was out of character for the autocratic pontiff, and he cannot have been pleased with the result: once announced, we never hear of the measure again.

What was missing from Gregory’s initial fundraising for the Barons’ Crusade was any compulsory ecclesiastical contribution. Monks and clerics could volunteer to contribute to the expedition by paying the requested donation, and clerics could pay to redeem crusade vows as well. But Gregory imposed no tax on ecclesiastical revenues, nor did he contribute any of the curia’s own funds to the campaign, as Innocent had offered to do in 1213.⁸³ There is no obvious reason why Gregory shifted the burden of funding the crusade from ecclesiastical taxation to vow redemption and, to a lesser extent, voluntary contributions. Admittedly the curia’s finances in the mid-1230s were not sound, but there was nothing unusual about that.⁸⁴ Perhaps the pope felt he had overburdened the clergy with a subsidy he had imposed upon them for his war against Frederick in 1228.⁸⁵ Yet he would not hesitate to resort to ecclesiastical taxation again in 1237 (for the Latin empire of Constantinople) and 1240 (for another war against Frederick).⁸⁶ The turn to vow redemption may have been in the nature of an experiment. Ecclesiastical taxation had already shown itself to be unpopular and difficult to collect. (Gregory himself had personally experienced some of these difficulties as a papal legate in

Lombardy in 1221, when trying to collect Innocent's three-year twentieth for the Fifth Crusade from the region's clergy.⁸⁷) Vow redemption had attracted criticism as well, but had yet to be fully tested as a fundraising mechanism. Gregory's preaching campaign would provide that test.

The final step in the recruitment process was to ensure that the fighting men for whom this material support was intended actually set out on campaign. Gregory sought to remove as many obstacles that stood in their way as he could, setting forth in *Rachel suum videns* and in a subsequent letter the privileges they were to enjoy, as well as prohibitions on activities that might impede their efforts. The privileges he granted crusaders were papal protection of their goods and property until their death or return was known; a release from paying interest on any loans they might contract; a delay in the repayment of the principal until they returned from overseas; and the right to answer lawsuits in ecclesiastical court. Crusading clergy were permitted to pledge their benefices for up to three years. At the same time he renewed Innocent's ban on trade with Muslims in weapons, iron, and wood, as well as his sentence of excommunication on pirates. None of the regulations he issued was original; some of them had been featured in papal crusade bulls for almost a century, and all of them had been included in *Quia maior* and *Ad liberandam*.⁸⁸

It was above all in his pursuit of vow redemption fees that Gregory took the idea of universal Christian participation further than Innocent had. Before Gregory's 1234 campaign, papal preaching tours had aimed primarily at recruiting crusaders; after it, they were concerned as much with raising finances. Innocent III's policy shift in 1213 was crucial to the development of vow redemption as a fundraising and recruitment mechanism, but it was not until Gregory's preaching campaign of 1234 that mass vow redemption emerged definitively as an integral feature of papal crusade recruitment, not just in England, but throughout Christendom.

Gregory's turn to vow redemption proved a watershed not just for papal crusade preaching, but also for papal finance. After 1234 vow redemption occupied a permanent place in the arsenal of the medieval papacy's fundraising techniques. Unlike Innocent III and Honorius III, Gregory IX relied upon vow redemption as a primary means to subsidize crusades. From his time on popes continued to use vow redemption, first to subsidize crusades, then to finance a wide range of papal endeavor. As the association with crusading weakened, vow redemption came to be referred to simply as "the sale of indulgences." In this guise it survived as an important mechanism of papal fiscality through to the end of the Middle Ages, even in the face of sometimes virulent criticism.⁸⁹

Of the new measures Gregory IX introduced in order to implement the preaching campaign, three proved lasting. He was the first pope to employ mendicant friars to preach the cross throughout the Latin West and to all segments of society. This was a role they had never played before but were

regularly to play afterward. Gregory also introduced ecclesiastical sanctions to increase attendance at mendicants' sermons. These sanctions, which are usually thought to have appeared first during the pontificate of Innocent IV (1243–54), became a standard element of papal preaching campaigns in the years after *Rachel suum videns*.⁹⁰ Finally, in the first crusade campaign designed to rely primarily upon vow redemption, Gregory used the contemplative image of Rachel as Mother Church, which had never before appeared in papal crusade propaganda. Afterward, however, it becomes part of crusade rhetoric, as in Innocent IV's crusade bull of 1250, *Filiorum dextera pia*, which in its opening paragraphs closely paraphrases *Rachel suum videns*, with Mother Church lamenting, the same reference to Lamentations 1.17, and explicit mention of vow redemption as a goal.⁹¹ Taken together, these new measures highlight Gregory's importance to the history of crusade recruitment, finance, and propaganda, arenas in which his efforts have often been overshadowed by those of Innocent.⁹²

On the eve of the Reformation critics of the papacy would make the practice of friars traveling from town to town selling indulgences into an image of papal greed, corruption, and abuse of the power of the keys. It is important to recognize that the promotional campaign for the Barons' Crusade brought all the components of that image together for the first time. Matthew Paris, a fierce thirteenth-century critic of Rome, only seems ahead of his time when he offers this portrait of Gregory's preachers in action in 1234:

And when the [crusade bull] became known to the faithful throughout the Christian lands, and especially throughout England, there was preaching by prelates, but especially, though, by brothers Preacher and Minor, to whom the power of signing with the cross had been given, as well as that of relaxing vows in return for money; and these preachers signed many with the cross.... [But] those they signed with the cross one day, on the next they redeemed their vows. There was, accordingly, such an exaction of money in such a short time, that the ardor of the faithful for the business of the cross grew lukewarm, and charity in general was cooled.⁹³

Matthew would not be the last to claim that vow redemption weakened Christian *caritas* generally and interest in crusading particularly. This practice, which Matthew and later critics saw as an abuse, sprang from a papal attempt to make good a vision of all Christendom acting together for a single cause. Before we judge Matthew's assessment, we ought to see with what kind of response Gregory's new kind of preaching campaign actually met.

The Preaching of the Holy Land Crusade: The Response

Gregory IX's optimistic measures to make crusading a universal Christian activity were matched by Matthew Paris's pessimistic assessment that the papacy would destroy crusading entirely. In the event, neither vision proved correct. There was an enthusiastic response, but it was regional, not universal. French and English magnates took the cross in large numbers while German and Italian magnates declined to crusade. Even within France and England, there was no cohesive response. Far from setting aside differences so that they could fight a common enemy together, feuding members of the same family and region chose to fight a common enemy separately, unable to agree even on a place or date of departure. This chapter traces the disparate responses to Gregory's call for united action.

The preaching campaign began slowly. At first, in fact, it met with no discernable response. Whether noncombatants were taking the cross in its early stages is difficult to say: the evidence that bears on this question, as we shall see, is sparse and difficult to assess. We can be more certain, though, that few if any fighting men, whose activities are better documented, were taking the cross in the months following the declaration of the crusade in September 1234. Through that autumn, and much of the following year as well, we hear of no baron or knight taking the cross. Perhaps Matthew Paris was right when he declared that Gregory's all-out pursuit of vow redemption fees would dampen enthusiasm for the crusade. *Rachel suum videns*, he said, was a "most weighty lamentation," whose "most eloquent" words would have touched the hearts of men, if it had not been so obvious that the purpose behind them was to "cheat" people out of their money.¹ But in actual fact, the poor initial response to the preaching campaign cannot be blamed on an over-zealous papal curia. The problem appears to have been the opposite: Gregory did not pursue his plan for the crusade zealously enough. No sooner had he announced the expedition than he turned his attention away from the Holy Land toward a more proximate concern, a rebellion against his rule that had broken out in Rome.

The revolt had actually begun in May 1234, when Gregory fled the city under threat of violence.² It was not the first time he had done so; previous uprisings of the citizenry had driven him from Rome in 1228 and 1231. Gregory reigned during a period of Roman expansionism, when aggressive city governments, contesting the claims of the Papal State, sought to dominate the surrounding countryside and the cities of Latium, the Campagna, and even

Tuscany. The pope spent eight of the first twelve years of his reign outside of Rome.³ He was thus no stranger to conflict with the city's civil authorities, but the revolt of 1234 was more serious than the others. It has been called the gravest challenge to papal rule of the city since the Alexandrine schism of the 1160s.⁴

From Rieti the pope called upon an unlikely champion, Frederick II.⁵ Recalling his imperial duty to defend the church and, as we have seen, desirous of papal help in deposing his son Henry (VII), then contemplating rebellion in Germany, the emperor hastened to the pope's side with a contingent of troops. By the late summer of 1234 these forces were besieging the Romans in Viterbo. But in September Frederick withdrew from the campaign, citing unrest in Sicily. Under the command of a papal legate, the soldiers he left behind defeated the Romans in a pitched battle in October. Despite this success, Frederick's departure spurred the pope to broaden his appeal for military aid against his still defiant see.

Toward the end of October Gregory wrote to the archbishop of Mainz. Reminding him of the vow he had sworn to maintain the Apostolic See's temporal rights in the patrimony of St. Peter, the pope commanded him to send 200 knights to serve the Roman church for three months the following spring. Gregory sent identical orders to the rest of the ecclesiastical hierarchy of Germany about a month later, shortly after sending *Rachel suum videns* to all the provinces of Christendom. Not long after that he requested similar assistance from all the major German secular lords, asking them to come in person, send one of their sons in their stead, or place their contingent under another's command. Receiving personal appeals were the king of Bohemia, the dukes of Kärnten, Saxony, Lorraine, and Brabant, the landgrave of Thuringia, and the counts of the Rhine Palatinate, Tübingen, Holland, Gelders, and Aschenleben. At the beginning of December the pope expanded his search for military support into France and northern Iberia. Now portraying the Romans as a threat to ecclesiastical liberties not just in the Papal State but throughout the Christian world, Gregory called upon every archbishop of France, along with the archbishops of Tarragona, Toledo, Compostela, Braga, the bishop of Pamplona, the kings of Portugal, Aragon, and Navarre, and the counts of Roussillon and Barcelona, to send a "suitable" cohort of warriors to his aid.⁶

These appeals for military assistance against the Romans may have drawn potential recruits away from the Holy Land crusade. The count of Toulouse, for example, who was under an obligation to crusade to Jerusalem as penance for his conduct during the Albigensian crusades, hurried to Rome instead, in the hope that his service there would prove sufficient satisfaction. (It did not.) Peter of Roches, the bishop of Winchester, removed from power in England in 1234, also joined the papal forces.⁷ Whether out of loyalty to the pope or fear of Roman aggrandizement, many of the towns of the Roman hinterland contributed to the cause as well.⁸ How many troops ultimately rallied to the

papal banner is difficult to say, although the willingness of the Roman authorities to enter into negotiations with the pope in the early spring of 1235 may speak to the success of his recruitment efforts.⁹ What is clear, though, is that the effort to organize a military campaign against Rome distracted Gregory's attention from the Holy Land preaching campaign. Having announced the crusade in November 1234, he made no further attempt to promote it until he entered into negotiations with the Romans to end the conflict in April 1235.¹⁰

It was only then that his stalled preparations for the Jerusalem expedition recommenced. A bull of 13 April offered to take Holy Land crusaders under apostolic protection, forbade usury to be charged on their debts, and allowed them to answer suits only in diocesan court.¹¹ Another letter instructed secular authorities to enforce a moratorium on the repayment of crusaders' debts.¹² In June, Gregory announced his penny per week fundraising plan, and in July, in the letter *Quantum nos urgeat*, he granted crusade preachers in Ireland and Austria powers to reward those who listened to crusade sermons with indulgences and to punish those who preferred not to hear them with ecclesiastical censure.

But if Gregory was ready to turn attention back to the Holy Land crusade after settling his differences with the Romans, Frederick was not. With his troops released from papal service, the emperor could contemplate a campaign against Henry (VII), now in open rebellion. Frederick's progress through Germany in the summer of 1235 more closely resembled a triumphal procession than a military operation, as one after another the rebels made their submission.¹³ But the emperor's campaign impeded recruitment in Germany for the Holy Land crusade nonetheless. Members of the German military elite were too busy sustaining or suppressing the rebellion to think of crusading to Jerusalem; and in any case Gregory was not giving his preachers there much encouragement. In May 1235, some two months before the chancery sent *Quantum nos urgeat* to crusade preachers in Ireland and Austria, it had drafted a version addressed to the provincial prior of the German Dominicans. But in the registers that earlier version of the letter bears a deletion mark, meaning in all likelihood that it was never sent.¹⁴ Perhaps Gregory cancelled the letter in order to minimize the access Frederick's enemies would have had to a means of gaining exemption from imperial jurisdiction, were crusade preaching to have gone ahead in the aggressive fashion prescribed by *Quantum nos urgeat*. By taking the cross, they could have claimed the crusader's immunity from secular justice.¹⁵ However one interprets the pope's motives in this instance, it is certainly true that he withheld the powers granted by *Quantum nos urgeat* from German preachers until the end of September 1235, by which time imperial authority had been re-asserted and Henry had surrendered himself into his father's custody.¹⁶

But the time was still not right to aid the Holy Land, in the emperor's view. He now resolved to invade Lombardy, where many towns had long resisted

his authority. Since the spring of 1234 his grievance with the Lombards had been in the hands of papal mediators; but their efforts to achieve a settlement had so far not yielded results.¹⁷ In September 1235 he delivered an ultimatum: if an agreement had not been reached by Christmas, he would take up arms the following spring.¹⁸ With the Lombard campaign looming on the horizon, the prospect that German knights and nobles would join the Holy Land crusade dimmed; when Frederick and his army departed for Verona in the summer of 1236, it was entirely extinguished.¹⁹ The ensuing campaign also reduced the likelihood that Lombard fighting men would join the crusade, since their energies would be consumed in repulsing the imperial forces. This became a matter of regret to Gregory. As papal-imperial relations worsened in the late 1230s, he would complain repeatedly that Frederick's war against the Lombards was "hindering the business of the Holy Land," because they "could provide a great quantity of men and material" for its aid.²⁰ This was true enough, as far as it went; but the emperor had not been the first to turn away from the Holy Land crusade when other matters seemed to demand attention.

Germany and northern Italy would play no part in the Holy Land crusade. But outside the ambit of papal-imperial conflict, the preaching campaign began to meet with greater success once the pope focused his attention on it again in the spring and summer of 1235. In France and England, no major military operations were either planned or underway that might occupy the fighting men Gregory wanted for the expedition. Although a truce between the two kingdoms had expired in July 1234, Henry III was in no position to renew his quest to restore the lost possessions of the Plantagenets in Normandy and Poitou. His usual ally in these ventures, Peter of Brittany, had submitted to Louis IX upon the expiration of the truce.²¹ A year later Henry acquired a still more formidable potential ally against the French when he married his sister Isabella to Frederick II. But the price of the alliance was so high as to prevent Henry from taking immediate advantage of it. The £20,000 dowry he agreed to pay the emperor precipitated a crisis in the royal finances, making expensive overseas adventures out of the question for the time being.²²

Although Louis and Henry posed no threat to each other's thrones, neither seems to have considered himself secure enough on his own to contemplate leaving it for a crusade. At first glance they look like prime candidates to take the cross. Both men were young and pious: in later years they would compete in displays of religious fervor. Louis would go on to become the most ardent crusader of his generation, perhaps of all time. While never able to match Louis's commitment, Henry would also prove a sincere supporter of the crusader states.²³ But all that lay in the future. In 1234 they were just beginning to take power into their own hands after long and difficult minorities, during which movements of baronial opposition, led by the Dreux clan in France and the Marshal clan in England, had risen up to challenge the custodians of royal government.²⁴ These families were not openly rebellious

in 1234, but neither were they completely pacified. A Dreux would rise against Louis IX in 1236, a Marshal against Henry III in 1238.²⁵ Eager to consolidate their authority in the face of threats such as these, Louis and Henry declined the crusader's cross.

They would not object, however, if others wished to receive it. At peace with each other and anxious to re-assert royal power at home, they could look with equanimity upon the prospect of their knights and nobles setting off on long overseas voyages. Each would make financial contributions to the crusade and each would permit members of their households to participate in it. And if some of their more fractious barons happened to join the crusade as well, that was an eventuality they seemed prepared to accept. There was nothing standing in the way of a strong response to the preaching campaign on both sides of the Channel.

In northern France, nobles and knights began to take the cross in large numbers from late 1235 onward. Among these were two great territorial princes, Thibaut IV, count palatine of Champagne (since 1234 king of Navarre), and Hugh IV, duke of Burgundy.²⁶ Before the expedition departed they would be joined by Peter of Dreux, who had originally planned to crusade to Constantinople. Peter was the equal of the territorial princes in prominence and prestige, if not in titles and landed assets. He had once been duke of Brittany and was closely related to the Capetians. Also taking the cross were several other prominent magnates, who ranked only slightly below the princes in political power and landed wealth: Guy, count of Forez and Nevers, Henry, count of Bar, John, count of Vendôme, Louis, count of Sancerre, John, count of Chalon-sur-Saône, Humbert, lord of Beaujeu, Stephen, count of Burgundy, and John, count of Mâcon.²⁷ Whether prince or magnate, these men were all powerful figures in their own right. They held their lands from the king of France. On that account they served in his army in a carefully prescribed fashion for a set period of time, and attended his council when called upon to do so. Outside of these obligations they conducted their affairs with considerable independence.

The first half of the thirteenth century was in many ways a heyday for the northern French magnates and territorial princes.²⁸ They had reduced the power and independence of the castellans who had dominated much of the countryside north of the Loire for the past two hundred years. Over a number of generations ruling dynasties in Champagne, Burgundy, and elsewhere had created centralized principalities by developing their administrations, converting allodial holdings within the borders of their territories into dependent lordships, purchasing outright the lands of seigniorial lineages fallen on hard times, and, when all else failed, making war against those who continued to resist their authority.²⁹ At the same time the Capetians had been pursuing a parallel strategy, expanding their domain lands and bringing royal justice and administration to bear upon the principalities.³⁰ By the 1230s the power and revenues of the monarchy had increased greatly, but its eventual

triumph within the French state was still many years away. The magnates and the princes still ruled, with little outside interference, over the greater portion of what now constitutes France. It was from these lands that most of the French participants in the Holy Land crusade would be drawn.

Recruitment was strong in regions where a territorial prince or magnate had taken the cross. In Champagne, a number of prominent local lords decided to join the crusade, including Henry, count of Grandpré and William, count of Joigny, who both held their counties directly from Thibaut; Anselm IV of Traînel and his cousin Garnier IV, lord of Marigny-le-Châtel, the scions of two old aristocratic families from the region around Troyes, the county capital; John of Valery, who would go on to serve in Louis IX's retinue on the king's first crusade; Simon V, lord of Clefmont; Gaucher Bridaine, lord of Méry, and his brother Geoffrey; Hugh, lord of Broys; Henry of Nogent; Peter Putemonnoie; and Philip of Nantueil, Thibaut's companion in rhyme as well as arms.³¹ To the southeast, in Burgundy, the rate of participation among followers of Duke Hugh also appears to have been high, with Josseran, lord of Brancion, John, lord of Barres, the brothers Andrew and Peter of Savoy, John of Paleau, Colin of Ligny-le-Châtel, Hugh of Arceau, and Guy of Doix numbering among the Burgundian crusaders.³² A similar pattern holds true for Brittany, even though Peter of Dreux was no longer its duke when he sailed for Syria. He was accompanied not only by his brother, John of Macon, his brother-in-law, Andrew, lord of Vitry, and his close advisor Geoffrey of Ancenis, but also by three magnates whose names are intertwined with the history of early thirteenth-century Breton politics: Ralph, lord of Fougères, Guyomar of Léon, and Fulk Paynel, lord of Aubigné.³³

But the preaching campaign also did well outside the lands of the great magnates. Recruitment was brisk, for example, in the royal domain lands in and around the Île-de-France, even though King Louis had not taken the cross. Many of his counselors decided to join the expedition. Pre-eminent among them was Amalric, count of Montfort and constable of France, upon whom the king conferred substantial financial aid as well as the right to bear the royal arms while campaigning in the Holy Land. In addition, Robert of Courtenay, butler of France, took the cross, as did John of Nesle, count of Soissons, one of Louis's main counselors by 1239, his younger brother Ralph, also in royal service, and their cousin Simon of Clermont, who would serve as co-regent of France during Louis's ill-fated crusade to Tunis in 1270. Some of the king's most able soldiers also signed on for the expedition, including Matthew of Marly and Drew of Mello, lord of Loches and Dinan. From the royal domain lands came Amalric's cousin Philip of Montfort, lord of La Ferté-Alais, Simon of Clermont's brother Ralph, lord of Ailli, William, lord of Chantilly, William, butler of Senlis, his brother Ralph, Anselm of Coucy, and Guy Mauvoisin, lord of Rosny, who would later make a name for himself on Louis's first crusade.³⁴

Across the Channel, not one but three distinct expeditions took shape in the

wake of papal crusade preaching; they were led respectively by Richard of Cornwall, Simon of Montfort, and William of Forz, titular count of Aumâle. Each man at the time he took the cross could claim a place among the great magnates of the realm; in the parlance of English historiography they were “barons.” With respect to political power and capacity for independent action, it is difficult to compare them to their French counterparts. England was then a more centralized kingdom than France. For English barons the monarchy could be a pervasive and restrictive presence. Even among the grandest of them, many could be found who owed their exalted position to royal patronage above all else. The leaders of the three crusade contingents certainly did. As Henry’s brother and heir presumptive, Richard of Cornwall was a major recipient of royal largesse. As of 1236 all the landed wealth he possessed had been granted to him by Henry.³⁵ Simon of Montfort could make no such familial claim upon crown resources, but his career provides a famous example of how far and how fast a royal favorite could rise in Henry III’s England.³⁶ William of Forz was one of the great barons of the North, having inherited from his mother the Yorkshire honors of Holderness and Skipton. Having been raised abroad, however, he had needed two years of steady petitioning and the impending threat of baronial rebellion to win permission from King John to travel to England to take up his inheritance.³⁷ That revolt, and the many others that followed during Henry’s reign, show that English barons could sometimes shake off the constraints that the nascent national monarchy sought to place on their aspirations. Richard of Cornwall defied his brother more than once;³⁸ William of Forz took up arms against Henry in 1221;³⁹ and Simon of Montfort went on to become the baronial rebel *par excellence*.

Richard of Cornwall’s contingent was the first to come together. In June 1236, at a meeting of the barons at Winchester, Richard took a vow to crusade to the Holy Land along with William Longsword, claimant to the earldom of Salisbury, Gilbert Marshal, earl of Pembroke, John le Scot, earl of Chester, Geoffrey of Lucy, and Richard Siward.⁴⁰ They were later joined by Eudo Fitz-Roy, Earl Richard’s half-brother; Henry of Trumbleville, a former seneschal of Gascony, who had campaigned there with the earl in 1225; Thierry of Nussa, the prior of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem in England, who acted as a chief of staff during the crusade; Philip Basset, a friend of the earl from a prominent baronial family in High Wycombe; John Fitz-John, the earl’s seneschal; John of Neville, a royal forester; several representatives of old knightly families, including William of Furnivall, Peter II of Brus, Geoffrey of Beauchamp of Bedford, John of Beauchamp, Baldwin of Béthune, and Eustace of Stuteville; the Yorkshire knights Robert Marmion and Robert of Tweng, who was also a well-known anti-papal activist; Hamo Pecche, a Lincolnshire land-owner; William Perevel, who sailed home with the earl in 1241, and perhaps Baldwin of Redvers, earl of Devon.⁴¹ Not all the cross-takers made it that far. Earl John of Chester and Henry of

Trumbleville died before the expedition departed, while Gilbert Marshal failed to set off with the rest and soon after was killed at a tournament in Hertford.⁴²

Simon of Montfort set sail for Syria shortly after Richard, embarking from Brindisi rather than Marseille. Like Simon himself, the expedition was as much a product of France as it was of England. Matthew Paris names ten men who accompanied Simon as knights-banneret;⁴³ of these five had French backgrounds. Peter of Chauntenay, as well as the brothers Gerard, Punchard, and William of Peaumes were Burgundian knights in receipt of annual fees from Henry III, while Fulk of Baugé was from Anjou. Among the bannerets with English connections were Wischard of Leidet, the brothers Thomas and Gerard of Furnivall, Hugh Wake, a considerable enough figure to receive his own papal funding, and Amaury of St. Amand, a steward of the royal household and an influential member of the king's council in the late 1230s. His presence, as well as those of the knights in royal service, gave the future rebel's contingent a royalist flavor.

William of Forz's expedition set off last, perhaps a year after the other two.⁴⁴ Descended on his father's side from a long line of Poitevin knights, William traveled to the Holy Land in the company of two of his countrymen, Ebelin of Rochefort and Peter of Maulay, who had been one of King John's most fervent partisans. Joining the Poitevins in William's contingent were the Englishmen John Ansard, Alexander of Hilton, and Geoffrey of Chandelers.⁴⁵

More than half of the English fighting men known to have taken the cross for the Holy Land crusade cannot be definitively linked to any of the three main contingents.⁴⁶ The social status of these crusaders ranged across the spectrum of the kingdom's military elite, from John, earl of Lincoln (who like Gilbert Marshal died at a tournament before setting out) and Hugh, earl of Oxford, at one end, to the royal sergeants Peter *de Lungevill* Adam of Berentin, Peter of Bareny, and Ralph *Pagani*, at the other, with many knights and members of the minor nobility in between.⁴⁷

We should further note that more people went on the crusade than can be identified by name. The leading magnates would have brought retinues of knights with them on the expedition, just as they did when they fought in royal or private campaigns at home.⁴⁸ The size of these retinues was supposed to reflect the wealth and social station of the person who sponsored them.⁴⁹ It is thus safe to assume that a territorial prince such as Hugh of Burgundy brought more fighting men to Syria than did a petty seigneur like Guy of Mauvoisin. But beyond such general estimations the sparse surviving evidence does not allow us to go.⁵⁰ Besides the knights, there were other kinds of military personnel in the army, including sergeants who fought on horseback, foot soldiers, and crossbowmen.⁵¹ Then there were the sailors who had to be hired to ferry the expedition back and forth across the Mediterranean, not to mention other indispensable "support staff": clergy, servants, cooks, clothes washers, and prostitutes.

With the Barons' Crusaders present and accounted for, we can now pay

some attention to how and why the expedition came together as it did. Historians have lately been studying the recruitment process with close attention. They have pointed out that the decision to crusade was never entirely individual but also involved family and lords. They therefore tie crusader piety to larger communities, emphasizing the influence exerted by ties of family, lordship, and regional association on the decision to take the cross. Analyzing the composition of single expeditions as well as recruitment tendencies over long time-periods, recent studies have shown that crusaders often belonged to families with strong traditions of participation; that family members and relatives often crusaded in one another's company; that powerful magnates often led their followers on campaign; and that crusaders from the same region often went on crusade together.⁵² While examples of these ties can be found among the Barons' Crusaders, it is important not to exaggerate their explanatory power over the recruitment of the expedition. On one hand, these ties did not prevent discord, division, and treachery among those bound by them. On the other hand, a significant proportion of the crusaders do not appear to have been party to any of these forms of association.

Crusading was well over a century old when the Barons' Crusaders began to take the cross in 1235 and 1236. Some of them were heirs to long dynastic traditions of military service in the Holy Land. Thibaut of Champagne came from a family that Jonathan Riley-Smith has described as "obsessed with crusading."⁵³ Among Thibaut's predecessors, Count Stephen of Blois, the son of Count Thibaut I of Champagne, was the leader of the First Crusade for a time. Stephen's half-brother Count Hugh of Troyes made an armed pilgrimage to Jerusalem in 1104 and joined the Templars in 1125. Henry the Liberal, count of Champagne (1152–81), went on the Second and Third Crusades and in 1179, during the interval between them, led his own expedition to Syria. Between 1192 and 1197 he ruled Jerusalem, although without ever taking up the royal title. Count Thibaut III (1197–1201), the father of our Thibaut, took the cross for the Fourth Crusade, but died before he could set out.⁵⁴

Thibaut IV's crusading lineage is striking, but not exceptional among the French Holy Land crusaders. Among the ancestors of Guy V, count of Forez and Nevers, were Count William III of Forez, who accompanied Raymond of Toulouse on the First Crusade; and Guy IV of Forez, who died returning home from the Fourth Crusade. When Guy V married Matilda, countess of Nevers in 1226, he joined a dynasty that had sent a member on every major Holy Land crusade since 1101.⁵⁵ The Montforts, meanwhile, who sent three representatives on the Barons' Crusade—Simon, Amalric, and Philip—had made their crusading reputation not only in the Holy Land but also in southern France, where they fought alleged supporters of the Albigensian heretics. Simon and Amalric's father, also named Simon, had been the leader of the Albigensian crusade in its earlier phases and before that had participated in

the Fourth Crusade. When still another Montfort married Amice, coheirress to the county of Leicester, the family became associated with the crusading tradition of the Beaumont earls, who were only one of many English families able to boast of a long crusading lineage.⁵⁶

Simon Lloyd has counted twelve English families who sent at least four generations of crusaders to the Holy Land in the thirteenth century.⁵⁷ Of these twelve families, four had representatives on the Barons' Crusade: the Nevilles, the Beauchamps, the Furnivalls, and the Bassets. Geoffrey of Lucy, for his part, was a crusading tradition in his own right, going on the Fifth Crusade, the Barons' Crusade, and Louis IX's first crusade.⁵⁸

Family ties linked Barons' Crusaders to one another as well as to the crusaders of past generations. There were multiple sets of brothers on the crusade. To the Montforts can be added the three Furnivall brothers, the three Peaumes brothers, John and Geoffrey of Beauchamp, Robert and William of Maleherbe, John and Richard of Grey, Geoffrey of Lucy and William of Longsword, Peter of Brittany and John of Mâcon, John and Ralph of Nesle, Simon and Ralph of Clermont, and William the butler of Senlis and his brother Ralph. Less immediate family ties were also prevalent, binding the leading figures of the crusade into an intricate web of connections and alliances. Among the French crusading magnates, the most powerful network of this sort had at its heart the remarkable Dreux clan. Like any good aristocratic family on the make, the Dreux had mastered the art of marrying well. Peter of Brittany and John of Mâcon were leading members of the family in the 1230s. They had sisters, nieces, and aunts married to Barons' Crusaders: their sister Philippa to Henry of Bar, their niece Yolanda to Hugh of Burgundy, and their aunt Elizabeth to Hugh of Broyes.⁵⁹ Peter's sister-in-law Catherine of Brittany was married to Andrew of Vitry, while Peter's son John the Red would wed Thibaut of Champagne's daughter Blanche in January 1236.⁶⁰ The leading English crusaders were no less familiar with dynastic marriages. Richard of Cornwall's connections among his fellow *crucesignati* included two brothers-in-law (Simon of Montfort and Gilbert Marshal), two first cousins (William Longsword and Geoffrey of Lucy), and a half-brother (Eudo Fitz-Roy).

Bonds of lordship and service are also evident among Barons' Crusaders. When Matthew Paris described the seven knights-banneret who went on crusade with Richard of Cornwall as comprising *his familia*, or household, the chronicler was giving voice to the common assumption that a magnate's faithful followers would faithfully follow him on crusade.⁶¹ In point of fact, the *familia* to which Matthew refers actually seems to have been a temporary association formed expressly for the expedition: some of the men he says belonged to it, such as Philip Basset, were powerful barons with households of their own, while others, such as John of Neville, were actually in royal service. Matthew's sense of the importance of ties of service and affiliation is borne out in other instances, however. The ties of lordship appear to have

been particularly strong in Champagne. This is perhaps not surprising, since the county often used to be (and sometimes still is) described as a quintessentially “feudal” thirteenth-century polity.⁶² While Hugh of Burgundy, Peter of Brittany, and Guy of Nevers could find several of their followers among the host, more members of the French expedition acknowledged Count Thibaut as their lord than any other.

If ties of family and lordship were factors in recruitment, then regional patterns of participation should be discernable. A look at the composition of the French expedition does reveal one stark pattern: the vast majority of known crusaders came from north of the Loire. The expedition was a product of the *langue d’oil*, not the *langue d’oc*. One reason for this may have been the recently concluded Albigensian crusades, which had pitted North against South and in which quite a few Barons’ Crusaders had participated with greater (Amalric of Montfort) and lesser (Thibaut of Champagne) degrees of enthusiasm.⁶³ Aside from the northern French crusaders who sailed with Simon of Montfort and the Poitevin crusaders who sailed with William of Forz, strong regional groupings are not as evident among the crusade contingents that departed from England. In general, recruitment levels appear consistent throughout the kingdom. With a few exceptions, such as John “le Scot,” earl of Chester, who was related to the Scottish royal house, there was very little participation from the rest of the British Isles. By and large, the Scots, the Welsh, and the Irish imitated the Occitans by staying home.

Family traditions of crusading, as well as bonds of kinship, affiliation, and regional association, can thus be found among those who joined the crusade. It is difficult, though, to weigh the effect of these ties on individual decisions to take the cross. For some of the magnates with strong crusading backgrounds, for example, the circumstances in which they found themselves at the time of their cross-taking may have counted for as much as their crusading lineages. As we have seen, Thibaut of Champagne’s family history could have predisposed him to go on crusade. At the time he took the cross, however, he badly needed the papal protection that crusader status offered: in the autumn of 1235 he was contemplating his last revolt against the French crown. We have seen that Guy of Nevers inherited a dynastic tradition of crusade participation as well. He only chose to pay heed to that heritage, however, when it became clear that committing to the crusade would secure his release from a sentence of excommunication, a penalty that was hampering his ability to fend off accusations of despoiling monasteries and sheltering heretics.⁶⁴ Amalric of Montfort also burnished a familial reputation for crusading by taking the cross in 1235. His vow provided him, in addition, with an honorable means of escaping his debts. Not long after he had sworn it the pope ordered the bishops of southern France to satisfy his many creditors, to the sum of 7900 *livres tournois*.⁶⁵ Personal matters such as these may have given these men the impetus to sustain the crusading traditions of their families.

The influence of family and lordship ties on the recruitment of the Barons' Crusade also warrants closer scrutiny. When we examine the past relations among the English and French crusaders bound by these ties, we find that in many instances such bonds had not fostered cohesion and group endeavor. For many of these men, political conflicts, economic disputes, and personal animosities had been the order of the day in the years prior to the crusade. The history they shared, I will argue, made it unlikely that the ties they shared would cause them to act together in the matter of the crusade.

The conflicts within the Dreux affinity, which included at various points the leading Barons' Crusaders Peter of Brittany, Henry of Bar, Hugh of Burgundy, and Thibaut of Champagne, had rocked northern French politics for the better part of a decade.⁶⁶ The trouble started in 1226, when Blanche of Castile took control of the royal government as guardian for her twelve-year old son, crowned Louis IX that November. Thibaut of Champagne, Peter of Brittany, and Hugh of Lusignan, count of La Marche, quickly formed a league opposed to her rule and persuaded Philip Hurepel, count of Boulogne, to offer himself as an alternative candidate for the guardianship.⁶⁷ The league was made more formidable still when Peter of Brittany entered into negotiations with another of Blanche's enemies, Henry III. But before these maneuverings could come to anything Blanche managed to detach Thibaut from the league, forcing Hugh of Lusignan and Peter of Brittany to make a costly submission to the crown.⁶⁸

The opponents of the regent would not soon forget Thibaut's betrayal of their own disloyal schemes. It was both convenient and gratifying for them to continue their struggle with Blanche indirectly, through attacks on her ally the count of Champagne. In the summer of 1230, while Peter was campaigning with Henry III in western France, two of Peter's brothers, Robert of Dreux and John of Mâcon, along with two more of Thibaut's former allies, Henry of Bar and Hugh of Burgundy, invaded Champagne. Louis IX was forced to come to Thibaut's rescue. The settlement reached between Thibaut and the invaders in September 1230 and the submission of Peter of Brittany to the French crown the following year brought the wars against Thibaut and the regent to an end.⁶⁹

But the resentments the wars engendered lingered on for years to come, sustained not by military campaigns but by smear campaigns, hostage-takings, food-fights, harassing lawsuits, and poetry both brilliant (Thibaut of Champagne) and indifferent (Hugh of la Ferté). Of course it was in the nature of things for there to be rivalries among the great magnates, even among those closely related by blood and marriage. They competed for land, wealth, and prestige. But the wars of Champagne and their aftermath created grounds for conflict among these men that were seemingly personal as well as systemic. No great amount of insight into the emotional lives of these remote figures is required to appreciate that Thibaut of Champagne may have resented it when Henry of Bar and Hugh of Burgundy attacked his lands, bribed his followers,

questioned his legitimacy, and accused him of murder; that Henry and Hugh may have resented it when Thibaut seized their esteemed elderly relation, Robert of Auvergne, archbishop of Lyon, as a hostage; that Thibaut may have resented it when Peter of Brittany resuscitated the claims of Thibaut's aunt Alice of Cyprus to the county of Champagne; that Peter may have resented it when Thibaut backed out of marriage with Peter's daughter Isabella the night before the ceremony was to take place, leaving her to face friends and family alone on what was to have been her wedding day. Going on crusade together did not end the discord. Upon arrival in the Holy Land, the French contingent quickly fractured into three rival factions, one led by Hugh and Henry, the others by Thibaut and Peter respectively.

So far we have been dealing with relations among men who occupied elevated and roughly equal social positions. They were related to each other, they held lands from each other, but these ties did not create a hierarchy among them. We might expect such bonds to exert a stronger influence upon those for whom they created a relationship of dependence, upon those, for example, who acknowledged the lordship or were employed in the service of one of the great magnates. There was, of course, potential for coercion in these cases: we can wonder whether someone like John Fitz-John, Richard of Cornwall's seneschal, or William of Vichy, Guy of Nevers's household chaplain, ever had much choice about joining the retinues of their employers.⁷⁰ But it is possible to exaggerate the power exercised by ties of service and lordship over the Barons' Crusaders. Many of the men who held their lands from Thibaut of Champagne participated in the expedition, but many apparently did not.⁷¹ Conversely, many of Louis IX's retainers went on the crusade, even though he stayed home. And sometimes, too, relations between the magnates and those who acknowledged their lordship could be as fraught as relations among the magnates themselves. Many of the Breton lords, as we saw, went on the crusade. But whether they did so on account of the bond they shared with Peter of Brittany, their old duke, is open to question, since a number of them had disavowed Peter's lordship in the era of his rebellions against the crown and crossed over into the royalist camp.⁷² Though the traditional hierarchy of power in Brittany was soon reconstituted, the Breton contingent hardly comprised a cohesive group within the expedition that reached Acre in the fall of 1239: Peter's faction on the crusade, interestingly, does not seem to have included the Breton lords.⁷³

At least the French crusaders all arrived at Acre around the same time. The English expedition did not even manage that. It is testimony to the inability or unwillingness of the leaders of the English crusade to work together that within a twelve-month span they each traveled separately to the Holy Land. Two of the leaders, as we have seen, were brothers-in-law. But that may have been precisely why Simon of Montfort and Richard of Cornwall refused to mount a joint expedition. Richard had not welcomed his sister Eleanor's marriage to Simon in January 1238. In fact, upon learning of the match

Richard had risen in revolt against the king and his council for agreeing to it. The uprising ended when Simon, under royal pressure, surrendered his place on the council and submitted himself to Richard.⁷⁴ The family bond made relations between these two expedition leaders worse, not better.

Relations could be complex even among English crusaders who chose to go on crusade together. Among those who took the cross with Richard of Cornwall at Winchester in June 1236 were Gilbert Marshal and two of his supporters, Philip Basset and Richard Siward. Richard had a connection with each of these men: he was Gilbert's brother-in-law through his marriage to Isabella Marshal in 1231; he counted Phillip among his friends; and he was Richard Siward's landlord for the manor of Stoke Basset, which Siward held by right of his wife, Philip Basset's sister Philippa, the dowager countess of Warwick.⁷⁵ Richard was a member of the Marshal family and was their sworn ally until Isabella passed away in 1240. During that decade, though, his support for his in-laws wavered at times. Richard declined to join the Marshals when they rebelled against the king in 1233. Led by Richard Marshal, Gilbert's older brother, the revolt was the most serious uprising against the monarchy since 1215. While Gilbert Marshal, Philip Basset, and Richard Siward were in the thick of the fighting, their erstwhile supporter Richard of Cornwall was far from the fray, accumulating grant after valuable grant from Henry as his reward, including some prime Basset land.⁷⁶

The rebellion was short-lived, and by spring 1236 Gilbert Marshal (the head of the family after Richard Marshal's death in 1234) had reconciled with Richard of Cornwall and was on peaceful terms with Henry. But relations between Richard of Cornwall and the Marshal clan were still strained. Richard Siward, for example, continued to arouse Earl Richard's "indignation."⁷⁷ This may have been because, in retaliation for Richard's failure to support the revolt, Siward had burnt to the ground one of the earl's favorite manor houses, at Beckley, in Oxfordshire.⁷⁸ Nor were the Marshal clan's dealings with the king as amicable as they might have been. Despite the charter of concord entered in the close rolls, Gilbert's influence in the royal council remained negligible.⁷⁹ Perhaps, then, as it has recently been suggested, the June 1236 cross-taking at Winchester was meant as a two-fold gesture of reconciliation, which would repair the alliance between Richard of Cornwall and the Marshals at the same time as it restored the family to royal favor.⁸⁰ If the cross-takings had this conciliatory effect, it was short-lived. Within weeks Henry had Richard Siward arrested and imprisoned in Gloucester Castle;⁸¹ eighteen months later Gilbert Marshal joined Richard of Cornwall's revolt against the king. In the meantime the complement of royalists in Richard's contingent had been augmented by Henry of Trumbleville, who in 1233 had vigorously suppressed supporters of the Marshal rising in the Welsh marches.⁸² Richard's contingent was brimming with political rivalries and personal animosities. Whether that was the intended consequence of the cross-taking of 1236, however, is not at all certain.

The influence of ties of family and lordship upon the decisions of these crusaders, moreover, appears to have been anything but straightforward. Family ties did not induce Richard of Cornwall to support the Marshal rebellion against the king in 1233; nor did they dissuade him from launching his own uprising against Henry in 1238. Similarly, Gilbert Marshal rebelled against his royal in-laws in 1233 and rebelled with one of his royal in-laws in 1238. Philip Basset was active in the 1233 rebellion but played no part in the 1238 uprising, despite his close kinship ties with the principals in each case. By 1237 Richard Siward had switched his allegiance to the crown, despite Richard of Cornwall's continuing enmity and the fact that Gilbert Marshal, Siward's onetime patron, remained out of royal favor. Over the next few years we find Siward going on the payroll as a household knight, participating in the Queen's coronation, serving as sheriff of Oxford, and even receiving two does as a personal gift from the king.⁸³ These crusaders honored obligations of kinship and affiliation only intermittently. This suggests a need to be cautious about ascribing too much influence to these ties upon the choices they made, including the choice to go on crusade.

Furthermore, some Barons' Crusaders seem not have shared any obvious social or familial bond with their companions. In France, there was recruitment for the crusade outside the lands of the great magnates, not just in the Île de France, but also in Poitou (Godfrey of Argentan), the county of La Marche (Guy of Rochefort), and Marseille (Benedict, the city's bishop).⁸⁴ In England, the number of unaffiliated *crucesignati* appears to have been larger, although this may be an illusion created by the greater abundance of surviving royal records there as compared to France. It is from the records of Chancery and Exchequer that crusaders like Robert of Fraxineto, William of Mastac, Ralph of Ringstone, and Robert Maleherbe, to name but a few, are known.⁸⁵ Then there is Earl John of Chester, who seems the odd man out among the magnates who took the cross with Richard of Cornwall in 1236; the rest were connected with either the Marshal clan or the royal family. Earl John was just one of many crusaders whose decision to take the cross cannot be easily explained in terms of familial or hierarchical loyalties.

Well connected or not, large numbers of fighting men in France and England were preparing to sail to the Holy Land by the spring of 1236. When the expeditions finally departed in 1239 and 1240, they represented the largest gatherings of French and English chivalry for a crusade in a generation. The preaching campaign had clearly achieved its goal of attracting the military elite to the crusade. But the campaign, we will recall, had aimed to appeal to a broader audience still, one that included noncombatants, who would help finance the expedition by redeeming their vows for cash. Unfortunately, there is no good way to gauge their response to the campaign designed so carefully to reach them.

There is no evidence documenting the vows of men and women who paid money in lieu of campaigning in Syria. In response to papal inquiries,

ecclesiastical officials sometimes compiled lists of those who had taken the cross in particular dioceses, in order to check up on the fulfillment of vows. Very few such lists survive, and none for the Barons' Crusade.⁸⁶ Other records do not fill this lacuna. Chroniclers tended to ignore noncombatant cross-takers, focusing instead on those who actually campaigned overseas. Even those few chroniclers who pay attention to the noncombatants are short on specifics, speaking unhelpfully of "people in countless numbers" or "very many of the common people" taking the cross.⁸⁷ References in papal and royal documents to those who purchased vow redemptions are also rare. I argued above that most candidates for vow redemption were not members of the economic elite. One result of this was that, as a rule, they could not afford to make themselves known to record-generating bodies. It was expensive to send a petition to Rome, for example, which might prompt a papal reply, or to purchase a royal judicial protection, which might be entered on the rolls. It is also true that these candidates had less reason to bring themselves to the attention of these bodies, since they had fewer assets to protect (or mortgage or sell) and were not going anywhere in any case. For similar reasons we can assume that the majority of crusaders named in monastic or seigniorial cartularies went on crusade in person or at least intended to do so.

In the absence of direct evidence, one way to gain a sense of the response of noncombatants to the preaching campaign would be to count the money they paid to redeem their vows. Since large assessments on individuals were rare, the more money raised through redemptions, generally speaking, the more people there would have been swearing and then redeeming crusade vows. But the information required to estimate redemption revenues is lacking. In Gregory's day income from redemptions did not pass through the camera, where ordinary papal revenues were received and tabulated.⁸⁸ Instead the fees were locally collected and distributed. Even without cameral accounts, we might still be able to estimate how much redemption income Gregory's preachers raised by adding up the grants made from these revenues. Unfortunately, the pope seldom granted fixed sums, preferring to promise indefinite amounts. He might assign a crusader all the vow redemption fees from a particular diocese, for example, or a percentage of them. Sometimes he specified a maximum amount that a crusader might receive, granting John of Mâcon, for example, crusade revenues from the province of Lyon to a limit of 4000 *livres parisis*.⁸⁹ But it is not safe to assume that the total amount promised to a crusader was ever collected, because at the time the pope made the offer he could have no idea how much money would be realized from the region in which the grant was to be raised—the fees could take years to collect and the final total might prove less than the initial estimate. A final difficulty with estimating these revenues is that the redemption fees paid by those who took the cross for the Holy Land between 1234 and 1236 were not kept separately from revenues gathered for other crusades. From 1236 onward they were often lumped together in papal grants with money raised for Latin

Constantinople, making them impossible to track as a distinct income category.⁹⁰

Under the circumstances a prudent crusader would want to keep a record of the papal funding he had received. Only one Barons' Crusader, though, issued receipts for redemption money that have survived. Not surprisingly, perhaps, it was Richard of Cornwall, living up to his reputation for fiscal prudence. Gregory had granted the earl all the revenues in the kingdom of England arising from legacies, crusading taxes, and vow redemptions.⁹¹ The term of the grant ran until the date of Richard's return to England, January 1242.⁹² Over the next few years he acknowledged receipt for all the money collected from legacies and redemptions in the dioceses of Salisbury and Chichester and in the archdeaconry of St. Albans. The receipts do not distinguish between redemption income and testamentary bequests, but the difference between the two forms of revenue is slight in any case, because many bequests were simply death-bed purchases of redemptions. The sums Richard received were £89 10s from Salisbury, £277 6s from Chichester, and £25 from St. Albans, for a total of £391 16s.⁹³

Taken on their own, these figures reveal little about the overall response among noncombatants to the preaching campaign in England. Although Richard was granted redemptions and legacies throughout the kingdom, his receipts cover only two dioceses and one archdeaconry. Because, moreover, they show that response could vary widely from one diocese to another (Chichester raised three times as much money as Salisbury), they do not provide a reliable statistical sample of redemption revenue from which an estimate of the total amount raised in England might be extrapolated. As a result there is no way to test Matthew Paris's claim that vow redemptions in England had generated 20,000 marks, or about £13,000, for Richard by 1241.⁹⁴ The reliability of Matthew's figure is open to doubt. It is true that Richard was one of the chief sources of information for the chronicler.⁹⁵ But Matthew mentions the 20,000 mark figure in the course of discussing the evils of vow redemption and Richard's exploitation of the mechanism to satisfy his greed. Since it suited Matthew's purpose to suggest that Richard had acquired a great amount of money from vow redemptions, the temptation to inflate the estimate may have been strong.

Amidst these uncertainties, there is one thing that can be said for certain about Gregory's effort to encourage noncombatants to take the cross. It did not dampen enthusiasm for crusading to the Holy Land, even if the campaign did not achieve the Christendom-wide response for which he had hoped. Gregory's preaching campaign made it possible to earn the crusade indulgence without ever having to venture upon a long and dangerous journey, without ever having to leave family and property behind, without ever having to risk death in battle. Nonetheless, contrary to Matthew Paris's gloomy prognostications, large numbers of people chose to set out personally in defense of Jerusalem. Their response to the preaching campaign testifies to

the continuing vitality of the Holy Land crusade in the early decades of the thirteenth century, even as their own divisions and the absence of crusade enthusiasm in many parts of Christendom belie the notion of general Christian unity of action or identity. The crusaders' response to what the pope tried to do next, however, shows just how fragile this coalition was. Gregory's attempts to rally all Christians against a new, and for him equally threatening, enemy, would not command the same degree of support.

The Diversion to Constantinople

If crusading was an emblem of Christian unity, it is necessary to posit a way such unity was achieved. In a sense, the answer appears simple: it was achieved through the pope, the head of Christendom. As we saw, the response to his call for a crusade against Muslims in the Holy Land was enthusiastic in places but not universal. The idea of Christians unified under him faced another challenge when he tried to divert the Holy Land crusade to Constantinople. In the diversion attempt, he no longer sought to persuade all Christians to fight; he concentrated upon those who had already shown themselves willing defenders of the faith by taking the cross for the Holy Land and upon those with interests in the area. It seems that even Gregory was giving up on the idea of universal Christian participation that he had tried to implement in the original preaching campaign. Even with its more limited aims, the diversion posed a formidable challenge. If it were to succeed, he would have to find a way to convince or coerce crusaders to go to the Latin empire after they had already been persuaded of the Holy Land's urgent need for their aid. It is only by understanding Gregory's motives for making such an attempt and the means at his disposal for executing it that we can measure the success or failure of his vision of Christians united against a religious enemy.

In the early winter of 1235 Gregory IX received a letter from John of Brienne, the emperor of Latin Constantinople, the state founded on the ruins of Byzantium by the Fourth Crusaders in 1204.¹ The letter told how John's two most formidable adversaries, John Asen, tsar of Bulgaria, and John Vatatzes, emperor of Nicaea, had forged an "iniquitous" alliance and invaded his lands at the head of an "innumerable" multitude of Greeks. First the allies had sacked Gallipoli and murdered its Latin residents, "distinguishing by neither sex nor age." Then they had marched on Constantinople, the capital city of the Latin empire and now its sole remaining possession of any significance. They had invested the city, and would have captured it, if the Lord had not worked a miracle through John of Brienne. Like a latter day Jonathan sallying forth single-handed against the Philistines, the emperor had advanced against the Greeks with only 160 knights as companions and "obtained a certain triumph," forcing them to withdraw. But the reprieve had proved short lived. Now, even as John's officials wrote, Vatatzes and Asen were renewing the siege with "infinite thousands of armed men." If the pope did not move "with haste" to recruit a crusading army, Latin Constantinople

would surely fall.

Soon after John of Brienne dispatched his appeal to Rome, a fleet of warships under the command of Geoffrey of Villehardouin, prince of Achaea, arrived in the waters off Constantinople. Geoffrey broke through the cordon of Greek vessels blockading the city and was able to land his ships and bring ashore 100 knights, 300 crossbowmen, and 500 archers.² Their appearance persuaded the Bulgarians and the Nicaean Greeks to abandon the siege, this time for good.³ The crisis had passed.⁴ But the pope knew nothing of this as he considered John's plea for aid. What that letter told him was that Latin Constantinople was teetering on the brink of destruction. Shortly after receiving it, on 16 December 1235, Gregory launched the greatest effort to save the Latin empire that any pope would ever make.

What made the effort unparalleled was its central component: a plan to divert the just-preached Holy Land crusade to Constantinople. This was something no pope had ever tried, not even the powerful Innocent III. It was Innocent, of course, who had preached the Holy Land crusade that turned against Constantinople in 1204. But it now seems clear that he played no part in the decision to attack the city.⁵ Once the conquest was complete, he welcomed the establishment of a Latin empire of Constantinople. Yet he never preached a crusade on its behalf.⁶ In fact, he insisted that Latin Constantinople should be a source of crusading aid, not a recipient of it. Even as the empire's inability to protect itself, let alone others, became increasingly obvious toward the end of his pontificate, he continued to rebuke its rulers for failing to help the Holy Land.⁷ Honorius III shared Innocent's reluctance to support Latin Greece at the expense of crusader Jerusalem. Honorius did preach one crusade to the region, in support of the short-lived Latin kingdom of Thessalonica. He even went so far as to provide it with 1500 marks of silver contributed by the faithful to the Holy Land. He did so, however, at a time when there was no Holy Land expedition in the works to claim the funds.⁸

From the beginning, Gregory IX was more willing to preach crusades to Latin Greece than his predecessors had been. In 1229 he had the cross preached in Reims for John of Brienne, who had just been crowned Latin emperor and was in France organizing an expedition to his new domains. But if the policy adopted toward the Latin empire was bolder than those of his predecessors, the rhetoric buttressing the new stance remained cautiously attuned to the Holy Land's claims on crusading support. In the letter announcing the expedition, Gregory explained that he was promoting it only because recent events had made it impossible to send direct aid to the kingdom of Jerusalem.⁹ The best thing to do under the circumstances was to provide the Latin empire with an able new ruler, who could then furnish the Holy Land with "easy and useful" aid. The real goal of the Constantinople expedition was thus to succor the Holy Land indirectly, "by a kind of shortcut." Gregory seems to have been suggesting that Latin Constantinople merited assistance only to the extent that it contributed to the welfare of the

Latin settlements in Syria and only when direct aid to these was impossible. If this seems a cautious rationale for crusading to the Latin empire, it only underscores how unprecedented was his attempt to preserve it six years later, when direct aid to the Holy Land was clearly possible and crusaders from Hungary and France were readying themselves to provide it.

On 16 December 1235 Gregory dispatched a dramatic account of Constantinople's recent travails, based on the outdated information in John of Brienne's letter, to a host of European leaders: King Bela IV of Hungary, the Latin empire's closest Catholic neighbor; Bela's brother Coloman; the archbishops of Esztergom and Kalocsa and the bishop of Győr, whose provinces and diocese encompassed Hungary; Thibaut of Champagne, the eventual leader of the French expedition; the archbishop of Sens, whose province spanned much of the crusade's northern French recruitment ground; and William of Cordelle, the Franciscan who was in charge of preaching the expedition in France.¹⁰ Bela, Coloman, and Thibaut were asked to bestow their "aid and counsel" on the Latin empire and to urge others to do the same. The archbishops of Esztergom and Kalocsa and the bishop of Győr were ordered to commute the vows of all Holy Land crusaders in their provinces to the defense of Constantinople, urge those who had not taken the cross to join the new crusade as well, and encourage one and all to set out for the Latin empire without delay. William of Cordelle was instructed to commute the vows of at least 400 French Holy Land Crusaders.

When read together, the letters reveal a plan for diverting the Hungarian and French Holy Land crusaders to Constantinople. This plan entailed, first, encouraging the leaders of the expeditions to fulfill their vows in Constantinople rather than the Holy Land; second, supplying them with recruits for the new campaign by commuting the vows of "rank and file" crusaders (who would thus not be available to the leaders if they persisted in crusading to Syria); and third, halting promotion for the Holy Land crusade, a step that, because of the preaching campaign's emphasis on vow redemption, would also halt fundraising for prominent Holy Land crusaders. Announced in a day, Gregory's plan for saving the Latin empire would occupy him for the next five years. It would concentrate initially on France and Hungary, then eventually extend to England as well, once a significant response to Holy Land preaching was achieved there in the spring of 1236. As Walter Norden long ago recognized, no pope after Gregory would again go to such lengths to preserve the Latin empire, which survived its keenest papal benefactor by only twenty years.¹¹ Before turning to that effort, though, it will be helpful first to consider the background to the diversion attempt.

The Origins of the Constantinople Crusade

Gregory launched the Constantinople crusade shortly after receiving John of Brienne's prediction of its imminent demise. This sequence of events suggests

that the crusade is best understood as an attempt to prevent the conquest of the Latin empire. Nevertheless, the only previous study devoted to the expedition has called it “the crusade for the union of the Latin and Greek Churches,” seeing a breakdown of negotiations as the precipitation for the diversion.¹² Church union under Latin headship had been a papal ambition since the mid-eleventh century. For a time Innocent III believed that the crusader conquest of Constantinople in 1204 had achieved it.¹³ It soon became apparent, though, that the conquest had made the prospects for reconciliation less likely, not more.¹⁴ The Latin ecclesiastical hierarchy established in the conquered Byzantine lands failed to win the allegiance of Greek clergy and laity. By 1208 a Greek patriarch was conducting services at Nicaea, one of the centers of exiled Byzantine power.¹⁵ By 1214 Innocent was negotiating with Nicaean authorities over matters of doctrine, an acknowledgment that union had not been achieved.¹⁶ Honorius III would also negotiate with Nicaean secular and religious authorities about church union, and so too would Gregory IX. In 1232 Gregory agreed to Patriarch Germanus’s proposal to hold talks on the subject.¹⁷ These got underway in January 1234 but were not productive. They were broken off in early May 1234 amid mutual recriminations and displays of bad temper.¹⁸ Gregory’s reaction to the failure of the talks was relatively measured. On 11 June 1234 he ordered some crusaders from Hungary (*nunnullos cruce signatos de Hungaria*) whose vows he had already commuted from the Holy Land to the Latin empire, but who had yet to fulfill their new obligation, to set off for Constantinople without further delay.¹⁹ Deeming that a sufficient response, he went ahead with Christendom-wide preaching for the Holy Land in September. It was only when he learned, in late 1235, that Vatatzes and Asen were seemingly on the verge of conquering Constantinople that he launched his ambitious plan to save the city. It seems to have been this threat to the survival of the Latin empire as a viable political entity, not the breakdown of talks, which prompted the diversion attempt on 16 December. The potential destruction of the Latin empire was a more serious threat to the possibility of eventual unity than any particular negotiations.

Even by the standards of the Latin empire, which had known nothing but crisis since its founding, the menace posed by the campaign of Vatatzes and Asen must have appeared grave. They were the empire’s most formidable regional rivals. Founded by Theodore Lascaris, the son-in-law of a Byzantine emperor, the empire of Nicaea was the most successful of the Byzantine successor states to emerge in the wake of the fall of Constantinople.²⁰ John Vatatzes succeeded Lascaris in 1221 and through relentless campaigning came to exercise effective control over the eastern shores of Asia Minor. By the early 1230s only the Dardanelles stood between him and the city he claimed as his empire’s true capital. No such physical obstacle protected the Latin empire against the ambitions of its neighbor to the northwest, the kingdom of the Bulgars.²¹ They had first broken free of Byzantine hegemony

toward the end of the twelfth century, winning recognition of their kingdom from Innocent III by acknowledging Roman headship.²² This nominal allegiance to the Latin Church did not, however, translate into support for the Latin empire. The Bulgarians defeated the Latins and captured the first Latin emperor, Baldwin I, at Adrianople in 1205. John Asen II took control of the kingdom and its war-machine in 1218, but only turned his full attention to Constantinople after 1230, when he secured his western borders by a successful campaign in the Balkans.²³ Thus by the early 1230s the Latin empire found itself flanked by two powerful states which coveted its capital city. Constantinople was kept safe, it seemed, only by their competing ambition to conquer her. When they joined forces to march on the city in the spring of 1235, this last safeguard appeared to have been overcome.

As difficult as the situation had become for the Latin empire, we might still wonder why Gregory showed such concern for its survival. Other Latin Christian states with legitimate claims to crusading support did not receive the same degree of attention during his pontificate.²⁴ The empire's fall, in fact, had two clearly negative consequences for the papacy: it would bring down the Latin church hierarchy erected in the Latin empire; and it would unseat John of Brienne, who was arguably Gregory's closest ally among secular rulers.

The conquest of 1204 had allowed clergy obedient to Rome to be established in lands brought under crusader control.²⁵ In Constantinople itself the crusaders had elected a Latin patriarch.²⁶ Both clergy and patriarch were sources of prestige to the papacy. Canon Five of the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, "On the dignity of patriarchs," declared that, after the Roman church, "the church of Constantinople shall have the first place."²⁷ Innocent III and Honorius III both tried to maintain the patriarchate of Constantinople in the position of honorable subordination envisioned by the canon. First they wrested control of the patriarchate from the Venetians, who had initially claimed it as their own. Then they dispatched a series of legates, who worked hard to enforce the patriarch's traditional rights over the Greek clergy. Despite these efforts, the 1220s and early 1230s saw a rapid reversal of fortune for the Latin church in the lands reconquered by the various Byzantine successor states, as Greek clergy supplanted the men who had supplanted them in 1204.²⁸

By Gregory's day, it was thus becoming increasingly clear that the survival of the Latin hierarchy hinged less on the result of negotiations between Greek and Latin churchmen than on the outcome of wars between Greek and Latin states. The letters Gregory wrote to Latin prelates in Greece suggest that he was aware of this fact. Requesting money to send troops to Constantinople, he urged the archbishops of Achaia to remember (as if they could have forgotten) that "whether you are saved or destroyed depends upon the aforesaid city."²⁹ No prelate risked more from the loss of Constantinople, of course, than the Latin patriarch himself. If the Latin empire were to fall, he

would surely go down with it. The era of papal primacy over Christendom's second see would be over, just three decades after it had begun.

Tumbling down alongside the Latin patriarch, if Constantinople fell, would be the Latin emperor. When Emperor Robert of Courtenay died in 1228, the heir to the throne was his younger brother Baldwin, a boy of eleven. What was needed under the circumstances was an experienced warrior who could lead the Latins in battle until Baldwin reached his majority. In September 1228 the barons of the empire decided upon John of Brienne, a native of Champagne, who had decades of hard campaigning behind him, kinship ties with prominent northern French crusading families, and a powerful friend in Pope Gregory IX.³⁰

At the time of the election John and Gregory were united in opposition to Frederick II. The emperor had recently offended the pope by setting out on his long-delayed crusade to Jerusalem unabsolved from a sentence of excommunication that Gregory had imposed upon him. In Frederick's absence, the pope made plans to wrest the kingdom of Sicily from imperial control. Gregory did not have to look far for someone to lead his forces. John of Brienne had first won his reputation as a fighter in Syria, where in 1210 he had married the heiress to the kingdom of Jerusalem, Maria "la Marquise." When Maria passed away in 1212, John became regent of the kingdom for their daughter Isabella. In 1225, he arranged to have Isabella marry Frederick II. Once the nuptials had been celebrated, the emperor made good his intention, unknown to John, of ruling the kingdom of Jerusalem personally, and John found himself unemployed. He retired to the Papal States, where he lived in reduced circumstances on lands near Viterbo that Honorius III had given him.³¹ Knowing of his desire for revenge on Frederick, the reconstituted Lombard League sounded him out as a potential commander in 1226, but John chose to ally himself more directly with the papacy, assuming the rectorship of the patrimony of St. Peter in Tuscany and, in the fall of 1228, taking charge of a papal army that was preparing to take the field against imperial forces the following spring.³²

But these plans were thrown into doubt in the late winter of 1228, when envoys from the Latin empire arrived in Rome and offered John the imperial crown. At first the old man hesitated to accept the unexpected honor. After protracted negotiations, and at Gregory's urging (a crusading army was promised if he came to terms), John agreed in April 1229 to become emperor for life, with Baldwin succeeding him.³³ Urgent though the needs of Constantinople were, John did not immediately set off for his new realm. Instead, shortly after accepting the envoy's offer, he marched from Rome at the head of a papal army, seeking confrontation with Frederick's lieutenant Rainald of Spoleto, whose troops had been active in the duchy of Spoleto and the march of Ancona.³⁴

Rumors abounded that John was after more than just revenge on the emperor. In early 1229 the imperial loyalist Thomas of Acerra wrote to

Frederick II, then overseas, that “if anyone made mention of the emperor, John of Brienne affirmed that there was no other emperor but himself.”³⁵ Less hostile sources ascribed to John less ambitious goals than supplanting Frederick in the *regno*. Alberic of Trois-Fontaines was sure that John was trying to advance familial claims on the county of Lecce, which John’s older brother Walter had won in 1205 while waging war on behalf of Innocent III.³⁶ Supporting this view is evidence that Gregory was trying to break up the kingdom of Sicily and establish self-governing communes or smaller lordships in its place, whose rulers would take papal suzerainty over southern Italy more seriously than had Frederick.³⁷ It is also true that John carried on fighting in the south well into the autumn of 1229, when news of Frederick’s return from the East finally turned the Latin emperor’s attention back to Constantinople. It is an intriguing possibility that he had been trying to end his career in southern Italy instead.

What can be said for certain about John’s failed Italian campaign is that it made Gregory even more obliged to support the new emperor once he arrived in Constantinople. Service such as John had given had to be rewarded, lest others hesitate to imitate his example. The troubled politics of the Italian peninsula ensured that Gregory, like other thirteenth-century popes, often needed “athletes of Christ” to advance his claims militarily. If these athletes could not gain their prize on the peninsula, as Walter of Brienne had done in 1205 and Charles of Anjou would do in 1264, then they would have to be rewarded elsewhere. To abandon John to his fate in Constantinople risked alienating other potential allies Gregory might soon need in Italy. And John was more than just a papal loyalist in need of rewarding; he was also the “declared” enemy of Frederick II.³⁸ His election brought the Latin empire within the compass of Hohenstaufen-papal relations, making its continued existence a matter of papal prestige in this arena, and thus a priority of Gregory’s crusading policy.

The Challenge of the Diversion Attempt

The Latin empire would never have a better friend in Rome than Gregory IX. But the pope had set himself a challenge in attempting to divert the Jerusalem crusades to Constantinople. For the past year and more his preachers had been exhorting the faithful to crusade to the Holy Land. They had been successful; expeditions were in preparation in Hungary and France. But now the pope had decided that these crusaders should go to Latin Greece instead. He would either have to persuade them that Constantinople was a more urgent priority than Jerusalem, or he would have to exert pressure upon them, in order to make it clear that, whatever their feelings on the relative merits of the two crusading venues, it was in their interests to follow his directions. In this way the diversion attempt tried both the persuasiveness of papal arguments and the effectiveness of papal mechanisms of control. It is thus a test case for the

papacy's ability to unite crusaders behind its program.

As a theater of crusading activity, the Latin empire did not compare well to the Holy Land. The latter was the oldest and best-established crusading venue. Western Europeans had been crusading there since the eleventh century, and going on pilgrimages there for hundreds of years before that. The Latin empire had been in place since 1204 and by Gregory's day a tradition of crusading in its aid, as we have seen, had yet to develop. The Holy Land was not only the most venerable crusading destination, it was also the most popular. The crusader states of Syria attracted support throughout Europe. The Latin empire had so far not attracted much enthusiasm outside of those with a vested interest in its survival, such as the Venetians and the friends and relatives of the ruling Hainault dynasty.³⁹ Challenged as they were by their Muslim neighbors, the crusader states of the Holy Land still held out the potential for an ambitious person to carve out a lordship and rise to a position of prominence. If the prospects there were not exactly bright, they were promising enough to induce such Barons' Crusaders as Ralph of Soissons and Philip of Montfort to stay behind after the expedition was over. The same could not be said of the Latin empire. The fighting men who went out with John of Brienne in 1231 soon returned disappointed. Never mind carving out lordships, rumor had it they were not even receiving their promised wages: John guarded his gold but lost his land, one chronicler said.⁴⁰ The cruel logic was that the more the Latin empire needed aid, the less willing the materially motivated would be to provide it. Finally, and crucially, the Holy Land could boast of sacred sites that had fired the imaginations of pious Christians for centuries. In Jerusalem alone there was the Holy Sepulcher and the Temple of the Lord, to name but two of the most venerated. The whole city, it has been said, was a kind of relic.⁴¹ Constantinople had its relics too, of course; they would prove some of the Latin empire's most valuable resources. But in a competition over Christian spiritual prestige, no place on earth could rival Jerusalem.

Invidious as these comparisons between the two crusading venues were, Gregory had no choice but to make them. If he were to divert the Holy Land crusade to the Latin empire, he would have to show that the Latin empire had the superior claim to support. At the best of times, this would have been a difficult case to make. In the wake of the fifteen-month long promotional campaign for the Holy Land crusade, it would be an unenviable task indeed. At the outset of that campaign, in *Rachel suum videns*, papal officials had tried to explain why the Holy Land needed immediate help. Any delay in coming to its aid risked the gravest consequences: the continued religious pollution of the Temple and the conquest of the kingdom of Jerusalem by Egyptian forces. Now they would need to make clear why assisting the Latin empire was a more urgent necessity, and why doing so would not risk the catastrophic results for the Holy Land they had lately prophesized. They would need to make this argument, moreover, to the very people who had found their

original appeal for the Holy Land most convincing, the crusaders who had chosen to set out personally in its defense. Somehow, the curia would have to demonstrate the greater merit of the Constantinople crusade to those who had already shown themselves predisposed to favor the Holy Land expedition above all others. Here was a challenge for the rhetorical skills of the chancery scribes.

Along with problems of rhetoric, the diversion attempt posed problems of logistics. Long distances separated the pope from the crusaders whose vows he was trying to commute. At a time when travel was slow and dangerous, simply communicating with them was a challenge. Thibaut of Champagne could sometimes be found in Troyes or in a market town like Provins, which lay astride a major overland trade route. But for much of the late 1230s he lived in the kingdom of Navarre, not an easy place for papal letters or emissaries to reach.⁴² Travel between the Papal States and England, home to Richard of Cornwall, and Hungary, home to King Bela, was scarcely less difficult. Both the pope and the crusaders, moreover, were far from the beneficiaries of the diversion attempt. From western or even eastern Europe, the journey to Constantinople was long and could be slow going. It could take a month or more, for example, to sail from the western Mediterranean to the Bosphorus.⁴³ But these were not unusually lengthy trips for crusade armies to make. Nor, for that matter, was it rare for a pope to organize expeditions of crusaders who lived far from Rome, each other, and their intended target. The diversion attempt compounded these typical logistical challenges, though, by adding the element of speed as a necessary component.

Major crusades in the thirteenth century typically took years to plan and execute: one thinks, for example, of the Fifth Crusade and Louis IX's first expedition, both of which took about four years to prepare. There was no rush for these armies, in a sense, because they aimed to reconquer lands that had already fallen out of Latin control. Better to plan thoroughly and increase the chances of winning a comprehensive victory. But the situation confronting Gregory was different, because Constantinople was still in the hands of Latin forces. The purpose of the Constantinople mission was to strengthen their grip on the city, before Vatatzes and Asen loosened it once and for all. The crusade would do little good if it arrived too late. Under these time constraints, the normal logistical obstacles to organizing crusades loomed larger than they otherwise might have, while the consequences of failing to overcome them were exacerbated.

Papal Resources

Gregory was not, however, without resources to put his plan into effect. Unprecedented as the diversion attempt was, the papal registers did contain propaganda materials that could be used to build a case in its favor. An obvious place to look for inspiration was in the modest cache of papal letters

advocating military support for the Latin empire. A major theme of this correspondence, as we have already seen from Gregory's letter promoting John of Brienne's 1228 crusade, was that the Latin empire had strategic significance for the Holy Land, which meant that by aiding the former one could help ensure the survival of the latter.⁴⁴ Although this instrumental argument had never been used to draw support away from the Holy Land to the Latin empire, the tradition of linking the two crusading venues was well established in papal rhetoric by the time of the diversion attempt.

A much larger body of papal correspondence addressed the vexed question of reuniting the Greek and Latin churches. Here the rhetoricians behind the diversion attempt found the useful claim that the Greeks fostered heresy. Negotiating with the patriarch of Nicaea over union in the early 1230s, Gregory had observed that diverse heresies had arisen as a result of the refusal of the Greek Church to recognize papal primacy. The Greeks' withdrawal from the Roman Church, Gregory maintained, created an environment in which heretical beliefs could flourish.⁴⁵ If that was the case, the Constantinople crusade could be promoted as a means of stopping the spread of heresy in the Aegean.

Finally, to persuade Holy Land crusaders to commute their vows to Constantinople, Gregory's chancery officials could draw upon their experience publicizing crusades to regions other than the Holy Land. It was their practice in this propaganda to describe the value of a crusade in terms of the service to the Church and the faith that it performed.⁴⁶ Although it was seldom maintained that expeditions to Spain, the Baltic, or southern France were more valuable in this regard than a crusade to the Holy Land, they were often declared equal in value.⁴⁷ Such could also be the case for the Constantinople crusade.

Whatever the strength of this rhetoric, the pope was able to fortify it with more practical means of persuasion. He had at his disposal, in fact, powerful coercive tools to bring about the diversion. He found these, for the most part, in the recruitment methods and mechanisms he had devised to promote the Holy Land crusade. We have examined these mechanisms, such as the authority to demand vow redemptions, deferrals, and commutations, the ability to define indulgences, and the right to collect crusade revenues, as ways the papacy recruited potential crusaders. By centralizing and consolidating papal power over crusading, they also served as means that allowed the curia to control crusades.

Among the mechanisms of control available to Gregory, some of the most potent sprang from the authority he claimed over the crusade vow.⁴⁸ *Rachel suum videns*, we will recall, declared that such vows could be "commuted, redeemed, or postponed by apostolic command." Canonists active in Gregory's day tended to construe this claim to authority narrowly. Raymond of Peñafort's discussion of crusade vows in his *Summa de casibus penitentiae* (c. 1222–1228/9) is a case in point.⁴⁹ He acknowledges that the power to

commute and redeem crusade vows is a papal prerogative that lesser clergy could not arrogate to themselves. But he takes it for granted that, in any given case, it is the crusader who seeks to change the status of his or her votive obligation. Assuming the crusader's prior consent to the commutation or the redemption, he limits the pope's role, or really his agent's, to determining whether there are sufficient grounds to grant it. Gregory had a more expansive conception of papal authority over the crusade vow. In the diversion attempt, he acted on the assumption that he could compel even unwilling crusaders to commute, redeem, or postpone their votive obligations.⁵⁰

Each of these options allowed for different kinds of control over crusaders. By postponing vows, the pope could seek to prevent crusaders from departing on their expeditions. The deferment could be for a fixed period of time, or it could be indefinite.⁵¹ By commuting vows, he could seek to have crusaders go somewhere other than where they had originally sworn to go. In theory, he could order one crusader to commute his vow from Livonia to the Holy Land, another from the Holy Land to Livonia, a third from Livonia to Provence, and so forth.⁵² By redeeming vows, he could seek to have crusaders pay money in lieu of fulfilling their vows. This power had implications for papal control over fundraising, because with it went the right to disburse the revenues arising from these redemptions. There was no rule that a fee paid by a crusader who had taken the cross for a particular expedition had to be spent on that expedition. The fee could be spent on any crusade or indeed any other pious work, at the pope's sole discretion.⁵³

Another instrument Gregory could deploy to control crusades was the indulgence. In preaching the crusade, indulgences had served as rewards for meritorious acts; as possible incentives for the faithful to perform those acts; as a kind of measure, telling people how highly their actions were valued; and as a form of sanction, since they could be withdrawn after they had been conferred. Only the pope could offer or withdraw the crusade indulgence, and only he could determine its worth.⁵⁴ In attempting to divert the crusade to the Latin empire, Gregory still had indulgences at his disposal and he used them primarily in two ways, as a measure of spiritual value and as a sanction. In *Rachel suum videns* he had already offered Holy Land crusaders the fullest possible indulgence; in his diversion attempt he could offer no more, but he could offer an equivalent indulgence. This he did, promising them "the same reward of divine remuneration."⁵⁵ By offering a full indulgence Gregory not only allowed crusaders to keep the reward they would have won from the earlier crusade, he also proclaimed the expedition to the Latin empire as equal in spiritual merit to that of the Holy Land. The pope also used his power over the indulgence as a form of sanction by threatening to withdraw it from those who had taken crusade vows to the Holy Land but refused to commute, redeem, or defer them as he saw fit. When, for example, some crusaders tried to set out for the Holy Land in order to avoid having their vows redeemed in aid of the Latin empire, he advised them to "desist from such presumption" on

pain of losing the indulgence.⁵⁶

The indulgence was not the only benefit of taking the cross. As we have seen, Gregory had conferred upon Holy Land crusaders a host of other spiritual and material privileges, which he also maintained the right to withdraw as well as dispense. Save for the indulgence, though, he does not seem to have deprived crusaders of individual privileges. There is no known case of him taking away a crusader's right to answer lawsuits in ecclesiastical court, for example, while leaving the other privileges intact. The more likely scenario was that crusaders would lose all their privileges at once through excommunication, a punishment which stripped them of the crusader status upon which the enjoyment of those privileges rested. Crusaders who wished to fulfill their vows would take a threat of excommunication seriously; so too would those who especially valued their crusader privileges. Deeply in debt, Guy of Nevers risked financial ruin if he were deprived of his crusader status, which afforded him relief from interest charges and a delay in repaying principal.⁵⁷ Feuding with many Breton bishops, Peter of Brittany chanced restoring to them their most powerful spiritual sanction if he lost his crusader privileges, one of which provided immunity from excommunication. Gregory's ability to withdraw these privileges gave him a means of bringing pressure to bear upon crusaders.

A further source of papal leverage derived from the financial demands of crusading. Crusading had always been a costly penitential activity and, as we have seen, the need for funding was acute. Thanks not only to vow redemption, but also to ecclesiastical taxation and legacies, the papacy was able to raise money to meet that need. Just as he did with redemption fees, Gregory claimed the right to collect and distribute the revenues generated by these other fundraising mechanisms. Taxes imposed for the sake of one expedition could be transferred to another.⁵⁸ Most types of legacies could also be spent at the curia's discretion—the only exception was the bequest to a named individual in aid of the Holy Land, which papal agents could not claim for other purposes.⁵⁹ Even so, these fundraising measures placed at the curia's disposal large sums of money, which not even the wealthiest crusaders could afford to ignore. By controlling access to these funds, Gregory could try to dictate where and when crusaders fulfilled their vows.

In theory, Gregory's authority over the crusade vow, the indulgence, other privileges, and crusade funding gave him great powers over crusaders. To make these effective instruments in the diversion attempt, though, required an efficient and responsive administration. As the first pope to employ the mendicant friars as papal crusade agents, he was better equipped in this regard than any of his predecessors. What had made the mendicants valuable to the Holy Land preaching campaign was their vocational expertise, commitment to a popular form of piety, urban roots, and geographical dispersion. What made them valuable to the diversion attempt was, above all, their capacity for obedience. There were no intermediate layers of authority between the curia

and mendicant preachers in the field. Although he was never able to dispense entirely with the services of local churchmen, by using the mendicants Gregory was able to centralize “the business of the cross” to an unprecedented degree. The contrast with Innocent III’s crusade administration is marked. For all his efforts to give the papacy a central role in crusade recruitment, Innocent had had to rely almost exclusively on local officials, who, embedded as they were in regional networks of power and patronage, were not always as responsive to papal directives as the pope might have liked.⁶⁰ Franciscans and Dominicans were more compliant, and not only because the rules of their orders bound them directly to Rome. Beyond the formal, constitutional bond, there were personal loyalties at play as well. This was especially true among the Franciscans, whose patron and first cardinal-protector Gregory had been. Whether out of obedience to the office or loyalty to his person, Franciscans and Dominicans seem to have been willing to carry out the most delicate tasks for him. Already, in the late 1220s, they had played a key part in organizing his military campaign against Frederick II.⁶¹ Now, in the late winter of 1235, they would assume a leading role in the diversion attempt.

Gregory embarked upon the diversion of the Hungarian, French, and (eventually) English Holy Land crusades with potentially powerful arguments and instruments of control at hand, a willingness to exploit them fully, and a staff that was eager to help him do so. As he appealed to crusaders to divert their vows, he employed a set of universal arguments that addressed them as Christians. While his arguments about why these fighters should aid Constantinople rather than the Holy Land remained universal, Gregory nevertheless tailored his approach to take account of regional and individual interests. He was clearly aware that these crusades hailed from three distinct regions of Christendom, each with its own relationship to the Latin empire. Even within these regions, moreover, divergent attitudes toward the empire could be found. As we will see in the following chapters, he modified his tactics place by place, negotiating individually with potential crusaders in terms of their particular political situations. In doing so, he demonstrates an awareness that his appeal to the crusaders as Christians to fight an enemy of Christendom might not in itself be enough to persuade them take up arms for Constantinople.

The Appeal to King Bela: Crusaders, Muslims, and Jews in Hungary

When Gregory IX called upon King Bela IV of Hungary to crusade to Constantinople, he invoked Beta's duty as a Christian: as the Latin empire's closest Catholic neighbor, the king was expected to take up arms. In Hungary we see the first response to the papal call to crusade against the enemies of Latin Greece. Bela was generally disinclined to fight non-Christians when it did not advance Hungarian interests. Moreover, he was particularly unhappy with the papal insistence that he enforce a stricter separation between Christians and non-Christians within his kingdom. Bela used negotiations over whether or not he would fight for the Latin empire in order to gain papal concessions over his policies toward Hungarian Muslims, Cumans, and Jews. In trying to gain crusaders for Constantinople, Gregory suspended his own stated policy of universal discrimination against non-Christians, largely granting the concessions Bela requested. Gregory justified this decision by explaining that heretics and schismatics posed a greater threat to Christendom than Muslims and Jews. Even Gregory, in his eagerness to gain fighters for Constantinople, thus put aside the idea of an undifferentiated non-Christian "other." In Hungary, Gregory's appeal elicited no warfare against schismatics in Latin Greece and eased pressure on non-Christians within Hungary's borders.

As the Latin regime in Constantinople struggled to fend off the joint attentions of Vatazes of Nicaea and Asen of Bulgaria in the winter of 1235–36, Gregory turned to Hungary for help. In mid-December he exhorted King Bela and his brother Coloman, duke of Slavonia, to hasten to bestow aid and counsel on the empire, while ordering Hungary's two leading prelates, the archbishops of Esztergom and Kalocsa, to recruit a crusading army for the royal brothers to lead to Constantinople.¹ In order to save time and concentrate resources, the churchmen were told to take troops for the new venture from crusading expeditions already in train. All crusade vows sworn by healthy young males in Hungary were to be commuted to the Constantinople crusade; the vows of so-called "incapable" crusaders were to be redeemed for cash to help pay for the expedition. This meant that Coloman's crusade against alleged heretics in Slavonia and Bosnia, in preparation since October 1234, was put aside; and so too, of course, were plans for crusading to the Holy Land. In mid-January, hardly before he could have expected a response to his initial flurry of directives, Gregory wrote

again to Hungary, this time to the kingdom's bishops. Warning them of the danger delay posed to the Latin empire, he announced that he had dispatched the Cistercian abbot of St. Thomas of Torcello to help prepare the proposed Hungarian crusade to Constantinople "prudently" and above all "quickly."²

Hungary was a natural place to look for a rapid relief force for Constantinople. Outside of the crusader states themselves, Hungary was the closest Catholic power to the Latin empire.³ In its early thirteenth-century heyday, moreover, the kingdom was a formidable regional presence. It was then about three times as large as the present-day republic, incorporating considerable portions of modern Croatia, Bosnia, Slovakia, Austria, Serbia, Romania, and Ukraine.⁴ The ruling Árpád dynasty favored expanding the kingdom farther still, and was not reluctant to employ military force to do so. Bela's father, King Andrew, mounted no less than fourteen campaigns against Galicia between 1205 and 1233.⁵ Andrew also committed the family to its grandest foreign adventure yet when he went on the Fifth Crusade in 1217, conducting a brief and bootless campaign in the vicinity of Mount Tabor.⁶ For all their fighting, the Árpáds did not pass up opportunities to spread their influence by more peaceful means, and one measure of their arrival on the European stage was the success they began to achieve in the international marriage market. In 1235, for example, Bela's half-sister Yolanda married another ambitious monarch intent on expanding Christendom's frontiers, James "the Conqueror" of Aragon. More intriguing perhaps to the pope were the ties the Árpáds had forged with the Latin empire. In 1215 King Andrew married Yolanda, the daughter of Peter of Courtenay, who was elected emperor of Constantinople in 1216 but disappeared on the journey east to take up the crown. Succeeding Peter was Robert of Courtenay, who set off in his father's wake four years later. When Robert arrived in Hungary, Andrew invited him to winter at his court. The following spring Bela himself traveled with Robert to Constantinople to witness the imperial coronation, a public demonstration of the ties of family and friendship that united Hungary and the Latin empire.⁷

Strong, Catholic, committed to crusading, and seemingly friendly, Hungary had all the makings of a good ally for the Latin empire. So far, however, it had not delivered on its promise. This was not through lack of effort on Gregory's part. He had, in fact, been trying to use Hungary as a recruitment ground for the Latin empire for some time before the crisis of 1235. The focus of his attention was a small expedition of Hungarian Holy Land crusaders that seems to have come together in the late 1220s or early 1230s under the impetus of the bishop of Győr. Several other prominent members of the Hungarian ecclesiastical and secular elite were also involved, including the bishop of Eger and Denis the Palatine, the highest officer in the royal administration. In the spring of 1231, anticipating John of Brienne's arrival in Constantinople, Gregory commuted the vows of these crusaders to service in John's army. The pope declared the new venture "more acceptable to God,

more useful to the Universal Church, and more convenient to them” than the Holy Land passage.⁸ Be that as it may, only the bishop of Győr, who had taken the cross from Gregory’s own hands, seems to have fully embraced the scheme. The bishop was soon complaining to the pope that his companions had failed to live up to their engagements—the deadline for joining up with John’s expedition had come and gone without any of them having left Hungary. In February 1232 Gregory authorized the bishop to compel his fellow crusaders to fulfill their vows or redeem them on pain of ecclesiastical censure.⁹ The next we hear of the crusade is 11 June 1234, just days, it will be recalled, after the breakdown of papal negotiations over church union with Nicaea. By then the bishop of Győr had duly employed the sanctioning power at his disposal, placing every crusader (save himself) under a sentence of interdict. Gregory upheld the punishment, lectured the crusaders on his right to commute or redeem crusade vows as he saw fit, and threatened excommunication for continued noncompliance.¹⁰ To no avail, however: there is no indication that anyone from this expedition ever set out for Constantinople.

Hungary’s performance in support of the Latin empire prior to 1235 had not been encouraging. But the question remained how Bela and Coloman would respond to the larger, more elaborate scheme to aid Constantinople that Gregory put before them that December. One potential problem, indeed, lay precisely in the ambition of the papal plan: it was asking a lot for them to take on Bulgaria and Nicaea, the two greatest Balkan powers of the day, at once. Then there was the delicate matter of compensation. Gregory offered spiritual rewards in abundance: anyone from Hungary who went on crusade to Latin Greece would receive the fullest indulgence he could grant, the one usually conferred upon Holy Land crusaders.¹¹ The pope justified his largesse by dwelling upon the benefits that assisting the Latin empire would bring to the Holy Land. Only through Romania, he insisted to Bela, could western pilgrims return freely from the Holy Land. And if the empire fell back into Greek hands, it would become more difficult to aid the Holy Land, because the Greeks hated the Latins even more than pagans.¹² Gregory said nothing, though, about complementing these spiritual benefits with more tangible rewards.

Even if a full crusade indulgence and the satisfaction of having helped the Holy Land had been reward enough for Bela and Coloman, the pope’s proposal had come at an awkward moment for them and the rest of the kingdom’s power elite. Bela had ascended the throne just two months earlier, on 14 October 1235.¹³ His father Andrew’s reign had been long and sometimes chaotic; and Bela’s relations with his father and his aged coterie of advisors had not always been easy. There was consequently a need for the young monarch to assert his newfound authority. He purged his father’s counselors, whom he accused of conspiring to overthrow him.¹⁴ He rescinded many of the land grants his father had made to supporters among the minor

nobility and in the Church. He ordered that only dukes, archbishops, and bishops could be seated in his presence and had the seats of the barons in the royal council chamber burned.¹⁵ Like Henry III in England and Louis IX in France the year before, Bela was thus occupied in consolidating his authority domestically when Gregory called on him to go abroad on crusade. Furthermore, with estates being confiscated left and right, it would be an imprudent landowner who left Hungary and her new king behind for a campaign against Vataztes and Asen.

Worse still for Gregory's chances of receiving a positive response, one of the reasons Bela found himself in such a difficult position had to do with the pope himself. During the last years of Andrew's reign Gregory had grown increasingly concerned about the position of non-Christians in Hungarian society generally and in royal administration particularly. Like France and England, the two other targets of the diversion attempt, Hungary had a small Jewish population. Unlike these other kingdoms, Hungary also had a tiny Muslim population, as well as a modest but growing population of "pagans" (mostly Cumans).¹⁶ These groups, the ecclesiastical hierarchy charged, enjoyed greater liberties and assimilation than was proper in a Christian kingdom. The pope's attempts to bring the status of these groups into line with canonical norms led to a bitter conflict with the Hungarian monarchy that weakened its authority and damaged its interests. If Gregory were to recruit Bela as a defender of the Latin empire, he would first have to overcome the obstacle Hungary's non-Christian communities posed to good papalroyal relations.

Gregory's fears about Hungary's non-Christians were initially sparked by the kingdom's ecclesiastical hierarchy, especially its ranking member, Robert, archbishop of Esztergom.¹⁷ Beginning in the early 1220s, Robert and his colleagues complained steadily to the papal curia that royal policy toward non-Christians violated canon law and harmed Christian society.¹⁸ Muslims and Jews were allowed to hold public office, contrary to the Fourth Lateran Council's declaration that it was "quite absurd that any who blaspheme against Christ should have power over Christians."¹⁹ Muslims owned Christian slaves and married Christian women with impunity. More troubling still, many Muslims enjoyed greater liberties under royal law than Christians, numbers of whom, especially among the poor, converted to Islam for the sake of the superior lifestyle. These complaints (some of which had a factual basis and some of which did not)²⁰ in turn comprised just one part of a larger struggle the episcopacy was waging with the Hungarian crown over issues of sovereignty, legal jurisdiction, and above all money—the more usual stuff of church-state conflict.

If the bishops had an overriding concern, it was with royal fiscal policy. In their view, the administration of royal finances had taken a disastrous turn when King Andrew, shortly after his accession, had introduced a policy he called "new institutions." Basically, this entailed distributing royal domain

land to his supporters on an unprecedented scale. With these lands no longer available to produce income for the crown, it became necessary to seek out new sources of revenue. Andrew and his officials introduced new taxes and customs dues, minted new coinage not once but several times a year, and created the Chamber of Salt, which gave to the monarchy the preponderant role in salt commerce previously enjoyed by the Hungarian Church.²¹ The right to collect these new revenues was farmed out to the highest (or best-connected) bidder, who was known by the title *comes camere* (count of the treasury). Some Jews and Muslims could be found among their number, although the office was by no means their exclusive preserve.²² This radical attempt to reform royal finance aroused opposition from nobles who had not benefited from Andrew's largesse. After a brief revolt, their demands were addressed in the king's Golden Bull of 1222. The church hierarchy, like the nobles, opposed Andrew's new policy. One of its key provisions, the creation of the Chamber of Salt, was an obvious blow to its interests, and the farming out of minting rights in particular dug into the revenues of the archbishop of Esztergom, because formerly royal coinage had been struck only at Esztergom and the archbishop had drawn an income from it. The only consolation in all this was that some land found its way into church hands as the result of Andrew's distributions. In the late 1220s, however, Bela, now firmly ensconced in Transylvania, began to rescind some of these donations. Having previously objected to Andrew's reforms, the prelates now objected to Bela's attempts to undo them and resolved to oppose the monarchy at all costs. By the early 1230s their complaints about royal attacks on ecclesiastical liberties and employment of non-Christians were reaching the papal curia, where Gregory readied himself to intervene on the bishops' side.

In March 1231 the pope authorized the archbishop of Esztergom to impose ecclesiastical sanctions upon those who violated church rights or connived at Muslim and Jewish oppression of Christians.²³ Under pressure from the archbishop, Andrew re-issued the Golden Bull in 1231 in a revised form.²⁴ Clauses from the 1222 version considered injurious to church interests, such as those touching on the payment of tithes and the salt trade, were removed. The prohibition on non-Christian office holding was retained. New clauses protecting ecclesiastical liberties in Hungary were added, with lay courts forbidden from hearing cases involving marriage and clerics. Most important of all was a new enforcement clause, which gave the archbishop of Esztergom the right to excommunicate the king or his counselors if they did not respect the liberties accorded by the new bull.

Archbishop Robert was not slow to wield the new weapon the revised Golden Bull had given him. Declaring that the king had ignored the bull's provisions, especially those bearing on non-Christians, in February 1232 Robert placed the kingdom under interdict and excommunicated some of the king's closest advisors.²⁵ Andrew convinced Robert to lift the interdict temporarily and then appealed to Rome for papal mediation.²⁶ Gregory

dispatched as legate Jacob of Pecorara, cardinal-bishop elect of Palestrina, who arrived in Hungary toward the end of 1232. Jacob sympathized with the bishops, and his discussions with royal officials dragged on until August 1233, when Gregory threatened Andrew with the renewal of the suspended sentences of interdict and excommunication.²⁷ On 20 August 1233 the king gave way and swore the Oath of Bereg.

Drafted by the legate, the Oath of Bereg addressed three ecclesiastical concerns: justice; non-Christians; and commerce in salt.²⁸ Andrew swore, not for the first time, that cases relating to marriage or clerks should only be heard before ecclesiastical tribunals. He promised again that Jews and Muslims should no longer be employed in minting, the salt trade, the collection of fines or customs duties, or in any other function that supposedly placed them in a position to oppress Christians. The king was to ensure further that non-Christians and Christians did not live together, whether as a result of non-Christians keeping Christian slaves or marrying Christian women. The legate introduced two new measures to enforce this article. First, in accordance with the Fourth Lateran Council, Jews and Muslims were to wear a sign that distinguished them from Christians; second, the palatine or another high royal official was to conduct an annual inspection of the realm to see that the law was observed; violators would be stripped of their possessions and enslaved. The remainder of the agreement, the bulk of it, in fact, sought to regulate the salt trade. The former dominance of the prelates in domestic salt commerce was re-established and they also obtained a monopoly on the transport of salt earmarked for foreign sale. Andrew agreed to pay 10,000 marks over five years in compensation for ecclesiastical losses in the trade stemming from royal policies.

In separate oaths, Coloman and Bela obliged themselves to uphold Cardinal Jacob's conventions.²⁹ In February 1234, the legate extracted from Bela an additional oath on non-Christians. Bela swore to remove from Hungary heretics, Christian converts who reverted back to Islam or Judaism, and false Christians. He also undertook to "compel those people in our land who disobey the Roman Church to obey her."³⁰

With the king and his male heirs committed by oath to upholding church rights and observing canonical regulations on non-Christians, the legate felt able to depart for Rome in the spring of 1234. Before leaving, though, he authorized the bishop of Bosnia, the Dominican and close papal ally John of Wildeshausen, to excommunicate the king and place Hungary under interdict if Andrew did not honor his commitments. Apparently the king did not, for the sentences were duly imposed in the late spring. At this point, whether because sanctioning power had been taken out of his hands, or because he had simply come to feel that things had gone too far, the archbishop of Esztergom switched to the king's side and refused to observe the ecclesiastical penalties. The conflict was now directly between the pope and the Hungarian monarchy. In the summer of 1234, with the legate at his side, Gregory upheld the

sanctions and ordered king and archbishop alike to observe them.³¹

The events of the summer of 1234 show that Gregory was prepared to pursue the dispute with the Hungarian crown over ecclesiastical liberties and the status of non-Christians farther than even Archbishop Robert, the churchman who had appealed for papal intervention in the first place, was willing to go. Through the autumn of 1234 and into 1235, though, as plans for the Holy Land crusade took shape, the pope began to display signs of a willingness to compromise on domestic issues in Hungary for the sake of his global priorities. On 31 August 1235, the papal curia announced that King Andrew had taken the cross and sworn to go personally in aid of the Holy Land.³² On the same day, it issued a number of privileges in the king's favor. The bishop of Bosnia was ordered not to proceed with the recently imposed sentences of excommunication and interdict without papal permission. Henceforth, Andrew and his family could be excommunicated only on the pope's direct license. A few days earlier the archbishop of Esztergom had obtained release from the ecclesiastical strictures imposed upon him for not observing the excommunication and the interdict; and the king's chaplains were forgiven for celebrating divine services with Andrew while the sentences were in force. The curia also extended the payments on the 10,000 marks Andrew owed the Hungarian church from five to ten years. Finally, at the king's request Gregory eased the inspection regime instituted by the legate into non-Christian employment and living arrangements. The reviews would now take place every two years rather than annually.³³ While conciliatory in spirit, these measures conceded less than it may at first appear. The spiritual sanctions on Andrew were suspended rather than lifted; the material sanction was delayed rather than reduced; and the inspections of non-Christians were made less frequent rather than eliminated. The actual provisions of the Oath of Bereg remained in place. This was just as well, perhaps, from the pope's point of view, because Andrew did not live long enough to deliver on his end of the bargain, dying just three weeks after taking the cross. Still, the path toward improved relations with Andrew's heir, the potential savior of Constantinople, was now marked out.

As Gregory stepped up efforts to win Bela's support for the Latin empire, he eased the pressure on the king to respect ecclesiastical liberties and enforce ecclesiastical norms on Hungary's non-Christian communities. After December 1235, papal protests over injuries done to the Hungarian church become less frequent and vehement. True, in January 1236 Gregory informed Bela that the heads of several Hungarian religious houses had remonstrated over the revival of the king's program of rescinding his father's donations to monasteries. Rather than dispatching a legate or threatening sanctions, however, the pope merely urged Bela to mind his duty as a Christian monarch and desist from further seizures of church property.³⁴ Later that year, when Bela complained about monasteries seizing lands from him, Gregory enthusiastically rebuked them on his behalf, revealing newfound sympathy for

the king's plight.³⁵ Bela carried on with his own confiscations through 1238 and into 1239.³⁶

Even more pronounced was the shift in Gregory's approach to Hungary's non-Christians. After 1235 papal correspondence about Jews and Muslims drops off. Compared to the high volume of writing during the first half of the decade, there is only one letter on the subject during the second half. This letter of December 1239 offered a concession on what had been one of the key issues in the dispute between the papal curia and the crown: the king's right to employ non-Christians as farmers of royal revenues.³⁷ Gregory expressed the view that it was better to employ Christians in that capacity, but allowed Bela to lease out his revenues to Jews and Muslims if they worked under Christian supervision. With papal pressure on him reduced, Bela ignored the Oath of Bereg and employed non-Christians without fear of repercussions through the latter half of the 1230s.

Gregory was going to great lengths to court the favor of the Hungarian royal family. Yet he received no reply to his invitation to crusade to Constantinople. While Bela busied himself with domestic affairs, Coloman went ahead with his crusade against heretics in Slavonia and Bosnia, which seems to have occupied him for the rest of the decade. The prospect of making war on Nicaea and Bulgaria simultaneously remained daunting. To make the venture more appealing, the pope could try to break up the "iniquitous" union between Vatatzes and Asen. A crusade against one of them stood a better chance of success than a crusade against both; and in any case separating them could help relieve the pressure on the Latin empire while the search for military aid continued.

In May 1236 Gregory warned Asen to avoid Vatatzes and to stop harassing the Latins of Constantinople, on pain of excommunication. This was in fact an idle threat, because at the time Asen was not in communion with Rome, having embraced Orthodoxy when he first allied himself with Vatatzes.³⁸ Fortunately for the pope, toward the end of 1236 Asen's enthusiasm for the Nicaean alliance began to wane of its own accord.³⁹ Although one scholar has called the tsar's foreign policy at this stage "somewhat incoherent," his second thoughts about the Nicaean coalition are quite understandable.⁴⁰ The allies had failed to achieve their main aim of taking Constantinople. They had conquered Gallipoli and parts of eastern Thrace, but these lands had gone to Vatatzes not Asen. With little to show from the alliance so far, Asen had reason to fear that it was allowing Nicaea to grow too powerful for Bulgaria's own good. In the early spring of 1237 he broke with Vatatzes and contacted Gregory, professing his loyalty to the Roman church and a desire to discuss with "an honorable and circumspect person ... those matters relating to the city of Constantinople and the state of the empire."⁴¹

The pope was only too happy to oblige. In May 1237 he sent the bishop of Perugia to Bulgaria as a papal legate with full authority to negotiate with the erstwhile schismatic. Around the same time Vatatzes received a stern letter

from the curia threatening grave consequences if he committed further acts of aggression against Constantinople. An “innumerable multitude” of “powerful men and strenuous warriors” had taken the cross for the Holy Land, Gregory warned, whose number would suffice, if it proved necessary, to thwart the enemies of Romania and allow it to breathe in peace again:

Therefore we ask and exhort your nobility, considering prudently your own interests and taking care to provide for your salvation in the future, especially because of the dangers to the soul, the destruction of bodies, the ruin of places, and the expense of such affairs, as well as the destruction of warriors—let the Lord prevent it—that would follow, that you contrive neither danger nor expense against the said empire.⁴²

The claim that a great body of crusaders was coming from the West to save the Latin empire was, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, something of a bluff. But it made clear to Vatatzes that he was now the main target of the papal crusade. The final piece of the diplomatic puzzle fell into place with a fresh appeal to Hungary. On the way to Bulgaria the bishop of Perugia stopped over at the Hungarian court and relayed the pope’s instructions to Bela: the king should encourage Asen to remain loyal to the Roman church but compel Vatatzes to return to her obedience by force.⁴³ To help generate this force, Gregory offered for the first time twenty days of relaxed penance to anyone who came to hear a crusade sermon for the Latin empire.⁴⁴ The aim behind the preaching and the diplomacy was clearly a combined Bulgarian-Hungarian attack on Nicaea.

The pope had given Bela a lot to think about. On the one hand, the new scheme was certainly more feasible than the previous one. If Asen proved amenable to joint operations, Bela would lose an enemy and gain an ally at the same time. Nor was the prospect of teaming up with the tsar inherently implausible. Bulgaria had been a fairly amicable neighbor to Hungary, at least by medieval Balkan standards, and Asen was Bela’s brother-in-law, having married Bela’s sister Maria in 1221.⁴⁵ On the other hand, material inducements were still in short supply. Save for King Andrew’s Holy Land crusade, Árpáadian military campaigns had focused on expanding the Hungarian realm into neighboring territories—Galicia to the northeast, “Cumania” to the southeast, Bosnia and Croatia to the southwest.⁴⁶ An expedition against the Nicaean empire, which did not share a border with Hungary, would not achieve this traditional aim. Furthermore, standing between Hungary and Nicaea was Bela’s proposed partner in the venture, Bulgaria, which was therefore better placed to profit from any conquests that were made.

Certainly by inclination, but in light of the previous considerations perhaps out of necessity too, Gregory’s appeal to Bela remained couched in altruistic terms. The king should fight for the Latin empire because it would ensure the security of the crusader states of the Holy Land. “If the lord ... had translated

the empire of Constantinople from the Greeks to the Latins before the destruction of the Eastern Land, as afterward he did translate it,” Gregory explained, “then perhaps the Christian people would not have wept over the desolation of the province of Jerusalem.”⁴⁷ In other words, if the Latins had come to power in Constantinople earlier, before Saladin’s conquests of the 1180s, Jerusalem might have remained in Christian hands. Now that Byzantium was under Latin control, it was essential that it remain that way, since “the retention of the [Latin empire] is akin to the restoration of the [Holy Land].” As a Christian ruler, blessed by Christ with power, riches, fame, and even a saint for a sister (Gregory had canonized St. Elizabeth of Hungary in 1235), Bela should heed the summons of His vicar to wield the material sword on the Latin empire’s behalf.⁴⁸

Bela did not heed the summons. Instead he looked on as Asen joined the Latins of Constantinople for the summer campaigning season. John of Brienne had died in March 1237, so the Latins went into battle under the temporary leadership of Anseau of Cayeux.⁴⁹ The new allies besieged the Nicaean fortress of Tzurulum, the key to eastern Thrace. But Asen soon withdrew from the siege on the news of an outbreak of the plague at Trnovo. He arrived there to find his wife and eldest son dead. According to George Acropolites, the Greek chronicler, the tsar interpreted their passing as a divine punishment for his abandonment of the alliance with Vatatzes.⁵⁰ Whether out of obedience to the divine will, or a sense that the balance of power ought to be tilted back in the direction of the Greeks, in the winter of 1237 Asen broke with the Latins and their Roman rite, re-united with Vatatzes, and made plans for a fresh assault on Constantinople.

In the event, it was Vatatzes, not Asen, who put Constantinople under siege again at the end of 1237. Yet in January 1238 Gregory called on Bela to crusade against the ruler of Bulgaria, not Nicaea. The idea may have been to take pressure off Constantinople by having Hungarian forces invade Bulgaria from the north, thus forcing Asen and his army to withdraw from Thrace to defend their homeland.⁵¹ Another, not incompatible, possibility is that Gregory was trying to offer Bela something he had not offered before—a solid expectation of territorial expansion—which he could only do by targeting Bulgaria, Hungary’s neighbor to the south.

With the change in target came a change in rhetoric. The pope’s appeal of 27 January to Bela, *Supremus opifex*, says nothing about the Holy Land or the Latin empire. Instead it presents the crusade as a way of eliminating a schismatic ruler who allowed heresy to thrive in his lands. Schismatics and heretics were those who rejected Peter’s heir, the pope, as their pastor. They were “more perfidious than Jews and crueller than pagans”:

For while the Jews affixed the Lord to the yoke of the cross one time, heretics crucify him in his members over and over again, wounding him with their insults and opprobrium; and while [the Jews] believe, in the blindness of their

sin, that God the father created everything visible and invisible, [the heretics] believe that the visible world was created by the prince of darkness. Pagans too used to rage as they punished and injured the bodies of Christians. They quietly steal upon the souls of faithful Christians and steal them away from Christ. ... Schismatics also try to tear asunder the seamless tunic of Jesus Christ ... namely, the Church.⁵²

The principle expounded here, that heretics and schismatics posed a greater threat to Christendom than Jews and pagans, provides a belated rationale for the course of action the pope had pursued in Hungary since 1235, when he put aside his campaign against the kingdom's Jews and pagans to rouse Bela to confront the Greek Orthodox enemies of Latin Constantinople. The pope had called Asen a schismatic in previous letters to Bela, but had focused mainly on the threat the tsar posed to Christian possession of the Latin empire and the Holy Land. In *Supremus opifex*, it is Asen the schismatic who takes center stage, and, for the first time in the correspondence, the implications of his withdrawal from the Roman church are drawn out: by removing himself from Peter's flock he has allowed heresy to thrive and has become such a receiver and defender of heretics that all his lands are said to be infested by their "depravity."

This shift in argumentation had practical import. It meant that Gregory could offer Bulgaria to Bela for occupation under canon three of the Fourth Lateran Council, which authorized the pope to declare open for conquest by Catholic princes the lands of rulers he believed had failed to repress heresy. Gregory invoked the conciliar legislation in his offer: "we expose that land for occupation as it is regulated in the general council." By "that land" he meant not just Asen's ancestral holdings, but all the territory he had conquered from the Latin empire too. Baldwin of Courtenay, the heir to the Latin empire, was encouraged to surrender all his rights in Asen's lands to the papal curia, so that Gregory could grant them to Bela. Gregory explained to Baldwin that he saw "scarcely another way of aiding the empire."⁵³ Hungarian military support for the Latin empire would come at the cost of some of its former extent, but Baldwin's loss would be Bela's gain. For the first time, the pope was offering the king tangible recompense for his services.

Now Gregory had Bela's attention. After a lengthy delay the king agreed in a letter of 8 June 1238 to invade Bulgaria.⁵⁴ The letter affords a rare glimpse at the crusader's side of a negotiation with the pope. Bela began by declaring how difficult it would be to do what Gregory asked. Asen may have been a schismatic, but he was bound to Bela by bonds of friendship and love. The tsar was "so subject to our orders in all things, that he seems not so much a friend as a subject." If Bela were to attack him, moreover, he would offend his friends and relations in Romania. Vatatzes, to name one, "will reckon that he will be attacked in the person of Asen." That being said, however:

because nothing ought to be put before divine love and salvation of the soul,

in the hope of eternal remuneration and the devotion of the Apostolic See and the sincere esteem which we hope that you have towards us, inspired from the soul we agree ... to occupy Bulgaria and other lands of Asen, and with God's aid to subject them to the jurisdiction of the Apostolic See in spiritual matters and to our jurisdiction in temporal matters, unless, as it happens, we will have been hindered by a legitimate impediment.⁵⁵

After this fervent expression of piety (and careful carving out of room to maneuver) Bela set forth his conditions for undertaking the expedition. There were eleven of these. The first was that Bela himself be appointed papal legate in Bulgaria, so that he might delimit dioceses, mark out parishes, and appoint bishops. This right, he claimed, was conceded to his blessed ancestor St. Stephen. Furthermore:

if we were to enter into those parts with the legate of the Apostolic See, it will be assumed by all the residents of those parts that we wish to subject them in temporal matters not to us, but to the Roman church, which they would abhor so much, that they would endeavor to defend to the death many things which we could otherwise obtain without the struggle of a fight. For they frequently used to upbraid us and other Christians, that we were servants of the Roman church.”⁵⁶

One has to wonder whether Gregory and the cardinals appreciated such an unflattering description of the state of the Roman church in a country that was supposed to have accepted the Roman rite in 1204 and observed it through the early 1230s. Yet Bela needed a bold argument to back up such an audacious request. To put it in perspective, we can recall that Gregory had taken his name in homage to Gregory VII, the pope who some 150 years earlier had launched the struggle to take church appointments out of the hands of secular rulers. To be sure, many lords continued to exercise *de facto* control over clerical offices during and after the Reform Movement. Nevertheless, in the early decades of the thirteenth century, for a pope to concede the powers of a legate to a king, to give him the right not only to appoint bishops, but to map out the boundaries of their dioceses and the parishes within them, was remarkable.

Conditions two through eight on Bela's list were less controversial. He asked that the army be allowed to bear a cross before it as it marched through Hungary toward Bulgaria, “so that by this means the devotion of the people might be increased”; that all crusaders from Hungary be committed to him for the expedition; that mendicant friars take charge of the preaching campaign and grant the Holy Land crusade indulgence to those who took the cross; that a cohort of friars, to be chosen by him, attend upon the army; that a sentence of excommunication be promulgated against anyone who attacked Hungary or conspired against him while the invasion was in course, “lest on account of this service to God we are exposed to injury”; that Bulgaria be laid open for

occupation to no one but him; and that he and everyone subject to him be taken under the protection of the Apostolic See.

With his final demands Bela sought to dismantle the apparatus of constitutions, oaths, and enforcement mechanisms that the former papal legate, Cardinal Jacob, had erected in Hungary to defend ecclesiastical liberties and enforce ecclesiastical law on non-Christians. Condition nine required the relaxation of all sentences of excommunication incurred by violators of the provisions of the Oath of Bereg. Bela claimed the legate had imposed these sentences for “light” reasons. The legate was a holy man, but his ignorance of conditions in Hungary had caused him to “so fortif[y] his constitutions with sentences of excommunication that almost everyone found himself excommunicated.” Therefore the tenth condition demanded the revocation of the legate’s order, issued just before leaving Hungary, compelling observance of the Oath of Bereg under pain of interdict and excommunication. Bela himself had been further obliged by the legate to swear to uphold the Oath of Bereg and to expel from Hungary heretics and insincere converts to Christianity. The king did not refer to these oaths explicitly but rather asked, as the eleventh and final condition, that the pope grant him blanket absolution from all the oaths the legate had made him swear, which “he took from us for light reasons, which we cannot even recall on account of their multitude.” Released from the “heavy burden” of papal constitutions, Bela could restore the country to the rule of “common law and the institutions of the sacred fathers.”

How far would Gregory go to accommodate a potential defender of the Latin empire? Very far indeed, as it turned out. In early August 1238 the pope lauded Bela’s resolve to attack Asen and issued orders granting almost all the king’s demands.⁵⁷ Gregory’s greatest concession by far was to give Bela the control he wanted over the church in a post-conquest Bulgaria. The pope insisted, though, on maintaining at least the veneer of ecclesiastical authority. Instead of granting authority to mark-out dioceses, create parishes, and institute bishops directly to Bela, Gregory would confer these powers on a legate of Bela’s choosing, who would faithfully follow the king’s advice. As the pope insisted, “Even if it is not what you requested to the letter, we have conceded to you [the power you wanted] in effect.”⁵⁸

There were other demands, however, to which Gregory was less willing to accede so completely, even if he tried hard to disguise the fact. He hesitated before the prospect of permanently abandoning Cardinal Jacob’s constitutions, as Bela had proposed. True, these had been allowed to lapse as the recruitment of the king went forward, but doing away with them entirely would deprive the papacy of a powerful source of leverage in Hungary. In order to avoid a flat denial, Gregory resorted to a time-honored negotiating expedient. He asked for more information about the constitutions, claiming ignorance of their contents.⁵⁹ He was equally subtle on the question of Bela’s oaths. At stake, of course, were not promises extracted for “light reasons,” but

the mechanism that bound the king to cherished if momentarily dormant papal policies. The pope would not absolve Bela from all the oaths the legate had made him swear, but only from those the provincial prior of the Dominicans of Hungary and the minister of the Franciscans of Esztergom province deemed detrimental to the king's soul.⁶⁰ Could these worthy friars be counted on to rule that the king's oaths on non-Christians posed no risk to his spiritual well being and were therefore in force? Gregory was putting his close ties with the mendicant orders to a stern test. He came closer, however, to meeting the demand that all of Cardinal Jacob's sentences of excommunication be lifted. He released those who took the cross against Asen from the ban, but kept it in place upon those who would not.⁶¹

Besides crusading privileges and relief from ecclesiastical punishments, Gregory had offered Bela two inducements medieval kings usually prized: more land and greater control over church offices and properties. Tempting to most monarchs, these rewards fit Bela's needs particularly well. King Andrew's conflicts with the ecclesiastical hierarchy and alienations of royal estates had weakened the monarchy to the benefit of church and nobility alike. By increasing royal domain lands and providing Bela with a church of his own to dominate, the conquest of Bulgaria would strengthen the crown at the expense of its two main rivals for domestic supremacy.

Still, Bela's response was slow to come; and when it did, on 13 January 1239, it was polite but noncommittal.⁶² Bela had come to realize that attacking Asen would be an expensive and laborious business. Yet he was nonetheless prepared to put forward his person and goods for Jesus Christ, to offer his creator a "living sacrifice," to "exchange this present life with its pleasures for an eternal one," to invade Bulgaria, in a word, if only the pope would provide him with more "aid, counsel, and favor." He accordingly dispatched the bishop of Győr to Rome for further discussions. Apparently these were not successful, because we hear nothing more of a Hungarian invasion of Bulgaria. Gregory, it seems, could still not offer enough to move the cautious monarch.

In the summer of 1239 Baldwin of Courtenay arrived on Hungary's border at the head of a modest crusading force. Bela allowed him to travel through the kingdom, but did not provide him with any troops and declined to join him on the march to Constantinople. Asen, ever adroit, also permitted Baldwin free passage through his lands, without, however, detaching himself from the Nicaean alliance.⁶³ Baldwin then commenced military operations of his own in the spring of 1240. Around the same time, Gregory wrote his final letter to Hungary about the Latin empire.⁶⁴ It is addressed to the provincial prior of the Dominicans, not to Bela, a clear indication that the pope had given up his four-year attempt to persuade the king to crusade to Constantinople. Gregory called for the prior to preach the cross for the empire for three years, to commute the vows of Holy Land crusaders to Constantinople, and to offer the Holy Land indulgence not only to those who went personally in its aid, but

also to those who sponsored another fighter in their stead or contributed appropriate aid. The emphasis on fundraising makes sense in light of Bela's refusal to join Baldwin's campaign or mount one of his own. With the Hungarians staying home, Gregory sought to liquidate what crusade enthusiasm there was in the kingdom to the benefit of the Latin empire, turning it into cash that could purchase military aid elsewhere, or perhaps fund Baldwin's current campaign.

Gregory, however, did not allow the fundraising campaign to carry on for very long. In February 1241 he cancelled it, ordering all crusade vows and revenues in Hungary to be redirected toward the crusade he was organizing against Frederick II, who had the pope trapped in Rome.⁶⁵ This was, in effect, to divert the diversion attempt: all funds raised in Hungary for the Holy Land and then re-allocated to the Latin empire would now be spent on the expedition against the German emperor. In this way Gregory concluded his long attempt to set Hungary against the enemies of the Latin empire, with no appreciable support in arms or money to show for it. He had done so, it is important to note, a month before the Mongols descended upon Hungary and turned the kingdom from reluctant supplier to hopeful recipient of crusading aid. The Mongols did not sweep away Gregory's crusading plans for Hungary, for he had already abandoned them by the time the invaders arrived on the scene. Nor is it clear that Hungarian fears of Mongol attack had impeded his recruitment efforts. It is notorious that Bela was slow to respond to news of the Mongols' westward advance and did not attend to the kingdom's defenses until it was too late.⁶⁶ We have seen him seriously contemplating the invasion of Bulgaria as late as January 1239. Contemplated it he may have, but commit to it he did not. Despite assiduous diplomacy, unprecedented concessions in the sphere of church-state relations, and the abandonment of once staunchly defended papal policies, Gregory had been unable to persuade Bela or any other member of the Hungarian elite to set out in defense of their Catholic neighbor to the East.

No crusade against the schismatics Vataztes and Asen resulted from the pope's recruitment drive in Hungary. Nor, contrary to what we might expect, did these efforts lead to violence against perceived enemies of the faith within the kingdom. Scholars have tended to see crusade preaching as a reliable generator of violence against non-Christian groups in regions where it took place, even when such groups were not the stated targets of a given promotional campaign.⁶⁷ The classic example of this phenomenon is the Rhineland pogroms of 1096, when crusaders attacked Jews on their way to fight Muslims in the Holy Land. In Hungary in the 1230s, by contrast, Jews, Muslims, and "pagans" do not appear to have come under physical attack or fallen prey to other forms of victimization, such as financial exploitation, as a result of Gregory's recruitment campaign for the Latin empire. If we bear in mind some of the circumstances surrounding the campaign, we can see why this was so. For one thing, Hungary's Jews and Muslims were not as heavily

represented as minorities in other regions of Europe in occupations that brought them into contact with crusaders, such as moneylending.⁶⁸ For another thing, there were not very many crusaders on hand to attack the kingdom's non-Christians or loot their property, since the preaching campaign, as we have seen, did not win many recruits. Given the paucity of crusaders in Hungary, the lack of crusader violence against non-Christians there is not surprising.

What is surprising, though, is that Gregory's crusade preaching actually eased, rather than intensified, the pressure on non-Christian communities in Hungary. In her groundbreaking study of these groups, Nora Berend argued that the papacy's hostility toward them in the 1220s and 1230s was underpinned in part by its commitment to an antagonistic approach toward non-Christians in a variety of countries at that time, a belligerent stance manifested above all in advocacy of crusades.⁶⁹ Combating Muslims in Spain and the Holy Land, the popes were inclined to look upon them as a menace in Hungary as well. Through 1234, Gregory's enthusiasm for laws that degraded the legal, social, and economic status of non-Christians in Hungary is not in doubt. In 1235, however, as he looked to recruit crusaders for the Holy Land and then for the Latin empire, he was faced with the predicament that his relations with Hungary's most prized recruits, Andrew, Bela, and Coloman, were poor, and that one important reason why this was so had to do with his uncompromising stance on non-Christians. As I have tried to show, the pope's solution was to allow the regulatory regime that had caused so much friction between himself and the royal administration to fall into abeyance. In this case, papal interest in crusading diminished papal interest in enforcing prejudicial laws against Hungary's Jews and Muslims. Since Andrew and Bela showed more interest in negotiating their release from these regulations than in enforcing them, these communities found themselves under less compulsion to adhere to rules that sought to damage their position in Hungarian society.

The diversion attempt in Hungary thus reveals a two-fold breakdown in the idea of Christians united against enemies of the faith, one unintended by Gregory, the other self-inflicted. Beyond the borders of Hungary, and Christendom itself, Vataztes and Asen suffered no harm as the result of Gregory's attempt to set the force of Hungarian arms against them. Within the kingdom itself, Muslims, Jews, and "pagans" enjoyed a momentary reprieve from the papal effort to undermine their standing. As we shall see, the non-Christians of Champagne, where Count Thibaut was readying himself for the journey to Jerusalem, would not be so fortunate.

The Appeal to Count Thibaut: Crusaders, Jews, and Heretics in Champagne

The Latin empire's closest Catholic neighbor was Hungary. Yet the kingdom with which it enjoyed the closest relations was France, thousands of miles farther west. It was an expedition of French Holy Land crusaders that had founded the empire in 1204, and it was an expedition of French Holy Land crusaders that Gregory called upon to save it in the late winter of 1235. On 16 December he ordered William of Cordelle, the Franciscan preaching the Jerusalem crusade in France, to commute the vows of at least 400 French knights who would be willing to fight in Latin Greece instead of the Holy Land.¹ A Venetian fleet was standing by, ready to whisk them across the Mediterranean at a moment's notice.² This time, unlike in 1204, the maritime republic was offering the transportation free of charge. Amid these calls for commuting vows en masse we find only one appeal to an individual crusader: Thibaut of Champagne.³

Thibaut was in a very different position than Bela when Gregory IX called upon him to stop the spread of heresy in Latin Greece. Unlike Bela, Thibaut had already taken the cross for the Holy Land, and unlike Bela, Thibaut had great need for papal support. Gregory attempted to persuade Thibaut of the importance of fighting for Constantinople, arguing that this would be the best way to aid the Holy Land and that without such efforts heresy would thrive. Gregory also used punitive measures to aid his persuasion. He withdrew promised funding, revived a host of outstanding disputes between himself and the count, and threatened interdict and excommunication if Thibaut did not rectify his behavior. Despite such measures, Thibaut refused to commute his vow. The consequences of Gregory's call for a crusade against non-Christians threatening Constantinople were in this respect the same for Thibaut as they were for Bela: no crusade resulted. The consequences for non-Christians in Thibaut's own lands, however, were very different than they had been in Hungary. Refusing Gregory's call to commute his vow left Thibaut deprived of funds and eager to prove his piety. Short of money, Thibaut issued a *captio*, or taking, from the Jews of his lands, exploiting them financially to make up for monetary shortcomings brought about by his defiance of papal plans. Needing to demonstrate his piety despite this defiance, Thibaut authorized judicial proceedings against accused heretics in his own lands, presiding over a burning of 180 of them at Mont-Aimé on the eve of his departure for the Holy Land. In Champagne, Thibaut's rejection of Gregory's call for violence

against some non-Christians led to deleterious consequences for others.

Thibaut was crucial to the plan to divert the crusade to Constantinople. He was one of the most prominent and prosperous of the French crusading barons, the ruler of both Champagne and Navarre, which he inherited from his uncle in 1234. Navarre put a crown upon Thibaut's head, something no other Barons' Crusader wore. Champagne gave him something more valuable still, economic resources that few of his companions could match. As count, Thibaut administered directly the counties of Bar-sur-Aube, Bassigny, Meaux, and Troyes, as well as several smaller lordships in the Yonne valley and in the regions of Soissons, Châlons-sur-Marne, and Reims. Powerful lords who owed him homage included the counts of Joigny, Roucy, Porcien, Rethel, and Grandpré. Yet what really set Champagne apart from other French principalities economically were the great fairs at Bar-sur-Aube, Lagny, Provins, and Troyes. These markets made Champagne the crossroads of European commerce and Thibaut a wealthy man.⁴

The lands, the revenues, and the titles made Thibaut a prize recruit for Constantinople in his own right, and perhaps one who could influence some of his neighbors in Champagne as well. Recruitment for the Holy Land had been heavy in the county, and if Thibaut commuted his vow, some of these crusaders might follow his lead. Champagne was also the home of many relations of the Latin emperor, John of Brienne. They too might decide to crusade to Constantinople if their lord Thibaut encouraged them to do so.⁵ That, in any case, was the theory under which Gregory was operating. He really had little choice but to hope that Thibaut could influence the crusading decisions of his family and followers: even with William of Cordelle doing the rounds, the papal curia was simply not administratively equipped to negotiate individually with every potential recruit for Constantinople in Champagne. Instead Gregory would have to reach these crusaders indirectly, through an appeal to their count.

Thibaut was an obvious target for the diversion attempt. The real question was how to proceed with the operation. Because he had already sworn a crusade vow, Gregory had the option of simply commuting it to service in Constantinople without further ado. Under canon law, as we have seen, the pope technically did not have to secure a crusader's permission before commuting his vow. In this particular case, however, it made sense to seek this consent. Thibaut's record as a conscripted crusader was poor. Compelled by King Louis VIII to attend the siege of Avignon during the latter stages of the Albigensian crusades, Thibaut had pitched his tent in the crusader camp for the forty days custom demanded, then departed, trailed by rumors that he had poisoned his suddenly ailing sovereign.⁶ While pondering Thibaut's record Gregory also had his own experiences to consider. The last time he had taken a strictly legal approach to a secular ruler's crusade vow, the result had been disastrous. Frederick II's expedition to the Holy Land as an excommunicated "noncrusader" was a repudiation of papal authority that

Gregory seems never to have forgotten. He would ask, not command, Thibaut to commute his vow.

There was reason to believe, in fact, that Thibaut would respond well to this approach. The pope's request to aid Constantinople had come at a moment of crisis for the count, when he badly needed papal protection and patronage. He was planning a rebellion against his king, Louis IX. Yet when he looked around for allies to join the revolt, he saw none. The most powerful faction among the barons of northern France, the Dreux clan and its supporters, was held together primarily by a resolve to oppose him at every turn. Meanwhile in Navarre a league of nobles was forming to drive him from his own throne. With hardly any friends anywhere else, Thibaut needed a friend in Rome at the onset of the diversion attempt. This need for support afforded Gregory a degree of leverage over Thibaut. Over the course of the diversion attempt we will see the pope alternating between helping him and threatening him, though never going so far as to impose excommunication, a sanction that would remove the crusader status Thibaut required in order to join the expedition to Latin Greece.

This moment of crisis for Thibaut had been almost a decade in the making. Its origins can be traced back to his first revolt against the French crown in 1226. Up until that time, Thibaut's relations with the Capetians had been close. The posthumous son of Count Thibaut III of Champagne, Thibaut IV had grown up in the court of King Philip Augustus, who protected him during his long minority in exchange for weighty financial considerations. When he reached his majority in 1222 Thibaut began to carve out a more independent role for himself, disputing with Louis VIII over Jewish policy in 1223,⁷ serving reluctantly in the royal host in 1226, and perhaps cultivating a passion for Louis's wife, Blanche of Castile. In any case, Thibaut's alleged affection for her did not prevent him from joining a league of barons opposed to her rule when she became guardian of the realm upon the accession of Louis IX in November 1226. The rebellion cost Thibaut little in terms of royal support, since he soon reconciled with Blanche. But it poisoned his relations with his fellow rebels, Peter of Brittany, Hugh, count of La Marche, and Philip, count of Boulogne. Eager to carry on the fight, but reluctant to confront the victorious regent directly, they turned on her new ally instead.

To justify their aggression they branded him a traitor against the crown, ascribing to him the role they were still anxious to play. Feeding the rumor mill was Peter's supporter Hugh of La Ferté, who mocked Thibaut as being talented only at "medicine," in other words, poisoning:

He who holds Champagne and Brie is not master of them by right; know that it was after the death of Count Thibaut [III] that he was conceived; see now if he is well born! Should such a man hold a lordship, castles, and cities, after he refused his aid to the king? ... Know well that if the king had returned from there [Avignon] no man born of woman could have prevented him from being

disinherited. ... Lord God, you know it well; he cannot defend himself because he knows he is guilty. Lord barons, what are you waiting for? Count Thibaut, gilded with envy, covered in crime, it is not by acts of chivalry that he is known; rather it is knowledge of medicine that sets him apart.⁸

The man upon whom Thibaut was alleged to have practiced this dark art was none other than Louis VIII himself, who was supposed to have succumbed to the count's attentions at the siege of Avignon. This tale of treachery soon attracted the notice of two inveterate gossips, Matthew Paris and the minstrel of Reims (as the author of a thirteenth-century anecdotal history is known). Although neither writer was willing to vouch personally for the story, both passed it along nonetheless. The minstrel purports to describe the moment when Thibaut's enemies invented it: "And they took counsel among themselves that they would blame him for the death of King Louis, for he had left him at Avignon and had departed basely, like a traitor."⁹ Matthew's reportage was more matter-of-fact: "The magnates acted against the count as if dealing with a crime of treason and a matter of *lèse majesté*, as against someone who, it was said, had killed by poisoning his lord King Louis at the siege of Avignon for the love of the queen, whom he adored."¹⁰ The story inverts the actual situation, transferring on to Thibaut the ambition of the plotters and exaggerating it in the process: their wish to replace the regent becomes his poisoning of the king, and their private vendetta against a former partner-in-crime becomes a legitimate defense of the honor of the Capetian dynasty.

As the rumors swirled, it must be said that Thibaut did little to help his own cause. He was the most widely acclaimed lyric poet of his day, and he persisted in singing songs in praise of a high-born, unnamed lady.¹¹ He also fell into disputes with his few remaining allies. In 1227 he fell into a conflict with Guy of Nevers over the boundaries of the county of Bar-sur-Seine. Seeking an ally, Thibaut turned to Hugh of Burgundy, who was then under the tutelage of his mother, Alice of Vergy. She agreed to come to Thibaut's aid and promised, in addition, not to marry Hugh to a daughter of Peter of Brittany or Robert of Dreux.¹² Nevertheless, on the advice of his elderly relation Robert of Auvergne, archbishop of Lyon, Hugh contracted to marry Robert of Dreux's daughter Yolanda. In his frustration, Thibaut had the archbishop captured and put in prison. This aroused the ire of Henry of Bar, who was Robert of Auvergne's friend and Yolanda's uncle. Henry liberated the archbishop and added his name to the long list of Thibaut's enemies, which now included, in addition to his former co-conspirators, his most powerful neighbors to the east and south.¹³

As 1229 turned into 1230, barons invaded Champagne one after another. First came Guy of Nevers in the autumn of 1229. The papal legate, Cardinal Roman of St. Angelo, was able to negotiate a truce with him on Thibaut's behalf.¹⁴ Then came Hugh of Burgundy the following spring. He was forced

to halt his advance, though, when Louis IX summoned him to the royal army, which was mustering to repel the invasion of Henry III of England and Peter of Brittany. Hugh and the rest of Peter's friends brought to the host as few troops as custom allowed. Thibaut, however, came with three hundred men, a show of force that helped persuade Henry to return to England. Frustrated by Thibaut yet again, the Dreux and their supporters gathered on the borders of Champagne in the summer of 1230 for an all-out assault. From the south, the duke of Burgundy marched on Chaource and Isle-Aumont; from the north, Enguerrand of Coucy, Robert of Courtenay, and the counts of Boulogne, Guines, St. Pol, Dreux, and Mâcon approached Troyes; and to the east lurked the count of Bar. Thibaut suffered defeat near Provins and fled to Paris seeking royal protection. Louis quickly gathered an army and marched into Champagne, confronting first the count of Boulogne and then the duke of Burgundy. Not daring to take up arms against their sovereign, they made peace with Thibaut in September 1230.¹⁵

Frustrated on the battlefield, the Dreux and their allies turned to the courts. In 1231 Thibaut's second wife Agnes of Beaujeu died. This presented him with a difficult choice: with his next marriage he could either cement his position as a loyalist to the crown or attempt a reconciliation with his enemies. He was offered the hand of Isabella of Dreux, Peter of Brittany's daughter, but Gregory IX declared the proposed union invalid on grounds of consanguinity.¹⁶ Thibaut, it is said, backed out of the marriage at the last moment, waiting until the prospective bride and her family had gathered for the ceremony at the abbey of Val-Secret.¹⁷ The Dreux responded to this affront by inviting Alice of Cyprus to return to the West to press her ancestral claim to the county of Champagne. Born in Syria, Alice was the eldest living daughter of Count Henry II of Champagne and Isabella of Jerusalem. Doubts were raised over Alice's legitimacy because her parents were alleged to have contracted an invalid union.¹⁸ Furthermore, it was claimed that before he departed on crusade for the Holy Land in 1192, Henry had compelled his vassals to recognize his younger brother Thibaut (III) as count in the event that he failed to return.¹⁹ Consequently, Champagne passed first to Thibaut III in 1197 and then to Thibaut IV in 1201 while Alice was overlooked. Thirty years later, and recently widowed, she agreed to Peter's proposal to renew her claim on the county.

Gregory IX reserved the case to his jurisdiction. He commissioned an inquiry into Alice's legitimacy and commanded her to appear before it.²⁰ But she refused to come to Rome, perhaps because she knew that some years earlier another papal tribunal had found her to be of illegitimate birth.²¹ Thibaut was therefore forced into negotiations with Alice. In September 1234 she agreed to renounce her claims to the county in exchange for lands with an annual revenue of 2,000 *livres* (l.) and a one-time payment of 40,000 l.²² This was an enormous sum that exceeded Thibaut's ordinary revenues.²³ To raise the cash, his counselors sold the viscounty of Châteaudun and the counties of

Blois, Chartres, and Sancerre to King Louis.²⁴ It was a heavy price to pay. Up until the mid-twelfth century, these lands had formed the core of the territories ruled by Thibaut's house;²⁵ their alienation seriously diminished his holdings in northern France.

Not long after the settlement with Alice had been finalized, Thibaut began to regret having sold so much land to the king. By the spring of 1235 he was actively plotting against Louis. First he declared that he had never agreed to the final cession of the counties, but had only pledged them temporarily.²⁶ Then he began to seek out allies to aid in the rebellion. The most likely candidate was that perennial machinator against royal authority, Peter of Brittany. Perhaps seeking compensation for the grief Thibaut had caused him over the past decade, Peter set a high price on his support—marriage between his son John and Thibaut's daughter Blanche, with Navarre as her dowry. The only catch was that the couple was too closely related to be married without a papal dispensation. In 1231 Gregory had declined to grant Thibaut a dispensation to marry Isabella of Brittany. In 1235, however, Gregory had something he wanted from the count: a commitment to the Holy Land crusade. In the late summer Thibaut took the cross, and, shortly thereafter, received the necessary dispensation.²⁷ Thanks to the pope, Thibaut had reconciled with the Dreux and acquired an ally for his revolt.

Taking the cross provided Thibaut with a further benefit: papal protection of his goods and family. Gregory appointed the abbots of Chizé and Val-Secret as conservators of this and all other crusader privileges Thibaut was entitled to receive.²⁸ Papal protection was something Thibaut would need as he pursued his schemes against the king of France. More immediately, it proved valuable to him in Navarre, where his own royal administration came under attack from a league of nobles in the early winter of 1235. Gregory's response was emphatic: on 5 December 1235 he ordered three leading prelates of Pamplona to break up these "illicit alliances" that prejudiced the timely prosecution of Thibaut's crusade vow, authorizing them to employ ecclesiastical censures if necessary.²⁹ Though written to the churchmen, the letter delivered a clear message to Thibaut: if he would participate enthusiastically in papal crusading plans, he could expect support from Rome in his domestic travails.

Shortly after threatening the nobles of Navarre with ecclesiastical sanctions, Gregory's crusading plans changed. On 16 December he dispatched a copy of his appeal for Constantinople, *Ut Israellem veteris*, to Troyes.³⁰ When two months passed without a response from Thibaut, the pope began to consider ways of exerting pressure on him to commute his vow. Over that short span of time Thibaut's need for papal protection had only increased: in January John of Brittany and Blanche of Champagne had celebrated their wedding, causing Louis to begin preparing for war.³¹ On 18 February 1236 Gregory threatened Thibaut with excommunication, a sentence that would remove his crusader status and thus his claim on the papal protection that went with it.³² The pope

accused Thibaut of encroaching upon the jurisdiction of church courts in Champagne. Other barons were more closely involved in the controversies then raging over the respective competencies of ecclesiastical and secular courts. At Saint-Denis in September 1235, over forty barons had signed a royal protest to the pope on the subject.³³ Thibaut had not been one of them. Nevertheless, he was the one Gregory warned not to do further harm to the church if he wished to retain his crusader status. “It behooves you to be cautious,” said the pope, “lest you do something to cause the vessel of such merit [i.e. the crusade vow] to be abandoned.”³⁴

Despite the menacing tone, the pope did not follow through on his threat to remove Thibaut’s crusader status. It was actually not in Gregory’s interest to do so, since Thibaut could only crusade to Constantinople if he were a crusader. The early summer of 1236 saw Gregory shifting even further away from the intimidation and threats of the previous winter. In fact, he now offered the most powerful proof of the value of his friendship to date. In early June 1236 Louis IX mustered his forces at Saint-Germain-en-Laye for his long-expected invasion of Champagne.³⁵ On the 18th Gregory forbade the king to attack Thibaut, citing the count’s protected status as a crusader.³⁶ The injunction seems to have had its intended effect, as Louis halted his military preparations and allowed Thibaut to hasten to Paris to make his submission. All in all, the punishments demanded of the two-time rebel were mild: Thibaut confirmed the sale of the four counties and placed two fortresses into Louis’s temporary custody.³⁷ Louis’s brother, Robert of Artois, received the satisfaction of throwing a fresh cheese in Thibaut’s face, although this did not constitute part of the formal settlement.³⁸

Thibaut may have been grateful to the pope for helping him out of a tight spot. If he was, though, he did not show it by agreeing to crusade to Constantinople. As the summer wore on, Gregory tilted back toward the pressure tactics he had only just put aside. In July 1236 he imposed an interdict upon two important Champenois market towns, Provins and Bar-sur-Aube, as punishment for Thibaut’s failure to settle two lawsuits filed against him at the papal curia by merchants with Roman citizenship.³⁹ One case was over debts Thibaut owed to a number of lenders, including two sets of brothers: Peter and Angelus and John and Angelus, who are identified as Jews.⁴⁰ The other case was over 1200 /. Thibaut was said to have extorted from a certain “B.,” the brother of Peter and Angelus.⁴¹ Both cases were of long standing, with one dating back at least to the early years of Honorius III’s pontificate. To date, though, Thibaut had refused to come to terms or even answer the charges. Ecclesiastical sanctions had not budged him from this intransigent position, because whenever one of the local churchmen assigned to these cases imposed a penalty, another cleric loyal to him lifted it.⁴² Now, however, Gregory brought the two proceedings together, imposed the single penalty of interdict, and forbade any churchman from lifting it. Interdict was usually regarded as a lesser sentence than excommunication, the

sanction with which Gregory had threatened Thibaut in February. Yet Gregory was actually increasing the pressure on Thibaut by announcing the interdict, because now rather than threatening a sanction he was imposing one. Interdict did not separate Thibaut from the community of the faithful, as excommunication did. But it was a serious penalty nonetheless, banning church services and administration of the sacraments in the places where it was in force. In this case, it had the potential to harm Thibaut's interests because it would inconvenience the many merchants who worked in Provins and Bar-sur-Aube, whose business he was anxious to cultivate. While delivering a sanction that was almost as powerful, interdict had the advantage over excommunication of not removing Thibaut's crusader status. By imposing the interdict, Gregory could hope to apply pressure on the count without jeopardizing his eligibility to aid Constantinople.

On 9 December 1236 the pope repeated his request that Thibaut aid Constantinople.⁴³ The arrival of Baldwin of Courtenay in the West had spurred Gregory into a fresh round of recruiting on the empire's behalf. The letter sent to the count, *Ad subveniendum imperio*, combines the standard appeal for assistance which the chancery was sending around at the time with a few arguments tailored specifically to him.⁴⁴ Although Thibaut never seems to have responded directly to this letter, we know that he took it seriously enough to have it copied into the comital registers.⁴⁵ It therefore seems appropriate to examine Gregory's arguments in light of Thibaut's situation.

The pope maintained that if the Latin empire fell heresy would thrive throughout the East. News of the spread of heresy in Bulgaria alone, as we have seen, had almost induced King Bela of Hungary to crusade in the empire's defense. One aspect of the proposed expedition that seems to have appealed to Bela was the chance it offered to conquer a neighbor's lands. Bulgaria made a tempting target because it was easier for him to attack and subsequently rule than territories far away from his power base. For Thibaut, of course, this was not the case: Bulgaria was thousands of miles from Champagne and Navarre, while the empire of Nicaea was more distant still. An expedition against heretics in the East was unlikely to result in permanent conquests for him.

Gregory also alluded in *Ad subveniendum imperio* to Thibaut's family ties to Baldwin. "And this also shows not a little support for our plan, that we understand that the noble Baldwin, the son of Peter of glorious memory the emperor of Constantinople ... is closely bound to you by the chains of consanguinity."⁴⁶ In actual fact, Baldwin was a distant cousin whom Thibaut, it seems, had not yet met in person.⁴⁷ But if present-day family connections could not convince Thibaut to assist Constantinople, perhaps the deeds of his ancestors would. The pope urged him to emulate their glorious achievements by aiding Constantinople. While none of Thibaut's ancestors had ever gone on crusade to the Latin empire, he could still emulate their services in defense of the faith elsewhere by coming to its assistance. If he wished to follow their

example more closely, of course, he could crusade to the Holy Land as generation after generation of his forefathers had done.

If he did go to the Holy Land, though, according to Gregory, he risked harming what he meant to help. For if the Latin empire were allowed to fall, the pope asserted, aid to the Holy Land would be impeded. The best way to help the Holy Land, therefore, was to assist Constantinople. It is puzzling that the letter offers no practical evidence in support of this hardly self-evident assertion. At first glance, diverting a crusade away from the Holy Land would not seem the most opportune means of providing for its security. But if any proofs of the validity of his reasoning existed, the pope kept them to himself.⁴⁸ Thibaut, however, made his own inquiries, writing to authorities in the Holy Land for advice on how best to help them.⁴⁹ They told him to sail to Cyprus, from where he could strike with equal ease at the kingdom of Jerusalem's enemies in Syria, Alexandria, or Damietta. They did not tell him to mount a campaign in Latin Greece, nor even to stop there on the way to the Holy Land. Although we cannot know Thibaut's response to every point in *Ad subveniendum imperio*, we do know that he took it seriously, wrote to the kingdom of Jerusalem, and received advice contradicting the idea that crusading to Constantinople was the best way of aiding the Holy Land.

While Thibaut was receiving appeals to help the Latin empire, he was not receiving what prominent crusaders had come to expect from the curia as a matter of course: money to help cover the high cost of crusading. Through all of 1237 and most of 1238, Thibaut waited for the pope to grant him funding. Crusade revenues were being collected in northern France during these years: in the ecclesiastical province of Reims, for example, William of Cordelle was redeeming the vows of some Holy Land crusaders considered incapable of fighting.⁵⁰ He was forbidden, though, from redeeming the vows of unfit Holy Land crusaders who lived in Thibaut's lands in the province. A good portion of the county of Champagne, in fact, lay in three of the province's dioceses: Reims itself, Châlons, and Soissons. Gregory also declined to authorize vow redemption either in the rest of Champagne (which formed part of the province of Sens) or in Navarre. By withholding these revenues Gregory was clearly trying to exert financial pressure on Thibaut to reconsider his crusading plans. Over these years French crusaders who opted for Constantinople, like Peter of Brittany, received lavish funding from the curia. It was not until December 1238, however, more than three years after he had taken the cross, that Thibaut obtained any crusade funding. Gregory granted him the redemption fees of Holy Land crusaders residing in his domain lands or fiefs, including those in the province of Reims. With this money, the pope said, Thibaut would be able "to set forth magnificently in aid of the Holy Land."⁵¹

French crusaders might yet come to Constantinople's assistance, but Thibaut would not be one of them. With his destination settled, he could now turn to his preparations for departure, scheduled for 24 June 1239.⁵² Like

most aristocratic crusaders, Thibaut had two main aims as he prepared himself for his journey overseas. The first was to raise a lot of money. Since he planned to sponsor “an honorable number of warriors” on the campaign, he faced heavy expenses for their weapons, food, and transportation.⁵³ The second was to ready himself spiritually for an act of penance. Crusading was more than just a costly military expedition against the infidel; it was also a penitential act which a crusader vowed to carry out in return for a spiritual reward. Like any other penitential performance, it had to be undertaken in a state of proper contrition to be efficacious. As Jean Richard has noted, crusaders had to meet the demands of the confessional to ensure this status.⁵⁴ They had to admit their faults to a priest and redress wrongs they may have committed against others. Unlike other penitential acts, however, crusading was also a type of Holy War. It had to be undertaken with the right intention.⁵⁵ It was a commonplace that disaster awaited those who set out with sinful or base motives.

The diversion attempt made it more difficult for Thibaut to meet these basic material and penitential demands of crusade planning. Having received papal funding only a few months before his expected departure, he would have to work harder to raise the ready cash he needed for immediate expenses. The redemption fees he had belatedly acquired would be slow to collect: although they might eventually cover a portion of his costs, they would do him little good in the short term.⁵⁶ Furthermore, since he had rejected the head of Christendom’s advice on how Christian lands and peoples could best be defended, he faced heightened pressure to demonstrate the contrite spirit and right intention that were supposed to underpin his commitment to the crusader’s cross. Indeed, he found himself in the unusual position of needing to defend his decision to go on crusade to the Holy Land, the most esteemed crusading destination. In part, Thibaut sought to meet these increased financial and devotional demands in peaceful ways. But he also turned to more violent methods that targeted Jews and heretics in Champagne.

One of his first measures was to ask the pope’s permission to spend part of the proceeds of a just-completed *captio* or “taking” of Jewish property on his Holy Land crusade.⁵⁷ This was not the first time he had turned to the Jews of Champagne in a moment of financial need. They had often proved a valuable financial resource to him, in part because some of them had access to capital through their involvement in trade and moneylending, but mainly because none of them was in a position to resist his exactions. Thibaut claimed the vast majority of Champenois Jews as his chattel: he called them “his” Jews. In return for his protection, he asserted the right to tax them at will. This is exactly what he had done in 1222, when, burdened by enormous debts rung up during his long minority, he had imposed a five-year, 70,000 *l.* levy on the community.⁵⁸ Thibaut’s *captio*, by contrast, as its brutal name suggests, envisioned a less regular and systematic method of financial exaction. It was a one-time seizure of all the profits of Jewish moneylending, with the aim of

restoring to Christian debtors the interest they had paid to Jewish lenders. Certainly there was a devotional motivation for Thibaut to take such a measure as he looked ahead to his expedition to Jerusalem. Usury was a sinful practice; by restoring the interest “his” Jews had collected from the Christians of Champagne, he was righting a wrong for which he was at least indirectly responsible. But the *captio* also benefited Thibaut financially. Since, as was often the case, many of the Christian debtors entitled to compensation could not be found, a portion of the *captio* remained in the comital treasury.⁵⁹ It was this unspent surplus of ill-gotten gains that he proposed to spend on the crusade.

This was the kind of scheme of which Gregory typically approved. He often tolerated, and sometimes encouraged, the financial exploitation of Jewish communities by or on behalf of crusaders. Only the year before he had urged Louis IX to donate the excess proceeds of a *captio* royal officials had conducted in 1234 to the Constantinople crusade.⁶⁰ At the end of November 1238 the pope gave his preliminary approval to Thibaut’s plan, asking the abbot of Jouy, Thibaut’s supporter and business partner, to “provide for him over these matters as shall seem expedient to you for the salvation of his soul.”⁶¹

As Thibaut strove to redirect the sinful profits of moneylending toward a pious purpose, he moved to suppress an even graver threat to the welfare of his Christian subjects. On 13 May 1239, at his stronghold of Mont-Aimé, he presided over one of the largest burnings of heretics ever to take place in northern France, in which some 180 people were executed. As the highest-ranking secular authority in Champagne it was Thibaut’s task to execute unrepentant heretics. Yet scholars have tended to minimize his role in the burning, most often portraying him as simply carrying out the bidding of local ecclesiastical authorities, especially the Dominican friar Robert le Bougre, the first papal inquisitor to operate in Champagne.⁶² By contrast, I wish to stress the crucial part Thibaut played in the burning and the strong incentive his impending departure on crusade gave him to punish heretics at that time. This is not to say that he alone was responsible for organizing the burning, or that he involved himself in it solely because he planned to depart for Jerusalem five weeks later. Evidence does not survive to support such claims. Rather, the burning was especially well suited to satisfying his particular financial and devotional concerns.

The investigation of heresy that was to culminate in the mass execution at Mont-Aimé began in 1233 when Robert le Bougre received a papal commission to “extirpate the heretical depravity” from Nevers, Champagne, Flanders, and other counties bordering the domain lands of the French crown.⁶³ Robert’s appointment was part of a new approach Gregory IX was taking to heterodox belief in the early 1230s. In the imperial lands, and then in France, Dominican inquisitors answering directly to the pope were supplanting the bishops, who had hitherto been responsible for investigating

heresy in their dioceses.⁶⁴ Robert took up his new assignment with a will, condemning large numbers of men and women as heretics through 1233 and the beginning of 1234, including some who had previously demonstrated their orthodoxy before their local bishops.

Predictably, Robert's proceedings quickly attracted criticism from the bishops of northern France. By finding heretics where they had not, he cast their efforts to prosecute heresy in a bad light. And by questioning those whom episcopal proceedings had exonerated, he showed a disregard for their jurisdiction. In early 1234 the archbishop of Sens lodged a complaint against Robert at the curia, accusing him of exercising his office in regions not infamous for heresy. The pope defended his own right to take action against heterodox belief by appointing papal inquisitors, but at the same time acknowledged the archbishop's claims in that arena. Henceforward, Robert would be able to prosecute heretics in Sens only if the archbishop assigned him to the task. The pope ordered the friar's proceedings to be suspended in the meantime.⁶⁵

The protestations of the bishops could not stop Robert's investigation for long, however. After an eighteen-month suspension he received a new commission from the pope to "loose the reins of the inquisition ... in every direction throughout the kingdom of France."⁶⁶ Gregory noted that, contrary to the claims of the bishops, heretics had swarmed through the kingdom in Robert's absence. He ordered the archbishop of Sens and the prelates of his province to lend their aid and favor to the friar's endeavors. Now firmly in charge, Robert embarked on a campaign against heretical beliefs and practices that surprised contemporaries by its ferocity. He condemned heretics and witnessed their execution by burning at Châlons-sur-Marne, Péronne, Elincourt, Cambrai, Douai, and Lille.⁶⁷ Over a two- or three-month span he released about sixty persons to the secular arm.⁶⁸ He cannot be placed at another execution until Mont-Aimé in May 1239.

Although ecclesiastical authorities were initially reluctant to support Robert's proceedings, secular authorities were not. One of his most enthusiastic collaborators was Thibaut of Champagne. The count's registers, in fact, contain Robert's only surviving piece of correspondence. On 21 February 1234 Robert and a certain brother Jacob, styling themselves "judges delegated by the pope against heretics in the kingdom of France," informed the count that the chapter of St. Quiriace of Provins was disputing his claim to the person and property of a suspected heretic known as Gila "the abbess," whom Thibaut had earlier detained on the brothers' recommendation. They ordered Thibaut, by the authority the pope invested in them, "to hand her over without any contradiction to the chapter's custody and remove any guards he may have placed over her home and possessions," if the chapter's claim proved to be true.⁶⁹ At issue was who exercised lordship over Gila. Innocent III's letter of 1199 on heresy, *Vergentis in senium*, had established that the goods of a convicted heretic belonged to the heretic's lord.⁷⁰ Over the course

of the thirteenth century this principle ensconced itself in the major collections of French customary law.⁷¹ Thibaut and the chapter eventually agreed to submit their claims to the binding arbitration of two experts in the law, a common procedure for settling legal questions in northern France at the time.⁷²

The dispute over Gila shows that Thibaut involved himself in the Dominican campaign against heresy from its earliest stages. He allowed Dominican inquisitors to operate in Provins, one of the more important towns in Champagne, and his administration collaborated in their proceedings. Robert's letter stresses this cooperation: "since on our recommendation you detained the said abbess in prison," it begins.⁷³ Thibaut's support for Robert should not be taken for granted. Just a few years earlier secular rulers in the German lands had opposed the operations of Conrad of Marburg, one of the first papal inquisitors to investigate heresy there. In 1233, not long after bringing charges of heresy against the powerful Henry III, count of Sayn, Conrad was murdered under mysterious circumstances.⁷⁴ Robert was more circumspect than his German colleague, to be sure, but Conrad's experience suggests nonetheless that secular rulers could decisively affect the outcome of heresy investigations, especially those conducted by members of the first generation of papally-sponsored inquisitors.

The final outcome of Robert's investigation, of course, was the burning at Mont-Aimé. Here too, it needs to be stressed, Thibaut played a crucial role. As the ranking secular authority of the region, it was his task to punish those whom Robert and his assistants identified as unrepentant heretics. It was forbidden to churchmen to inflict the penalty that the crime of willfully persisting in heterodox belief was thought to merit. Canon law, customary law, and northern French tradition insisted upon this cooperation of the spiritual and secular arms. Philip Mouskes's statement that Thibaut attended the burning at Mont-Aimé because he was "lord of Champagne" confirms that he acted there in the capacity of the secular authority responsible for executing those whom the inquisitors had condemned as unrepentant heretics. The burning could not have taken place without him.

It follows that Thibaut had a say in where, when, and in what manner the final punishment of the heretics should be carried out. His input, for example, is evident in the choice of site for the burning. Located in the territory of the commune of Bergères-les-Vertus, Mont-Aimé stands some 500 feet (240 meters) high and dominates the plain between Reims and Troyes. At its summit stood a fortress that Blanche of Navarre had built in 1210. During the wars of Champagne, Mont-Aimé proved itself to be one of Thibaut's most strategically important strongholds.⁷⁵ An eyewitness to the burning, the Dominican Stephen of Bourbon, mentions specifically that it took place at "the castle of the count of Champagne."⁷⁶ Mont-Aimé provided secure internment for the suspects because its high altitude made escape difficult. In addition, it furnished accommodation for the crowd that gathered to watch the

burning. Present that day were the archbishop of Reims and the bishops of Soissons, Tournai, Arras, Thérouanne, Noyon, Laon, Senlis, Beauvais, Châlons, Cambrai, Orléans, Troyes, Meaux, Langres, and Verdun. All in all sixteen prelates attended, with eleven of the twelve dioceses of the province of Reims represented, as well as three of the eight dioceses of the province of Sens. Among the secular dignitaries were the count of Champagne himself, his court, and other (unfortunately unnamed) barons of Champagne. There were persons of lesser rank in the audience as well. Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, for his part, numbered the crowd at 700,000.⁷⁷ The burning was a public event, and the fact that it was carried out at Thibaut's own stronghold suggests that he wanted it that way. Thus, some five weeks before he was expected to go on crusade, Thibaut chose to support inquisitorial proceedings in a highly public fashion. If his ultimate reasons for doing so must remain obscure, it can be shown that his upcoming departure for Jerusalem provided him with a number of reasons to have wished to be involved in punishing heretics at that time and in that fashion.

In the first place, Thibaut had a claim on the property of those persons under his lordship condemned to die at Mont-Aimé. This claim gave him a financial incentive to participate in the burning. Although it is impossible to quantify with any precision the amount of revenue that such confiscations could bring to the comital treasury, the dispute over the heretic Gila, in which we saw Thibaut engaging with St. Quiriace, suggests that it may have been considerable. Both parties to the quarrel apparently felt that the home and possessions of one person such as "the abbess" were worth fighting over. On a larger scale, the many quarrels between royal officials and churches that confiscations generated in southern France in the 1230s suggest a similar conclusion.⁷⁸ If there were profits to be made from inquisitorial proceedings, it is easy to see that Thibaut would have had an interest in tapping into them as he prepared for his crusade. By overseeing the burning at Mont-Aimé, Thibaut stood to profit from the confiscation of the property of not one but as many as 180 persons under his lordship.

The burning also helped the count meet the penitential demands of crusading. For Thibaut and his contemporaries, the burning of persons they deemed offensive to God could be a pious act likely to win divine favor. Alberic of Trois-Fontaines described the mass execution at Mont-Aimé as a burnt sacrifice, "a holocaust pleasing to the Lord."⁷⁹ Philip Mouskes declared that the burnings of heretics at Cambrai, Douai, and Lille in 1236 aroused "great joy without end."⁸⁰ The punishment of heretics was, furthermore, a pious act of particular relevance to crusading, in that it fulfilled the same purpose of defending Christian lands and peoples from the threats of nonbelievers. By striking against heretics in their own lands, crusaders could affirm their commitment to battling infidels in the Holy Land. Above all, though, the burning satisfied a devotional need peculiar to crusaders of Thibaut's rank.

Secular rulers who wished to depart on crusade in a penitent state had to answer not only for their personal conduct, but for the welfare of their people as well. Because heresy endangered the people of Champagne, it also threatened Thibaut's status as a penitent. The burning at Mont-Aimé provided him with an opportunity to eliminate this menace and fulfill a responsibility toward the people he ruled; more importantly, it gave him a chance to show them that he had done so. He presided at Mont-Aimé in his capacity as "lord of Champagne," to recall Philip Mouskes's expression. Gathered to watch the event were representatives of all strata of Champenois society (spiritual and temporal, rich and poor) and of all its geographical regions (clergy from every diocese). The conflagration, moreover, had the effect of demonstrating that Champagne was entirely rid of heretics. The large numbers condemned and the mass nature of their execution served to convey an impression of completeness to the watching crowd. The site of the burning suggested this as well. People knew Mont-Aimé in the thirteenth century as the ancient seedbed of heresy in Champagne. Tradition had it that the Manichean Fortunat, chased from North Africa by St. Augustine of Hippo, had fled to Mont-Aimé and met a warrior chief named Widomar who had his camp there. Fortunat converted the chief to Manicheism and from then on the mountain was a meeting place for heretics.⁸¹ In the twelfth century, the cathedral chapter of Liège described Mont-Aimé as the home of a heretical sect that had spread its teachings throughout Champagne.⁸² Many believed the sect's destruction was foretold by a battle of dogs that raged in 1230. "And so, as the story runs," explained Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, "that dogs once came from all directions and tore themselves to pieces in a battle at this same place, as a sort of prophecy of what was to be, so these Bougri, worse than dogs, were there exterminated in one day to the triumph of Holy Church."⁸³ By striking at the home of the first heretics in Champagne, the burning signaled the destruction of all their progeny. Ultimately, though, even those among the crowd who were ignorant of Mont-Aimé's history could grasp the meaning of the event. They saw the heretics physically, not symbolically, removed from Champagne. By eliminating this threat to their welfare, the burning removed an obstacle to the successful prosecution of Thibaut's crusade vow.

The burning also demonstrated to Rome how seriously he took his responsibilities as a secular ruler. He had dealt a blow to the diversion attempt by refusing to join the Constantinople crusade. Gregory had promoted the expedition to him as, among other things, a means of stopping the spread of heresy in the East.⁸⁴ These circumstances may have combined to increase the pressure on the count to take action against heretics in his own lands. The burning was a timely, dramatic, and public affirmation of his willingness to do so.

The burning was also a show of support for the pope's new approach to heterodox beliefs and practices.⁸⁵ Contemporaries were struck by the novelty of the fact that Robert le Bougre and his fellow mendicants acted on papal

authority alone. Many chroniclers who discuss his proceedings mention it.⁸⁶ And Robert himself had emphasized in his letter of 1234 that he was operating under the aegis of the pope. This was why, after all, he initially encountered opposition from bishops in northern France: they feared losing to a papally delegated judge a function that typically pertained to their office. Thibaut, by contrast, had thrown himself behind the fledgling tribunals from the start and had presided over one of the most striking demonstrations of their efficacy to date: the burning at Mont-Aimé. After such a display it would be difficult for the pope to question the sincerity of his faith and the zeal with which he defended it as the departure date for the Holy Land expedition loomed. And so the same magnate who rejected the papal invitation to crusade against heretics in Greece welcomed the papal initiative against heretics in his own lands.

The burning at Mont-Aimé has often been portrayed as a particularly egregious example of inquisitorial zeal on the part of northern French ecclesiastical authorities, especially the Dominican friar Robert le Bougre, in the wake of Pope Gregory IX's introduction of the first papal inquisitorial tribunals into the region in the 1230s. Certainly it was the churchmen who condemned the heretics to die; but it was the count of Champagne, strictly speaking, who executed the death sentence. He bears a greater share of the responsibility for the unprecedented violence that took place there than historians have previously acknowledged. While we will never know the full range of Thibaut's motives for involving himself so closely in the burning, it seems clear that taking the cross gave him an interest in prosecuting heretics before he departed on crusade. The burning, after all, satisfied two powerful needs of his that were not easily reconciled: spiritual purification and capital accumulation.

Having "taken" the Jews and executed the heretics, Thibaut made his final preparations for departure in late spring and early summer of 1239. Most of these were financial in nature. He called upon the clergy of Champagne to support the "burdens" of the land, perhaps a reference to a monetary aid.⁸⁷ He exchanged forest rights with a number of religious houses and a secular lord.⁸⁸ In accordance with a policy pursued by many magnates in northern France in the middle decades of the thirteenth century, he exchanged rights in farther-flung areas for those closer to the core of his principality.⁸⁹ These transactions, as well as a village-exchange with the bishop of Langres, indicate that Thibaut was able to raise sufficient funds for the crusade without compromising his long-term goal of territorial consolidation in Champagne. In fact, he was even able to dabble in the real-estate market in the period preceding his departure as a buyer, not a seller. Neither the number of purchases made (four) nor the sum of money spent (1070 /.) is particularly impressive.⁹⁰ Yet the very fact that he was spending cash at a time when most crusaders were trying to raise it suggests that Gregory's tactic of withholding papal funding until the last minute had not unduly troubled him.

Clearly the various financial expedients—the *captio*, the confiscations of the property of condemned heretics, and perhaps the monetary aid—combined with his considerable regular income, allowed him to make up the shortfall in ready cash created by the absence of vow redemption revenue.

In July 1239 Thibaut traveled south to Lyon, then down the Rhône to Marseille, where ships waited to sail him and a large contingent of Champenois knights and nobles to Acre. Rather than feeling content with the way the affair had worked itself out, Thibaut nursed a lingering resentment toward the pope and his machinations, a resentment that shines through four poems he wrote about crusading before his departure for the Holy Land.⁹¹ While one of the poems addresses a perennial theme of medieval crusade poetry (the conflict the crusader feels between love for his lady and love for his Lord),⁹² the rest focus less on crusading in the abstract and more on the Barons' Crusade itself. They are songs of "exhortation and polemic" in which Thibaut treats the expedition and its wider context from a frankly political perspective.⁹³ Two themes dominate the verse: the importance of crusading to the Holy Land and the hypocrisy of the pope.

In "Seigneurs, sachiez, qui or ne s'en ira," instead of drawing the familiar distinction between the inferior goods of this world and the superior goods of the next, Thibaut links both together by declaring that going to the land "where God died and lived" is the course of action for "Those who love God and the honor of this / world."⁹⁴ Those who refuse to go to the Holy Land, conversely, "Will hardly go to paradise" and will lose "the glory of the world."⁹⁵ "You from whom I never received aid," Christ declares in the poem, "Will all descend into the depths of Hell."⁹⁶ In "Au tens plain de felonnie," it is the failure of the Christian world to act on this obligation to aid the Holy Land that causes the singer to decry his age as "a time full of wickedness, / Envy, and deceit, / Wrongs and outrage, / Without good or courtesy."⁹⁷ The crusader state itself demands that Christians repent for not coming to its aid: "The kingdom of Syria / Cries out to us in a loud voice / That we repent, / For God's sake, for not going there."⁹⁸

In "Dex est ensi conme li pellicanz," the singer makes clear what remained implicit in "Au tens plain de felonnie," namely, that crusaders were not going to Syria because of the actions of one man, Pope Gregory IX:

Our head causes great pain in all our members,
And it is indeed fitting that we complain to God about it;
Our leader accuses our barons of great sins
Which he weighs upon them when any wishes to be of worth.⁹⁹

It is not sin that weighs down the barons, but the pope's accusations of sin, which he uses to prevent the barons' valorous acts. The singer continues his attack on the pope by describing a kind of bird called a *papelard*:

Do you know who the evil birds are
Who murder God and his children?
The *papelards*, whose name is well-suited—

They are indeed cruel, foul-smelling and evil.
With their wicked words
They slay the simple, God's children.
The papelards make the world tremble;
By God the Father, may evil befall them!¹⁰⁰

In Old French, there is no species of bird named *papelard*. Rather the term refers to a hypocrite, especially in matters of religion. The first syllable of the word, *pape*, means pope, which links the hypocrisy directly to Gregory IX and to Thibaut's earlier idea that the head of the church was causing pain to the members of Christendom he was supposed to comfort. The poems, rather than abstract praises of the virtues of crusading, state that the pope himself works to prevent Christians from exercising these virtues and actively hinders his stated goal of aiding the Holy Land.

In the end, Gregory had not been able to convince the count to crusade in Latin Greece, despite the leverage he had initially enjoyed as Thibaut's protector in northern France and Navarre. Certainly Gregory had some early triumphs. Convincing Louis IX not to invade Champagne was an impressive display of power over Thibaut's enemies. But the pope met with less success when he tried to impose his will on Thibaut himself. Ecclesiastical sanctions might have proved an effective means of exerting influence, but Gregory had a difficult time enforcing them. The abbots of Chizé and Val-Secret, the agents he had assigned to protect Thibaut's interests as a crusader, took their duties all too seriously, canceling every significant sentence Gregory directed against Thibaut while he was *crucesignatus*, including the 1236 interdict upon Provins and Bar-sur-Aube.¹⁰¹ Withholding the vow redemption fees proved an ineffectual stratagem as well, because Thibaut, as a wealthy man, was able to draw upon sources of funding not under Gregory's control. The count of Champagne could afford to act on his convictions, which appear to have been deeply held. However badly he had needed papal protection in 1235–36, he evidently came to see in his crusade vow something more than a means to secure support in a moment of crisis. Gregory repeatedly stressed to him the equivalency of crusading to Jerusalem and Constantinople, first by offering the same spiritual reward for each venture, then by declaring that each accomplished the same purpose. But Thibaut's poetry makes it clear that he rejected this notion. For him, only the crusade to the Holy Land, or Outremer as he sometimes called it, offered a path to paradise for a valiant knight:

Lords, be informed: anyone who will not go
To the land where God died and lived,
And will not bear the cross of Outremer,
Will hardly go to paradise.¹⁰²

The crusade promise and goal of paradise, these lines assert, cannot be reached without a willingness to campaign in the Holy Land itself, no matter the crusades to other places that a person might fight. Thibaut here equates the idea of paradise with the geography of bearing the cross in the Holy Land,

rejecting Gregory's idea of the equivalency of reward that would accrue to anyone bearing the cross to any place the pope named.

Although Thibaut had failed to mount a campaign against Christendom's gravest external enemies, Vatatzes and Asen, he had acted against two of Christendom's gravest perceived internal enemies, heretics and Jews. Both the mass execution at Mont-Aimé and the *captio* had accomplished papal goals, the former by eliminating the menace of heterodox beliefs, the latter by discouraging the sinful practice of usury, offering redress to its Christian victims, and generating a surplus that benefited an unobjectionable cause. Both measures also appear to have been marked by close collaboration between the count and the curia. Thibaut had asked Gregory's permission to spend the *caption* surplus on the Holy Land crusade and had cooperated with the papal inquisitor Robert le Bougre in conducting the burning. Divided over crusade policy, the two rulers appear united in their determination to confront the common threat posed to Christendom by the enemies in its midst.

Yet the details of the actions against non-Christians reveal a situation that was far more complex, both in terms of the policy toward non-Christians and in terms of the pope's control over it. To start with, neither the count nor the pope took a consistent approach to enemies of the faith in Champagne. Thibaut treated Jews in one way and heretics in another, financially exploiting the former but ordering the executions of the latter. Gregory did not even treat all Jews living in Champagne alike: he defended the financial interests of those who had Roman citizenship but made no objection to Thibaut seizing the assets of "his" Champenois Jews. Nor did the pope exert as much control over the measures against Jews as it might at first appear. The *captio* accomplished papal goals, but it was not a papal initiative that Thibaut simply executed. By the time Gregory learned of it, the Jews had already surrendered their money to the comital treasury. As for the burning, Thibaut's role in it was more than that of a passive agent of ecclesiastical judgment. Certainly papal inquisitorial proceedings seemed to give Gregory a potent new instrument of control over violence against heretics; but in practice, as Thibaut's example shows, the influence of secular rulers on these proceedings could be very great if they chose to exert it. Despite the appearance of unity, the burning owed more to the conflict between Thibaut and Gregory than to their cooperation. Set in the context of the diversion attempt and Thibaut's sense that Gregory weighed "great sins" upon barons who wished to be of worth, it looks less like a collaboration than a concession so that defiance in other areas would be harder to question. Gregory's seeming success against enemies of the faith in Champagne owed much to his larger failure to direct violence against Christendom's external foes.

The Appeal to Peter of Brittany: Crusaders and Jews in Western France

Gregory IX's attempts to persuade Bela of Hungary and Thibaut of Champagne to defend Constantinople had met with no success, but for a time it looked as if his luck was changing with Peter of Brittany. Peter not only agreed to fight schismatics and heretics threatening the Latin empire, he agreed on terms so ambitious that Gregory's main problem was procuring sufficient funds for his army. As we have seen, vow redemption and commutation were designed to allow such flexibility. In western France these mechanisms should have worked particularly well because the response to the initial preaching of the cross had been enthusiastic there. In the event, they proved difficult to control. Administrative mix-ups, sales of indulgences by unlicensed traffickers, and resistance to the idea of crusading in Latin Greece instead of the Holy Land left Peter short of the money and men he wanted for the campaign. In the end he changed his mind and left for the Holy Land.

The end result for relations with the non-Catholics in Latin Greece was thus ultimately the same for Peter as it had been for Bela and Thibaut: no crusade, despite the papal efforts. The result for the non-Christians in western France, however, was different again. Whereas Bela had used negotiations over the Latin empire to reduce papal pressure on Hungarian minorities, and whereas Thibaut had taken money from Champenois Jews and burned accused heretics, the situation in Brittany was far more volatile. The initial preaching of the Holy Land crusade was accompanied by a massacre of thousands of Jews. Whereas in Champagne Thibaut had worked with the papacy, however uneasily, to suppress heresy, in western France the massacre was directly contrary to papal teachings. The Jews who were not killed or driven out of the region by this violence were instead removed by law. While the crusade was in the Holy Land, all remaining Jews were expelled from the duchy. In Brittany, the pope's crusade appeal achieved devastatingly unexpected results.

By the early autumn of 1236 the pope was deep in negotiations with Thibaut's longtime rival and occasional collaborator Peter of Brittany. On 23 October the chancery announced that Peter had volunteered to lead an expedition in defense of the Latin empire.¹ His reasons for doing so are difficult to reconstruct. By that time Peter's career in northern French politics had almost run its course. A rebellion with Thibaut of Champagne against the French crown the previous spring had ended in submission to royal authority; a truce between the kingdoms of England and France prevented him from

resorting to an alliance with Henry III as he had in the past; and in the coming year (1237) his eldest son John was due to reach his majority and succeed to the duchy of Brittany, which Peter possessed only in his son's name.² Besides needing an occupation, Peter probably owed the pope a favor in the autumn of 1236. Gregory had taken Peter's children John and Isabella under papal protection prior to the rebellion, a favor which, because Peter held little land of his own, had limited his exposure to royal punishment.³ Peter would also have appreciated the privilege that only the pope could place him under excommunication or interdict.⁴ His struggles with the Breton church, which earned him the sobriquet "scourge of the clergy," continued unabated at this time.⁵ Finally, we also know that Peter was a committed crusader, participating not only in the Barons' Crusade but also in Louis IX's first expedition.

Peter certainly hatched an ambitious plan for his Constantinople campaign. After persuading his brother John, count of Mâcon, and the royal counselor John of Nesle, count of Soissons, to join the venture, he told the pope they would recruit 2000 knights and 10,000 foot soldiers to take to the Latin empire.⁶ Even Gregory thought this might be overdoing it a little: he proposed that Peter bring fewer troops—1500 knights and 6000 foot soldiers—but more money. Imperial envoys had informed the pope that mercenaries were in plentiful supply in Constantinople, so Peter could purchase soldiers there for less than it would cost to recruit them in France.⁷ This was a sensible economizing measure, but even if Peter adopted it the cost of the expedition would still be well beyond his private means. A venture of this scale was going to require heavy financial support from the curia. In order to raise the required funds, Gregory turned to his favorite technique of crusade finance: vow redemption. By redeeming the vows of Holy Land crusaders in western France, Gregory could convert their enthusiasm for supporting the kingdom of Jerusalem into money that could then be directed toward Peter's expedition. Gregory, in other words, proposed to channel enthusiasm for crusading to the Holy Land into help for Constantinople through the medium of cash.

Even before the diversion attempt, however, Gregory's ability to channel crusade enthusiasm successfully in western France had been called into doubt. For in the entry under the year 1236 in the *Chronicon Britannic* we read that "immediately after Easter crusaders to Jerusalem, at which time there were many, killed Jews throughout all of Brittany, Anjou, and Poitou."⁸ In this laconic fashion the chronicle reported one of the largest outbreaks of mass violence against European Jewry ever to accompany the launching of a crusade, a massacre in which thousands of members of the Jewish community of western France may have been killed.⁹ The few pieces of evidence we have for the attacks agree that they were carried out primarily in Brittany, Anjou, and Poitou. In addition to the entry in the *Chronicon Britannie*, there is an apparent reference to the violence in a canon promulgated by an ecclesiastical synod held in June 1236 in Tours, the metropolitan city of the province that

encompassed Brittany, Anjou, and Poitou. The prelates gathered there “emphatically prohibit[ed] any crusader or other Christian to dare kill Jews, or to flog them, or to invade their property, or to carry it off, or to bring any other kind of injury upon them.”¹⁰ The attacks are also mentioned in the Jewish account of Rabbi Yehiel of Paris’s involvement in the so-called “trial of the Talmud” conducted in Paris in 1240. The converted Jew Nicholas Donin, the motive force behind the trial, is made to ask the rabbi “Why have so many Jews been massacred in Brittany, Anjou, and Poitou if they are God’s chosen people? Why doesn’t God protect them with miracles?”¹¹ There is also an apparent description of the attacks in the *Shevet Yehuda* of Solomon ibn Verga, one of the exponents of the so-called “lachrymose school” of history writing that flourished among the post-1492 Spanish exiles. Misdating the attacks to 1219, Solomon nonetheless described how “all the wicked ones of the provinces of Anjou, Poitou, and Brittany took counsel against the sons of our people, to change their honor. But they held on to their faith, and sanctified the Heavenly Name, and more than three thousand of them were killed.”¹² A papal letter of 5 September 1236 on the attacks indicates that their compass may have extended a little farther still, perhaps even into southern Normandy. In addition to the bishops of Poitiers, Angers, Nantes, Rennes, and Quimper, and the archbishops of Bordeaux and Tours, the curia sent the letter to the bishops of Sées and Avranches, just to the northeast of Brittany, as well as to their provincial, the archbishop of Rouen.¹³

In addition to suggesting its wide geographical scope, the letter provides some details of the violence. It answered a petition that the Jewish communities of the kingdom of France had addressed to the curia. In the style of papal letters, it summarized the main points of the petition to which it was replying. According to their “tearful and pitiful complaint,” as the curia described it, the crusaders had tried to “wipe them off the face of the earth,” slaughtering 2500 of them, young and old alike, as well as pregnant women. Some had been trampled to death under the feet of horses. The dead had been left where they lay, exposed as “food for the birds of the sky and flesh to the beasts of the earth.” Their property was looted, and in a prelude to the campaign against the Talmud, their books were burned. “Wherefore,” the letter concludes, “placed as under a new Egyptian bondage, and fearing their enslavement, the Jews turned to, and humbly besought mercy from, the Apostolic Throne.”¹⁴

One might ask what mercy the Jews could expect from the current occupant of that throne. In fact, Gregory IX’s attitude toward crusader relations with Jews was ambivalent. On the one hand, as we have already seen in the cases of Thibaut of Champagne and Louis IX, he tolerated and in many instances actively promoted the financial exploitation of Jewish communities by or on behalf of crusaders. On the other hand, he did not tolerate physical violence by crusaders against these communities. This stance was in accord with the traditional protection the papal curia provided to Jews in the bull *Sicut Judeis*,

issued by Pope Calixtus II in 1120 and re-issued periodically thereafter, including by Gregory IX in 1235.¹⁵ The pope's response to the violence was in keeping with the provisions of *Sicut Judeis*. He ordered the bishops in whose dioceses the attacks had taken place to compel the perpetrators to make satisfaction for their crimes on threat of ecclesiastical censures.¹⁶ It seems in fact that many of these prelates had already resolved to punish the guilty crusaders if they could find them. The canon they adopted at the Council of Tours in June 1236 declared that "the Church tolerates the Jews, since it does not want the death of the sinner, but rather that he return and live. Know that whoever dares act otherwise will not avoid canonical punishment."¹⁷ To assist the bishops, Gregory also called on the ranking secular authority, Louis IX of France, to provide justice in the matter. The pope hoped that Louis would punish and correct the guilty crusaders and make them return the property they had stolen.¹⁸

These standard hopes for punishment and restitution are made more complex by Gregory's own conviction that this particular wave of violence was incited in part at least by his own statements about the need for a crusade. In *Rachel suum videns*, as we have seen, the pope stressed the idea of taking the cross to avenge Christ's injuries. He instructed crusade preachers to take up this theme in their sermons, ordering Franciscan preachers in Ireland, Germany, and France, for example, to induce the faithful "to revenge the injuries of the Crucified One, as is contained in the general letter," and to "set forth everything that was set forth in the general letter about aid for the Holy Land."¹⁹ As the pope maintained in his letter of September 1236, sermons of this kind were meant to inspire crusaders to prepare themselves to fight the battles of the Lord and liberate Christ's heritage from pagan hands. Since the cause was especially Christ's, they should have been filled with fear and love of his name, "lest, God forbid, they steep themselves in their evil desires and arouse against themselves divine displeasure."²⁰ This was precisely what they had done, though, by "plotting impious designs against the Jews."²¹ For the crusaders had failed to understand that God did not want to see the Jews destroyed: their remnant would be saved. Nor was it an adequate excuse that the Jews had refused to be baptized. Conversion to Christianity could not be forced, the pope explained; it had to come of an individual's free will. He condemned their attempt to force the Jews to accept Christ as their Messiah as "offensive to God."²²

In the pope's view the crusaders had misunderstood the meaning of *Rachel suum videns*. Vengeance for Christ's injuries was to be inflicted upon those who "hold and defile the Temple of the Lord" in the Holy Land, not upon those who, though perfidious in other respects, enjoyed his protection of their lives and property and could not be converted by force.²³ Misinterpreted as he may have been, the pope acknowledged here that his call to avenge Christ's injuries had helped spur the attacks against the Jews of western France. The enthusiasm for crusading to the Holy Land that his appeal had

aroused had manifested itself not in a well-organized effort to mobilize resources for an expedition to aid the kingdom of Jerusalem, as he had originally wished, but rather in an apparently brutal and destructive wave of violence against a group that enjoyed his protection. The exhortations of his crusade preachers had unleashed violence, to be sure, but not violence he could control.

The pope's inability to re-channel the violence he had precipitated in western France did not dissuade him from a further, even bolder, attempt to re-direct the enthusiasm of the region's crusaders on behalf of Peter of Brittany and his expedition to Constantinople. Papal agents took an aggressive approach to mustering support for Peter's crusade. They made little attempt to persuade those who had taken the cross for the Holy Land to crusade instead to Constantinople. Rather they simply compelled Holy Land crusaders deemed unsuitable for fighting to redeem their vows for a cash payment. Gregory did not often order his officials to compel crusaders to redeem their vows, but his instructions to one of the agents assigned to Peter's expedition, the Dominican friar William of Oléron, were unambiguous on this point: "Truly, if anyone among the crusaders from Brittany and the dioceses of [Poitiers and Angers] shall be thought unsuitable for fighting in aid of the Holy Land because of illness, weakness, or poverty, you should compel them to redeem their vows."²⁴ These redemption fees, along with any testamentary bequests that the faithful had left for the Holy Land, would then be diverted to Peter, who would use them to recruit warriors and purchase supplies. While William of Oléron set about redeeming vows and collecting legacies in the duchy of Brittany and the dioceses of Poitiers and Angers, the bishop of Le Mans, who was planning to accompany Peter on the crusade, did the same in his own diocese and in the province of Rouen.²⁵ This was diversion of funds on a wide scale, encompassing an area extending from Saint-Pol and Quimper in the west, to Rouen in the north, Evreux in the east, and Saintes in the south, altogether much of western France.

Indications that the diversion campaign was heading for trouble began to appear almost as soon as it was announced. The first rumbles of resistance were sounded against the diversion of funds in Brittany and the dioceses of Poitiers and Angers. The pope learned that "some bishops, prelates, and clerics of the aforementioned areas were impeding aid to the [Latin] empire." Without going so far as to name the malefactors, Gregory nonetheless ordered William of Oléron "to compel them by our authority to [desist] from their obstruction."²⁶ Complaints also arose in the other area where considerable diversion of funds was underway: the ecclesiastical province of Rouen. Just a few months after the bishop of Le Mans had received his fundraising commission, the pope reprimanded the archbishop of Rouen and his suffragans for opposing his collection "of vow redemptions, legacies, and other revenues which were put aside for aiding the Holy Land but were conceded to the duke of Brittany to aid the Latin empire."²⁷ The bishop of Le

Mans needed these churchmen to cooperate because they had already collected some of the funds that he was supposed to hand over to Peter. Realizing how favorably positioned they were to obstruct the diversion, Gregory commanded them in the strongest possible terms to surrender the money they had gathered to the bishop of Le Mans.

The most extraordinary response to the diversion campaign came from the Holy Land crusaders who were being compelled to redeem their vows. William of Oléron complained to the curia that some of them were setting out for the Holy Land in advance of their expedition's official departure date "out of fear of commuting or redeeming their vows."²⁸ Far from sympathizing with their predicament, Gregory ordered those who did so to be deprived of the crusade indulgence.²⁹ He was clearly anxious to prevent crusaders from avoiding his campaign of forced vow redemption, which was apparently driving some of them toward the very place he had forbidden them to go.

It was not only effective local resistance that hindered the diversion of funds to Peter's expedition. Administrative mix-ups played a part as well. One problem was that some of the money earmarked for Peter's expedition had already been promised to Holy Land crusaders. Although the pope had granted Peter all crusade revenues from the diocese of Poitiers, for example, he had earlier promised Godfrey of Argentan, a Poitevin crusader who had vowed to lead twenty knights to Jerusalem, "a suitable portion" of those same revenues.³⁰ Faced with this prior claim, the pope had little choice but to reserve some vow redemption money for Godfrey, with the result that Peter obtained less funding from Poitiers than he had expected. Peter's brother John of Mâcon encountered the same problem with his funding for the Constantinople crusade. The curia had first promised him all proceeds from vow redemptions in the province of Lyon, a sizable grant. But then it assigned the redemption fees collected in two of the province's larger dioceses, Langres and Autun, to Hugh of Burgundy for the Holy Land crusade. John told the pope that because he had been "deprived of apostolic provision" in this fashion he had had to sell a castle worth 8,000 *livres* to make up the shortfall. Gregory sympathized with John's plight, and offered him testamentary bequests left in aid of the Holy Land or the Latin empire in Lyon up to a total of 4,000 *livres parisis*, or half the value of the castle.³¹

Even revenues to which the Constantinople crusade had an uncontested claim proved difficult to collect. While some Breton crusaders fled the region to avoid redeeming their vows, others paid their redemption fees not to William of Oléron, as they were supposed to do, but to other, unknown, unauthorized collectors.³² These collectors may have been fellow clerics carrying out conflicting papal orders in good faith; they may also have been *executores*, the agents noble crusaders appointed to ensure that they received all the crusade funding to which they were entitled.³³ Sometimes *executores* took matters into their own hands and collected these revenues themselves rather than waiting for the duly authorized papal official to do it.³⁴ The

unauthorized collectors may even have been the notorious *questuarii*, or indulgence traffickers.³⁵ These shadowy figures operated on the fringes of papally sanctioned crusade preaching, going among the crowds while the sermon was being delivered and selling the crusade indulgence to any who wished to buy it.³⁶ Whatever the reason, redemption fees were slipping through William's fingers and there was very little he or the pope could do about it. Gregory suggested that William have the crusaders in question redeem their vows for a second time, a rather unrealistic expectation.³⁷ Needless to say, the pope could not distribute money to Peter of Brittany that his agents had not gathered in the first place.

These instances of local resistance and administrative error doubtless contributed to Peter's decision to abandon the Constantinople expedition for the Holy Land crusade. By the late summer of 1238, it was becoming clear that Peter's coffers were not filling as quickly as he wished. Around that time he complained to the pope that certain persons were "injuring" him by refusing to pay back debts they owed him. Peter warned that if these injuries were not redressed, they might prevent him from fulfilling his vow to crusade to Constantinople. This threat drove Gregory to the unusual step of conscripting two senior French prelates, the bishops of Le Mans and Sées, to serve as Peter's debt collectors in France.³⁸ In the meantime, Gregory dealt personally with one of Peter's chief defaulters in England, Simon of Montfort, who owed the duke of Brittany 2800 marks. Although Simon was planning to lead a crusade expedition to the Holy Land, Gregory threatened to excommunicate him if he did not pay what he owed to Peter.³⁹ None of these last minute expedients was enough to compensate for the apparently meager returns from the fundraising campaign instituted for Peter in western France. Unwilling to bear the expense of an expedition under his sole command, he contented himself with joining the Barons' Crusade in the company of a modest retinue.

Peter's decision in turn led John of Mâcon and John of Soissons to change course as well and sign on for the Holy Land crusade. In a final twist, it seems clear that all three men were able to use at least some of the money the pope had striven so hard to raise for their Constantinople expedition to offset the cost of crusading to Jerusalem. John of Soissons received 1500 /. to crusade in Latin Greece, but he declined Gregory's request to return the funds, prompting the pope to threaten his person with excommunication and his lands with interdict, to no apparent effect.⁴⁰ Gregory, however, did not ask John of Mâcon for the money conceded to him to crusade to Constantinople, perhaps because John died soon after arriving in the Holy Land and left no estate upon which a claim for the funds could be made.⁴¹ Unlike the other two, Peter of Brittany did renounce his claim to the crusade revenues granted him, but only after he had returned from Syria in mid-September 1240.⁴² Although it is impossible to say for certain, he may well have already spent some of the money he so graciously offered to return. Certainly he had some

of it in his possession by the time he sailed for Acre: in April 1238 the bishop of Le Mans was supposed to have handed over to him one third of the vow redemption fees collected thus far in the province of Rouen and the diocese of Le Mans.⁴³ Moreover, the Barons' Crusade did not leave Peter financially incapacitated, despite the fact that he lived in reduced circumstances following his son John's accession to the duchy of Brittany in 1237.⁴⁴ Peter went on crusade again in 1248 with Louis IX, and was even able to lend the king 8000 /. during the campaign.⁴⁵ Along with John of Mâcon and John of Soissons, Peter had evidently beaten the pope at his own game, diverting funds from the Latin empire to the Holy Land rather than the other way round. Gregory's attempt to re-direct the crusaders and crusade revenues of western France had failed. He had not been able to translate the region's obvious enthusiasm for the Holy Land crusade into support for the Latin empire. In the late spring of 1239, the three barons who had come closest to realizing his hopes of mounting a major western expedition in defense of Constantinople set off to join Thibaut of Champagne and the rest of the Barons' Crusaders in Lyon.

But even the departure of the crusade in August 1239 did not put an end to the persecution of the Jews of western France that its preaching had initially aroused. On the Tuesday of Easter week in 1240, John, duke of Brittany, issued the so-called "Assize of Jews."⁴⁶ "Having in mind the good of all Brittany," the duke expelled all the Jews from his lands. Neither he nor his heirs would let them return, nor would any of his vassals be allowed to keep their Jews. All debts owed to Jews in Brittany were to be canceled, and all pledges of movable and real property were to revert to the debtors or their heirs. No debts contracted in Brittany were to be paid to Jews who lived in the lands of the duke's father, Peter of Brittany. No one was to answer charges in the case of the death of a Jew. The duke swore to observe the decree in perpetuity and promised as well to ask Louis IX of France to confirm it.

Two factors in particular appear to have weighed heavily in John's decision to issue the assize. The first was the extremely vulnerable position of the Jewish communities of Brittany after 1236. To the lords who allowed them to settle in their lands, Jewish communities were financial assets, a source of tax revenue and credit. There is evidence that by 1236 Breton Jews had established a network of credit,⁴⁷ that they held both land and personal property in pledge, and that the lords who exercised jurisdiction over them had in place sophisticated administrative structures to control their persons and tax the profits of their business. A charter of 1235, for example, indicates that the bishop of Nantes had a seneschal of the Jews, in other words, an official whose exclusive function it was to administer the bishop's rights of lordship over them.⁴⁸ Other charters, as well as the assize itself, reveal that the ducal administration also exercised careful jurisdiction over its Jews.⁴⁹ The violence and looting of 1236 must have reduced the wealth of these communities considerably. The decision to expel them in 1240 may in part

reflect their decline in value to the duke's treasury. If so, it would conform to the pattern of other expulsions, such as that by Edward I of England in 1290, which came after the resources of the Jewish communities of the realm had been depleted to the extent that they had little left to offer their royal guardian.⁵⁰ Furthermore, despite evidence that seigniorial exploitation of Jewish moneylending was fairly extensive, the Jews of Brittany were in fact only weakly integrated into the larger Christian community.⁵¹ They were a recent arrival in Brittany, having only entered the duchy in 1210 in flight from the increasingly inhospitable regime of King Philip Augustus of France.⁵² They consequently lacked the networks of support and protection that might have helped them withstand better the attacks of 1236 and perhaps recover from them more quickly afterward. As it was they were left after 1236 with precious little money to tax or lend, making them easily expendable.

The second factor that weighed in John's decision to issue the assize was his need to consolidate his authority over the duchy in the wake of Peter of Brittany's turbulent rule. Thanks to his wearisome feuds with several Breton bishops, Peter had bequeathed to his son a legacy of ecclesiastical hostility. John himself had not helped matters when he refused to swear to uphold ecclesiastical liberties at his accession ceremony in November 1237.⁵³ By this provocation he signaled his refusal to compromise on the key financial issues that were at the core of the dispute.⁵⁴ The question of the status of the Jewish communities, however, gave John the chance to make a gesture toward reconciliation. These communities were less valuable to him now than they had been earlier and the ecclesiastical hierarchy appears to have been strongly in favor of expelling them. There are indications that John was under ecclesiastical pressure to issue the assize. One of its clauses threatened a sentence of excommunication upon the duke and interdict upon his lands if he violated its tenets in any way.⁵⁵

Whatever its support among churchmen, the secular lords of Brittany might have rejected this measure under normal circumstances. The Jews, however diminished in value, were still their property, and they were not accustomed to losing property with good grace. It may not be a coincidence that John issued the assize when many prominent Breton magnates were away on crusade in the Holy Land with Peter of Brittany.⁵⁶ Their participation in the crusade prevented them from objecting to the expulsion order; but more importantly it might also have made the measure more palatable to them when they returned. Crusading was expensive. It required of its noble participants large sums of ready cash. In a society where sources of liquid capital were few, loans from Jews were a popular way of meeting that need. Funding from the papal curia was another option, but as we have seen the curia had tried to divert most of the money raised for Breton Holy Land crusaders to the Constantinople crusade. The assize, by canceling repayment of all debts owed to Jews and returning all property pledged to them as collateral, could well have been more valuable to many Breton lords by 1240 than the Jews

themselves.⁵⁷

The assize also benefited the barons and the duke alike by relieving them of the responsibility of investigating accusations of murder against crusaders who had participated in the attacks of 1236. Pursuing such charges would have placed them in the uncomfortable position of appearing to side with the Jewish communities under their jurisdiction against their Christian subjects. When Louis IX sent investigators to hear complaints against royal officials in Poitou and Anjou, the lands outside of Brittany where attacks against Jews had also taken place in 1236, they recorded scores of complaints from Christians claiming to have been unjustly accused of having murdered (as well as beaten and possibly raped) Jews.⁵⁸ By refusing to pursue accusations of murder against any of his Christian subjects, John removed a potential source of resentment toward his fledgling administration.

The massacre and then expulsion of the Jewish communities of western France, committed over a short time-period against the same minority group in the same region, were nevertheless distinct in their causes, nature, and effects. The attacks of 1236 erupted suddenly, resulted in murder, looting, and destruction of property, and, whatever the longer-term sources of resentment they may have reflected, they were triggered by one specific event, the preaching of the Holy Land crusade. All this is in contrast to the carefully calculated weighing of interests and circumstances we see in the expulsion order of 1240, which reflected the declining value of the Jews, John's need to conciliate the ecclesiastical hierarchy, the magnates' interest in defaulting on their loans, and John's desire to keep peace among the Christian communities in his lands.

These differences encapsulate the inability of prevalent models of western medieval violence against non-Christians to explain the events of the Barons' Crusade. On one hand, we cannot posit a Christendom-wide program of persecution, directed against any and all threats to the faithful. In this case, crusaders clearly distinguished among the "threats to the faithful" the papacy urged them to conflate when it called upon them to attack Greek Christians rather than Muslims. On the other hand, violence against non-Christians was not systemic, employed strategically, and a stabilizing force in society. The attacks of 1236 were exceptional rather than ritual, precipitated by a particular propaganda campaign, and the expulsion of 1240 removed the possibility of "stabilizing" violence by removing the Jews from the land.

In examining the consequences of the preaching of the Barons' Crusade in western France, we furthermore can see the lack of Christian unity both at home and overseas. Gregory IX, head of Christendom, was unable to contain the violence the preaching of the crusade had unleashed, was unable to divert the crusaders to Constantinople, was unable to get Peter of Brittany, the supposed leader of the Constantinople expedition, to stay the course, and was finally unable even to recover the funds from Peter of Brittany that had been raised on behalf of the mission he abandoned. Relations with non-Christians

did not follow the forms Gregory dictated, but nor did they follow the pattern we have seen in Hungary and Champagne. In both Champagne and western France, unlike in Hungary, the Holy Land crusade met with great enthusiasm. In western France, however, unlike in Champagne, it also led to widespread physical violence against the Jews. The consequences of the papal call for crusade were thus different in the forms anti-Jewish hostility assumed, different from what the pope directed, and different than in other regions of Christendom.

The Appeal to Earl Richard: Crusaders and Jews in England

Gregory IX clearly saw England, like Hungary and France, as a potential source of support for the Latin empire. In 1237 he preached the cross against Vatatzes and Asen in England and also called upon the English clergy to pay a subsidy in aid of Constantinople. Less clear, though, is the role he envisioned for the kingdom's Holy Land crusaders in his plans to save John of Brienne's tottering regime. While the pope had worked steadily to divert Hungarian and French Holy Land crusaders to Constantinople, his policy toward their English counterparts was anything but consistent. Gregory's continual reversals and re-reversals of policy in his dealings with the English Holy Land crusade, dizzying to later historians, seem nevertheless to have had remarkably little effect on the planning of the crusaders themselves.¹ Therefore, English crusaders, like those in Hungary, Champagne, and western France, declined to campaign in Latin Greece. Unlike in the other regions, however, the crusade appeal seems to have had no discernable consequences for internal minorities either.

At various times Gregory told the English Holy Land crusaders to go to the Holy Land, to stay in England on pain of losing the indulgence, to redeem their vows in aid of the Latin empire, and to go to the Holy Land if they really wanted although it would be better if they redeemed their vows. But he never asked them to travel to the Latin empire themselves. This silence may have been a measure of the likely support, or lack of it, he could expect to find in England for his plans to aid Constantinople. On the face of it, the prospects were not bright. While Hungary was nearby, and France was the home of the empire's founders, England had no connection to the empire save the general one of common membership in Christendom. As of the mid 1230s, few if any Englishmen had gone on crusade to Constantinople. It is true that John of Brienne had aroused some sympathy for the empire's plight when he made a fundraising stop in England sometime in 1228 or 1229. But if Matthew Paris is to be believed, the goodwill dissipated when John helped Blanche of Castile repulse Henry III's invasion of France in 1230.² English crusading enthusiasm focused instead on the Holy Land. In the central Middle Ages, it was the only crusading target ever to attract serious interest in the kingdom.³ English participation was heavy on the Third and Fifth Crusades, and, in the late 1220s, the bishops of Exeter and Winchester, at the head of a sizable body of knights, campaigned with Frederick II in Syria.⁴ Aside from Gregory's efforts to recruit for the Latin empire in the 1230s, and Alexander IV's

promotion of the “Sicilian Business” in the 1250s, the papacy made no major attempt to persuade the English to crusade anywhere else in the thirteenth century.⁵

A preference for helping Jerusalem rather than Constantinople, however, was not the only obstacle Gregory faced in implementing his crusading plans in England. A more serious problem was the opposition to the papacy that had taken root during the early years of his pontificate among two groups whose support would be crucial to the success of any scheme to assist the Latin empire: the knights and the nobles, who provided the prize recruits for crusade armies, and the clergy, who preached the cross and raised the money.

Among English knights and nobles, discontent focused on the papacy’s practice of appointing, or providing, its own nominees to English benefices. The practice was relatively new to England, having been introduced on a wide scale only after King John’s submission to Innocent III.⁶ Papal provisions became even more frequent during the minority of Henry III, when the legates Guala and Pandulph exerted unprecedented influence over the English crown.⁷ Knights and nobles resented provisions because the curia often appropriated benefices to which a lay patron had the right of presentation, thus depriving the patron of the income and local influence that accrued from exercising that right. In 1231 lay opponents of papal provisions launched a campaign of intimidation and violence against foreign clerics beneficed in England. Describing themselves as a confederation (*universitas*) of laymen “who would rather die than be oppressed by the Romans,” the anti-papalists wrote to prelates throughout the kingdom threatening to burn their crops if they did not cease paying out rents owed to foreign clergy.⁸ In late December the tough talk gave way to physical violence: an Italian cleric was ambushed, taken prisoner, and held to ransom; papal messengers were set upon and their letters confiscated; crops were seized, barns and houses were burned, and livestock was destroyed.⁹ The attacks began in Kent but soon spread across a wide swath of the country; it took the sheriffs until the late spring of 1232 to restore the king’s peace.¹⁰ No doubt the confederates exaggerated when they claimed to speak for all the nobles and commons of the realm.¹¹ But the intensity of the violence against the Italian clerics, its wide geographical distribution, and its long duration do suggest a high level of hostility to papal provisions among England’s military classes.

One of the leaders of the anti-Roman campaign was Robert of Tweng, a Yorkshire knight who had been dispossessed of his right of presentation to a church by a papal provision.¹² His career after the attacks illustrates that the anti-papal views he espoused continued to resonate among the upper echelons of English lay society. Despite his many crimes Robert received lenient treatment from King Henry, who granted him a safe conduct to plead his case personally to the pope.¹³ Spared from punishment by the king, Robert went on to carve out a role for himself as the embodiment of the English nobility’s sense of collective victimization at the hands of the papal curia and its

provisions policy. “Although this annoyance has been introduced against us all in general,” proclaimed the greater magnates of the realm in a petition of August 1239 to Gregory IX,

from which contention, rivalry, anger, and strife, as well as human slaughter, may perhaps arise, we have determined to bring before you, for the sake of example, the injury inflicted upon one of our compeers; that what has been unwisely done against him and the danger to his right of patronage, may, by your authority, if it please you, be annulled.¹⁴

To underscore the exemplary quality of his complaint, the magnates sent Robert to present the petition to the pope.

Sometime before this, Robert had taken the cross for the Holy Land, and in this context too he emerged as a spokesperson for anti-papal grievances. We find him in 1240 with Richard of Cornwall at La Roque, readying the ships that would carry the crusade to Acre. But in a gesture of displeasure toward the pope, Richard dispatched Robert to report on the progress of the crusade to Frederick II, the excommunicated emperor with whom Gregory was at war.¹⁵ Robert’s career shows that anti-papal attitudes were not incompatible with enthusiasm for crusading to the Holy Land. But in the mid 1230s, when the attacks against Italian clerics were a matter of recent history, and lay opposition to provisions was still running high, such attitudes were unlikely to accord with support for ventures as closely associated with the papacy’s hierarchical claims as the crusade to the Latin empire.

There was a surprisingly high degree of sympathy for the complaints of lay patrons in English clerical circles, where the right of presentation to benefices was seen as a bulwark against the encroachments of papal tax collectors upon ecclesiastical revenues. Papal taxation of the English church increased greatly under Gregory IX, the first pope to collect an aid from the English clergy for a purpose other than a crusade to the Holy Land.¹⁶ This was in 1228, when he obtained a tenth of movables for his war against Frederick II. Matthew Paris, for one, never seems to have gotten over paying the subsidy, to judge by the repeated references to it in the *Chronica majora*.¹⁷ But clerical opposition to papal taxation in England was not limited to the St. Albans chronicler. Like Matthew, the rectors of the archdeaconry of Berkshire did not soon forget the money they had handed over to the pope in 1228. Complaints about the aid of 1228 feature prominently in their response to a papal demand for a new subsidy against the emperor (this time for a fifth of ecclesiastical revenues) in 1240:

Item, it would be good to contribute, to be sure, nevertheless it ought and would be expeditious to omit the matter, because of the scandal now arisen and spread throughout the world against the Roman church, because it is said publicly that other exactions have been made on other occasions, and clerics have been tremendously impoverished; and immediately after the money was

exacted and extorted, the emperor and the pope came to an agreement (i.e., the treaty of San Germano, 1230) and not one farthing was restored; indeed if any balance had been left uncollected, it was rigidly extorted even after the agreement made between the two.¹⁸

The rectors objected to the 1228 tax not because it subsidized a military campaign against a Christian ruler, but because it did not. What upset them was that Gregory refused to refund the tax after reaching a quick settlement with Frederick. The pope had taken their money, but had not spent it as promised. Would he treat future subsidies in the same cavalier fashion? This was the question implied by the rectors' critique, and it was a dangerous one for the pope, because it could be asked not just of fundraising appeals for controversial campaigns against Christian rulers, but of any papal request for financial aid.

Deterred neither by the tradition of English support for the Holy Land, the lack of interest in the Latin empire, the attacks by laymen on Italian clergy he had appointed, nor indeed by the clergy's own antipathy toward his previous attempt to raise a subsidy for a military campaign, Gregory called on the laity and clergy of England to come to the Latin empire's aid in the fall of 1237. On 30 October he commissioned Peter of Roches, the bishop of Winchester, to preach the cross for Constantinople throughout the realm.¹⁹ Once the leading figure in the government, Peter had suffered a spectacular fall from favor in 1234 and was now, in his biographer's words, "a spent volcano."²⁰ At the time of his appointment he had less than eight months to live. What may have commended him to Gregory was his reputation as a papal loyalist, acquired when he helped broker the treaty of San Germano in 1230 and burnished when he hastened to Rome to quell the city's rebellion against its papal overlord in 1234 and 1235.²¹ Peter obtained all the powers a crusade preacher could want. He was authorized to dispense indulgences to those who came to hear his sermons; to allow those who took the cross from him to receive the sacraments in places under interdict; to absolve cross-takers who had committed grave offenses such as laying hands on a cleric or starting a fire; and to permit clerics who signed on for the crusade to pledge the incomes of their churches.²² A few days after offering these privileges to anyone who would take the cross in Constantinople's aid, Gregory appealed specifically to the prelates of England to send warriors or "other appropriate assistance" (i.e. money) to Latin Greece. Prelates who agreed to contribute would earn the Holy Land crusade indulgence.²³

While appealing for aid for Constantinople, Gregory did not try at this stage to divert resources away from the Holy Land crusade that had been taking shape in England since Richard of Cornwall, William Longsword, and others had taken the cross in June 1236. Peter of Roches's preaching orders of 30 October 1237, unlike those issued to the archbishop of Bordeaux on the same day, included no instruction to encourage Holy Land crusaders to serve in

Latin Greece.²⁴ Given that diversion efforts were reaching their height in France and Hungary around this time, Peter's orders may reflect a concession to English crusading preferences. Yet already we see a certain lack of consistency in the papal approach, because many participants in the "English" Holy Land crusade, as the curia knew, actually lived in Bordeaux, the ecclesiastical province that encompassed Henry III's main continental possession, Gascony. The leader of the Gascon contingent was Henry of Trumbleville, the seneschal of the province, to whom Gregory had granted a generous crusade subsidy in February 1237.²⁵ Whether the pope now intended Henry and his companions to commute their vows is unclear. In any case, it appears that as of November 1237 Holy Land crusaders resident in England, at least, were to be permitted to campaign in Syria as planned.

As of 25 February 1238, that was no longer the case. On that day the pope forbade Richard of Cornwall, William Longsword, and Simon of Montfort to set out for the Holy Land, on pain of being deprived of the crusade indulgence.²⁶ Gregory told the crusaders he had issued the prohibition on the advice of Henry III, who was apparently concerned that their departure would compromise the security of the realm. The papal chancery did not specify the cause of England's peril, but what we know about Henry's situation at the time suggests that the king was more concerned about internal threats than external ones. He had a truce with France; he had recently reached a settlement with King Alexander of Scotland; and although there was still some unrest in the Welsh marches, a legacy of Richard Marshal's revolt in 1233–34, Henry was at peace with Prince Llywelyn of Wales.²⁷ Within the kingdom, though, there was trouble with the barons, who were disturbed by some of the financial reforms the royal council had instituted in 1236, when Henry's marriage to Eleanor of Provence and his sister's to Frederick II had drained the royal treasury. Seeking out additional sources of income, the council began taking back into the crown's possession royal estates that had originally been granted out as fiefs.²⁸ Such a patent threat to seisin could not but arouse a storm of baronial protest; and as it raged about him, Henry preferred to keep his brother (Richard) his cousin (William) and his favorite (Simon) by his side.

Gregory had his reasons, too, for wanting these crusaders to stay in England. The Holy Land expedition was not his highest crusading priority at the time. Furthermore, he had an interest in making Henry feel secure on his throne, because the king was a pivotal figure in papal-imperial relations. By early 1238 these relations were worsening rapidly as Frederick made war on the pope's Lombard allies.²⁹ The pope clearly needed additional support, and as a vassal of the Apostolic See, powerful but also needy, Henry had the makings of a good papal ally. On the other hand, as Frederick's brother-in-law, he had the makings of a good papal enemy too. At the moment, with a papal legate shepherding him through his domestic travails, Henry seemed ensconced in the papal camp, and Gregory's aim in winter of 1238 was clearly

to keep him there.³⁰ But Henry was a changeable man, as Robert Stacey has said.³¹ If his sympathies tilted toward the emperor, it would be best that the crusade not reach the continent, where Richard of Cornwall could link it up with imperial forces to threaten the Papal States. The scenario is not entirely far-fetched. Two weeks before Gregory had forbidden Richard of Cornwall to depart on crusade, Frederick had asked the earl to postpone the expedition for a year but then to travel to the Holy Land via the kingdom of Sicily.³² The emperor extolled southern Italy as the ideal launching point for a sea journey to the Levant. Of course it was also an excellent launching point for an invasion of the Papal States. Keeping Richard, William, and Simon in England would help prevent any such mischief from taking place.

With Gregory and Henry set against it, the crusade appeared to be over before it had begun. But Richard of Cornwall, for one, was not going to give up that easily. He petitioned Gregory to lift the ban and set some excellent lawyers to work in the curia. Faced with this concerted effort, the pope waffled. He wrote to Richard that he could not approve of him setting out for Syria under current circumstances. “Trustworthy sources” from England (probably the legate) were reporting that Richard’s presence alone was preventing those who were “ill-disposed” to the government from “bursting forth” into public to carry out their “wicked deeds.” Nor was the time right to aid the Holy Land:

It is apparent that in many ways it would be fruitful for you to defer the execution of your vow and those of the barons who were prepared to proceed to the Holy Land with you to an opportune time; especially since the business of the Holy Land might be better and more usefully directed if aid were provided by magnates following each other at diverse times, rather than all of them proceeding there in one and the same passage.³³

After dispensing this unconventional military advice, Gregory proposed that Richard consult with the king. If Henry agreed that the crusade could go forward without any “detriment to him and the kingdom,” the pope would not stand in its way. In the event that Richard could overcome his brother’s objections, Gregory bestowed upon the earl all the crusading privileges a good curial lawyer could dream up,³⁴ together with a massive funding package: all the legacies in aid of the Holy Land, crusade taxes, and vow redemption fees that could be collected in England.³⁵

What the pope did not know when he made this offer was that Richard had already changed Henry’s mind about the crusade. It was Richard’s revolt against the crown in January 1238 that seems to have done the trick. The occasion for the rebellion was the marriage of Simon of Montfort to Richard’s sister Eleanor at the beginning of the year. Contracted without Richard’s consent and celebrated in secret, the union was an affront to his status as the bride’s brother and the king’s counselor. Henry moved quickly to settle the revolt, fearing the consequences if Richard were allowed time to rally other

disaffected barons to his side. The king forced Simon to submit personally to Richard, then set about spending great sums of money on the crusade.³⁶

One aim of the spending was certainly to buy back Richard's allegiance. Bribery was ever Henry's technique for conciliating his brother, who "never quarreled with Henry without coming away a richer man."³⁷ Richard's crusade fund had already benefited from the king's largesse the year before, when Henry had wanted Richard's approval for an unpopular tax on movables. As the negotiations over the thirtieth reached a crisis point in early 1237, Henry ordered the Jewish communities of England to pay 3000 marks to Richard for his "pilgrimage to the Holy Land."³⁸ Henry got his thirtieth, but promptly found himself spending part of its proceeds on his brother's crusade. In February 1238, the king lent £1000 from the thirtieth to Thierry of Nussa, the head of the English Hospitallers and Richard's close friend, to defray his expenses in the Holy Land.³⁹ At the end of May, 6000 marks from the thirtieth were transferred to the Templars in Paris for Richard's own use on the crusade.⁴⁰ In June, Richard received the amercements, or fines, from William of York's eyre in Cornwall.⁴¹ Over the long term, Henry's expenditure on the crusade would prove money well spent. After 1238, Richard never again wavered in his support for the crown. But of course Henry did not know what the future held when he paid over these sums. In the immediate aftermath of the revolt, no one appeared a greater threat to English domestic stability than Richard himself. So it may be that the bribes had another aim as well, which was to expedite his departure overseas.

Gregory did not share Henry's newfound enthusiasm for the crusade. On 25 November 1238 the pope made a fresh attempt to prevent Richard from setting out. This time he tried the new tack of inviting the earl to commute his vow and transfer to the Latin empire the money he would have spent in going to the Holy Land, staying there, and returning.⁴² The new approach came at a time when Gregory was broadening his search for support for the Latin empire. On the same day that he urged Richard to redeem his vow, for example, Gregory asked the churches of France and England to pay a three-year thirtieth in the empire's aid.⁴³ He may have been concerned that the schemes for aiding the empire upon which he had initially pinned his hopes were not coming to fruition: it was around this time that Thibaut was confirming his commitment to the Holy Land crusade; Peter of Brittany was grumbling about the lack of funding for his Constantinople expedition; and Bela was dithering over Gregory's offer to let him occupy Bulgaria and control its church. As these plans unraveled, the pope began to seek assistance for the Latin empire elsewhere and by other means.

However concerned Gregory was for the Latin empire, he did not ask Richard of Cornwall to crusade there personally. Instead, he was more emphatic than ever in his letter of 25 November that the earl should not leave England. "You should not withdraw your person from that kingdom, which depends for the most part on your providence, but rather you should put aside

entirely your plan of departing from it.”⁴⁴ Gregory’s resolve to prevent Richard from crossing the Channel may have been strengthened by events of the previous summer, when Henry III had sent a cohort of troops under the command of the Holy Land crusader Henry of Trumbleville to help Frederick II besiege the Lombards at Brescia and Milan.⁴⁵ These joint operations against papal allies could not have increased Gregory’s enthusiasm for seeing Richard and an even larger English army on the loose on the mainland.

Hitherto pursued separately, Gregory’s twin goals of keeping the Holy Land crusade in England and raising aid for the Latin empire came together in his appeal of 25 November to Richard of Cornwall. They came together again in the pope’s next move against the earl’s crusading plans, which the chancery announced on 19 December 1238. On that day archbishops throughout France and England received orders to divert vow redemption fees and legacies paid in their provinces in aid of the Holy Land to Baldwin of Courtenay, who was then in the midst of a European fundraising tour.⁴⁶ Baldwin was to receive one quarter of this money immediately, in order to purchase equipment and supplies, and another quarter when he reached Constantinople. The remainder of these funds would not go to Holy Land crusaders but would instead be reserved, as Gregory said, “at our pleasure.”⁴⁷ By this order, the curia deprived Richard of virtually all his crusade funding. Although he had been granted all English crusade revenues in April, he now could claim only the uncollected proceeds of old crusade taxes, which were likely to be negligible. With most of his funding gone, Richard would no longer be able to crusade to the Holy Land at the papacy’s expense. If he wanted the crusade indulgence, he would have to pay for it, either by covering the entire cost of his expedition, or by spending an equivalent sum to redeem his vow.

Richard was willing to fight the infidel in the Holy Land, but he preferred not to pay for the privilege of doing so. As the French crusaders sailed for Syria in the summer of 1239, he stayed home and petitioned the curia to return his funding. Supporting the appeal was Henry III, who wrote to the pope confirming his brother’s “fervent desire to execute magnificently his vow.”⁴⁸ After several months passed with no response from the curia, Richard decided to affirm his commitment to the Holy Land in more dramatic fashion. On 12 November 1239, the crusading magnates of England gathered at Northampton to make plans for the expedition. As Matthew Paris tells it, the proceedings began with an oath:

In order that their honest vow might not be impeded by the caviling of the Roman church, nor be turned aside for the shedding of Christian blood, to Greece or to Italy, as had been hinted to them was intended, all swore to set out in that year to the Holy Land, to liberate the holy church of God. The first among them all to swear was Richard of Cornwall, who took the oath on the great altars in All Saints’ church, in the middle of the city; after him Earl G[ilbert], the marshal, repeated the same oath. ... Next came Richard Siward,

and after him Henry of Trumbleville, and a great many nobles too numerous to mention, who all, with one impulse and one mind, prepared themselves for the service of the cross.⁴⁹

The oath of Northampton looks like an attempt by Richard and the leading English crusaders to withdraw their crusade from European politics. By swearing to crusade only to the Holy Land, and not to shed Christian blood, they signaled their refusal to participate in any intrafaith conflict, whether it be between the Catholics of Constantinople and their Greek Orthodox adversaries in the Aegean, or between pope and emperor on the Italian Peninsula. They would not fight in a papal crusade against Vatatzes, Asen, or Frederick, but neither would they fight in an imperial “crusade” against Gregory. They swore, in other words, to fulfill their vows completely but also exclusively, in Jerusalem and Jerusalem only.

The oath of Northampton was shrewd politics. On one hand, it reassured *cruce signati* that they could indeed fulfill their vows as they had originally conceived them. Richard, in this guise, stood up to a papacy that seemed intent on canceling the crusade and had gone so far as to remove his funding. On the other hand, if Richard’s refusal to comply with the papacy’s wishes did not exactly endear him to Rome, Gregory could at least have felt reassured that Richard would not hazard an attack against him on his way through Europe. The oath contained defiance, but also the possibility for compromise.

Gregory seems to have reached, independently, the same conclusion as Richard about the possibility of compromise. On 17 November 1239 Gregory reissued the crusade privileges for Richard that he had revoked, and on 23 November he restored Richard’s funding.⁵⁰ In a conciliatory phrase, Gregory claimed that “it was not our intention to revoke in any way ... the concession made earlier to the said [earl].”⁵¹ Gregory could not have known about the oath of Northampton, sworn just a few days earlier, when he decided to return crusade funding and privileges to Richard, but the decision bears the hallmark of a similar desire to compromise. Henry’s petition may well have given the pope pause. It made clear to Gregory, perhaps for the first time, that the king was now behind his brother’s crusade. It was one thing to take a hard line with Richard when Henry also opposed his leaving England. It was quite another when Henry was happy to see him go. The king’s about-face on the crusade left Gregory with no obvious course of action to pursue. If the pope allowed the crusade to go forward, he risked seeing it meet up with Frederick II, whom he had excommunicated and deposed the previous spring.⁵² If he cancelled it, he risked antagonizing Henry and driving him permanently into Frederick’s camp. Over the past year Frederick had been pressuring Henry to distance himself from Rome, demanding, for example, that he expel the legate from England.⁵³ Henry had demurred, alleging that as the pope’s vassal he could not oppose him in anything.⁵⁴ As Gregory well knew, however, that was hardly the case. If allowing Richard to fulfill his vow gave Henry one less

reason to resent papal overlordship, then perhaps it was worth the gamble of setting the crusade loose on the continent. After all, if Richard was as sincere about crusading to Syria as he claimed, he might well hasten there directly, without making any trouble along the way. Perhaps too the need to commute Richard's vow into money for Constantinople seemed less urgent in the wake of Baldwin's departure on crusade in July 1239.

If these considerations inclined the pope to compromise, they did not do so for long. In the early winter of 1240 he made one last try to prevent English crusaders from setting out for Syria. On 5 February 1240 he ordered the archbishop of York to forbid the crusaders of his province to journey to the Holy Land before they had received an order to cross from the Apostolic See.⁵⁵ Gregory justified this indefinite postponement of crusade vows on the familiar grounds of national security and the needs of the Holy Land. The crossing would lead to "severe danger" for the king and the kingdom, he asserted, and it would be "of little or no use to the eastern land." These arguments would seem to warrant postponing the entire English crusade, not just the portion of it based in York province. Yet we have no record of a papal mandate forbidding crusaders from Canterbury province to depart. From what we know about the way the chancery registered its correspondence, it seems unlikely that such an order was ever drafted.⁵⁶ If the postponement order were limited to York, it would have barred only a minority of English crusaders from departing, since most of them lived under Canterbury's jurisdiction. William of Forz and Robert Tweng would have had to stay home, while Richard of Cornwall, Simon of Montfort, and most of the other prominent *crucesignati* would have been allowed to make the crossing. Why postpone part of the crusade? There is no obvious answer, but we should note that Gregory was essentially a prisoner in Rome when he issued the order. Frederick and his troops were besieging the city and seemed on the brink of taking it.⁵⁷ During this chaotic time, formulating a coherent policy on the English Holy Land crusade may not have been the pope's highest priority.

The papal order of February 1240 partially postponing the crusade did not disrupt planning for the expedition, which had been underway since about the time that Gregory had first tried to postpone it in February 1238. Over those two years a stream of mandates regarding the crusade had issued forth from the curia, each one different from the last. None of these orders, however, seems to have disturbed the crusaders' preparations for the journey that lay before them. They halted their planning only long enough to come together at Northampton in November 1239 to declare what was already obvious: that they would not be delayed, diverted, or impeded by anyone from sailing for Syria in June 1240.

Not even Richard of Cornwall, who received most of the mail from Rome, was seriously hampered by Gregory's ever-evolving schemes. At most, Richard's finances may have suffered a short-term strain due to the pope waiting until November 1239 to restore his funding. Richard may have had to

scramble a little over the spring of 1240 to find the cash he needed, but he was clearly in funds by the time he reached Acre in September, when he offered to take into his service any crusader who wished to enter it.⁵⁸ No doubt his personal wealth, as well as the contributions he received from Henry III, helped make up for any temporary shortfall in papal funding. In the long term, of course, the papal grant did produce revenue for Richard, which would trickle in over the next two decades.⁵⁹

It is more difficult to assess whether the other English crusaders suffered financially from curial policies. The hard financial data that could answer the question definitively are lacking. Moreover, individual circumstances varied widely among the English crusaders, with some more able to afford the crusade than others, and some receiving more financial support than others. For example, those who accompanied Richard of Cornwall benefited from his largesse in Acre (and thus indirectly from the papal grant), while those who journeyed separately to the Holy Land, such as Simon of Montfort and William of Forz, did not. Another difficulty is that if there were any crusaders dissuaded from fulfilling their vows by the withholding of papal funding, we would not know who they were, since their nonparticipation would be unlikely to have left a trace in the records. What is clear, though, is this: despite the late restoration of the papal grant, large numbers of crusaders were able to set forth from England for the Holy Land in the spring of 1240. They were all, in one fashion or another, able to secure the funds they needed to go on the crusade.

A case in point is Simon of Montfort, who effectively chose to forgo papal funding by mounting his own expedition.⁶⁰ The measures he took before departure suggest that this decision may have been costly. In his case, the need to raise money for the crusade exacerbated preexisting financial difficulties: he was in debt before he even took the cross. Unlike most crusaders, who were entitled to delay repaying loans until they fulfilled their vows, Simon came under papal pressure to satisfy his obligations before departure. This was because his chief creditor was Peter of Brittany, the would-be defender of Constantinople, whose collection efforts Gregory supported, as we saw, with threats of excommunication. All this may explain why sometime in 1239 Simon made the disastrous move of naming Henry III as security for payment of the debt to Peter. In an unfortunate oversight, Simon neglected to tell the king what he had done. When Henry found out, Simon had to flee to France to escape the king's wrath. By April 1240, however, Simon had restored himself to royal favor and was able to return to England to raise money for the crusade. He chopped down his "noble" woods of Leicester and sold them to the Hospitallers for £1000, a financial expedient that probably cost his heirs dear.⁶¹ He alienated another valuable asset by selling pasturage rights to the burgesses of Leicester.⁶² While both measures speak to Simon's acute need for cash on the eve of departure, they also speak to his ability to fulfill his vow without papal funding.

Simon of Montfort was not the only crusader feeling the pinch in the spring of 1240. While Simon was leveling his forests, Ralph of Ringstone was selling his estate near Clapton (Northamptonshire) to his brother Hugh, for 100 marks.⁶³ Raising money for the expedition was also a family concern for the Hacards. Geoffrey Hacad's mother, Isabelle of Bashley, "gave" land to Carisbrooke priory on the Isle of Wight, which in return "gave" Geoffrey four marks for his overseas journey.⁶⁴ Other crusaders, not content to allow their mothers to pay their way overseas, took matters into their own hands. William of Cley raised six marks by pledging land he owned in Gateley for three years.⁶⁵ Nicholas Malesmeyns pledged his entire inheritance for four years, a year longer than the standard term of crusader leases.⁶⁶

In addition to selling and pledging land to private interests, crusaders turned to the crown for assistance. King Henry was willing to offer financial support to many crusaders, but in small quantities. To high-ranking royal officials and other favorites he offered gifts. Amaury of St. Amand, the esteemed royal counselor, received fifty marks, while Roland of Bray and Reynold of Bernevall received twenty and ten marks respectively.⁶⁷ For Henry of Trubleville, the former seneschal of Gascony, there was a steady trickle of benefactions over 1238 and 1239: thirty-six pounds in May 1238; forgiveness of a small debt that he owed to a Jewish lender in April 1239; twenty marks from the farm of Southampton in July; and sixty pounds from the exchange of London in August.⁶⁸ Even after Henry of Trubleville died on 21 December 1239, the gifts kept coming.⁶⁹ The king paid sixty pounds for a cup to carry Henry's heart back to Normandy, his homeland, and gave William of Trubleville an advance on his knight's fee so that he might fulfill his late brother's crusade vow.⁷⁰

William of Trubleville was one of many crusaders in royal service to obtain a pay advance from the king. It seems to have been the budget-conscious monarch's favorite way of supporting the crusade. In a way, though, the pay advance was not much different from a gift, since the king would receive no military service for the wages he dispensed. It was an expensive proposition, for instance, to pay Robert of Sabliol 400 marks in yearly fees to fight in Syria when he could have been doing Henry's business at home.⁷¹ Nonetheless, many knights benefited from arrangements of this type,⁷² as did a number of royal sergeants. The latter, unsurprisingly, did not do as well for themselves as the former: the sergeants Peter of Lungevill, Adam of Berentin, and Peter of Barenay secured fifty-eight shillings each from the king, not as an advance but as payment for wages in arrears.⁷³

For those not in royal service the crown was, at the least, a source of ready cash. We have seen Thierry of Nussa obtaining a £1000 loan from the proceeds of the thirtieth. Bertram le Gros sold land once owned by the count of St. Pol to the king for forty marks, while William of Mastac pledged all the land he held in England to the king for three years for £180.⁷⁴ Since impending crusades usually created a buyer's market, we can imagine that

these were good deals for the king. On the whole, in fact, his dealings with the crusaders were rather careful. Aside from the bribes paid to Richard of Cornwall, his spending on the crusade was not profligate. Even so, it helped the crusaders meet the financial demands of crusading without papal support.

Raising cash was not the only concern of crusaders before they departed. They also had to protect their property and families, obtain spiritual support, and extricate themselves from day-to-day cares. We might expect that the various papal orders forbidding English crusaders from departing overseas would have caused some of them to think twice about proceeding with these vital tasks. But the crusaders do not appear to have been deterred. The evidence shows a steady stream of preparatory measures, which, in the traditional pattern, gradually increase in number as the departure date looms closer.

First out of the gate was Hamo Pecche of Lincolnshire. In 1237 he settled a property dispute with the abbey of Ramsey that had its origins in his father's preparations for the Third Crusade some fifty years before.⁷⁵ By resolving this quarrel, Hamo avoided having litigation continue while he was overseas. Protecting assets was also a priority for William Say. In May 1238 he purchased royal protection of his goods, property, and family "for so long as he be on pilgrimage beyond the seas."⁷⁶ Such protection, widely regarded as an essential supplement to the safeguards offered by the papacy, did not come cheap. When he purchased it, William must have been either unaware of or unconcerned about the papacy's ambivalent attitude toward the crusade he meant to join. Others took a more martial approach to defending their property rights. In 1238 Robert of Marmion asserted his claim to the manor of Wat, in Yorkshire, by challenging the abbot of Mont St. Michel, who also claimed it, to a duel. Robert bested the abbot's champion in the fight and took possession of the manor, leaving the abbot to bemoan his fate to the pope, to what effect is not known.⁷⁷

1239 and 1240 saw many of the wealthier Barons' Crusaders kicking their preparations into high gear. In June 1239, mixing piety and self-interest in equal measure, Ralph of Thony gave three granges to the Cistercians of Cumhyr. The grant sponsored thirteen monks to pray for him and his family in perpetuity; the convent in return petitioned the Cistercian general chapter to release Ralph from an earlier promise to found an abbey.⁷⁸ While seeing to his family's spiritual welfare, Ralph did not ignore its material prospects. He contracted a splendid match for his son and heir Roger, securing royal permission for him to marry Alice, the daughter of the earl of Hereford and Essex.⁷⁹ John of Neville also advanced his family up the social ladder before sailing for Syria. In February 1240 his son Hugh contracted to marry Isabel, the daughter of the earl of Winchester. Familial concerns underlay another measure John took before departing on crusade. Sometime in 1240 he transferred part of his forest bailiwick to his brother Ralph of Neville, thereby keeping this valuable office in the family. Amid these displays of concern for

family and property, preparations for the crusade itself did not go entirely neglected. John did not bother to make the trip to Northampton in November 1239 to swear the crusader oath, but he did send three representatives to scout out knights for his crusade retinue. While Richard of Cornwall was orchestrating the histrionics at All Saints, they negotiated with Philip Basset over horses, baggage, and transportation costs. John of Neville, it appears, was not overly troubled by shifting papal crusade policies.⁸⁰ As the steady progression of planning measures for the crusade between 1237 and 1240 shows, his attitude was widely shared.

But the most remarkable illustration of the limited impact of papal policy on the English crusaders comes in the way church authorities continued to honor crusader privileges, even as the papacy sought to keep the crusade from Jerusalem. Richard Siward, for one, was fortunate that this was so. Before he could liberate the Holy Land, he had to liberate himself from jail. A supporter of the Marshals in their feuds with the crown, Richard was arrested by royal sheriffs and imprisoned in Gloucester Castle in 1236.⁸¹ Having signed on for the crusade not long before, however, he pled the defense of the cross, appealing to his bishop for redress. This was none other than Robert Grosseteste of Lincoln, who drafted for Richard what was surely the best defense of the cross petition a crusader ever had.⁸² With the archbishop of Canterbury pleading on Richard's behalf as well, Henry relented and set his longtime adversary free.⁸³ Two years later Henry took similar action in the case of a certain William Goscelin, a crusader who had been imprisoned for allegedly attacking Cardinal Otto, the papal legate, during the Oxford riots of 1238. Otto showed forbearance toward William and respect for his crusader status by remonstrating with the king for his release, which was secured in August 1238.⁸⁴ Then there is the case of Hugh Wake, who turned for defense of his crusader privileges not to his bishop, nor to the legate, but to Pope Gregory himself. Early in 1238 Hugh complained to Gregory that a suit brought against him in royal court was preventing him from executing his vow. The pope's answer was remarkably sympathetic under the circumstances. He ordered Cardinal Otto to use his influence with the king on Hugh's behalf, expressing the hope that Henry would not frustrate the crusader's pious intentions by allowing the suit to drag on unnecessarily.⁸⁵ Although it went against his plan of blocking the departure of the English crusade, there was a certain logic to the pope's advocacy. Gregory wanted secular authorities to respect crusader privileges. In this case, as in those of Richard Siward and William Goscelin, this interest seems to have trumped more immediate priorities. As far as the evidence permits us to see, then, papal policy did not prevent English crusaders from meeting the cost of the expedition; it did not delay or halt their planning for departure; and it did not keep their privileges from being enforced.

If the crusaders' preparations are important for showing the limited impact Gregory had upon preparations for the expedition, they demand attention for

another reason as well: they allow us to complete our survey of the crusade's impact on non-Christians within Christendom, which has so far covered Hungary and France. Compared to what happened in those two kingdoms, the crusade's effect on England's main religious minority, the Jews, appears to have been slight. In Hungary, the years leading up to the crusade witnessed a major re-orientation of papal policy toward the kingdom's Jews, which eased the pressure on them to conform to burdensome canonical regulations. In France, the same period saw financial exploitation in Champagne along with mass violence and expulsions in Brittany. In England, by contrast, the preparations for the expedition seem to have made very little impression on the country's Jewish communities, whether for good or ill.

Evidence for crusader interaction with Jews in England between 1236 and 1240 is sparse. What few instances of documented contact there are, moreover, speak to nonviolent, if not especially cordial, relations. Ralph of Ringstone's sale of his estate at Clapton to his brother involved the Jewish moneylender Aaron of York, who lent Hugh of Ringstone the 100 mark purchase price at an interest rate of 50 percent. To pay back the loan, Hugh sold off the estate to the Hotot family in 1242 for 170 marks. It was a good deal all round: Ralph went on his crusade, Hugh made twenty marks, and Aaron made fifty.⁸⁶ In 1237, however, Master Robert of Gloucester, a crusading clerk, accused certain unnamed Jewish lenders of charging "burdensome and immoderate" usury. The allegation appears in a complaint Robert made to the pope about his treatment at the hands of the archbishop of Canterbury, whom he accused of failing to protect his rights as a crusader and, perhaps more to the point, of depriving him of a church he claimed by right of a papal provision.⁸⁷ This context suggests that the charge of exorbitant usury should be taken with a grain of salt. Faced with the daunting task of winning a lawsuit against a mighty prelate of the English church, Robert may have been tempted to lard his case with an allegation that Jews had exploited him financially, a charge that highlighted his penury and the archbishop's denial of justice to him. Not all crusaders were as keen as Robert to exercise their privileges with respect to loans from Jews. Despite enjoying a moratorium on the repayment of his debts until he returned from crusade, Robert of Fraxineto settled accounts with the Jewish creditors Aaron and Ursello of Colchester before setting out for the Holy Land. This was a rare action for a crusader to take. Later, though, there was a breakdown in relations, or at least in communications, between the lenders and Robert's widow, Oliva. She accused them of holding back one of the debt instruments they were supposed to have returned on receipt of payment. Her grievance against them, however, resulted not in violence but a court case—she filed suit against them with the king's justices in 1242.⁸⁸

Oliva appealed to the king because he exercised direct and strict lordship over English Jewry.⁸⁹ This tight royal control may be one reason why England, unlike France, saw no physical attacks by Barons' Crusaders upon

Jews. Certainly an earlier English monarch, Richard I, had not been able to prevent the violence that crusaders unleashed upon the Jews of York in 1190.⁹⁰ But the administrative reforms introduced in the wake of those attacks, however baleful their effects on Anglo-Jewry in other respects, do seem to have helped limit the opportunities for further large-scale crusader assaults on Jews.⁹¹ In the thirteenth century, there was no recurrence of the kind of attacks that had taken place at York.

Royal control of Jews played a more certain role in the story of the finances leading up to the crusade. Whereas French barons like Thibaut of Champagne could extract funds from their Jews to help pay for the expedition, in England close central control of Jewish money made such exploitation impossible. It was for King Henry, and King Henry alone, to decide whether Jewish assets should be seized in order to subsidize the crusade. Needless to say, his interest in expending a valuable crown resource on a project in which he was not directly involved was limited. For the most part, he reserved Jewish capital for his own priorities, the most urgent of which was reconquering Poitou. With this end in view he assessed a tax of one third of Jewish goods and debts in 1239.⁹² When the proceeds from this tax proved disappointing, he imposed a new levy of 20,000 marks in 1241.⁹³ Compared to this, the cost of the Barons' Crusade to English Jewry was low: 3000 marks in 1237 for Richard of Cornwall.⁹⁴ Even this expenditure, it could be argued, advanced Henry's interests as much as it did Richard's, since it eased the way for the thirtieth of 1237, which proved to be a financial windfall for the crown. English Jews were exploited financially for the Barons' Crusade only to the extent that Henry wanted them to be.

In June 1240, the one eventuality Gregory seemed most keen to avoid came to pass: Holy Land crusaders set sail from England in large numbers. The pope had not been able to prevent them from departing, nor had he been able to recruit English knights for the relief of Latin Constantinople. In fact, save for the 500 marks King Henry gave Baldwin, England generated no discernible support for the Latin empire in the late 1230s.⁹⁵ The bishop of Winchester's short-lived preaching campaign bore no fruit; and when he passed away in the spring of 1238 no attempt was made to replace him. Just as meager as the yield in soldiers was the yield in money. The curia's request for a thirtieth from the English church for Constantinople seems to have fallen on deaf ears. William Lunt has persuasively argued that it was never paid.⁹⁶

Jerusalem, not Constantinople, was the focus of English crusading ambition in the spring of 1240. Most of the crusaders sailed with Richard of Cornwall. Before taking ship with them, Richard went to St. Albans to solicit prayers for the crusade.⁹⁷ Then he made his way to London. The king and the legate met him there and escorted him down to Dover, where Henry had ships waiting to ferry the expedition across the Channel.⁹⁸ Spurning Frederick II's invitation to travel through Italy, Richard embarked about 10 June and sailed only as far as the French coast, traveling overland to Marseille, where he took ship again

for Acre.⁹⁹ Simon of Montfort, by contrast, chose to accept his brother-in-law's hospitality. In the company of a smaller contingent of knights and his wife Eleanor he took the route "through Lombardy and Apulia" to Brindisi. From there he sailed for Acre without further ado, leaving behind Eleanor, now many months pregnant, as the emperor's guest.¹⁰⁰ About a year later, William of Forz led the third English expedition to the Holy Land, again without incident.¹⁰¹ Gregory's fears of English crusaders invading the Papal States had proven as unfounded as his hopes of English crusaders invading Bulgaria and Nicaea. Instead, as they had promised at Northampton, they were setting off to "liberate the holy church of God in the Holy Land."¹⁰²

It is difficult to see the English crusaders as acting out of a common sense of Christian identity. Like their peers in Hungary, Champagne, and western France, they did not do what the pope wished. Nor did they act together, as Christians. Moreover, since they insisted on fighting only in the Holy Land, they clearly refused to understand their enemy as a generic non-Christian other. And when we compare the seeming absence of consequences for internal minorities that resulted from the crusade preaching in England to the variety of consequences elsewhere, we see the impossibility of extrapolating from single situations to general accounts of interfaith relations in the Middle Ages.

The Constantinople Crusade

In the preceding chapters we have examined the widespread consequences of Gregory's crusade appeal. It is now time to focus in upon the expeditions to which the appeal actually led. As one by one Bela of Hungary, Thibaut of Champagne, Peter of Brittany, and Richard of Cornwall declined invitations to aid the Latin empire, it became clear that only one Catholic magnate of any note was willing to lead an expedition to Constantinople. This was Baldwin of Courtenay, the nineteen-year-old marquis of Namur, who also happened to be heir to the Latin empire. Despite his self-interest and the most strenuous papal support, he was able to raise only a modest army in defense of his inheritance. By following his expedition we see the consequences of the Holy Land crusaders' unwillingness to support the pope's favored cause. The army that assembled to defend Constantinople was much smaller than the one that went to Syria. The schismatic and heretic John Asen, against whom Gregory had inveighed, actually provided more support for the crusade than many of the leaders to whom Gregory had appealed. In the end, the campaign proved ineffective as an instrument of papal policy. Overshadowed by the Barons' Crusade, Baldwin's expedition represented a poor return on the massive investment Gregory IX had made in trying to save the Latin empire in the latter half of the 1230s.

Baldwin had come to the West in search of support in 1236, immediately after the second siege of Constantinople.¹ His first stop was the papal curia.² There he found ambitious plans for assisting the empire already underway: Gregory had issued his appeals to Bela of Hungary and Thibaut of Champagne in December 1235, and Peter of Brittany had taken the cross for Constantinople in October 1236. From the beginning, Peter made it clear that he intended to lead his own crusade to Latin Greece. He would not subordinate himself to anyone, not even to the heir of the empire he had sworn to defend.³ Since Peter declined to crusade with Baldwin, Baldwin decided to recruit a small army of his own, which he would take back to Constantinople as quickly as possible. With this aim in mind Gregory issued crusading privileges to Baldwin in December 1236 and ordered the bishops of Arras, Cambrai, and Tournai to commute the vows of 400 Holy Land crusaders in their dioceses, focusing on the friends and relations of Baldwin and John of Brienne.⁴

Baldwin made his way from the curia to Paris, hoping to arouse the interest of his great aunt Blanche of Castile and her son King Louis IX in his cause.⁵

In this he succeeded, despite making a poor impression at court. Blanche, it is reported, found him “infantile in speech” and despaired for the fate of the empire under his rule.⁶ Even so, she and Louis would prove staunch supporters of Baldwin in the years to come. Anxious to court royal favor, Baldwin had come to France for another reason as well. His elder brother Philip, lord of Courtenay and marquis of Namur, had recently died without leaving a direct heir, and Baldwin intended to claim the inheritance. King Louis surrendered Courtenay without difficulty, but Baldwin’s sister Margaret claimed Namur for herself, going so far as to occupy it by force. Negotiations between Baldwin and Margaret dragged on and on, ruining Baldwin’s plans for a rapid return to Constantinople. In autumn 1237 the countess of Flanders, who had volunteered to arbitrate between the feuding siblings, finally settled the dispute in Baldwin’s favor. He took possession of Namur from Margaret in exchange for an indemnity of 7000 *livres*.⁷ Needing money more than land, the new marquis promptly pawned Namur to Louis in return for a 50,000 *livres paris* loan.⁸

With cash in hand, Baldwin could buy soldiers to fight in Latin Greece. It was decided that a first wave of reinforcements would sail from Venice in early spring 1238, under the command of John of Béthune, a leading baron of the empire.⁹ Baldwin himself would follow in August, taking advantage of the additional time in France to raise more money and troops. Gregory approved of the scheme and began to cast the net more widely for recruits and cash, ordering the cross to be preached for the Latin empire in Bordeaux and England, as we have seen.¹⁰

Very early in 1238, John of Béthune and his army set off from northern France for Venice. Whether they intended to travel by land or sea is not known, but in either case they would have to cross territory controlled by Frederick II to reach their destination. The emperor, however, refused to grant them safe-conduct. Certainly Frederick had more reasons to block the crusade than to let it pass. The very idea of a Latin emperor of Constantinople may have troubled him, since it challenged his own claim to be the true heir to Rome. The barons of Constantinople had antagonized him further by selecting as emperor his archenemy and the former commander of the papal armies in Italy, John of Brienne. By choosing the papal candidate par excellence, the barons had cast their lot with the Apostolic See, bequeathing to Baldwin a legacy of imperial antipathy. This inheritance was especially burdensome in 1238, when Frederick’s relations with the pope were poor. Rumors abounded that Frederick was in contact with Vataztes and Asen, who were proposing to hold Constantinople from him in fief, if only he would help them conquer it. And in a neat reversal of Gregory’s own worries at the time, Frederick may also have been concerned that, if he allowed the French crusaders into northern Italy, they would join the Lombards in their struggle against imperial forces there.¹¹

The story of what became of John of Béthune’s crusade is told by Philip

Mouskes, the Low Countries chronicler who is generally well-informed about Baldwin and the Latin empire.¹² Though a little fantastic in parts, Mouskes's account is not contradicted by any contemporary source, and its broad outlines are corroborated by two papal letters written shortly after the events it recounts, in March 1238.¹³ According to the chronicler, Frederick only allowed the army to continue its journey after John of Béthune offered himself as a hostage for its good behavior. Once the crusaders reached Venice, John was released and went to join them there. No sooner had he arrived, however, than he fell ill and died, leaving the crusaders to their own devices in a city far from home. Most went to Rome, to seek absolution from their vows by the pope; some went to Milan, perhaps to fight alongside the Lombards; while only a few boarded Venetian galleys bound for Constantinople. Bad luck and too close an association with the papal curia seem to have cost Baldwin the first fruits of his fundraising tour.

Rather than depart for Constantinople in August as planned, Baldwin went to Rome to try to rebuild his shattered crusade.¹⁴ If papal enemies like Frederick insisted on seeing him as a papal dependent, he might as well benefit from the relationship as much as he could. Besides, there was really nowhere else he could turn. King Louis had given him much already, and only Gregory could furnish the indulgences, temporal privileges, and moral sanction that might yet allow Baldwin to raise an army to defend his costly inheritance. It was, in fact, money that Baldwin was mainly after now. Few prominent fighting men had volunteered for his campaign. Among the French nobility, there had so far only been one: Humbert of Beaujeu, a middling lord who was Baldwin's cousin and one of King Louis's top captains.¹⁵ If knights would not volunteer they would have to be hired, but neither Baldwin nor the government in Constantinople could afford to pay their wages. Baldwin's personal finances were in disarray: he was 50,000 *l.p.* in debt to Louis, with little to show for it. Back in Constantinople, the cupboard was bare: the empire's most valuable relic, the crown of thorns, had already been pawned to the Venetians during a previous crisis.¹⁶ If there was to be a crusade at all, Gregory was going to have to find money for his indigent client, and he was going to have to find it fast.

With many of the pope's grander schemes for aiding Constantinople running aground in the fall of 1238, it became possible in any case to concentrate more resources on Baldwin's campaign than ever before. We have already seen the main fundraising measures Gregory took for Baldwin in November and December 1238: the request to Richard of Cornwall to redeem his vow; the call for a three-year thirtieth from the churches of England and France; and the order to the archbishops of these kingdoms to set aside for Baldwin half the money from vow redemption fees and legacies paid in their provinces in aid of the Holy Land, with the remainder reserved for Gregory's own use.¹⁷ But papal largesse did not end there. In two of the larger French provinces, Rouen and Tours, as well as the dioceses of Tournai, Arras,

Cambrai, and Poitiers, Gregory turned over his share of Holy Land funds to Baldwin.¹⁸ Later, the pope would extend the diversion of Holy Land funds into four dioceses to the north and east of French territory: Liège, Metz, Toul, and Verdun.¹⁹ Smaller revenue streams were not neglected either. On 10 December 1238 Gregory advised Louis IX to contribute the unreturned proceeds of Jewish usury to the pious cause of Baldwin's crusade.²⁰ All this was in addition to redemption fees paid by those who had vowed to crusade to the Latin empire, legacies donated in its aid, and a generous grant to Humbert of Beaujeu.²¹ Over a two-month span, the pope had channeled the greater portion of crusade revenues generated in England and France toward the Constantinople expedition.

On parchment, Baldwin had a great sum of money coming to him. But while precise figures are lacking, all the evidence we have suggests that he received nowhere near what Gregory had promised him. One problem was that a great deal of this money had already been granted to other crusaders. To Richard of Cornwall, the curia had promised all Holy Land crusade revenues in England; to Thibaut of Champagne, vow redemptions and legacies in his own massive principality; to Peter of Brittany (albeit for crusading to Latin Greece), vow redemptions and legacies from Brittany, the dioceses of Poitiers, Angers, and Le Mans, and the province of Rouen; to Henry of Trumbleville, vow redemptions and legacies in the province of Bordeaux; to Hugh of Burgundy, vow redemptions and legacies in the dioceses of Besançon, Langres, and Autun; to Henry of Bar, ten percent of vow redemptions from the province of Reims; to Amalric of Montfort, vow redemptions and legacies in his lands to a total of 3000 *l.*; to John of Soissons, 1500 *l.* to accompany Peter of Brittany to Constantinople; to John of Mâcon, 4000 *l.p.* for the same reason; and finally to the bishop of Nevers, vow redemptions and legacies in two French dioceses where these funds had not already been claimed by another crusader.²² In addition to these grants to individual crusaders, Gregory had also, after a visit to Rome by the representatives of several prominent Holy Land crusaders, set aside Holy Land legacies in the provinces of Bordeaux, Reims, Bourges, and Tours, along with the diocese of Le Puy, for the common expenses of the Jerusalem expedition.²³

To obtain much of his funding, Baldwin would have to defeat the claims of a veritable “who’s who” of leading magnates. In some cases, we know the results of the competition. The holders of the two largest grants, Richard of Cornwall and Thibaut of Champagne, had their funding reconfirmed.²⁴ John of Soissons and John of Mâcon did not renounce their claims to the money promised them.²⁵ Peter of Brittany did cede his crusade funding to Baldwin, but not until the autumn of 1240.²⁶ By this time Baldwin had returned to Constantinople and Peter had had ample opportunity to spend the money raised for him in the Holy Land. As for the other rival claimants, there is no evidence to say how they fared against Baldwin. It seems fair to wonder,

though, how aggressively he pursued his claims against them, since these were men whose good will he would have been anxious to cultivate under other circumstances. Nor is it clear how enthusiastic the archbishops would have been about collecting this money, as Gregory had ordered them to do. In many instances, this would have entailed taking funds away from people of influence and power; in others, it would have meant compromising the interests of relatives or political allies. It was asking a lot of the archbishop of Reims, for example, to prevail upon his friend and kinsman Henry of Bar to accept only half of the crusade revenue he had been promised, for Baldwin's sake.²⁷

Diverting money away from the Holy Land crusade was never going to be easy. Collecting funds earmarked for the Latin empire, however, ought to have been more straightforward, since Baldwin's claim to them was uncontested. Yet even here, difficulties arose. Some collection agents did not attend to their duties as well as they might have. The bishop of Le Mans, for example, was given the task of fundraising for the Latin empire in France. He was supposed to work under the supervision of Brother William of Cordelle, the chief crusade preacher in the kingdom. But the bishop proved reluctant to take direction from the Franciscan. After rebuking the bishop of Le Mans for failing to heed William's advice, Gregory replaced him with the bishop of Paris.²⁸ The case brings to mind the infighting between seculars and mendicants that attended Robert le Bougre's inquisitorial proceedings. In any event, such squabbling did nothing to fill Baldwin's war chest.

Humbert of Beaujeu's fund-drive ran into trouble as well. In five dioceses—Lyon, Mâcon, Clermont, Belley, and Geneva—Gregory allowed indulgences to be given to those who made a financial contribution to Humbert's military expenses. If the donor showed sufficient devotion (and paid enough money), he or she could earn the full Holy Land crusade indulgence without even taking the cross. Within weeks of the scheme being announced, reports reached Rome that bishops in the targeted dioceses were trying to prevent it from going into effect. Gregory was forced to issue a mandate forbidding the archbishop of Lyon, the elect of Belley, and the bishops of Mâcon, Clermont, and Geneva to "place any obstacle" in the way of the collections.²⁹

Clerical opposition hurt the fundraising campaign for the Latin empire. But clerical indifference may have harmed it even more. As mentioned above, the English clergy paid little heed to Gregory's request of a thirtieth for Constantinople. French clerics appear to have been equally uninterested in paying the subsidy.³⁰ Such clerical apathy dealt Baldwin's campaign a cruel blow because ecclesiastical taxation was crucial to the financial prospects of any crusade. One need only recall the role it played in funding Louis IX's first crusade to be reminded of the fact.³¹ In the final analysis, finding money for Baldwin proved a struggle. Administrative breakdowns, a stingy, truculent clergy, and the competing claims of Holy Land crusaders dogged Gregory's

efforts from beginning to end. It is doubtful whether he provided the generous subsidy Baldwin was seeking when he came to Rome.

In the spring of 1239 Baldwin returned to France and the company of his other patron, Louis IX.³² At a ceremony at Melun on 15 May the king knighted Baldwin and gave him a fine warhorse.³³ In the weeks that followed, Louis also distributed small sums of money, often just thirty or forty *sous*, to a few crusaders in Baldwin's company.³⁴ The gifts were welcome, but they could not make up for the inadequacy of the papal fundraising campaign. The breakdown of this campaign was harmful to Baldwin's crusade because of the concomitant lack of volunteers. With little money, Baldwin could not make up for the shortfall of volunteers by paying for soldiers. Given his funding problems, it seems implausible that he might have hired a sizable complement of fighters, as some have suggested.³⁵ To the contrary, it seems safer to assume that the force that gathered around him in late June 1239 was rather small.³⁶

Although it is impossible to provide an exact count for Baldwin's army, its size can be compared to that of the Barons' Crusade. A contemporary chronicler, Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, estimated that the Barons' Crusade was more than three times as large as Baldwin's expedition. As compared to 700 knights who fought with Baldwin, Alberic counted 2300 knights who campaigned in the Holy Land.³⁷ Moreover, what we know about the magnates who volunteered for the two crusades and the resources they commanded tends to bear out Alberic's estimate. As we have seen, each magnate was expected to bring soldiers with him on campaign. So the more magnates there were in the army, the larger it was likely to be. Only five secular lords are recorded as crusading with Baldwin: Humbert of Beaujeu, Thomas of Marie, Josseran of Brancion, William of Cayeaux, the castellan of Beaumetz, and Watins of La Haverie. Also in the host was Warin, a former archbishop of Thessalonica, and possibly the bishop of Sées.³⁸ By comparison, well over forty secular lords are recorded as participating in the French half of the Barons' Crusade alone. Besides being more numerous, the nobles who went to Syria were also, by and large, more prominent and prosperous than those who went to Latin Greece. Barons' Crusaders like Thibaut of Champagne and Hugh of Burgundy, both great territorial princes, could afford to sponsor much larger retinues than even such considerable figures in Baldwin's army as Humbert of Beaujeu and Thomas of Marie. If it is impossible to determine the exact number of troops that fought on each crusade, it is clear that the expedition Gregory supported was much smaller than the one he opposed.

At the beginning of July, Baldwin's army set off on the long march overland to Constantinople. Louis IX's parting gift, it seems, had been to secure Frederick II's permission for the army to pass through imperial territory.³⁹ After crossing Germany and Hungary, the crusade reached the Bulgarian frontier. It received a surprisingly friendly welcome from John

Asen. Allied with Vatatzes against the Latin empire, Asen should have tried to stop the crusaders in their tracks. Instead he left the job to Vatatzes, who was becoming too powerful for his liking in Thrace.⁴⁰ The Bulgarian tsar allowed the crusaders to march peacefully through his lands and even bolstered their numbers with a squadron of Cuman cavalry.⁴¹ So, oddly enough, John Asen, the schismatic and heretic, the great scourge of the Latin empire in the pope's eyes, made one of the most helpful contributions to Baldwin's crusade.

In the winter of 1239 Baldwin made his long-promised return to Constantinople. With all the pomp and ceremony the impoverished city could manage, he was crowned emperor around Easter 1240. Then he began his crusade. The target was Tzurulum, a Nicaean stronghold in Thrace less than seventy-five miles west of Constantinople. Two major eastbound routes to Constantinople came together at Tzurulum, one coming from Thessalonica, the other from Adrianople.⁴² Possessing this strategically important site could therefore help in defending Constantinople against an invasion from the west.⁴³ In 1237, the Latins had unsuccessfully tried to seize Tzurulum from the Nicaeans. This time, the fortunes of war favored the crusaders and their Cuman allies. The city fell to them after a short siege.⁴⁴ The capture of Tzurulum increased the security of Constantinople, but it came at the price of further losses in the east. Unable to raise the crusader siege, Vatatzes attacked Latin territory on the other side of the Bosphorus. His forces seized two Latin-held towns in Asia Minor, Dakivya and Nikitiaton.⁴⁵ With these conquests, the summer campaigning season came to an end.

The results of Gregory's Constantinople crusade can now be summed up. On balance, the capture of Tzurulum outweighed the loss of two minor holdings in Asia Minor. But this moderate success was scarcely commensurate with the enormous amount of time, energy, and political capital Gregory had expended upon the expedition over the past five years. In the gap between the effort expended and the result achieved, the pope's failure to unify the Christian world behind his crusading policy comes into view. It was a failure that would have grave consequences for the Latin empire. When the Barons' Crusade sailed for Acre, the empire lost its best chance to halt its decline. For as it turned out, no western potentate was ever again willing to go to the lengths that Gregory had gone to try to save it. This was not for lack of trying on Baldwin's part. By 1244 he was back in the West, touring European capitals in search of support. Tzurulum's conquest had not reduced the empire's dependency on western aid. Baldwin became, in Longnon's phrase, the "begging prince"; his reign became a never-ending quest for charity.⁴⁶ He gathered promises by the score, but little money and few troops. Modest as it was in scale and achievement, his 1240 campaign was the last western crusade of any significance to come to the Latin empire's aid.⁴⁷ It therefore comes as no surprise that the Latin regime in Constantinople survived its greatest papal patron by only twenty years.

The Barons' Crusaders in the Holy Land

The expedition to aid Constantinople that Gregory IX supported so vigorously met with little success. The Holy Land crusade he tried to divert presents a different picture. The Holy Land crusaders, as we have seen, rejected the pope's appeal to crusade in Latin Greece or to commute or redeem their vows. Although they did not fight those the pope wanted them to fight, their expedition was nevertheless another consequence of his initial crusade appeal. When we study the course of the campaign we see that even though all rejected Gregory's diversion attempt, their common religious identity did not work to unite them. Instead, their expedition was marked by divisions over leadership, strategy, and tactics. Another kind of division, too, marks this expedition: a division not among the crusaders, but one they were able to recognize and affirm among the Muslims they attacked. In the face of military losses, Thibaut of Champagne turned to diplomacy. Rather than seeing all Muslims as equal threats, he forged alliances with some princes against others. Such a policy was unpopular with the papal legate, but it was upheld by Richard of Cornwall when he arrived at Acre a few weeks after Thibaut's departure. The point on which there thus seems to have been the most, although not complete, crusader unity was the decision to differentiate among non-Christians and the refusal to see all as equal threats to the faith. By making distinctions Gregory did not support, the crusaders' expedition achieved stunning territorial success.

The success of the Barons' Crusade not only confounded Gregory's advice to campaign in Constantinople, it also continues to confound many modern historians, who find themselves at a loss to explain how an expedition lacking the ingredients they consider crucial to success nonetheless achieved it. They have assumed that a successful Holy Land crusade would have strong European support, a powerful leader who could unite the fighting forces, good relations with the kingdom of Jerusalem, prowess on the battlefield, and an initial grasp of Near Eastern politics and diplomacy.¹ The Barons' Crusade had none of these. It had little backing from the two great pan-European powers, the pope and the emperor. Gregory opposed the campaign, while Frederick II's support was lukewarm at best. Frederick thought his truce with Egypt offered better security to the kingdom of Jerusalem than an expedition of French and English barons could. When he learned that the crusaders planned to depart for Syria in 1238, a full year before the truce expired, he demanded that they postpone their journey. If they agreed to the delay, he

hinted that he might be willing to assume command of the expedition. If they did not, he would withhold all aid and refuse them permission to pass through his lands. The barons acceded to Frederick's demand, but when the time came to leave in 1239, he informed them he would not be accompanying them after all—his conflict with Gregory IX would not allow it. In the end, he offered the crusaders the use of his ports in southern Italy, but little more.²

What the Barons' Crusade lacked in support on the home front, it did not make up for in other respects. Far from having a leader who could rally the troops, the crusade had as its commander Thibaut of Champagne, a divisive figure who proved incapable of maintaining discipline during the campaign. Far from cooperating with the authorities in the kingdom of Jerusalem, whom they were ostensibly trying to aid, the crusaders quarreled with them ceaselessly. Far from besting the Muslim forces on the battlefield, the crusade was a military disaster. And far from laying the groundwork for the campaign with preliminary diplomacy, the crusaders seem to have contacted no local Muslim leaders before they arrived.³

Faced with these circumstances that should lead to catastrophe, Sidney Painter explains the results of the campaign as a miracle visited upon fools.⁴ Similarly, Michel Balard sees the territorial gains won by the crusade as the work of a "lucky diplomat," Thibaut of Champagne.⁵ René Grousset, more damningly, sees the expedition as emblematic of a new "romantic" conception of crusading on the part of French knights in the thirteenth century, a shift away from the "colonial realism" of the previous generation. These paragons of chivalry, with no notion of diplomacy or colonial governance, bungled their way to success through luck, but should have done much better.⁶ Peter Jackson instead argues that the crusaders were clever, and through their cleverness overcame the disadvantages we might expect their chivalric values and chaotic organization to present.⁷

Whatever the reason or reasons for their success, it is worth noting that the crusaders' background was not necessarily an overwhelming handicap. In fact, the political and diplomatic situations in northern France and England in the 1230s bore striking similarities to the political and diplomatic situation the crusaders found in Syria. If the crusaders' background taught them the value of chivalric ideals, it also taught them how to maneuver in a political context with little central control, uncertain loyalties, and shifting alliances. In the face of a regency government for a twelve-year-old monarch, the French barons had contested for power, forming and breaking treaties and promises. The English barons were in a similar position because King Henry had endured a turbulent minority in the years leading up to the crusade. In Syria, the Ayyubids were a family dynasty. The sultan in Egypt exercised more or less control over his relatives at any given time, but power was very much shared in the family and was highly decentralized.⁸ The struggles among the Ayyubid princes were always fierce, but they were fiercest of all when a powerful sultan died. This is precisely what happened in 1238, the year before

the Barons' Crusaders arrived in Syria. The situation the crusaders found in the kingdom of Jerusalem was similarly chaotic, with Frankish barons feuding in the absence of the nominal head, Frederick II.⁹ While the crusaders may not have been good colonial administrators, as Grousset anachronistically charges, they were certainly familiar with a decentralized system of shifting power and loyalties, rather than a firm and centralized state. In the Near East, they found a different cast of characters than those they knew at home, but the story was the same.

For the French crusaders, the journey to that new, yet familiar, world began at Lyon in July 1239. By the end of the month, in the estimation of the crusade's main chronicler, "almost all the best knights of France" had assembled there.¹⁰ A different chronicler described the expedition as comprising "all the nobles, knights, and barons of France," while another simply called it a "great crusade."¹¹ Contemporaries enthused about the quality as well as the quantity of fighting men gathered for the expedition. One chronicler called them "great crusaders," another "famous knights," and still another "very famous knights," singling out Thibaut of Champagne, Peter of Brittany, and Amalric of Montfort by name.¹² However much their reputations suffered after they left France, the place of these men in the chivalric pantheon was unquestioned at the outset. One of their lesser-known confrères acknowledges as much, rather ruefully, in a poem about the crusade:

How great and glorious a throng
Set off from France, the flower
Or so it seemed, of chivalry,
Best in the world, all said.¹³

While the scale and splendor of the host is not in doubt, great uncertainty surrounds its sojourn at Lyon in July 1239. Three months earlier, Gregory IX had excommunicated Frederick II. The ensuing papal-imperial conflict entangled more than one chronicler in its web, with the result that we have competing versions of Gregory's and Frederick's final dealings with the crusaders before they departed overseas. The anonymous author of the "Rothelin Continuation" of William of Tyre's *Chronicle* wrote for the anti-imperialists.¹⁴ He says that imperial envoys came to Lyon and proposed to the crusaders that Frederick would personally lead their expedition overseas if they agreed to postpone it for a year. But the crusaders spurned the offer, seeing

very clearly ... that the emperor of Rome's message was nothing but guile, trickery and deceit, sent because he was determined that the pilgrims should not cross the sea with his support to make war on the unbelieving Muslims who were his dear, close and intimate friends.¹⁵

Matthew Paris also mentions that Frederick tried to postpone the crusade.¹⁶ But true to his anti-papalist leanings, Matthew reserves his rhetorical

firepower for an encounter between the crusaders and a papal messenger:

while [the crusaders] were holding council, a messenger arrived in all haste from the pope, who, as strenuously as he had formerly urged and persuaded them to set out on the expedition, now as eagerly dissuaded them from setting out on their journey; and the messenger, in the name of his lord the pope, ordered each to return to his home at once, and showed them all the papal warrant for so doing. To this they all unanimously replied, “Whence arises this fickleness in the Roman court and the pope? ... We have come to the port, and now, to obstruct the crusade from proceeding, our pastors alter their tone, and rise against us”; and being enraged in no slight degree, they almost attacked the pope’s messenger, and would have done so, if the prudence of the prelates had not restrained the fury of the people.¹⁷

Matthew is the only chronicler to report this incident, which provides the anti-Gregorian counterpoint to the Rothelin Continuation.

The correspondence of the interested parties clarifies matters a little, but not entirely. Frederick did send envoys to Lyon in July 1239, but they passed along his best wishes for the voyage and an invitation to use his ports in southern Italy, not a demand to postpone the crusade.¹⁸ Gregory’s last letter to the crusaders is dated 9 March 1239.¹⁹ In it he appears to resign himself to the departure of the expedition, commanding Thibaut of Champagne and other leading participants to leave for the Holy Land on 24 June 1239. Without subsequent correspondence, it is impossible to say whether he later changed his mind and tried to cancel the crusade, as Matthew Paris would have us believe.²⁰

In any event, the crusaders for the most part tried to steer clear of the papal-imperial discord. Of the major magnates, only two accepted Frederick’s offer to use the ports of the *regno*. These were Amalric of Montfort, who had family connections to the emperor, and Henry of Bar, whose lands straddled the Meuse, the traditional dividing line between France and the German empire.²¹ The rest declined Frederick’s invitation and sailed with Thibaut of Champagne from Marseille.²²

Their destination was Acre, the *de facto* capital of the kingdom of Jerusalem since Saladin’s conquests of the 1180s and 1190s. In sailing for Acre, the crusaders were rejecting advice Thibaut had solicited from the Frankish barons and prelates opposed to Frederick’s rule in the Holy Land, who had proposed that the crusading fleet land at Cyprus.²³ From the island, the crusaders would have been able to attack Egypt or Muslim Syria with equal ease. From Acre, by contrast, a direct assault on Damietta or Alexandria was a more difficult proposition. The crusaders were limiting their strategic options by sailing straight for the Holy Land. As always, they were charting their own course for the crusade, spurning the recommendations of Frederick and his Frankish enemies alike, just as before they had refused the counsel of the pope.

The sea, however, has a way of confounding the best-laid plans. Taking ship at Marseille on 1 August 1239, Thibaut and his fellows had an easy time of it at first, with fair winds and good sailing. But when the ships were only two days from Acre, the Rothelin Continuation reports, a storm drove them back across the Mediterranean.²⁴ Some made landfall on Cyprus after all, as the Frankish barons had proposed, while others were blown all the way back to Sicily and Sardinia, islands under Frederick's rule. Thibaut himself arrived at Acre on 1 September, but some of the others may have taken longer to reach the city.²⁵ There was apparently time enough for the first arrivals to "refresh themselves after the great distress, the great fear and danger they had suffered at sea."²⁶

Acre was the largest city in the kingdom of Jerusalem, but it was too small to host all the crusaders who arrived before its gates in the autumn of 1239. A few found lodgings in the city, but many had to camp outside the walls.²⁷ Once the billeting was arranged, the crusaders turned to business usually dealt with earlier in the process of planning a crusade. Although the expedition had been in the works since the summer of 1235, they still had not chosen a leader. The major figures in the crusade had discussed the leadership question intermittently since 1237, but had not been able to settle on a candidate. At one point, as we have seen, Frederick II had hinted that he might lead the crusade if they postponed it as he wished, but it is doubtful whether anyone took his proposal seriously. At another point Gregory IX had invited two leading churchmen to consider assuming command of the expedition. Both declined, citing as their reason the lack of concord among the barons.²⁸

The problem was that five barons—Hugh of Burgundy, Thibaut of Champagne, Amalric of Montfort, Peter of Brittany, and Henry of Bar—each had a reasonable claim on the leadership, and none of them was really better qualified for the post than any other. Hugh of Burgundy had a fine title and wealth to spare, but he was younger than the others and less experienced in warfare.²⁹ Thibaut, as king of Navarre, had a greater title than Hugh and perhaps more cash as well. Thibaut had more military experience too, but all of it was bad. During the wars of Champagne, his main tactic appears to have been to wait until defeat seemed inevitable, then flee to Paris and the protection of Louis IX. Amalric of Montfort, on the other hand, enjoyed a reputation for dashing feats of arms that Thibaut might have envied, despite having suffered defeat after defeat during the latter stages of the Albigensian Crusades. Amalric had also brought the Capetian war banner to Syria, which gave him some claim to be Louis IX's representative on the crusade.³⁰ Unlike Thibaut and Hugh, however, the count of Montfort was not a territorial prince of the first rank. The same could be said of Peter of Brittany, now that his son had succeeded him as duke of Brittany. But Peter was known as a strenuous warrior, and his reputation as a hothead was beginning to subside. By 1239 his transformation from young rebel into the "good count" so admired by John of Joinville was virtually complete.³¹ Henry of Bar was nobody's idea of a

good knight. Sidney Painter put it best when he said that Henry “had probably done more fighting with less success than any other baron of France.”³² Still, he was a little older than the others, which garnered him a certain measure of respect.

To settle on a leader, four of these barons would have to renounce their candidacies in favor of someone who was their virtual equal in rank, prestige, and accomplishments. Under the best of circumstances, this would have been hard for them to do. But these were not the best of circumstances. Most of these men had been at war with one another in the early 1230s. Some attempts at reconciliation had been made in the meantime, but the old wounds continued to fester. Little wonder they put off such an unpleasant decision until the last moment.

When finally a choice had to be made, the crusaders elected Thibaut of Champagne “captain of the host.”³³ The nominal precedence he enjoyed as the only king on the crusade may have given him the edge over the other candidates. Whatever the case, he was now supposed to be in charge, and all the leading figures in the army duly swore to obey him for the duration of the campaign. The idea behind the vows was to create a temporary hierarchy among people who did not normally acknowledge one another’s authority. The vows made Thibaut “first among equals,” for the time being at least.

With a captain in place, the barons turned to their battle plans. They invited some of the leading authorities in the kingdom of Jerusalem to a great council at Acre to weigh the possibilities. Representing the church were the patriarch of Jerusalem, the archbishop of Tyre, the bishop of Acre, and the masters of the Templars and the Teutonic knights. From the crusaders’ point of view, the most important Frankish secular lord at the meeting was Walter of Brienne, a native of Champagne who controlled the kingdom’s southernmost lordship, the county of Jaffa.³⁴ Walter would work closely with the crusaders over the coming months. So too would three barons who were likely also present at the council: Odo of Montbéliard, constable of Jerusalem, John, lord of Arsuf, and Balian, lord of Sidon. The latter two men were members of the Ibelin family, the kingdom’s most powerful baronial dynasty and the traditional leaders of the opposition to Frederick II. The emperor’s lieutenant in Syria, Richard Filangieri, was a conspicuous absentee from the proceedings. After years of conflict the barons had succeeded in marginalizing Richard from the mainstream of Frankish politics. Isolated in Tyre, he would play little part in the upcoming campaign.

The participants in the council met to determine what course of action the crusade should take. But whatever strategy they ultimately decided upon, the results it achieved would depend very much on the situation on the ground in Muslim Syria, which had recently grown more complicated.³⁵ In March 1238 Sultan al-Kamil of Egypt had died at the height of his power. A few months earlier, after years of scheming and strife, he had finally occupied Damascus. This triumph made him master of Syria and Egypt, the twin heartlands of the

Ayyubid domains. He could now claim to have largely reconstituted the empire Saladin had carved out of these lands fifty years earlier. But the unity al-Kamil imposed upon the Ayyubid world did not outlast his death. It is not really clear that he wished it to, since he had promised both his sons a share of his inheritance before passing away. The younger son, al-Adil Abu Bakr, would have Egypt and the sultanate as his portion; the elder, al-Salih Ayyub, would have the Jazira, the northern-most Ayyubid province that was bounded by the Tigris and the Euphrates.³⁶ Neither son had a claim on Damascus, which al-Kamil had promised instead to their cousin, al-Nasir Da'ud. This important Ayyubid prince was currently the master of the Transjordan, the strategically critical region that linked Egypt to Syria. Left out in the cold, but taking a close interest in these matters nonetheless, was al-Kamil's brother, al-Salih Ismail, the ruler of Baalbek.

A meeting of al-Kamil's emirs in the early spring of 1238 confirmed all of the former sultan's arrangements but one. Jilting Da'ud, they placed Damascus in the hands of an obscure Ayyubid princeling named al-Jawwad Yunus, who was supposed to rule the city as governor in the name of the new sultan, al-Adil. Yunus, however, proved difficult to control from Cairo and was soon doing just as he pleased in Damascus. His independence distressed al-Adil, who threatened to dispatch an army if Yunus did not adopt a more compliant attitude. Realizing that his days in Damascus were numbered, Yunus devised an inventive scheme to save himself: he offered the city to Ayyub in exchange for three of Ayyub's cities in the Jazira. Ayyub accepted without hesitation and took charge of Damascus in January 1239.

Damascus was a good start, but Ayyub wanted more. He set his sights on Cairo, where al-Adil was making himself unpopular with his father's old emirs. In March 1239, several of these emirs sent an embassy to Ayyub, offering their help if he would invade Egypt. They did not need to ask him twice: by April Ayyub was camped with a large expeditionary force at Nablus, waiting for the emirs to make their move. So as not to lose what he had so recently gained, he had taken the precaution before marching south of forging an alliance with his uncle Ismail, who could threaten Damascus from Baalbek. The plan was for Ismail to come to Nablus as soon as he could equip his troops, but war materials must have been hard to find in northern Syria that year, because he delayed his departure again and again. In fact, Ismail had hatched a plot to seize Damascus behind Ayyub's back. With the aid of his friend al-Mujahid of Homs, Ismail took the city by storm on 28 September 1239.

Ayyub was now in a tough spot. To his south was his hated rival al-Adil; to his north was the man who had just taken Damascus from him. Worse still, his two rivals seemed determined to be friends. One of Ismail's first moves had been to insert al-Adil's name into the Friday prayers at Damascene mosques, a declaration of loyalty to the Egyptian sultan. Ayyub's troops were well aware of his predicament. Most of them abandoned him, leaving him with

only a small bodyguard for security. Fearful of falling into the clutches of al-Adil or Ismail, Ayyub sought asylum from Da'ud of Transjordan. Da'ud seemed happy to oblige. He dispatched troops to Nablus who, rather than seeing to Ayyub's protection, took him prisoner on 21 October 1239. So anxious had Ayyub been to avoid one trap that he had fallen straight into another.

With Ismail's seizure of Damascus and Da'ud's seizure of Ayyub, Ayyubid politics achieved an exquisite complexity. By the end of October 1239, three princes of the blood—Ismail, Ayyub, and Da'ud—were claiming Damascus; two princes—Ayyub and al-Adil—were contesting Egypt; and one prince was holding another captive. Meanwhile the rulers of Horns and Hamah were upholding their traditional rivalry, allying with one party or another in the larger conflicts as it suited their purposes.³⁷

It is a matter of conjecture what, if anything, the crusaders and their Frankish advisers knew about these developments when they met at Acre to devise their campaign strategy. The main source for the crusaders' council offers only the sparest summary of its deliberations, declaring that "many words were spoken, many arguments put forward," without elaborating further.³⁸ All we can say for certain is that, after lengthy deliberations, the crusaders settled on a two-step approach. First they would re-fortify Ascalon, a dilapidated stronghold on the Franco-Egyptian frontier, then they would attack Damascus.³⁹

Historians have long speculated on whether or not this plan was wise. For many years, they agreed that it was not. Faced with feuding Muslim princes in Cairo and Damascus, scholars have argued, the crusaders should have exploited the princes' disagreement by allying with one to attack the other. Instead, by proposing to fortify Ascalon and then attack Damascus, the crusaders concocted a scheme that would antagonize both rulers and cause them to unite in the face of the common threat.⁴⁰ More recently, Peter Jackson has questioned the fairness of this critique, arguing that the crusader strategy could not have driven Damascus and Cairo together because the cities were already on good terms when the strategy was adopted.⁴¹ Ismail's conquest of Damascus on 28 September, he points out, restored good relations between that city and al-Adil's regime in Cairo, while Ayyub's capture on 21 October solidified the alliance. Jackson dates the crusaders' council to the beginning of November 1239, after these events.⁴² Using a deep knowledge of Arabic sources to redress the condescension of modern historians toward their medieval subjects, Jackson makes an important argument. While the chronology upon which his claim depends is plausible, however, it is unfortunately unverifiable. There is no positive evidence to pinpoint when the council took place—it could have been any time between 1 September 1239, when Thibaut arrived in Acre, and 2 November 1239, when the army marched south.⁴³ Nor do we have good information about the extent of the crusaders' or the Franks' knowledge of Ayyubid politics and military movements. The

paucity of verifiable evidence means that we can know with certainty only that the crusaders did decide to fortify Ascalon, a defensive measure, and to march on Damascus, an offensive strategy. Whether wise or foolish, their stratagems did not result in military success.

On 2 November 1239 the crusaders set off from Acre for Ascalon, accompanied by several Frankish barons, their knights, and contingents of Hospitallers, Templars, and Teutonic knights. Almost immediately, it became clear that Thibaut was not going to be able to exert control over this disparate group, no matter what had been promised at Acre. The first baron to go his own way was Peter of Brittany. After two days of marching, when the army had reached Jaffa, Peter heard that large herds of livestock would soon be passing close by the crusader camp. An ally of Ismail's was driving anything that walked and could also be eaten—cattle, sheep, camels, and buffaloes—north to Damascus in anticipation of the crusader siege, news of which had apparently spread. The livestock made an inviting target to Peter because the army, even though it had just taken the field, was already low on provisions. If he could feed the hungry troops he would earn their gratitude—and perhaps also their allegiance. In a starving army, controlling access to food could be a source of power. Without telling the other leading barons, he gathered a few knights together one night and led them from the camp “in great secrecy” to lay an ambush on the convoy.⁴⁴

The raiders rode through the night and at dawn reached the castle where the convoy was staying. Two roads ran from the castle toward Damascus. Peter took half the knights to guard one road, and sent the rest under Ralph of Soissons to watch the other. When morning came the beasts made a noisy exit from the castle, escorted by heavily armed Mamluk cavalry, and rumbled off along the route under Peter's guard. The leader of the Mamluks spotted Peter's small band and, believing the numbers to be in his favor, decided to chance an encounter. At first the Mamluks were able to fight in their preferred fashion, pelting the crusaders with arrows from horseback, then galloping away before close combat could ensue. But then Peter and his knights managed to bring the fight to a narrower part of the road, forcing the Mamluks to “give up their usual spurring technique,” as the Rothelin Continuation says, and fight hand-to-hand with maces and swords.⁴⁵ This was the preferred method of the crusaders, but even so they could not overcome the Mamluks. With the battle turning against him, Peter sounded his horn to call up Ralph of Soissons and his men. Their sudden arrival on the scene stunned the Mamluks, who now retreated toward the castle. Riding on fresh horses, Ralph's knights were able to pursue them right into the stronghold. The crusaders took some Mamluks prisoner, killed the rest, “and took everything they could find.”⁴⁶

Peter returned in triumph to the main army at Jaffa, trailed by a menagerie of edible animals and carts bearing everything that could be looted from the castle. He distributed this bounty among the soldiers and also, pointedly, gave

livestock to the other leading figures in the host, driving home the message that they could only provide for their followers with his help. The soldiers were grateful for what they received; the barons were not. Amalric of Montfort and Henry of Bar resolved to acquire some livestock of their own.⁴⁷ As it turned out, they did not have to look far to find it. News of the crusaders' descent toward Ascalon had reached the residents of Gaza, the next town down the coast. Fearful for the safety of their animals, they had driven them to a discreet stretch of pastureland not far from town, where they could all graze in peace until the crusaders had gone home. But spies brought word of the beasts' whereabouts to Amalric and Henry, who immediately laid plans to seize them. On the evening of 12 November 1239 the two nobles gathered with a large raiding party outside Jaffa, away from the crusader camp.⁴⁸ In the party was a roughly equal mix of western crusaders and eastern barons: Hugh of Burgundy and a number of lesser crusading lords on the one hand, and the Frankish barons Walter of Brienne, Balian of Sidon, John of Arsur, and Odo of Montbéliard, on the other.⁴⁹ Before they could sneak off for Gaza unnoticed, Thibaut of Champagne, Peter of Brittany, and the masters of the military orders found out about the raiding plan and came charging up from the camp to try to stop it. They pointed out that Sultan al-Adil had sent an army to Gaza to defend the Egyptian frontier. In the face of this strong force, the crusaders should stay together and march only as far as Ascalon. When the raiders rejected this appeal for caution, Thibaut forbade them to leave, reminding them of the vows they had sworn at Acre to obey him as leader. Thibaut's order swayed the raiders not at all. They set off for Gaza as soon as darkness had fallen.⁵⁰ Food shortages and the barons' jockeying for power had turned the crusade into a cattle raiding contest.

Following the coast road, Henry, Amalric, and their companions rode south, past Ascalon, until they arrived at a brook that marked the boundary between the kingdom of Jerusalem and Egypt. Dawn was breaking, and the men and horses were tired after traveling through the night. Walter of Brienne, who was beginning to have second thoughts, suggested going back to Ascalon to rest and wait for the rest of the army. But the other barons wanted to press on, so Walter, who knew the terrain best, led the company across the stream. Soon after this the raiders entered "a narrow place with hills on both sides and nothing but sand underfoot," which the scouts told them was near the Gaza pastureland.⁵¹ They were, in fact, in a valley just northeast of Gaza, where the village of Beit-Hanun now stands.⁵² Here they decided to halt until later in the morning, when the livestock would be put out to graze. The richer men in the party had cloths spread on the sand for a picnic, while others rested or saw to the horses.

The full light of morning revealed the raiders' position to the scouts of Rukn al-Din al-Hijawi, the commander of the Egyptian forces deployed to Gaza. Once informed of the situation, Rukn al-Din sent archers and javelin slingers to cover the hills and dunes around the valley. His aim at this stage

may have been to provoke a withdrawal rather than a confrontation.⁵³ As his artillery men moved into place, they made themselves conspicuous by pounding on drums and sounding horns. Furthermore, he left a passageway out of the valley open, giving the raiders time to decide whether they should fight or flee. As ever, they were divided over what to do. Walter of Brienne and Hugh of Burgundy advocated retreat, pointing to the Egyptians' command of the heights, their greater numbers, and the difficulty of fighting when "both men and horses would be treading up to their knees in sand."⁵⁴ But Henry of Bar and Amalric of Montfort said it was too late to withdraw. Those on horseback might yet escape, but the foot soldiers would be caught by the advancing Egyptian forces. They refused to abandon their men to certain death. Walter and Hugh pleaded that there was still time to save the entire company, but to no avail. They withdrew toward Ascalon, leaving their companions to face a large Egyptian army.⁵⁵

When Rukn al-Din saw that some of the raiders were determined to fight, he ordered the artillery men on the dunes to open fire. The raiders answered with their crossbows, but soon they ran out of bolts. As arrows and spears rained down on them, they looked for a way to break out of the valley. By that time, however, Egyptian horsemen and foot soldiers had occupied every possible escape route. The raiders would have to fight their way out. They charged into a passageway that was narrow and deep enough to shelter them from the artillery fire from above. After a bitter struggle, they seized this pass from its Egyptian defenders, who retired back to Rukn al-Din and the main body of the Egyptian army a short distance away. Although still not out of the valley, the raiders were at least in a strong defensive position. To draw them from it, Rukn al-Din tried a feigned retreat, a time-honored tactic of Muslim armies in the crusader era. The ruse succeeded, perhaps because it appeared to open the way for the raiders to escape out of the valley and away to safety.⁵⁶ In fact, the raiders did not stand a chance once they reached the open ground. As the Egyptian artillery men ran down from the dunes to occupy the pass they had just evacuated, the Egyptian cavalry wheeled around to attack. Many of the raiders were killed in the ensuing combat, including possibly Henry of Bar. Many others were taken captive, including Amalric of Montfort, the viscount of Beaumont, Philip of Nanteuil, Giles of Asies, the butler of Senlis, Stephen of Charny, Peter of Valeni, and many other knights and sergeants.⁵⁷ Today a "victory mosque" in Beit-Hanun marks the site of this famous Ayyubid triumph over the crusaders.⁵⁸

While the raiders were fighting and dying at Gaza, Thibaut and the main body of the crusade army had marched down to Ascalon. When they learned of the raiders' plight, they set off in the direction of the battle. They arrived to see only its grizzly aftermath: the bodies and armor of fallen raiders strewn along the road, and just a few survivors. Thibaut sought advice on whether to pursue the Egyptians, who were withdrawing south. The masters of the military orders said that Rukn al-Din would kill the prisoners if he saw the

crusaders following him. The relatives of the captives wanted to try to a rescue, but after a long debate they agreed to return with the rest of the army to Ascalon. Abandoning all thoughts of fortifying the place, the army soon retreated all the way back up the coast to Acre.⁵⁹

Adding insult to injury, Da'ud of Transjordan quickly matched the Egyptian victory over the forces of Christendom with one of his own. Sometime in early December he moved on Jerusalem. The fortifications of the Holy City were in poor repair. Da'ud's troops forced the small garrison in charge of the defense to retire into the Tower of David, where it held out for nearly a month before agreeing to surrender in exchange for safe conduct to Acre. Jerusalem was back in Muslim hands for the first time since 1229.⁶⁰

In the wake of the military catastrophes at Gaza and Jerusalem, Thibaut began to wonder whether more might be gained for the crusader kingdom through diplomacy than fighting. Until then he had not shown much interest in the Syrian diplomatic scene. Seeking advice from the authorities in Acre prior to his departure on crusade, he had written asking about when to sail for the Holy Land, the best ports of departure, and where to find provisions for the army.⁶¹ In the letter he had not asked a single question about Near Eastern politics. But the Gaza raid had damaged his credibility as a military commander, reduced the fighting strength of his army, and circumscribed his military options, since any move against Egypt could threaten the lives of the captives. He returned to Acre ready to plunge into the murky waters of Ayyubid diplomacy.

The conflict between Hamah and Homs in northern Syria gave Thibaut his first chance.⁶² In the winter of 1239–40, al-Muzaffar of Hamah found himself politically isolated after having supported the wrong side in the struggle for Damascus in late September 1239. An ally of Ayyub, he had tried and failed to prevent Ismail from taking the city. This failure exposed al-Muzaffar to reprisals from Ismail; worse still, it strengthened the hand of al-Muzaffar's great rival al-Mujahid of Horns, Ismail's firm ally. At the same time, al-Muzaffar had to deal with the hostility of the regent of Aleppo, Dayfa Khatun, who had her eyes on one of his prize possessions, Ma'arrat al-Nu'man.⁶³ Anxious to keep his adversaries at bay, al-Muzaffar sent a Christian priest to Acre to ask the crusaders to come north to Hamah. What he offered in return for their services is unclear. The chroniclers say he promised to become Christian and to hand over all his fortresses, but these are improbable terms, since to abide by them would entail surrendering precisely what he was calling the crusaders in to protect.⁶⁴ In any event, Thibaut was sufficiently intrigued to lead part of the army to Mount Pilgrim, outside Tripoli, from where he dispatched an envoy to see if al-Muzaffar wished to proceed with the proposed alliance. But the advance to Tripoli, it seems, had been enough to deter al-Muzaffar's enemies. He told the crusaders he would not require their assistance after all.⁶⁵

Ayyubid princes, it turned out, were almost as difficult to deal with as

French barons. After this unhappy inauguration into Near Eastern diplomacy, Thibaut stayed awhile at Tripoli as the guest of its ruler, then returned to Acre in early spring 1240. The lack of military action began to chafe on some parties in the crusade. One of these was the papal legate to the army, Brother William of Cordelle, the very friar earlier assigned to divert the expedition to Constantinople. If the Rothelin Continuation can be believed, Brother William was wont to end his sermons by exclaiming:

For God's sake, good people, pray to Our Lord, beg him to give the commanders of this host their hearts back, for you can be sure they have lost them through their sins! Such a huge force of Christians ought to be able to attack the unbelievers in any place at all, if they had God on their side.⁶⁶

Perhaps because he repeatedly called them cowards, Brother William was no favorite of the commanders of the host. He found a more sympathetic audience for his belligerent propagandizing, however, among the knights, one of whom (his identity unknown) wrote a poem castigating the barons for failing to lead the army into battle again after Gaza:

There is no point, say what you will
in happiness or joy,
when idle barons take their ease
at war in Syria.
As yet they've not made one assault
on castle, city, town;
a foolish raid, ill-planned, that's all,
which killed the count of Bar.⁶⁷

The longer the army delayed taking the field, the knight explains, the harder it was on the poor knights who had pawned their lands to go on the crusade. Crueler still, the lords gave them no help, allowing them to starve in Acre. After the failure of the talks with Hamah, the opponents of Thibaut's diplomacy were coming out in the open.

In the spring of 1240, however, an Ayyubid family revolution produced a negotiating partner with whom Thibaut could do business, giving his diplomatic approach a new lease on life. On 21 April 1240 Da'ud of Transjordan released Ayyub from captivity. Needless to say, there were strings attached. In exchange for his freedom, Ayyub was to join Da'ud in a bid to carve up the Ayyubid empire between them. Ayyub, as the late sultan's eldest son, was to acquire Egypt and the sultanate; Da'ud was to obtain Damascus and the Jazira. For the scheme to succeed, they had only to conquer Egypt and Damascus in turn, a task that had taken al-Kamil a lifetime. Undeterred, they began with Egypt, trusting in reports of worsening relations between al-Adil and his emirs. They advanced as far as Gaza and waited for the emirs to do their work; the two princes lacked the troops to take Cairo by force. On 31 May, they received the news they awaited—al-Adil had been seized and imprisoned by his own guards. On 16 June 1240 Ayyub entered

Cairo to take up the sultanate. His improbable rise to power was bad news for Ismail of Damascus. The man Ismail had expelled from Damascus was now sultan; and the sultan would not be slow to seek his revenge. Ismail therefore needed allies fast, but his choices were few: al-Adil was a prisoner; al-Muzaffar of Hamah was as hostile as ever; Dayfa Khatun of Aleppo was determined to remain neutral; and Da'ud of Transjordan was in league with Ayyub. There was little to be done for it; Ismail would have to deal with the crusaders.⁶⁸

The negotiations did not last long. Ismail and Thibaut had a deal in place by mid-summer 1240.⁶⁹ The crusaders and the Damascenes were to form a defensive coalition against Ayyub of Egypt. Each party was to defend the other's territory against Egyptian invasion, and neither was to make peace with Egypt without the other's consent. To keep the Egyptian army away from Syria, the crusaders were to take up positions near Gaza. In exchange for this service, Ismail offered territorial concessions to the kingdom of Jerusalem. First, he surrendered lands in his own possession: the hinterland of Sidon; the key fortress of Beaufort; the fortified towns of Châteauneuf, Toron, and Tiberias; and the ruins of Saphet Castle. Secondly, he acknowledged the kingdom's right to re-occupy all the territory it had once ruled west of the Jordan river. This land was not in Ismail's possession to give. Instead, by recognizing the kingdom's right to this land, he gave his consent to any military actions the crusaders might take to win it. A second component of the treaty therefore consisted of an offensive alliance against the ruler who held much of this land, Da'ud of Transjordan.⁷⁰ Taken on their own, Ismail's territorial concessions to the crusaders in northern Syria were substantial. If the crusaders could add to these concessions by seizing Da'ud's lands in the south, they would go some way toward reconstituting the kingdom of Jerusalem as it had existed before Saladin's conquests of the 1180s.

This treaty has been called "certainly one of the most humiliating offers which any Ayyubid prince had yet been forced to make to the Franks."⁷¹ The master of the Templars, Armand of Peragors, hailed it as a "miraculous doing of the Lord."⁷² Among Ismail's own subjects, however, the agreement aroused a storm of protest. The chief preacher of Damascus's chief mosque, the noted jurist Ibn Abd al-Salam al-Sulami, denounced the accord as a betrayal of the principles of *jihad*. Ismail had al-Sulami arrested and later exiled. Then the garrison of Beaufort refused to surrender the castle to Balian of Sidon, as the treaty stipulated. Ismail himself was compelled to besiege the stronghold with the army of Damascus. The defenders held out through a lengthy siege, which only ended in August or September 1240.⁷³

As Ismail laboriously fulfilled his obligations to the crusaders in northern Syria, the crusaders pursued their claims in the lands of Da'ud of Transjordan. They attacked Nablus, raided up and down the Jordan valley, and began to rebuild Ascalon.⁷⁴ They also re-occupied Jerusalem, which allowed Thibaut to make the pilgrimage there.⁷⁵ These operations brought Da'ud to the

bargaining table. Da'ud had returned home from Cairo in July 1240 after Ayyub had refused to help him reconquer Damascus as promised.⁷⁶ Having broken with Egypt, Da'ud now had an interest in making peace with the Franco-Damascene coalition attacking his lands. He appears to have offered the crusaders all the land he possessed west of the Jordan river that had formerly belonged to the kingdom of Jerusalem, save, however, for Nablus and its vicinity.⁷⁷ As for the Holy City itself, the chroniclers disagree whether the Franks were to possess it outright, or whether they were to share control with Da'ud.⁷⁸ Thibaut accepted these terms in the late summer of 1240, thereby gaining in fact territorial concessions that the Damascus treaty had granted him only in theory. As a result, the kingdom of Jerusalem now encompassed more territory than at any time since 1187.⁷⁹

Despite its clear success, Thibaut's diplomacy won him little credit with the local Franks or his fellow crusaders. The Hospitallers opposed the Damascus treaty, for reasons not entirely clear.⁸⁰ Some crusaders also turned against the agreement when Ismail proposed an invasion of Egypt, a move that could threaten the lives of the captives.⁸¹ Thibaut himself may not have been insensible to the prisoners' plight. One of his best friends, the poet Philip of Nanteuil, was among their number.⁸² Thibaut refused to countenance an attack that might risk their lives, but at the same time he was weary of the complaints of his co-religionists. The fortification work on Ascalon was unfinished, and there were provisions of the agreements with Damascus and Transjordan that remained to be implemented. It did not matter. Having concluded his treaties and seen Jerusalem, Thibaut set sail from Acre for France around the middle of September 1240, accompanied by Peter of Brittany.⁸³

About three weeks later, on 8 October 1240, Richard of Cornwall's crusading fleet sailed into Acre harbor.⁸⁴ Richard probably had fewer troops than his French counterparts, but he had the advantage of being in complete charge of his expedition.⁸⁵ Since Simon of Montfort and William of Forz were proceeding separately to the Holy Land, no one in Richard's contingent had the financial means or social status to challenge his authority.⁸⁶ As a result, there were no agonizing debates in Acre over what the crusade should do. Instead, Richard determined straight away to use his expedition as a vehicle for diplomacy, not warfare. His first inquiries were to Da'ud of Transjordan: would he observe toward Richard the truce he had made with Thibaut of Champagne?⁸⁷ Da'ud thought not, perhaps because his rapprochement with Ismail and an agreement with Homs gave him less need of a Frankish alliance.⁸⁸ Then Richard received an envoy from Ayyub of Egypt, who certainly did want the friendship of Acre, since virtually all of Muslim Syria was now united against him. The envoy asked Richard for a truce. When Richard took counsel, he found only the Templars willing to speak on behalf of maintaining the agreement with Ismail of Damascus. The other authorities he consulted—the Hospitallers, Walter of Brienne, and Hugh

of Burgundy (who had remained in the Holy Land to complete the work at Ascalon)—all favored reaching an accord with Egypt.⁸⁹ Richard also knew that his brother-in-law Frederick II favored a pro-Egyptian policy.⁹⁰ Toward the end of November 1240, Richard dispatched an embassy to Ayyub to finalize terms.

In the meantime Richard marched his troops down to Ascalon, where they set about the re-fortification work. When it was done, he assigned the castle to an imperial official.⁹¹ It was just as well that Ascalon had given the army something to do, because the negotiations with the sultan dragged on through the early winter of 1241. Richard's envoys finally returned with the concluded pact on 8 February. No text of the treaty survives, but Richard himself summarized its terms in a rather self-serving letter he wrote to his friends in England. The territorial clauses basically confirmed the concessions Thibaut had won for Jerusalem in his treaties with Ismail and Da'ud.⁹² Ayyub could do little more for Richard in this regard, because the sultan did not actually control any territory in Syria at this time.⁹³ But Ayyub could return the Gaza prisoners, which he did in April. Then Richard arranged to have the bones of the crusaders killed at Gaza retrieved and sent to Ascalon for Christian burial. Together with the release of the prisoners, this act of piety won him praise from English chroniclers and French nobles alike, a rare combination.⁹⁴ With that Richard sailed for home on 3 May. He had not done quite as much for the Holy Land as he claimed, but his expedition had been helpful all the same. He had re-fortified Ascalon and secured the territorial gains won by the French expedition.

With little papal support, and without winning a battle, the Barons' Crusade had expanded and strengthened the kingdom of Jerusalem. These gains were one result of the pope's initial call for a crusade, although they were primarily achieved through a type of diplomacy his appeal did not envision. They came about not from Christians unified for a single cause, but from crusaders so fractious that they could not fight together. In the north, the kingdom had gained the protection of several key fortresses, the most important of which was Beaufort. In the south, a rebuilt Ascalon Castle now guarded the Egyptian frontier.⁹⁵ Up and down the length of the kingdom, the Barons' Crusade had pushed the border eastward, off the coast and into the interior. In the north, the kingdom had re-acquired the Sidon hinterland; in eastern Galilee, the Jordan river border was restored; in the south, the triangle of land bounded by Jaffa, Ascalon, and Jerusalem once again came under Christian control. These territorial gains would prove ephemeral; and other expeditions helped the crusader states in other ways, such as by securing truces that gained peace if not territory. Measured in terms of lands acquired and defenses strengthened, however, the Barons' Crusade did more for the Christian cause in the Holy Land than any after the First Crusade, a victory for those who wanted a Christian state there.⁹⁶

Conclusion

In March 1239 Pope Gregory IX sent a letter to the leaders of the Barons' Crusade that was, in one sense, a pointless instruction.¹ He ordered the duke of Burgundy and the counts of Bar, Champagne, Montfort, and Vendôme to be prepared to depart for the Holy Land by 24 June 1239. Since they had no intention of doing otherwise, all having declared their intention to campaign in the Holy Land and all having declined the pope's directive to campaign in Latin Greece, the instruction was akin to closing the stable door after the horses had bolted. In another sense, though, the letter did have a purpose. The leading crusaders had apparently criticized the pope for diverting funds from the Holy Land to the Constantinople expedition and neglecting the business of the Holy Land. "[We have] received your letter," replied the pope, "from the tenor of which we gather that crusaders and others are led to no little astonishment that ... we intended to withdraw the legacies and other means [of funding] that we lately conferred upon you for the Holy Land." Gregory admitted that he had "provide[d] for the [Latin] empire from the aid deputed for the [Holy] Land," but justified his policy in language remarkably defensive for a medieval pope. Rather than explaining the reasons why Constantinople needed help, he instead invoked the general principle that as the head of the Christian people the pope had the responsibility, and therefore the right, to allocate crusade resources as he felt would most benefit Christendom as a whole:

We are compelled to reach out shrewdly for [the empire's] aid. ... For if Mother Church abandoned the Latin empire as if lost, leaving it neglected, whose protection could be expected? And if its dire circumstances were not to arouse compassion, then who shall console it in its adversities?²

Given the results of Gregory's attempts at protection, we might well question how much consolation the empire could have felt. The crusaders, Gregory knew, had rejected his assertion that he could allocate funds raised for the Holy Land as he saw fit. Gregory here emphasizes the Church's responsibility as a mother to all Christian nations rather than strategy or ends. The letter draws attention to the high principles that had inspired the diversion of funds and crusaders to Constantinople. It suggests that the pope had promoted the venture not to keep his ally John of Brienne in power in Constantinople, but rather to carry out his duty to protect the Christian people.

In this book I have taken the pope's crusade appeal, voiced on behalf of Mother Church, and traced its consequences everywhere it was heard. When

we compare the consequences of the appeal across Christendom, we see that they varied widely from place to place. One aspect of this call was Gregory IX's attempt to make it universal and to establish means for the crusade to be a universal Christian activity. Christians did not, however, respond universally as Christians, nor did they put aside other differences to come together in their identification as Christians. One of the most important consequences we see in tracing the course of this crusade, therefore, must be its failure as a vision of Christian unity.

There had been a tremendous response when Gregory IX preached a crusade for the Holy Land in 1234, although not from Italy, Germany, or Spain. When, the following year, he directed that vows and funds be diverted to aid the Latin empire of Constantinople, he saw the wide-scale rejection of his ideas that Christians could best aid the Holy Land by campaigning in Latin Greece and that the two campaigns were equivalent. Although his call was largely unsuccessful, it failed in different ways in the various regions where he pressed his case. In Hungary, Gregory failed to convince King Bela to take the crusade vow at all, despite granting Bela a string of concessions that included the right to occupy Bulgaria and to organize its Church, appoint ecclesiastical officials, and delimit dioceses after such a conquest. In the course of the negotiations Bela did, however, persuade Gregory to turn away from the papal policy of separating the minority and Christian populations in Hungary. The crusade, therefore, eased pressure upon Jews, Muslims, and Cumans under the control of the Hungarian monarchy.

In northern France Gregory tried to persuade Thibaut of Champagne, who had sworn to crusade to Jerusalem, to commute his vow to the Latin empire. When Thibaut resisted papal arguments about the importance of such a commutation and the pope's right to demand it, Gregory turned to other means of persuasion, withholding the funding a magnate of Thibaut's importance might expect to receive for going on crusade. Thibaut's great wealth allowed him to ignore such persuasion. He did not, however, use the situation to ease pressures on minorities in his lands, as Bela had. Rather than fighting heretics in Latin Greece, as Gregory suggested, Thibaut chose to burn heretics at home. Thibaut did take the kind of action against Jews that the pope found appropriate, exploiting them financially while leaving them physically unharmed. He used the results of his *captio*, however, not to aid the Latin empire as the pope directed, but instead to help fund the campaign to Jerusalem that the pope was trying to divert.

In western France it seemed that Gregory had persuaded Peter of Brittany to defend Constantinople, provided that Gregory could come up with the funding Peter demanded for an ambitious campaign. Gregory largely acceded to this request, but the fundraising mechanisms he hoped would allow universal Christian participation in the crusade broke down when they were tested. Peter was promised money that had already been promised to others; redemption fees were paid to unauthorized collectors rather than to papal

agents; and crusaders fled the region to avoid paying redemption fees. In the absence of funds he considered adequate, there is strong indirect evidence that Peter took money the pope had given him for the Latin empire and instead applied it to help himself campaign in Jerusalem. The pope was disappointed not only by Peter, but also by other crusaders of western France. Gregory took the theoretically possible but seldom practiced step of ordering compulsory redemptions. When crusaders began to set off to the Holy Land in advance of the official departure date to avoid having their vows redeemed, Gregory put himself in the unusual position of ordering that the crusade indulgence be revoked from Christians trying to liberate the Holy Land. The local authorities responded in turn by refusing to carry out these orders. The breakdown in a united Christian front intensified in western France when Holy Land crusaders massacred Jews on a massive scale despite the pope's explicit commands to avoid physical violence against them. While the crusaders campaigned in Syria, the Jews who survived the massacre of 1236 were expelled from Brittany.

In England the situation was different again. Gregory flatly forbade English crusaders to leave for the Holy Land, to no apparent effect. He next asked Richard of Cornwall to commute his vow. When Richard refused, Gregory withdrew Richard's funding for a campaign to Jerusalem, also to no avail. Richard, like Thibaut, had enough independent wealth to withstand such persuasion. While vacillations in Gregory's instructions make it impossible to speak of a consistent papal strategy in England, his changing directives seem not to have interrupted preparations for the English crusaders. The situation of the Jews of England was largely unaffected by the crusade because Henry III, who had firm control of the Jews and the treatment of them in his lands, did not take a crusade vow.

The expeditions themselves show a further breakdown in the idea of Christian unity. A few crusaders did go to Latin Greece. They achieved modest success but failed to secure the stability for the Latin empire that the pope had sought. Other crusaders went instead to the Holy Land. In the uncoordinated departures and efforts of the English and the French, in the French crusaders' squabbling and competitive cattle raids, and in the disagreements about whether to form alliances with some Muslims or whether to attack all, we do not see a group of people willing to act together on account of their common identity as Christians. We see instead the impossibility of speaking of a consistent Christian strategy in matters large or small.

The consequences of the crusade appeal, then, are diverse and defy the traditional understanding of a crusade as an embodiment of Christian unity in the various ways that this understanding has been voiced. The Barons' Crusade defies the idea that crusading was an instrument of papal policy, since most Christians rejected Gregory IX's diversion attempt. It defies prevalent explanations of piety as the determining characteristic of crusader

actions, since the crusaders' actions varied from place to place instead of demonstrating a common Christian piety. It defies prevalent accounts of medieval violence toward non-Christians, since the cases of violence were not Christendom-wide, were not against undifferentiated non-Christian others, and were not stabilizing. The lack of uniformity in the ways that Christians responded to the appeal defies, too, the practice of extrapolating behavior from a single place to medieval Christians in general.

My argument, therefore, has been that the Barons' Crusade exhibits Christian diversity, not unity. If this claim has implications for the study of crusades and medieval interfaith violence, I believe it also has something to say about medieval history more broadly. Medievalists tend to write not only in terms of aggregate groups, but also in terms of aggregate oppositions: self versus other; Christian versus non-Christian; orthodoxy versus heresy; and communicate versus excommunicate. One preliminary insight we can take from this single comparative history is the need to reconsider some of these larger classifications on which the writing of medieval history often depends. Modern philosophers of language have taught us to distrust such binaries and the misleading way they can present the world. The easiest way to heed the philosophers' warnings is often simply to smash the binaries, to argue that the distinctions themselves are not distinct. One lesson that emerges from this study is to guard against that satisfying impulse to destroy the categories of the past. These distinctions do exist in the Middle Ages in the sense that people believed them and that they sometimes organized individual and institutional behavior. They do not, however, exist in the reified sense we today think intrinsic to binary divisions. This difference must be borne in mind in order to prevent us from regarding medieval oppositional categories as simply explanatory.

One case in point is found in Hungary. From 1230 to 1235 the papacy seemed intent on creating greater separation between Christians and non-Christians, a set of oppositional categories that were very real to all who came under the jurisdiction of papal laws and influence. To point out that there was a continuum of religious beliefs, not simply people who "were Christian" or "were not Christian," might be true to the nature of beliefs at the time. It does not, however, follow that the categories should be discarded as untrue. To deny the categories would be to deny the reality of lived experience, and particularly the experience of those who fell on the "non-Christian" side of the division. From 1235 to 1240 Gregory gave up his push for greater separation between Christians and non-Christians within Hungary in order to persuade Bela to aid the Latin empire. In this process Gregory articulated a new way to order his categories: Jews and Muslims, he asserted, posed a lesser threat to Christendom than schismatics and heretics. This assertion shows not that the "Jews and Muslims" category became unimportant or "false," but instead that Gregory at this moment considered it less important to oppose those he placed in it than those he placed in the "schismatics and heretics" category. Over this

same five years, John Asen was seen as orthodox, then schismatic, then orthodox again, and then schismatic again. This series of reclassifications shows not that the categories of orthodox and schismatic did not matter or that they were “false,” since the consequences of them were, in each case, enormous. Instead it shows that people moved between these categories with greater fluidity than we today see as likely or possible. The categories were used instrumentally, both in terms of which were more and less important and also in terms of who belonged in each. The categories themselves were firm, but the identities of the individuals within each category were not.

We see a similar flexibility in the weight assigned to various binary categories when the Barons’ Crusade reached the Holy Land. Thibaut entered into Ayyubid politics with a vengeance. On one hand, those with whom he entered treaties were non-Christian rather than Christian. At the same time, however, they were people who could aid the kingdom of Jerusalem rather than destroy it. His diplomacy did not, however, “break” the binary between Christian and non-Christian, as it might have if he had made an alliance with an Ayyubid prince against Henry of Bar, for example. Instead, Thibaut used the categories instrumentally. They were important when the Barons’ Crusade embarked, less so when it appeared that fighting would not allow them to achieve their goals. The categories themselves were not fluid, but the way in which Thibaut valued them was.

In most cases, then, either doing away with the categories, on one hand, or reifying them, on the other, would be equally misleading. The one exception in the events this book investigates is the division between self and other, which emerges as untrue of the way the people whom I examine acted or seemed to think. Throughout the crusade they made distinctions among variously defined “others”: some crusaders fought Muslims in the Holy Land but not schismatics in Latin Greece; some fought accused heretics at home but not in the Latin empire; some killed accused heretics at home but not Jews; some entered into treaties with particular groups of Muslims against others. The picture that emerges, then, is not one in which conceptual binary oppositions should be discarded, but nor is it one in which we can assign or predict motives or actions on the basis of these categories. They were real in the sense that people acted according to many of them and they therefore had concrete consequences, but they were applied in different ways at different times by different people. They can help explain behavior, but never wholly, and we must always be vigilant for the complex and shifting ways in which they were used. This lesson emerges clearly from the diversity of responses we see to the call for the Barons’ Crusade.

Abbreviations

MGH~~GH~~*Anta, Germaniae historica, scriptores*. Ed. Georg H. Pertz et al. 32 vols. Hannover and Leipzig: Impensis Bibliopolii Hahniani, 1826–1934.

PL*atologiae Latinae cursus completus*. Ed. Jacques-Paul Migne. 221 vols. Paris, 1844–55.

Registres*registres de Grégoire IX. Recueil des bulles de ce pape publiées ou analysées d'après les manuscrits originaux du Vatican*. Ed. Lucien Auvray. 4 vols. Paris: Librairie Thorin et fils, 1896–1955.

RHC*Recueil des historiens des croisades: historiens occidentaux*. 5 vols. Paris: Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres, 1841–1906.

RHG*Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France*. Ed. Martin Bouquet et al. 24 vols. Paris: Aux dépens des libraires associés, 1737–1904.

RS*rum Britannicarum medii aevi scriptores (Rolls Series)*. 251 vols. London: Longman and Co., 1858–96.

MT*Monumenta historica Hungariam sacram illustrantia*. Ed. Augustin Theiner. 2 vols. Rome: Typis Vaticanis, 1859–60.

Notes

Introduction

1. Joseph H. Lynch, *The Medieval Church: A Brief History* (New York: Longman, 1992), 160; Eamon Duffy, *Saints and Sinners: A History of the Popes* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), 105; Geoffrey Barraclough, *The Medieval Papacy* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1968), 91; Colin Morris, *The Papal Monarchy: The Western Church from 1050 to 1250* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 152.
2. Fulcher of Chartres, *Historia Hierosolymitana (1095–1127)*, ed. Heinrich Hagenmeyer (Heidelberg: Carl Winters Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1913), 161; translation in *The First Crusade: The Chronicle of Fulcher of Chartres and Other Source Materials*, 2nd ed., ed. Edward Peters (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 58.
3. William of Malmesbury, *Gesta regum Anglorum: The History of the English Kings*, ed. and trans. R. A. B. Mynors, R. M. Thomson, and M. Winterbottom, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 1: 606; translation from *First Crusade*, 59, n. 16.
4. Robert of Reims, *Historia Hierosolymitana*, in *RHC Occ*, 3: 729–30.
5. Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The First Crusaders, 1095–1131* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 21.
6. A recent overview of these shifts is Christoph Maier, “Mass, the Eucharist and the Cross: Innocent III and the Relocation of the Crusade,” in *Pope Innocent III and His World*, ed. John C. Moore (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 351–60.
7. *RHGF*, 22: 595.
8. The Barons’ Crusade owes its name to a fourteenth-century chronicler who was impressed by the number of great barons who participated: see *Les gestes des Chiprois*, in *Recueil des historiens des croisades: documents Arméniens*, 2 vols. (Paris: Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres, 1869–1906), 2: 725.
9. A relatively recent scholarly biography of Gregory is Salvatore Sibilio, *Gregorio IX, 1227–1241* (Milan: Ceschina, 1961).
10. The only systematic overview of Gregory’s crusade activity to date is Richard T. Spence, “Pope Gregory IX and the Crusade” (Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University, 1978).
11. Lynch, *The Medieval Church*, 160.
12. For the most influential post-war statement of this view, see Steven Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951–54), 3: 478–80.
13. Jonathan Riley-Smith has been the most influential advocate of pious idealism. See in particular his *First Crusaders*, 6, 15–22, 189; his “Early Crusaders to the East and the Costs of Crusading, 1095–1130” in *The Crusades: The Essential Readings*, ed. Thomas F. Madden (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 171; and his *The Crusades: A Short History* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1987), 10–14. See also Marcus Bull, *Knightly Piety and the Lay Response to the First Crusade: The Limousin and Gascony, c. 970–c. 1130* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 5–6, 14–20, 250–81, 285–87; James M. Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade, 1213–1221* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986), 58–63; and Thomas F. Madden, *A Concise History of the Crusades* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), 11–14.
14. Marcus Bull, “The Roots of Lay Enthusiasm for the First Crusade,” in *The Crusades: The Essential Readings*, 180–81, 184.
15. Norman Housley, *The Italian Crusades: The Papal-Angevin Alliance and the Crusades Against Christian Lay Powers, 1254–1343* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 252–57; Norman Housley, *The Later Crusades, 1274–1580: From Lyons to Alcazar* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 2–5; and Christoph Maier, *Preaching the Crusades: Mendicant Friars and the Cross in the Thirteenth*

Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 1, 166.

16. A recent and welcome exception is provided by the collection *Religious Violence Between Christians and Jews: Medieval Roots, Modern Perspectives*, ed. Anna Sapir Abulafia (New York: Palgrave, 2002). See especially the contribution of Jeremy Cohen, "Christian Theology and Anti-Jewish Violence in the Middle Ages: Connections and Disjunctions," 44–60.

17. R. I. Moore, *The Formation of a Persecuting Society: Power and Deviance in Western Europe, 950–1250* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), 100–53; R. L. Moore, *The First European Revolution, c. 970–1215* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 160–98.

18. Gavin I. Langmuir, *Toward a Definition of Antisemitism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 100–133, 301–10; Kenneth R. Stow, *Alienated Minority: The Jews of Medieval Latin Europe* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), 4; Jeffrey Richards, *Sex, Dissidence, and Damnation: Minority Groups in the Middle Ages* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), 9–21.

19. Richard Kieckhefer, "The Office of Inquisition and Medieval Heresy: The Transition from Personal to Institutional Jurisdiction," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 46 (1995): 36–61; Richard Kieckhefer, *Repression of Heresy in Medieval Germany* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979), 3–9.

20. Nora Berend, *At the Gate of Christendom: Jews, Muslims, and "Pagans" in Medieval Hungary, c. 1000–c. 1300* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 162.

21. David Nirenberg, *Communities of Violence: Persecution of Minorities in the Middle Ages* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), 13, 127–99.

22. Mark Meyerson has wondered "if Christians north of the Pyrenees imagined violence and its possible ends in quite the same way" as they did in the Crown of Aragon. See Mark Meyerson, review of *Communities of Violence*, in *Speculum* 74 (1999): 467.

23. Nirenberg, *Communities of Violence*, 7.

24. There are, however, three important articles on the crusade: Reinhold Röhricht, "Die Kreuzzüge des Grafen Theobald von Navarra und Richard von Cornwallis, nach dem heiligen Lande," *Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte* 26 (1886): 67–102; Sidney Painter, "The Crusade of Theobald of Champagne and Richard of Cornwall," in *A History of the Crusades*, 2nd ed., ed. Kenneth M. Setton et al., 6 vols. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969–89), 2: 463–85; and Peter Jackson, "The Crusades of 1239–41 and Their Aftermath," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 50 (1987): 32–62.

Chapter 1. The Preaching of the Holy Land Crusade: The Plan

1. According to Robert of Reims, Pope Urban II in his speech at Clermont forbade the old, the feeble, those unfit to bear arms, and women to set out on the crusade: Robert of Reims, *Historia Hierosolymitana*, in *RHC Occ*, 3: 729–30. Urban's letter of September 1096 to his supporters in Bologna forbade clerics and monks from going overseas without permission from their superiors: Heinrich Hagenmeyer, *Die Kreuzzugsbriefe aus den Jahren 1088–1100* (Innsbruck: Wagner'sche Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1901), 137–38. For twelfth-century recruitment, see James A. Brundage, *Medieval Canon Law and the Crusader* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), 69; Helmut Roscher, *Papst Innocenz III. und die Kreuzzüge* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1968), 278; and Simon D. Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade, 1216–1307* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 18, 72–81.

2. Brundage, *Canon Law and the Crusader*, 69.

3. In England, diocesan synods continued to call for strict enforcement of crusade vows into the 1220s. See the constitutions ascribed to Hereford diocese and dated between 1225 and 1230 in *Councils and Synods with Other Documents Relating to the English Church*, ed. Frederick M. Powicke and Christopher R. Cheney, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964–81), 2: no. 88.

4. Eugenius III, for example, granted crusaders the privilege of selling lands not normally alienable. See "Der Text der Kreuzzugsbulle Eugens III," ed. Peter Rassow, *Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde* 45 (1924).

5. For the growing criticism of noncombatant participation in the twelfth century, see Elizabeth Siberry, *Criticism of Crusading, 1095–1274* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 25–46.

6. Fred A. Cazal, Jr., "Financing the Crusades," *A History of the Crusades*, 2nd ed., ed. Kenneth M.

Setton et al., 6 vols. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969–89), 6: 126.

7. For the tax, which was set at one fortieth of income, see Innocent III, *Opera omnia*, in *PL*, 214: cols. 829–31.

8. Donald E. Queller and Thomas F. Madden, *The Fourth Crusade: The Conquest of Constantinople*, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997), 2, 52.

9. For *Quia maior*, see Georgine Tangl, *Studien zum Register Innocenz' III* (Weimar: H. Bohlaus, 1929), 88–97. The translation is based on that of Brundage, *Canon Law and the Crusader*, 70.

10. For *Ad liber andam*, see *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, ed. Norman P. Tanner, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1990), 1: 267–71.

11. For a summary of Innocent's measures for the Fifth Crusade, see Jonathan Biley-Smith, *The Crusades: A Short History* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1987), 143–45.

12. Christoph Maier, "Mass, the Eucharist and the Cross: Innocent III and the Relocation of the Crusade," in *Pope Innocent III and His World*, ed. John C. Moore (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 351–60; John Gilchrist, "The Lord's War as the Proving Ground of Faith: Pope Innocent III and the Propagation of Violence (1198–1216)," in *Crusaders and Muslims in Twelfth-Century Syria*, ed. Maya Shatzmiller (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1993), 78–79; Michele Maccarrone, *Studi sul Innocenzo III* (Padua: Antenore, 1972), 163; Roscher, *Innocenz III und die Kreuzzüge*, 145, 296; Paul Alphandéry and Alphonse Dupront, *La chrétienté et l'idée de croisade*, 2 vols. (Paris: Editions Albin Michel, 1954–59), 2: 152.

13. James M. Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade, 1213–1221* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986), 67–87.

14. Robert Courçon, Innocent's legate in northern France, bore much of the brunt of this criticism: Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade*, 35; Thomas C. Van Cleve, "The Fifth Crusade," *A History of the Crusades*, 2: 380–81.

15. *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, 1: 267–71.

16. Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade*, 95, 201; Richard Kay, "The Albigensian Twentieth of 1221–3: An Early Chapter in the History of Papal Taxation," *Journal of Medieval History* 6 (1980): 307–15. There is no mention of vow redemption in either of Honorius III's major Holy Land crusade bulls, *Tempus acceptabile* (23 January 1217) and *Dextera Domini* (26 May 1226): *Epistolae selectae saeculi XIII e regestis pontificum Romanorum*, ed. Karl Rodenberg, *Monumenta Germaniae historica*, 3 vols. (Berlin: Weidmann, 1883–94), 1: nos. 12, 229.

17. Ugolino's legation is documented in *Registri dei Cardinali Ugolino d'Ostia e Ottaviano degli Ubaldini*, ed. Guido Levi (Fonti per la storia d'Italia, 8, Rome: Istituto storico Italiano, 1890).

18. See above, note 16, and Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade*, 19.

19. Roscher, *Innocenz III und die Kreuzzüge*, 279–81; Hans Eberhard Mayer, *The Crusades*, 2nd ed., trans. John Gillingham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 217–18.

20. Michael R. Evans, "Commutation of Crusade Vows: Some Examples from the English Midlands," in *From Clermont to Jerusalem: The Crusades and Crusader Societies, 1095–1500*, ed. Alan V. Murray (Turnhout: Brepols, 1998), 221–22; Christoph Maier, *Preaching the Crusades: Mendicant Friars and the Cross in the Thirteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 136; Maureen Purcell, *Papal Crusading Policy: The Chief Instruments of Papal Crusading Policy and Crusade to the Holy Land from the Loss of Jerusalem to the Fall of Acre, 1244–1291* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975), 119–32.

21. Christopher Tyerman, *England and the Crusades, 1095–1588* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 105, 162–63; Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade*, 19–20.

22. For a statement of this principle see *Registres*, no. 4640.

23. Matthew Paris, *Chronica maiora*, ed. Henry Richards Luard, 7 vols., *RS* 57, 5: 73, 4: 9; *Vita Gregorii IX*, in *Le liber censuum de l'église romaine*, ed. Paul Fabre and Louis Duchesne (Paris: Ernest Thorin, 1889–1905), 2: col. 27; Roger of Wendover, *Chronica sive flores historiarum*, ed. Henry O. Cox, 5 vols. (London: Sumptibus societatis, 1841–44), 4: 331; *E Mari historiarum auctore Johannis de Columpna OP*, in *RHGF*, 23: 109; Philip Mouskes, *Chronique rimée de Philippe Mouskes*, ed. [Frédéric] de Reiffenberg, 2 vols. (Brussels: Académie royale des sciences, des lettres et des beaux-arts de Belgique, 1836–38), 2: 606–7. For the old and dying, see Christoph Maier, *Crusade Propaganda and Ideology: Model Sermons for the Preaching of the Cross* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 63; for children, see Brundage, *Canon Law and the Crusader*, 43.

24. For *Rachel suum videns*, see Rome, Archivio segreto Vaticano, Registra Vaticano 17, fol. 230r—v. A partial edition of the registered copy of the bull is *Registres*, no. 2200. Matthew Paris included a

copy of the bull in his *Chronica majora*, 3: 280–87. There is a French translation of Matthew's copy of the bull by Jean L. A. Huillard-Bréholles: Matthew Paris, *Grande chronique de Mathieu Paris*, ed. and trans. Jean L. A. Huillard-Bréholles, 8 vols. (Paris: Paulin, 1840–44), 4: 47–48. Roger of Wendover transcribed an abridged version of the bull into his chronicle: Roger of Wendover, *Flores historiarum*, 4: 327–30. There is an English translation of Roger's copy of the bull by John A. Giles: Roger of Wendover, *Flowers of History, Comprising the History of England from the Descent of the Saxons to A.D. 1235, Formerly Ascribed to Matthew Paris*, trans. John A. Giles, 2 vols. (London: H.G. Bohn, 1849), 2: 604–6. An edition of the bull based on the versions of Matthew and Roger is *Epistolae saeculi I*: no. 605. For the list of addressees, see *Registres*, nos. 2200–2. For the instruction letters to preachers, see Maurice P. Sheehy, *Pontificia Hibernica: Medieval Papal Chancery Documents Concerning Ireland, 640–1261*, 2 vols. (Dublin: M.H. Gill, 1962–65), no. 214 (Ireland); *Registres*, nos. 2203–10 (Trier, Mainz, Cologne, Salzburg and other Austrian provinces, Rouen, Sens, Troyes and other various provinces of France, Lombardy); *Bullarium Franciscanum*, ed. Johannes H. Sbaralea, 4 vols. (Rome: Typis sacrae congregationis de propaganda fide, 1759–68), no. 146 (Lombardy); *Bullarium Ordinis Praedicatorum*, ed. Thomas Ripoll, 7 vols. (Rome: Ex typographia Hieronymi Mainardi, 1729–39), no. 112 (Tuscany). For the chroniclers, see *Vita Gregorii IX*, 2: col. 27; Roger of Wendover, *Flores historiarum*, 4: 327; Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 3: 287.

25. As a papal legate Cardinal Ugolino of Ostia had worked hard to establish peaceful conditions in Lombardy in 1221 in order to spur the region's military elite to participate in the Fifth Crusade. See *Registri dei Cardinali Ugolino*, no. 13 (peace negotiations in Piacenza).

26. *Registra Vaticano 17*, fol. 230r-v; Tangl, *Studien zum Register Innocenz' III*, 88–97.

27. *Layettes du trésor des chartes*, ed. Alexandre Teulet et al., 5 vols. (Paris: H. Plon, 1863–1909), no. 2141.

28. *Registres*, no. 2180.

29. The various surviving versions of the treaty are printed in *Historia diplomatica Frederici secundi*, ed. Jean L. A. Huillard-Bréholles, 6 vols. (Paris: H. Plon, 1852–61), 3: 86–90.

30. For the civil war see Peter Edbury, *John of Ibelin and the Kingdom of Jerusalem* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1997), 40–50. Gregory's peacemaking efforts can be followed in *Epistolae saeculi I*: nos. 594, 656, 674, 650. See also Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1174–1277* (London: Macmillan, 1973), 203–7.

31. *Historia diplomatica Frederici secundi*, 4: 473–76, 530. Along with the impending crusade, another factor inclining Gregory toward compliance in this matter was a rebellion in the city of Rome that had driven him to Rieti in the summer of 1234: he wanted Frederick's support in putting it down. See Thomas C. Van Cleve, *The Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen: Immutator Mundi* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), 373; David Abulafia, *Frederick II: A Medieval Emperor* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 238.

32. The Annalist of Dunstable seems to have been aware of the problem, describing the promotional campaign in England in 1235 in the following fashion: "In the same year [1235] there was a general preaching of the cross throughout England. But the truce made by the emperor still had four years to run." *Annales prioratus de Dunstaplia*, in *Annales monastici*, ed. Henry Richards Luard, 5 vols., *RS* 36, 3: 142.

33. *Registra Vaticano 17*, fol. 230r-v.

34. *Registres*, nos. 3930, 3932–34.

35. For the *vita apostolica*, see Robert Godding, "Vie apostolique et société urbaine," *Nouvelle revue théologique* 104 (1982): 705–21; Caroline Walker Bynum, *Jesus as Mother: Studies in the Spirituality of the High Middle Ages* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 9–20; Richard Southern, *Western Society and the Church in the Middle Ages* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970), 272–99; and Herbert Grundmann, *Religious Movements in the Middle Ages*, trans. Steven Rowan, intro. Robert E. Lerner (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), 55–74.

36. On the friars and the towns, see the classic discussions of Jacques Le Goff, "Apostolat mendiant et fait urbain dans la France médiévale: l'implantation des Ordres Mendiantes, programme questionnaire pour une enquête," *Annales: économies, sociétés, civilisations* 23 (1968): 335–52; and Lester K. Little, *Religious Poverty and the Profit Economy in Medieval Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), 146–217. For more recent approaches, see the work of Kaspar Elm and his students, especially: *Stellung und Wirksamkeit der Bettelorden in der städtischendischen Gesellschaft*, ed. Kaspar Elm (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1981); and Andreas Rüther, *Bettelorden in Stadt und Land: Die Strassburger Mendikanten Konvente und das Elsass im Spätmittelalter* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1997).

37. Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade*, 63.
38. *Vita Gregorii IX*, col. 27.
39. Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade*, 22.
40. PL, 216: 822–23. I follow here the translation by Louise and Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: Idea and Reality, 1095–1274* (London: Edward Arnold, 1981), 130–31.
41. PL, 216: 906–7.
42. Maier, *Preaching the Crusades*, 20–31.
43. For *Pium et sanctum*, see *Registres*, nos. 2203–10. For Tuscany and Lombardy, see *Bullarium Ordinis Praedicatorum*, no. 112; and *Bullarium Franciscanum*, no. 146. For Ireland, see *Pontificia Hibernica*, no. 214. For Austria, see *Bullarii Franciscani epitome et supplementum quattuor voluminum priorum olim a Johanne Hyacinthio Sbaralea editorum*, ed. Conrad Eubel (Apud Claras Aquas [Quaracchi], 1908), no. 7. For France, see *E Mari historiarum*, 109. For William of Cordelle, see Philip Mouskes, *Chronique rimée*, 2: 607. For England, see Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 3: 287; Roger of Wendover, *Flores historiarum*, 4: 331–32; and *Annales monasterii de Theokesberia*, in *Annales monastici*, 1: 95.
44. The power is granted in the letter *Quantum nos urgeat* issued to the bishop of Hildesheim on 28 September 1235: *Epistolae saeculi*, 1: no. 664.
45. Roger of Wendover, *Flores historiarum*, 4: 331–32; Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 3: 312–13.
46. Brundage, *Canon Law and the Crusader*, 154.
47. *Pontificia Hibernica*, no. 228; *Bullarii Franciscani epitome*, no. 7; *Epistolae saeculi*, 1: no. 664; Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 3: 287; Maier, *Preaching the Crusades*, 35–36. Partial indulgences were measured in the number of days (or years) less that a person would have to spend in purgatory as a result of earning them.
48. Roger of Wendover, *Flores historiarum*, 4: 331–32; Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 3: 312–13.
49. Jonathan Riley-Smith, *What Were the Crusades?* 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1992), 36.
50. *Pontificia Hibernica*, no. 214; *Registres*, nos. 2203–10; *Bullarium Franciscanum*, no. 146; *Bullarium Ordinis Praedicatorum*, no. 112.
51. Registra Vaticano 17, fol. 230r–v.
52. Registra Vaticano 17, fol. 230r–v.
53. English translations of biblical passages will be taken from the “Douay-Reims” version of the Latin Vulgate: *The Holy Bible: Douay Reims Version* (Rockford, Ill.: Tan Books, 2000).
54. Justin Martyr (c. 166) saw in Rachel a figure of the church and in Leah a figure of the synagogue. Origen, Jerome, Gregory the Great, Isidore of Seville, and Paschasius Radbertus, among others, adhered to this interpretive tradition. See Paul-Marie Guillaume, “Rachel et Lia,” *Dictionnaire de spiritualité*, ed. M. Viller et al. (Paris: Beauchesne, 1932–95), fasc. 86: cols. 27–29.
55. Registra Vaticano 17, fol. 230r–v.
56. On Muslim religious pollution as a theme in crusade propaganda before *Rachel suum videns*, see Penny J. Cole, “‘O God, The Heathen Have Come into Your Inheritance’ (Ps. 78.1): The Theme of Religious Pollution in Crusade Documents, 1095–1188,” in *Crusaders and Muslims in Twelfth-Century Syria*, 88–89, 91, 96, 97, 104. There was wide agreement among medieval medical authorities that menstruating women were impure. See Esther Lastique and Helen Rodnite Lemay, “A Medieval Physician’s Guide to Virginity,” in *Sex in the Middle Ages: A Book of Essays*, ed. Joyce E. Salisbury (New York: Garland, 1991), 60; Charles T. Wood, “The Doctors’ Dilemma: Sin, Salvation, and the Menstrual Cycle in Medieval Thought,” *Speculum* 56 (1981): 716; Danielle Jacquart and Claude Thomasset, *Sexuality and Medicine in the Middle Ages*, trans. Matthew Adamson (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), 73–76, 129, 186, 191; Joan Cadden, *Meanings of Sex Difference in the Middle Ages: Medicine, Science, and Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 41–42, 175, 268. In his influential medieval commentary on the book of Lamentations, the Carolingian exegete Paschasius Radbertus related the physical pollution spread by menstruating women to spiritual defilement. He links the figure of a menstruating Daughter Zion to various types of pollution caused by the absence of Christian faith, seeing in her an image of the religious impurity of the Jew, the heretic, and the Christian soul corrupted by sin. See Paschasius Radbertus, *In Lamentationes Jeremiae*, in PL, 120: cols. 1093–94.
57. For the Temple area in the era of the Crusader States, see Thomas S. R. Boase, “Ecclesiastical Art in the Crusader States in Palestine and Syria,” *A History of the Crusades*, 4: 86–89; and Jaroslav Folda, *The Art of the Crusaders in the Holy Land, 1098–1187* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995),

58. For a contemporary account of “New Babylon,” with its capital at Cairo, see the Rothelin Continuation: *Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr, de 1229 à 1261, dite du manuscrit de Rothelin*, in *RHC Occ.*, 2: 536–37.

59. Tangl, *Studien zum Register Innocenz’ III*, 88–97. I follow here the translation by Riley-Smith, *Idea and Reality*, 121.

60. Tangl, *Studien zum Register Innocenz’ III*, 88–97.

61. Registra Vaticano 17, fol. 230r-v; Bernard of Clairvaux, *Epistolae*, in *Sancti Bernardi opera*, ed. Jean Leclercq, Henri M. Rochais, and Charles H. Talbot, 8 vols. (Rome: Editiones Cistercienses, 1957–77), 7–8: no. 363.

62. *Registres*, nos. 2203–10.

63. Registra Vaticano 17, fol. 230r-v.

64. For patristic and medieval interpretations of Rachel as a figure of the contemplative, see Guillaume, “Rachel et Lia,” cols. 27–30. For Clare’s use of the Rachel image, see Regis J. Armstrong, “Women in the Letters of Clare,” *Collectanea Franciscana* 62 (1992): 75–85.

65. Registra Vaticano 17, fol. 230r-v.

66. Bynum, *Jesus as Mother*, 130; Giles Constable, *Three Studies in Medieval Religious and Social Thought: The Interpretation of Mary and Martha; the Ideal of the Imitation of Christ; the Orders of Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 190–217.

67. Registra Vaticano 17, fol. 230r-v.

68. Jonathan Riley-Smith, “Crusading as an Act of Love,” *History* 65 (1980): 177–85.

69. Registra Vaticano 17, fol. 230r-v.

70. Matthew Paris, *Historia Anglorum*, ed. Frederick Madden, 3 vols., *RS* 44, 3: 51–52, n. 3. Cited by Sibly, *Criticism of Crusading*, 152.

71. Penny J. Cole, *The Preaching of the Crusades to the Holy Land* (Cambridge, Mass.: Medieval Academy of America, 1991), 161, reads the reference in *Rachel suum videns* to Christ looking only for “good will” in his service as bearing only upon unarmed pilgrims to the Holy Land, but the broader interpretation offered here seems justified both in light of Matthew Paris’s similar use of the phrase to refer to vow redemption and in light of the emphasis Gregory placed upon recruiting noncombatants throughout his preaching campaign for the Barons’ Crusade.

72. Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 3: 287.

73. For the calculation of redemption fees, see Maier, *Preaching the Crusades*, 135, 155–57; Purcell, *Papal Crusading Policy*, 125–27.

74. In England, for example, crusade preachers did not collect the redemption fees they solicited. Agents working under a certain Brother Thomas of the Templars had that responsibility: see Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 3: 374.

75. Papal agents were gathering fees for Richard of Cornwall some fifteen years after he had returned from Syria. See William E. Lunt, *Financial Relations of the Papacy with England to 1327* (Cambridge, Mass.: Medieval Academy of America, 1939), 432–34.

76. Gregory ordered the fees collected for Richard of Cornwall to be stored there: *Registres*, nos. 4268–72.

77. Peter of Brittany, for example, was to receive one third of the sums raised on his behalf before he set out for Constantinople, and the remainder upon his arrival there: *Registres*, no. 4265.

78. Registra Vaticano 17, fol. 230r-v; Tangl, *Studien zum Register Innocenz’ III*, 88–97.

79. *Epistolae saeculi*, 1: no. 646.

80. Tangl, *Studien zum Register Innocenz’ III*, 88–97.

81. *Epistolae saeculi*, 1: no. 646.

82. The request was made in *Constitutiones pro zelo fidei*, a constitution of the Second Council of Lyon, which I cite from Purcell, *Papal Crusading Policy*, Appendix A, 196–99.

83. *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, 1: 267–71.

84. Peter Partner, *The Lands of St. Peter: The Papal State in the Middle Ages and the Early Renaissance* (London: Eyre Methuen, 1972), 247–52.

85. For the imposition of the subsidy in England, see Roger of Wendover, *Flores historiarum*, 4: 200–203; for Sweden, see *Epistolae saeculi*, 1: no. 378.

86. *Registres*, nos. 4605–7; *Epistolae saeculi*, 1: no. 787.
87. *Registri dei Cardinali Ugolino d'Ostia*, no. 5.
88. Registra Vaticano 17, fol. 230r–v; *Registres*, no. 2511. For the development of crusader privileges, see James A. Brundage, “Crusaders and Jurists: The Legal Consequences of Crusader Status,” *Le concile de Clermont de 1095 et l'appel à la croisade*, ed. André Vauchez (Rome: Collection de l'Ecole française de Rome, 1997), 150–54.
89. For vow redemption as a papal fundraising mechanism after Gregory, see William E. Lunt, *Papal Revenues in the Middle Ages*, 2 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1934), 1: III–25; Cazet, “Financing the Crusades,” 116–49; Purcell, *Papal Crusading Policy*, 119–32; Brundage, *Canon Law and the Crusader*, 133–36; Norman Housley, *The Italian Crusades: The Papal-Angevin Alliance and the Crusades against Christian Lay Powers, 1254–1343* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 187–89; Maier, *Preaching the Crusades*, 140–60. For criticism of vow redemption, see Siberry, *Criticism of Crusading*, 150–55.
90. Compare with Maier, *Preaching the Crusades*, 107.
91. *Foedera, conventiones, litterae et cuius-cunque generis acta publica inter reges Angliae et alios quosvis imperatores, reges, pontifices, principes vel communitates*, ed. Thomas Rymer et al, 4 vols. (London: Record Commission Edition, 1816–69), 1: 272–73.
92. The tendency has been to see Innocent as the key figure in the history of thirteenth-century crusade recruitment and organization. See, for example, Christoph Maier, “Mass, the Eucharist and the Cross,” 351; Christopher Tyerman, *The Invention of the Crusades* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 35–36; Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A Short History*, 120; Roscher, *Papst Innocenz III und die Kreuzzüge*, 260–91.
93. Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 3: 287–88.

Chapter 2. The Preaching of the Holy Land Crusade: The Response

1. Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, ed. Henry Richards Luard, 7 vols., *RS* 57, 3: 280.
2. For the Roman revolt and its background, see Ferdinand Gregorovius, *History of the City of Rome in the Middle Ages*, trans. Annie Hamilton, 8 vols. (London: George Bell and Sons, 1897), 5: 147–79; Walter Gross, *Die Revolution in der Stadt Rom 1219–1254* (Berlin: Ebering, 1934; reprinted Vaduz: Kraus Reprints, 1965), 28–39; Daniel Waley, *The Papal State in the Thirteenth Century* (London: Macmillan, 1961), 134–45; Peter Partner, *The Lands of St. Peter: The Papal State in the Middle Ages and the Early Renaissance* (London: Methuen, 1972), 246–53; and Jürgen Strothmann, *Kaiser und Senat: der Herrschaftsanspruch der Stadt Rom zur Zeit der Staufer* (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 1998), 335–42.
3. Waley, *Papal State*, 141.
4. Partner, *Lands of St. Peter*, 250.
5. The narrative that follows synthesizes Gregorovius, *History of Rome*, 174–76; Thomas C. Van Cleve, *The Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen: Immutor Mundi* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), 372–76; and Strothmann, *Kaiser und Senat*, 339.
6. *Epistolae selectae saeculi XIII e regestis pontificum Romanorum*, ed. Karl Rodenberg, *Monumenta Germaniae historica*, 3 vols. (Berlin: Weidmann, 1883–94), 1: nos. 602 (24 October 1234), 607 (25 November), 608 (27 November), 612–13.
7. For the count of Toulouse and Peter of Roches, see Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 3: 304.
8. Gregory's old diocese of Velletri was particularly supportive: *Epistolae saeculi*, 1: nos. 617–19.
9. Waley, *Papal State*, 143.
10. *Registres*, nos. 3018–44.
11. *Registres*, no. 2511.
12. *Registres*, nos. 2512–17.
13. Van Cleve, *Immutor Mundi*, 377–88; David Abulafia, *Frederick II: A Medieval Emperor* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 239–42.
14. *Epistolae saeculi*, 1: no. 640.
15. Christoph Maier, *Preaching the Crusades: Mendicant Friars and the Cross in the Thirteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 36.

16. *Epistolae saeculi*, 1: no. 664.
17. *Epistolae saeculi*, 1: nos. 580–1, 583, 587, 603, 628, 641, 648, 657.
18. *Historia diplomatica Frederici secundi*, ed. Jean L. A. Huillard-Bréholles, 6 vols. (Paris: H. Plon, 1852–61), 4: 876–77.
19. Van Cleve, *Immutator Mundi*, 398.
20. The quotations are from *Epistolae saeculi*, 1: no. 648. For further complaints along these lines, see *Historia diplomatica Frederici secundi*, 5: 249; and Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 3: 552–62.
21. *Layettes du trésor des chartes*, ed. Alexandre Teulet et al., 5 vols. (Paris: H. Plon, 1863–1909), nos. 2141, 2144.
22. Robert C. Stacey, *Politics, Policy, and Finance Under Henry III, 1216–45* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 43.
23. As argued by Simon Lloyd in *English Society and the Crusade, 1216–1307* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 207–32.
24. Louis turned 20 that year, married, and started, gradually it is true, to play a more active role in government alongside his mother Blanche of Castile: Jacques Le Goff, *Saint Louis* (Paris: Gallimard, 1996), 128–57. On Louis's minority see still Elie Berger, *Histoire de Blanche de Castille reine de France* (Paris: A. Fontemoing, 1895), to be supplemented by Sidney Painter, *The Scourge of the Clergy: Peter of Dreux, Duke of Brittany* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1937), who revises Berger's chronology, and also Jean Richard, *Saint Louis: roi d'une France féodale, soutien de la Terre sainte* (Paris: Fayard, 1983). Henry had technically reached his majority some years earlier, but in 1234 he dismissed Peter of Roches, the leader of the last faction to dominate the royal council during his minority, and began to rule personally: see Stacey, *Politics, Policy, and Finance*, 40; and David A. Carpenter, "The Fall of Hubert de Burgh," in his *The Reign of Henry III* (London: Hambledon Press, 1996), 45. On Henry's minority, see David A. Carpenter, *The Minority of Henry III* (London: Methuen, 1990).
25. For the revolt of Peter of Dreux, see Painter, *Scourge of the Clergy*, 92–94; for the revolt of Earl Gilbert Marshal and Richard of Cornwall, see the important revisionist account in Stacey, *Politics, Policy, and Finance*, 118–31.
26. The term "territorial prince" is used by historians to designate the most powerful French aristocrats who ruled large territories with little outside interference. The term is helpful as a way of distinguishing these rulers from other magnates, whose power, although great, would have been more local in scope. The main source for the participants in the Barons' Crusade is the so-called Rothelin Continuation of William of Tyre: *Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr, de 1229 à 1261, dite du manuscrit de Rothelin*, in *RHC Occ.*, 2: 526. English translation in Janet Shirley, *Crusader Syria in the Thirteenth Century: The Rothelin Continuation of the History of William of Tyre with Part of the Eracles or Acre Text* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 38.
27. For Guy of Nevers, Henry of Bar, Louis of Sancerre, and John of Mâcon, see *Continuation Rothelin*, 526; for John of Vendôme and Humbert of Beaujeu, see *Registres*, nos. 3727, 4219; for John of Chalon-sur-Saône, see Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, *Albrici monachi Triumfontium chronicon*, ed. Paul Scheffer-Boichorst, in *MGH SS*, 23: 937; for Stephen of Burgundy, see *The Apostolic See and the Jews*, ed. Shlomo Simonsohn, 8 vols. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1988–91), no. 149.
28. My discussion here is indebted to Jean Richard, *Saint Louis*, 17–154, who counterbalances the trend in the literature to focus narrowly on the growth of royal power in this era.
29. For an overview of this centralization process, see Elizabeth Hallam and Judith Everard, *Capetian France, 987–1328*, 2nd ed. (Harlow: Longman, 2001), 33–81. For Champagne see Michel Bur, *La formation du comté de Champagne* (Nancy: Université de Nancy II, 1977); and for Burgundy, Jean Richard, *Les ducs de Bourgogne et la formation du duché* (Paris: Société les Belles Lettres, 1954).
30. Monique Bourin-Derruau, *Temps d'équilibres, temps de ruptures: XIII^e siècle* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1990), 149–97; Olivier Guillot, Albert Rigaudière, and Yves Sassier, *Pouvoirs et institutions dans la France médiévale: des temps féodaux aux temps de l'État* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1994), 90–121.
31. For Henry of Grandpré, William of Joigny, Simon of Clefmont, and Philip of Nantueil, see *Continuation Rothelin*, 526; for Anselm of Trānel, see Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, *Chronicon*, 946; for Gamier of Marigny, see Ms. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat.17098, fol. 68r.; for John of Valery, see *Chartes et documents de l'Abbaye Cistercienne de Preuilly*, ed. Albert Catel and Maurice Lecomte (Montereau: Clavierie, 1927), nos. 407–10; for Henry of Nogent, see Ms. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat.9904, fol. 238; for Gaucher and Geoffrey Bridaine, Hugh of Broys, and Peter Putemonnoie, see Arthur Prévost, "Les Champenois aux croisades," *Mémoires de la société académique d'agriculture, des*

sciences, arts et belles-lettres du département de l'Aube 85 (1921): 181.

32. For Josseran of Brancion, Andrew and Peter of Savoisy, Hugh of Arceau, Guy of Doix, and John of Paleau, see the acts of the dukes of Burgundy catalogued by Ernest Petit, which shall be referred to by number: Ernest Petit, *Histoire des ducs de Bourgogne de la race capétienne*, 9 vols. (Paris: A. Picard, 1885–1905), nos. 2364, 2313, 2395, 2235, 2357; for Colin of Ligny, see *Recueil de pièces pour faire suite au cartulaire général de l'Yonne*, ed. Maximilien Quantin (Auxerre-Paris: La Société, 1873), no. 209; for John of Barres, see Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 4: 25.

33. For John of Mâcon, see *Continuation Rothelin*, 526; for Andrew of Vitry, Ralph, lord of Fougères, and Guyomar of Léon, see Painter, *Scourge of the Clergy*, 113; for Geoffrey of Ancenis and Fulk Paynel, see Barthélemy A. Pocquet du Haut-Jussé, *Les papes et les ducs de Bretagne: essai sur les rapports du saint-siège avec un état*, 2 vols. (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1928), 1: 120.

34. For Robert of Courtenay, Matthew of Marly, Philip of Montfort, and Drew of Mello, see *Registres*, nos. 2808, 2809, 2810, 3727; for Ralph of Nesle, Simon of Clermont, Ralph of Clermont, William and Ralph of Senlis, and Guy Mauvoisin, see *Continuation Rothelin*, 526; for John of Soissons, see Philip Mouskes, *Chronique rimée de Philippe Mouskes*, ed. [Frédéric] de Reiffenberg, 2 vols. (Brussels: Académie royale des sciences, des lettres et des beaux-arts de Belgique, 1836–38), 2: 630; for William of Chantilly, see Sidney Painter, “The Crusade of Theobald of Champagne and Richard of Cornwall,” *A History of the Crusades*, 2nd ed., ed. Kenneth M. Setton et al., 6 vols. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969–89), 2: 469; for Anselm of Coucy, see Reinhold Röhrich, “Die Kreuzzüge des Grafen Theobald von Navarra und Richard von Cornwallis, nach dem heiligen Lande” *Eorschungen zur deutschen Geschichte* 26 (1886): 72; for Amalric of Montfort, see Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, *Chronicon*, 947.

35. At that time, his holdings consisted of the earldom of Cornwall, the honors of Berkhamstead, Wallingford, St. Valery, Eye, and some scattered estates from his mother's dower lands: Noël Denholm-Young, *Richard of Cornwall* (New York: William Salloch, 1947), 21–22.

36. For Simon, see John R. Maddicott, *Simon de Montfort* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

37. Ralph V. Turner, “William de Forz, Count of Aumâle: An Early Thirteenth-Century English Baron,” *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 115 (1971): 224–25.

38. Richard quarreled with Henry in 1227 and 1238: Denholm-Young, *Richard of Cornwall*, 10, 34.

39. Turner, “William de Forz,” 238–43.

40. Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 3: 368–69.

41. For Thierry of Nussa, Philip Basset, John of Beauchamp, Geoffrey of Beauchamp of Bedford, John of Neville, Peter of Brus, and William of Furnivall, see Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 4: 44; for Eudo Fitz-Roy, John Fitz-John, Baldwin of Béthune, Eustace of Stuteville, Robert Marmion, and Hamo Pecche, see Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 4: 174–75; for Henry of Trumbleville and Robert Tweng, see Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 3: 620, 4: 47; for William of Perevel, see Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade*, 161 and references; for Baldwin of Redvers, see *Chronicon vulgo dictum chronicon Thomae Wykes (A.D. 1066–1289)*, in *Annales monastici*, ed. Henry Richards Luard, 5 vols., RS 36, 4: 86–87.

42. Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 3: 476 (John of Chester); 3: 624 (Henry of Trumbleville); 3: 620, 4: 135–36 (Gilbert Marshal).

43. Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 4: 44.

44. Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade*, 84.

45. Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 4: 89, 174.

46. Thirty-eight of the seventy-four English Barons' Crusaders known to me fall into this category.

47. For Hugh of Oxford, see *Calendar of the Patent Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office, 1232–1307*, 8 vols. (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1898–1908), 3: 175; for John of Lincoln, see Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade*, 99; for the royal sergeants, see *Calendar of the Liberate Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office, 1226–72*, 6 vols. (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1917–64), 2: 31.

48. The papal chancery wrote of Henry of Bar that “he intend[ed] to take with him many noble and powerful men” to the Holy Land, and of Godfrey of Argentan (a Poitevin crusader), that he had “vowed that in aid of the Holy Land he would lead twenty knights from the kingdom of France.” See *Registres*, nos. 3633, 4107. For the retinues of crusading magnates in the thirteenth century, see Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade*, 5–6, 72–79.

49. Thus Thibaut of Champagne is described as leading an “honorable number” of warriors to the Holy Land: *Registres*, no. 4630.

50. There is only one document that approximates direct evidence for a Barons’ Crusader’s retinue. It is a draft contract between two members of Richard of Cornwall’s contingent, John of Neville and Philip Basset, both of whom are described as knights banneret by Matthew Paris. The contract is printed as Appendix Five in Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade*. According to its terms Philip would accompany John to the Holy Land with two other knights and four horses. Philip would pay for his passage to Syria but once there would serve with his knights in John’s retinue at John’s expense. Since Philip may not have been the only prominent crusader to consider contracting to go on crusade with John, the proposed contract does not reveal the total size of John’s retinue. But it does tell us that Philip’s planned retinue consisted of two knights and four horses. This is half the number of knights that a banneret usually brought with him on military campaigns in the mid-thirteenth century, according to the recent estimate of William Chester Jordan, *Louis IX and the Challenge of the Crusade: A Study in Rulership* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), 66. In light of this discrepancy and the overall dearth of evidence relating to the retinues of the leading Barons’ Crusaders, it would be unwise to hazard an estimate of their “average” size.

51. *Continuation Rothelin*, 532, 539.

52. The most comprehensive study of family traditions of crusading is Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The First Crusaders, 1095–1131* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). For the influence of ties of family, lordship, and regional association on thirteenth-century crusade recruitment, the key contributions are Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade*, 71–112, and Christopher Tyerman, *England and the Crusades, 1095–1588* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 152–228.

53. Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A Short History* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1987), 108.

54. For the crusading record of the counts of Champagne, see Theodore Evergates, *Feudal Society in Medieval France: Documents from the County of Champagne* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), 96–122; and Prévost, “Les Champenois aux croisades.”

55. Elizabeth Siberry, “The Crusading Counts of Nevers,” *Nottingham Medieval Studies* 34 (1990): 64–70.

56. Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade*, 101, n. 155.

57. Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade*, 103.

58. Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade*, 82–84.

59. For the Dreux, see the genealogical chart, “Un puissant lignage: les Dreux,” in Richard, *Saint Louis*, 614.

60. For the marriage of Blanche and John, see *Layettes*, no. 2432.

61. Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 4: 44.

62. Witness the title of Theodore Evergate’s collection of documents from medieval Champagne: *Feudal Society in Medieval France*.

63. Amalric was active in these campaigns until 1226, when he renounced the family claims in Languedoc in favor of Louis VIII, confirming the renunciation after the peace of Paris in 1229: *Layettes*, no. 2000. Thibaut served for forty days with Louis VIII at the siege of Avignon in 1226 and then returned home, claiming that he had performed all the service he owed: *Récits d’un ménestrel de Reims au treizième siècle*, ed. Natalis de Wailly (Paris: Librairie Renouard, 1876), 176–77.

64. See Michael Lower, “Papal Authority and the Barons’ Crusade of 1239” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Cambridge, 1999), 61–72.

65. *Registres*, no. 3926.

66. The most detailed narratives of these conflicts, usually known as the “Wars of Champagne,” are Berger, *Blanche de Castille*, 145–97; Painter, *Scourge of the Clergy*, 55–88; and Richard, *Saint Louis*, 88–96.

67. For the alliance of Hugh of Lusignan, Peter of Brittany, and Thibaut of Champagne, see Henri d’Arbois de Jubainville, *Histoire des ducs et des comtes de Champagne*, 6 vols. (Paris: A. Durand, 1859–69), nos. 1739–40 (of his catalogue of the acts of the counts of Champagne).

68. *Layettes*, nos. 1921–22, 2065. Thibaut was obliged to surrender the lordships of Breteuil-en-Bauvaisis and Romorantin; Peter was to give his daughter in marriage to the third son of Louis VIII, John, while Hugh was to marry a daughter of Alphonse of Poitiers, and one of Hugh’s sons was to marry Isabella, Louis IX’s sister. None of these marriages took place.

69. Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 3: 198–99; Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, *Chronicon*, 924–26.
70. For John Fitz-John, see above, n. 41; for William of Vichy, see Jean L. A. Huillard-Bréholles, *Titres de la maison ducale de Bourbon*, 2 vols. (Paris: H. Plon, 1867–74), 1: 46.
71. Some prominent crusading dynasties in Champagne, like the Chappes and Plancy families, seem not to have sent any of their members on the crusade. For their genealogies, see Theodore Evergates, *Feudal Society in the Bailliage of Troyes under the Counts of Champagne, 1152–1284* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 168–69, 191–92.
72. Among the crusading Breton lords to transfer their homage to the king were Andrew of Vitry and Ralph of Fougères in 1230 and Guyomar of Léon in 1231: Painter, *Scourge of the Clergy*, 73.
73. According to the Rothelin Continuation, none of the Breton lords joined the raiding party Peter formed in the early stages of the campaign: *Continuation Rothelin*, 533–36.
74. Stacey, *Politics, Policy, and Finance*, 118, has argued that the marriage was a main cause of the revolt.
75. Denholm-Young, *Richard of Cornwall*, 28.
76. Denholm-Young, *Richard of Cornwall*, 29.
77. Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 3: 363.
78. Denholm-Young, *Richard of Cornwall*, 29.
79. Stacey, *Politics, Policy, and Finance*, 94.
80. Tyerman, *England and the Crusades*, 103.
81. *Close Rolls of the Reign of Henry III Preserved in the Public Record Office, 1227–72*, 14 vols. (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1902–38), 3: 363–64, 367; Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 3: 368–69.
82. Tyerman, *England and the Crusades*, 102–3.
83. Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade*, 105; for the gift, see *Close Rolls*, 4: 97.
84. For Godfrey and Guy, see *Registres*, no. 4107, 5130; for Bishop Benedict, see Röhrich, “Die Kreuzzüge des Grafen Theobald und Richard,” 72.
85. For Robert of Fraxineto, see *Close Rolls*, 4: 489; and Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade*, 163; for William of Mastac, see *Liberate Rolls*, 1: 384; for Ralph of Ringstone, see Tyerman, *England and the Crusades*, 200, 212; for Robert Maleherbe, see *Curia Regis Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office, Richard I-1242*, 16 vols. (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1922–79), 16: no. 2491.
86. Two lists drawn up in England in the 1190s survive: Historical Manuscripts Commission, *Export on Manuscripts in Various Collections*, 8 vols. (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1901–14), 1: 235–36; Historical Manuscripts Commission, *Fifth Export* (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1876), 462.
87. *E Mari historiarum auctore Johannis de Columpna OP*, in *RHGF*, 23: 109; *Continuation Rothelin*, 526 (*Crusader Syria*, 38).
88. William E. Lunt, *Papal Revenues in the Middle Ages*, 2 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1934), 1: 119.
89. *Registres*, no. 4204.
90. Thus Godfrey of Argentan was promised a subsidy from crusading revenues raised either for the Holy Land or for Constantinople, as the local collector saw fit: *Registres*, no. 4107.
91. *Registres*, no. 4965.
92. Lunt, *Papal Revenues*, 1: 432.
93. For Salisbury, see Lunt, *Papal Revenues*, 2: no. 533; for Chichester, see Historical Manuscripts Commission, *Reports on Various Collections*, 1: 190; for St. Albans, see Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 6: 138.
94. Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 4: 134.
95. Richard Vaughn, *Matthew Paris* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), 13.

Chapter 3. The Diversion to Constantinople

1. This letter does not survive, but its contents are summarized in the papal chancery’s reply to it, *Ut Israellem veteris*, dated 16 December 1235: *Registres*, nos. 2872–79.
2. Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, *Albrici monachi Triumfontium chronicon*, ed. Paul Scheffer-Boichorst,

3. Philip Mouskes, *Chronique rimée de Philippe Mouskes*, ed. [Frédéric] de Reiffenberg, 2 vols. (Brussels: Academie royale des sciences, des lettres et des beaux-arts de Belgique, 1836–38), 2: 620.

4. Walter Norden argued that John did not send his appeal for aid to Rome until after the arrival of Geoffrey of Villehardouin, withholding news of his successful intervention in order to paint a bleaker picture of the situation in Constantinople. But no evidence is offered in support of this suggestion: see Walter Norden, *Das Papsttum und Byzanz: die Trennung der beiden Mächte und das Problem ihrer Wiedervereinigung* (Berlin: B. Behr's Verlag, 1903), 307.

5. See now Alfred J. Andrea and John C. Moore, "The Date of Reg. 6: 102: Pope Innocent III's Letter of Advice to the Crusaders," in *Medieval and Renaissance Venice*, ed. Ellen E. Kittel and Thomas F. Madden (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999), 109–23.

6. Richard T. Spence, "Gregory IX's Attempted Expeditions to the Latin Empire of Constantinople: The Crusade for the Union of the Latin and Greek Churches," *Journal of Medieval History* 5 (1979): 167.

7. In a letter of 1211 to the Latin emperor Henry I, Innocent struck a reproachful note: "Since you and other crusaders have striven to capture and keep the empire of Romania principally in order that by this means you may bring help more easily to the Holy Land, you have not only failed to provide any assistance for this, but have also brought trouble and damage to the brothers of the Temple, who are laboring with all their strength for the defense of this land." See Innocent III, *Opera omnia*, in *PL*, 215: cols. 636–37. Malcolm Barber, "Western Attitudes to Frankish Greece in the Thirteenth Century," in *Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean After 1204*, ed. Benjamin Arbel, Bernard Hamilton, and David Jacoby (London: Frank Cass, 1989), 112, drew my attention to this quotation.

8. Preached in 1223 and 1224, well after the Fifth Crusade had come to its unsuccessful end in Egypt, the Thessalonica expedition arrived in 1225 to find the kingdom already in the possession of Theodore Angelus Ducas Comnenus, despot of Epirus, one of the centers of exiled Byzantine power: see Peter Lock, *The Franks in the Aegean, 1204–1500* (London: Longman, 1995), 61–62. For Honorius's efforts to organize and fund the expedition, see *Regesta Honorii papae III*, ed. Pietro Pressutti, 2 vols. (Rome: ex typographis Vaticana, 1888–95), nos. 4355, 4754.

9. Jean Van Den Gheyn, "Lettre de Grégoire IX concernant l'empire latin de Constantinople," *Revue de l'Orient Latin* 9 (1902): 230–34.

10. *VMH*, no. 249 (King Bela); *Registres*, nos. 2874–76 (archbishops of Esztergom and Kalocsa, bishop of Győr), no. 2873 (Coloman), no. 2877 (Thibaut of Champagne), no. 2878 (archbishop of Sens); *Bullarium Franciscanum*, ed. Johannes H. Sbaralea, 4 vols. (Rome: Typis sacrae congregationis de propaganda fide, 1759–68), no. 185 (William of Cordelle).

11. Norden, *Das Papsttum und Byzanz*, 306.

12. Spence, "Gregory IX's Attempted Expeditions," 163.

13. In his initial exultation Innocent declared the crusader victory a divine judgment on the Greeks for their descent into schism and rejoiced that it had returned them to Roman obedience as "the daughter to the mother, the part to the whole, and the member to the head": *Die Register Innocenz' III*, ed. Othmar Hageneder et al., 5 vols. to date but numbered according to the register year (Graz-Cologne, Rome, Vienna: Hermann Böhlhaus, Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1964–), 7: no. 154 (13 November 1204). I follow here the translation of the letter in *Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade*, ed. Alfred J. Andrea (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 115–26.

14. P. L'Huillier, "La nature des relations ecclésiastiques gréco-latines après la prise de Constantinople par les croisés," in *Akten des XI. internationalen Byzantinistenkongresses* (Munich: C. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1960): 314–20.

15. Michael Angold, "Byzantium in Exile," in *The New Cambridge Medieval History V, 1198–1300*, ed. David Abulafia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 545.

16. For these discussions, see Joseph Gill, *Byzantium and the Papacy, 1198–1400* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1979), 40–41.

17. *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX e registris Vaticanis aliisque fontibus collegit*, ed. Aloysius L. Tautu (Rome: Typis polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950), no. 179.

18. Girolamo Golubovich, "Disputado Latinorum et Graecorum seu relatio apocrisiorum Gregorii IX de gestis Nicaeae in Bithynia et Nymphaeae in Lydia," *Archivum Franciscanum historicum* 12 (1919): 464. A recent study of these negotiations is John Doran, "Rites and Wrongs: The Latin Mission to Nicaea, 1234," in *Unity and Diversity in the Church: Papers Read at the 1994 Summer Meeting and*

the 1995 Winter Meeting of the Ecclesiastical History Society, ed. R. N. Swanson, *Studies in Church History* 32 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 131–44.

19. *Registres*, no. 1957.

20. For the rise of Nicaea, see Michael Angold, *A Byzantine Government in Exile: Government and Society under the Laskarids of Nicaea (1204–1261)* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 12–26; and the same author's "Administration of the Empire of Nicaea," *Byzantinische Forschungen* 19 (1993): 127–38.

21. For the rise of the Bulgars, see Robert L. Wolff, "The Second Bulgarian Empire: Its Origin and History to 1204," *Speculum* 24 (1949): 180–203; and Paul Stephenson, *Byzantium's Balkan Frontier: A Political Study of the Northern Balkans, 900–1204* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 275–315.

22. James Ross Sweeney, "Innocent III, Hungary, and the Bulgarian Coronation: A Study in Medieval Papal Diplomacy," *Church History* 42 (1973): 320–30.

23. Prior to 1230 the presence of Theodore of Epirus to the southwest of Asen's power base beyond the Bithynian mountain range had deterred Asen from committing himself fully to an attack on Constantinople. The wisdom of this cautious strategy was borne out in 1230 when Theodore invaded the Bulgar kingdom. Asen gave battle at Klokotnica and won the day, taking Theodore prisoner and blinding him. In the ensuing chaos Asen's army marched the breadth of the despotate, from Adrianople to the Adriatic, leaving Theodore's brother, Manuel Ducas, who was also Asen's son-in-law, only in control of Thessalonica and its hinterland. With the regions west of Constantinople in friendly hands, Asen could concentrate on the Latin capital. See Kenneth M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant (1204–1571)*, 4 vols. (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1976–84), 1: 54–56.

24. A case in point is Hungary: King Bela came to believe that Gregory's response to the Mongol invasion of Eastern Europe in 1240/1, which coincided with the height of the papal conflict with Frederick II, was inadequate. See Peter Jackson, "The Crusade Against the Mongols (1241)," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 42 (1991): II.

25. Recent surveys of this process are Jean Richard, "The Establishment of the Latin Church in the Empire of Constantinople (1204–27)," in *Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean*, 45–58; and Lock, *Eranks in the Aegean*, 193–221.

26. For the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople, see Robert L. Wolff, "The Organization of the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople, 1204–1261," *Traditio* 6 (1948): 33–60, and "Politics in the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 8 (1954): 228–303; and Charles A. Frazee, "The Catholic Church in Constantinople, 1204–1453," *Balkan Studies* 19 (1978): 34–35.

27. *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, ed. Norman P. Tanner, 2 vols. (Washington, D. C.: Georgetown University Press, 1990), 236.

28. John V. A. Fine, *The Late Medieval Balkans: A Critical Survey from the Late Twelfth Century to the Ottoman Conquest* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1987), 115, 125.

29. *Registres*, no. 4035, and also no. 3409, where similar reasoning is used to justify a tax on the church of Achaea.

30. Two accounts of John's career are Louis Bréhier, "John de Brienne," *Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastiques*, 26 vols, to date (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1912–), 10: cols. 698–708; and Ludwig Böhm, *Johann von Brienne, K ö nig von Jerusalem, Kaiser von Konstantinopel (um 1170–1237)* (Heidelberg: August Lipp, 1938). For John's family ties, see the genealogical chart in Theodore Evergates, *Feudal Society in the Bailliage of Troyes under the Counts of Champagne, 1152–1284* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 165.

31. Richard of San Germano, *Chronica*, ed. Carlo Alberto Garufi, *Rerum Italicarum scriptores. Nova series*, ed. Giosuè Carducci et al., 34 vols, to date (Bologna: N. Zanichelli, 1900–), 7.2: 141. For the letter of donation, see *Epistolae selectae saeculi XIII e regestis pontificum Romanorum*, ed. Karl Rodenberg, *Monumenta Germaniae historica*, 3 vols. (Berlin: Weidmann, 1883–94), 1: no. 339.

32. David Abulafia, *Frederick II: A Medieval Emperor* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 161; Daniel Waley, *The Papal State in the Thirteenth Century* (London: Macmillan, 1961), 137.

33. *Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig*, ed. Gottlieb Tafel and Georg Thomas, 3 vols. (Vienna: Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1856–57), 2: no. 273.

34. Richard of San Germano, *Chronica*, 152.

35. Roger of Wendover, *Chronica sive flores historiarum*, ed. Henry O. Cox, 5 vols. (London: Sumptibus societatis, 1841–44), 4: 182–84.

36. Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, *Chronicon*, 23: 925.
37. On 19 May 1229 Gregory instructed his legate Cardinal Pelagius of Albano to ensure the security and liberties of towns captured by the papal armies; on the same day the residents of Sessa were taken under direct papal protection. See *Epistolae saeculi*, 1: nos. 386, 388, and also Abulafia, *Frederick II*, 198.
38. Roger of Wendover, *Flores historiarum*, 4: 209.
39. Barber, "Western Attitudes to Frankish Greece," 113.
40. Philip Mouskes, *Chronique rimée*, 2: 613; a similar accusation is found in *L'estoire de Eracles empeur et la conqueste de la terre d'Outremer*, in *RHC Occ.*, 2: 382.
41. Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A Short History* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1987), 7.
42. Henri d'Arbois de Jubainville, *Histoire des ducs et des comtes de Champagne*, 6 vols. (Paris: A. Durand, 1859–69), 4: 338.
43. For the difficulties entailed, and examples of journey times, see John H. Pryor, "Winds, Waves, and Rocks: The Routes and the Perils Along Them," in *Maritime Aspects of Migration*, ed. Klaus Frieland (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 1989): 82–85.
44. Van Den Gheyn, "Lettre de Grégoire IX," 230–34. In a letter of 1211 to the patriarch of Constantinople, Innocent III worried that "if the Greeks were to recover the empire of Romania, they would impede almost entirely aid to the Holy Land": Innocent III, *Opera omnia*, 216: cols. 353–54. Promoting the Thessalonica crusade of 1223–24, Honorius III insisted that the expedition would be of great use not only to the Latin empire, but also to the "business of the Holy Land." See *Regesta Honorii*, no. 4355.
45. *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, nos. 179, 193.
46. Examples of this descriptive practice can be found across the spectrum of Gregorian crusade propaganda prior to 1235. See, for example, *Registres*, nos. 229 (the "business undertaken against the Albigenian heretics" in Languedoc is the "business of the orthodox faith": 21 March 1228); 255 (Castilian offensive against "perverse nations" benefits the "Church in general": 8 December 1228); *Epistolae saeculi*, 1: nos. 539 (Stedinger peasants in Bremen attack "the church of God and the Catholic faith": 17 June 1233); 557 (by crusading in support of Conrad of Marburg's heresy investigations in Germany, Conrad, landgrave of Thuringia, shows his devotion to the Apostolic See and "the defense of the Catholic faith": 20 October 1233).
47. This was done by offering the Holy Land crusade indulgence to participants in these ventures: *Registres*, no. 515 (crusaders from León fighting "Saracens" in Spain); *Epistolae saeculi*, 1: no. 671 (crusaders from northern German provinces fighting "pagans" in Livonia and Estonia); *Registres*, no. 230 (crusaders from northern French provinces fighting "Albigenian heretics").
48. For the crusade vow, see the comprehensive treatment in James A. Brundage, *Medieval Canon Law and the Crusader* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), 30–114.
49. Raymond of Peñafort, *Summa de casibus penitentiae* (Rome: Sumptibus Ioannis Tallini, 1603), 56. For the date of composition, see Brundage, *Canon Law and the Crusader*, 91, n. 45.
50. *Registres*, no. 3945.
51. See, for example, *Registres*, nos. 3938 (which grants Baldwin II a sixmonth delay in fulfilling his vow to crusade to Constantinople) and 5050 (which postpones the English Holy Land crusade until further notice).
52. Numerous mid-thirteenth-century examples are cited in Brundage, *Canon Law and the Crusader*, 133–34, 136, and Maureen Purcell, *Rapal Crusading Policy: The Chief Instruments of Papal Crusading Policy and Crusade to the Holy Land from the Loss of Jerusalem to the Pall of Acre 1244–1291* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975), 106–14.
53. In 1233 Gregory stipulated that 100 marks raised from the redemption of Holy Land crusade vows be paid to the Dominicans of Worms to compensate them for moving out of their residence in the city and allowing the bishop of Worms to have the use of it: *Registres*, no. 1209. This letter is also cited by Brundage, *Canon Law and the Crusader*, 133.
54. Adopting Innocent's formula, in *Rachel suum videns* Gregory related the power of granting the indulgence to the pope's authority over the penitential system. "And so we, trusting in the mercy of almighty God and the authority of the blessed apostles Peter and Paul, by that power of binding and loosing that God has conferred upon us, although unworthy, grant to all those submitting to the labor personally or at their own expense full forgiveness of their sins, of which they freely make oral

confession with contrite hearts, and as the reward of the just we promise them a greater share of eternal salvation”: Rome, Archivio segreto Vaticano, Registra Vaticano 17, fol. 230v.

55. *Bullarium Franciscanum*, 1: nos. 185, 187.

56. *Registres*, no. 3945.

57. Michael Lower, “Papal Authority and the Barons’ Crusade of 1239” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Cambridge, 1999), 61–72.

58. Thus Gregory diverted the unspent proceeds of Innocent III’s twentieth, imposed for the Fifth Crusade two decades before, to Peter of Brittany’s Constantinople expedition: *Registres*, no. 4107.

59. As Gregory made clear in an instruction to William of Cordelle: *Registres*, no. 4437.

60. Innocent’s complex staffing arrangements for the Fifth Crusade are reviewed in James M. Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade, 1213–1221* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986), 22–26, 92–93.

61. Christoph Maier, *Preaching the Crusades: Mendicant Friars and the Cross in the Thirteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 26–31.

Chapter 4. The Appeal to King Bela: Crusaders, Muslims, and Jews in Hungary

1. *Registres*, no. 2872 (VMH, no. 249); *Registres*, nos. 2873–76.

2. *Registres*, no. 2911.

3. As Gregory himself explained in his initial approach to Bela, the empire “could be more easily and quickly aided by the men of Hungary, since they are closer to it [i.e., than men from other parts of Christendom]”: *Registres*, no. 2872 (VMH, no. 249).

4. Pál Engel, *The Realm of St Stephen: A History of Medieval Hungary, 895–1526*, trans. Tamás Pálosfalvi, English edition ed. Andrew Ayton (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001), xiii.

5. Engel, *Realm of St Stephen*, 89.

6. James Ross Sweeney, “Hungary in the Crusades, 1169–1218,” *International History Review* 3 (1981): 479.

7. Jean Longnon, *L’empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée* (Paris: Payot, 1949), 159.

8. *Registres*, no. 657 (VMH, no. 171).

9. *Registres*, no. 774 (VMH, no. 177).

10. *Registres*, no. 1957 (VMH, no. 212).

11. *Registres*, nos. 2872 (VMH, no. 249), 2911.

12. *Registres*, no. 2872 (VMH, no. 249).

13. Gyula Kristó, *Histoire de la Hongrie médiévale: le temps des Árpáds*, trans. Chantai Philippe (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2000), 138.

14. Denis the Palatine, the erstwhile Holy Land crusader, was blinded.

15. For these measures, see Engel, *Realm of St Stephen*, 98–99; Kristó, *Hongrie médiévale*, 138–39.

16. Nora Berend, *At the Gate of Christendom: Jews, Muslims, and Pagans’ in Medieval Hungary, c. 1000–c. 1300* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 63, 67, 71–72.

17. Berend, *At the Gate of Christendom*, 155.

18. The accusations of the bishops come down to us in the papal letters that repeat them. In this paragraph, I summarize complaints mentioned in the following papal letters: *Regesta Honorii papae III*, ed. Pietro Pressutti, 2 vols. (Rome: ex typographis Vaticana, 1888–95), nos. 3301, 3296, 5611 (VMH, nos. 58–59, 127); *Registres*, no. 561 (VMH, no. 168).

19. *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, ed. Norman P. Tanner, 2 vols. (Washington, D. C.: Georgetown University Press, 1990), 1: 266 (canon 69).

20. Some Muslims and Jews did serve as revenue farmers for the crown: see Berend, *At the Gate of Christendom*, 120–27.

21. Kristó, *Hongrie médiévale*, 126.

22. Berend, *At the Gate of Christendom*, 124.

23. *Registres*, no. 561 (*VMH*, no. 168).
24. *VMH*, no. 187.
25. *VMH*, no. 187.
26. *VMH*, no. 180.
27. *Registres*, nos. 1498 (*VMH*, no. 195), 1499.
28. *VMH*, no. 198.
29. *VMH*, nos. 199, 208.
30. *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX e registris Vaticanis aliisque fontibus collegit*, ed. Aloysius L. Tautu (Rome: Typis polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950), no. 201.
31. *Registres*, nos. 2036 (*VMH*, no. 213), 2060 (*VMH*, no. 214). See also Z. J. Kosztołnyik, *Hungary in the Thirteenth Century* (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1996), 114.
32. *Registres*, no. 2757 (*VMH*, no. 236).
33. *Registres*, nos. 2760 (*VMH*, no. 239), 2756 (*VMH*, no. 235), 2733 (*VMH*, no. 232), 2759 (*VMH*, no. 238), 2755 (*VMH*, no. 234), 2758 (*VMH*, no. 237).
34. *Registres*, no. 2917 (*VMH*, no. 251).
35. *Registres*, no. 3296 (*VMH*, no. 262).
36. Kristó, *Hongrie médiévale*, 139.
37. *Registres*, no. 5000 (*VMH*, no. 313).
38. The agreement between Vatatzes and Asen called for the patriarch of Nicaea to recognize the leader of the Bulgarian church as an orthodox patriarch: see Ioannis Tarnanidis, "Byzantine-Bulgarian Ecclesiastical Relations During the Reigns of Ioannis Vatatzis and Ivan Asen II, up to the Year 1235," *Cyrrillomethodianum* 3 (1975): 52; Michael Angold, *Church and Society in Byzantium Under the Comneni, 1081–1261* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 535–.
39. Compare with Vasil Gjuselev, "Bulgarien und das Kaiserreich von Nikaia (1204–1261)," *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik* 26 (1977): 150, who sees papal pressure as a significant factor.
40. Alain Ducellier, "Albania, Serbia, and Bulgaria," in *The New Cambridge Medieval History V, 1198–1300*, ed. David Abulafia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 789.
41. *Registres*, no. 3694 (*VMH*, no. 275).
42. *Registres*, no. 3693. This letter provoked from Vatatzes a defiant response that dwelt on his sacred duty to recover Constantinople, his claims to the imperial succession, and the inconsistency of the existence of the alleged empire of the Latins with the papal hope of liberating the Holy Land. For a study and French translation of Vatatzes's reply, see Venance Grumel, "L'authenticité de la lettre de Jean Vatatzès, empereur de Nicée, au pape Grégoire IX," *Échos d'Orient* 29 (1930): 450–58.
43. *Registres*, no. 3716 (*VMH*, no. 277).
44. *Registres*, no. 3717 (*VMH*, no. 278).
45. There was occasional skirmishing over Beograd and Branicevo in northwestern Bulgaria: see John V. A. Fine, *The Late Medieval Balkans: A Critical Survey from the Late Twelfth Century to the Ottoman Conquest* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1987), 128–30.
46. Engel, *Realm of St Stephen*, 88–90.
47. *Registres*, no. 3695 (*VMH*, no. 276).
48. *Registres*, no. 3716 (*VMH*, no. 277).
49. Longnon, *L'empire latin*, 180.
50. George Acropolites, *Die Chronik*, ed. and trans. Wilhelm Blum (Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 1989), 104–5.
51. Fine, *Late Medieval Balkans*, 131.
52. *Registres*, no. 4056 (*VMH*, no. 283).
53. *Registres*, no. 4057 (*VMH*, no. 284).
54. *VMH*, no. 308 (dated 8 June 1239 by Theiner, although the dating clause of the letter clearly states 8 June 1238).
55. *VMH*, no. 308.
56. *VMH*, no. 308.
57. *Registres*, nos. 4489 (standard emblazoned with cross), 4490 (religious processions by clergy),

4484 (all Hungarian crusaders can commute vows to service against Asen; friars will preach cross; Holy Land indulgence made available), 4486 (Bulgaria to be conceded to no one but Bela), 4487 (Bela and family taken under papal protection).

58. *Registres*, no. 4482 (VMH, no. 295).

59. *Registres*, no. 4484 (VMH, no. 299).

60. *Registres*, no. 4484 (VMH, no. 299).

61. *Registres*, no. 4482 (VMH, no. 295).

62. Jean L. A. Huillard-Bréholles, "Examen des chartes de l'église Romaine contenues dans les rouleaux dits rouleaux de Cluny," *Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la bibliothèque impériale* 21 (1865): 363.

63. Fine, *Late Medieval Balkans*, 132.

64. *Registres*, no. 5123 (VMH, no. 320).

65. *Registres*, no. 5362.

66. Kristó, *Hongrie médiévale*, 139.

67. This idea is often expressed broadly. Mark Cohen, discussing twelfth-century Jewish-Christian polemic, writes, "This was the period of the Crusades, a time of increasing anti-Jewish hostility in Europe." See Mark R. Cohen, *Under Crescent and Cross: The Jews in the Middle Ages* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 142. Jeremy Cohen argues that "the very idea of holy war against the enemies of Christ" was a danger to all of European Jewry. See Jeremy Cohen, *Living Letters of the Law: Ideas of the Jew in Medieval Christianity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 150–51. Nuanced discussions of the impact of crusading on European Jewish communities can be found in *Juden und Christen zur Zeit der Kreuzzüge*, ed. Alfred Haverkamp (Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1999).

68. Berend, *At the Gate of Christendom*, 120.

69. Berend, *At the Gate of Christendom*, 156.

Chapter 5. The Appeal to Count Thibaut: Crusaders, Jews, and Heretics in Champagne

1. *Registres*, no. 2879.

2. *Registres*, no. 2909.

3. *Registres*, no. 2877.

4. The standard study of Thibaut remains Henri d'Arbois de Jubainville's *Histoire des ducs et des comtes de Champagne*, 6 vols. (Paris: A. Durand, 1863–69). For a concise summary of Thibaut's major holdings in the mid 1230s, see Jean Richard, *Saint Louis: roi d'une France féodale, soutien de la Terre sainte* (Paris: Fayard, 1983), 64.

5. The pope, for example, asked Thibaut to encourage Erard of Chacenay and "other relations of the emperor of Constantinople and the noble man Baldwin to take up the sign of the cross in aid of the empire": *Registres*, no. 2877.

6. *Récits d'un ménestrel de Reims au treizième siècle*, ed. Natalis de Wailly (Paris: Librairie Place Renouard, 1876), 176–77; Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, ed. Henry Richards Luard, 7 vols., RS 57, 3: 196.

7. William Chester Jordan, *The French Monarchy and the Jews: From Philip Augustus to the Last Capetians* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989), 98–99.

8. Second *serventois* of Hugh of La Ferté, in Paulin Paris, *Le romancero françois* (Paris: Techener, 1833), 186–89; I have adapted the French translation in Elie Berger, *Histoire de Blanche de Castille reine de France* (Paris: A. Fontemoing, 1895), 148–49.

9. *Récits d'un ménestrel de Reims*, 176–77.

10. Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 3: 196.

11. The Saint-Denis chronicle tradition has Thibaut's love for Blanche inspiring his entire poetic oeuvre: see *Les grandes chroniques de France*, ed. Jules Viard, 10 vols. (Paris: Société de l'histoire de France, 1920–32), 7: 67.

12. For this agreement, see the acts of the dukes of Burgundy catalogued by Ernest Petit, which shall be referred to by number: Ernest Petit, *Histoire des ducs de Bourgogne de la race capétienne*, 9 vols.

(Paris: A. Picard, 1885–1905), no. 1872.

13. Berger, *Blanche de Castille*, 150–52.

14. For the truce, see d'Arbois de Jubainville's catalogue of the acts of the counts of Champagne, which will be cited by number: d'Arbois de Jubainville, *Histoire des comtes de Champagne*, no. 1942.

15. This paragraph synthesizes the narratives of Richard, *Saint Louis*, 92–94; Sidney Painter, *The Scourge of the Clergy: Peter of Dreux, Duke of Brittany* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1937), 65–76; and Berger, *Blanche de Castille*, 156–92.

16. *Registres*, no. 789.

17. John of Joinville, *Histoire de Saint Louis*, ed. Natalis de Wailly (Paris: Société de l'histoire de France, 1868), 29.

18. Hans Eberhard Mayer, *The Crusades*, 2nd ed., trans. John Gillingham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 144.

19. *Registres*, no. 1242.

20. *Registres*, no. 1242.

21. *Registres*, no. 1237.

22. *Layettes du trésor des chartes*, ed. Alexandre Teulet et al., 5 vols. (Paris: H. Plon, 1863–1909), nos. 2312–14, 2322–23.

23. D'Arbois de Jubainville, *Histoire des comtes de Champagne*, 4: 265.

24. *Layettes*, no. 2312.

25. Michel Bur, *La formation du comté de Champagne* (Nancy: Université de Nancy II, 1977), 504.

26. Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, *Albrici monachi Triumfontium chronicon*, ed. Paul Scheffer-Boichorst, *MGH SS*, 23: 938.

27. *Registres*, no. 2805; d'Arbois de Jubainville, *Histoire des comtes de Champagne*, no. 2634.

28. *Registres*, no. 2806.

29. *Registres*, no. 2856.

30. *Registres*, no. 2877.

31. *Layettes*, no. 2432.

32. Edmond Martène and Ursine Durand, *Thesaurus novus anecdotorum*, 5 vols. (Paris: Lutetiae Parisiorum, 1717), 1: cols. 993–96.

33. *Layettes*, no. 2404.

34. *Thesaurus novus anecdotorum*, 1: cols. 993–96.

35. Richard, *Saint Louis*, 95–96.

36. *Registres*, nos. 3195, 3197.

37. Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, *Chronicon*, 938.

38. *Récits d'un ménestrel de Reims*, 185. This was a gesture of disdain toward Thibaut's cowardice.

39. *Registres*, nos. 3222–23; *The Apostolic See and the Jews*, ed. Shlomo Simonsohn, 8 vols. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1988–91), 1: no. 152.

40. For this case, see *Apostolic See and the Jews*, 1: nos. 100, 128, 152; *Registres*, no. 3222.

41. For this case, see *Registres*, nos. 1639–44, 3223, 4718, 6064.

42. To cite one example among many: the abbot of St. Jean-des-Vignes lifted sentences of interdict and excommunication imposed upon Thibaut by the abbot of St. Geneviève: *Registres*, no. 3222.

43. *Thesaurus novus anecdotorum*, 1: cols. 998–99.

44. For other versions of *Ad subveniendum imperio*, see *Registres*, nos. 3395, 3945–46.

45. Ms. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 5993a, fols. 44v–45r.

46. *Thesaurus novus anecdotorum*, 1: cols. 998–99.

47. Baldwin VI of Hainault, Baldwin of Courtenay's uncle, had married Maria, Thibaut's aunt, in 1186: d'Arbois de Jubainville, *Histoire des comtes de Champagne*, 4: 10.

48. If the Latins had possessed Constantinople in the twelfth century, the security of the kingdom of Jerusalem might have been enhanced, because in those days the major crusades to the Holy Land traveled overland, passing through Constantinople before crossing the Bosphorus to Asia Minor. In the thirteenth century, however, the major Holy Land expeditions, including the Barons' Crusade, traveled by sea, typically charting routes that kept them well to the south of Constantinople, thus making the city neither a useful stopping off point for these fleets nor, if the Latin empire were to fall, a profitable base

from which to launch naval attacks against them. On these routes, see John H. Pryor, *Geography, Technology, and War: Studies in the Maritime History of the Mediterranean, 649–1571* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 89, 93. Constantinople, of course, was closer than western Europe to the Holy Land, so in theory the Latin empire could respond more quickly to appeals for aid from the kingdom of Jerusalem. By Gregory's day, though, the empire was barely able to defend itself, let alone come to the assistance of others. It is very difficult to see how the Latin possession of Constantinople made any difference to the security of the crusader states in the Holy Land in the 1230s.

49. Thibaut's letter does not survive, but the reply to it does: Ms. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 5993a, fol. 78v. The writers were the leading secular and ecclesiastical authorities in the kingdom opposed to Frederick II's regency, including the patriarch of Jerusalem, the archbishop of Nazareth, the masters of the Templars and the Hospitallers, and Walter of Brienne.

50. *Registres*, no. 3632.

51. *Registres*, no. 4630.

52. *Registres*, no. 4741.

53. *Registres*, no. 4630.

54. Richard, *Saint Louis*, 193.

55. Jonathan Riley-Smith, "Crusading as an Act of Love," *History* 65 (1980).

56. Thibaut was still scrambling to accumulate vow redemption pledges as he traveled south to Marseille in July 1239: the abbots of Chizé and Val-Secret appointed Simon, a member of the Trinitarian Order and Thibaut's chaplain, "to collect, at Marseille, or wherever crusaders might be found..., the vow redemptions of crusaders of the lands of the said king [Thibaut] and of his fiefs": Ms. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 5993a, fol. 275r.

57. The pope's response to Thibaut's petition is given in *Registres*, no. 4601.

58. Solomon Grayzel, *The Church and the Jews in the XIIIth Century*, rev. ed. (New York: Hermon Press, 1966), no. 9. A recent English translation of this document can be found in Theodore Evergates, *Feudal Society in Medieval France: Documents from the County of Champagne* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), no. 19.

59. On the propensity of *captiones* to generate surpluses, see Joseph Shatzmiller, *Shylock Reconsidered: Jews, Moneylending, and Medieval Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 58–61.

60. *Apostolic See and the Jews*, 1: no. 157.

61. *Registres*, no. 4601.

62. Major discussions of Robert le Bougre and the burning at Mont-Aimé include Jules Frederichs, *Robert le Bougre, premier inquisiteur général en France* (Gand: Clemm, 1892); Emile Chenon, *L'hérésie à la Charité-sur-Loire et les débuts de l'Inquisition monastique dans la France du nord au XIIIe siècle* (Paris: Librairie de la société du recueil Sirey, 1917); Charles H. Haskins, "Robert le Bougre and the Beginnings of the Inquisition in Northern France," in Charles H. Haskins, *Studies in Medieval Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1929), 193–244; Georges Despy, "Les débuts de l'Inquisition dans les anciens Pays-Bas au XIIIe siècle," *Problèmes d'histoire du Christianisme* 10 (1980): 71–104; and Lothar Kolmer, "Ad Terrorem Multorum. Die Anfänge der Inquisition in Frankreich," in *Die Anfänge der Inquisition im Mittelalter: mit einem Ausblick auf das 20 Jahrhundert und einem Beitrag über religiöse Intoleranz im nichtchristlichen Bereich*, ed. Peter Segl (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 1993), 77–102. For more on this literature and Thibaut's role in the burning, see Michael Lower, "The Burning at Mont-Aimé: Thibaut of Champagne's Preparations for the Barons' Crusade of 1239," *Journal of Medieval History* 29 (2003): 95–108.

63. *Registres*, no. 1253.

64. Kolmer, "Ad Terrorem Multorum," 91–92.

65. *Registres*, nos. 1763–64.

66. *Bullarium Ordinis Praedicatorum*, ed. Thomas Ripoll, 7 vols. (Rome: Ex typographia Hieronymi Mainardi, 1729–39), nos. 137–39.

67. For these proceedings see Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, *Chronicon*, 936–37; Philip Mouskes, *Chronique rimée de Philippe Mouskes*, ed. [Frédéric] de Reiffenberg, 2 vols. (Brussels: Académie royale des sciences, des lettres et des beaux-arts de Belgique, 1836–38), 2: 608–9, 611; *Extraits de la chronique attribuée à Baudouin d'Avesnes*, in *RHGF*, 21: 166; *Notae S. Amati Duacenses*, in *MGH SS*, 24: 30.

68. Lower, "Burning at Mont-Aimé," 102.

69. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS lat. 5993a, fol. 412. The letter is published in Haskins, "Robert le Bougre," 215–16 n. 3.

70. Henri Maisonneuve, *Etudes sur les origines de l'Inquisition*, 2nd ed. (Paris: J. Vrin, 1960), 156–57.

71. For example title XC "On punishing heretics and unbelievers" from the *Etablissements de Saint Louis*: "If someone is suspected of heresy, the judge should arrest him and send him to the bishop; and if he is convicted, he should be burned; and all his personal property goes to the baron." See *The Etablissements de Saint Louis: Thirteenth-Century Law Texts from Tours, Orléans, and Paris*, ed. and trans. F. R. P. Akehurst (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 59.

72. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS lat. 5993a, fol. 436; Haskins, "Robert le Bougre," 216.

73. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS lat. 5993a, fol. 412.

74. Alexander Patschovsky, "Zur Ketzerverfolgung Konrads von Marburg," *Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters* 37 (1981): 641–51.

75. Maurice Grisart, "Les Cathares dans le nord de la France," *Revue du Nord* 49 (1967): 512; Yves Dossat, "L'hérésie en Champagne aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles," *Mémoires de la société d'agriculture, commerce, sciences et arts du département de la Marne* 84 (1969): 68–70; Odile François, *Le Mont-Aimé: étude historique et archéologique sur le Mont Aimé*, 2nd ed., revised and expanded by Gilbert Chérest (Châlons-sur-Marne: Union républicaine, 1976), 15.

76. Stephen of Bourbon, *Anecdotes historiques*, ed. A. Lecoy de la Marche (Paris: Librairie Renouard, 1877), 415–

77. Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, *Chronicon*, 944–45.

78. See, for example, *Registres*, nos. 1909, 1914, 1916–19, 4184–92. For discussion of these cases, see Albert C. Shannon, *The Popes and Heresy in the Thirteenth Century* (Villanova, Pa.: Augustinian Press, 1949), 100–5.

79. Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, *Chronicon*, 944.

80. Philip Mouskes, *Chronique rimée*, 2: 613.

81. Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, *Chronicon*, 936; *Annales Erphordenses Fratrum Praedicatorum*, in *Monumenta Erphesfurtensia saec. XII XIII XIV*, ed. Oswald Holder-Egger (Hannover and Leipzig: Impensis bibliopolii Hahniani, 1899), 96.

82. *Epistola ecclesiae Leodiensis ad Lucum papam II*, in *Veterum scriptorum et monumentorum historicum, moralium amplissima collectio*, ed. Edmond Martène and Ursine Durand, 9 vols. (Paris: P. de Bats, 1724–33), 1: 776–78.

83. Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, *Chronicon*, 945. The story also appears in Stephen of Bourbon, *Anecdotes historiques*, 415.

84. *Thesaurus novus anecdotorum*, 1: cols. 998–99.

85. Richard Kieckhefer emphasizes that inquisitorial proceedings lacked institutional maturity in the 1230s: Richard Kieckhefer, "The Office of Inquisition and Medieval Heresy: The Transition from Personal to Institutional Jurisdiction," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 46 (1995): 36–61.

86. See, for example, *Notae S. Amati Duacenses*, 30; *Extraits de la chronique attribuée à Baudoin d'Avesnes*, 166; *Ex epitome Andreae Silvii prioris Marchianensis de gestis et successionem regum Francorum*, in *RHGF*, 18: 559.

87. *Registres*, no. 4891.

88. The religious houses were the monasteries of Reclus, Châtrices, Rebais, and Jouy, and the Hôtel-Dieu of Meaux: *Layettes*, nos. 2812–17, 2831. The secular lord was Isabella of Braiselve: *Layettes*, nos. 2827–28.

89. Richard, *Saint Louis*, 62–74.

90. D'Arbois de Jubainville, *Histoire des comtes de Champagne*, nos. 2444 (a village from the squire of Maignil: 300 l.), 2486 (40 l. in annual rent on the fairs of Champagne from Peter of Marly: 300 l.), 2514 (all the land William Prunelle, knight, held in fief from Thibaut: 200 l.); Ms. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, nouv.acqu.lat.2454, fol. 542r (a three-year pledge on all the land held in fief from Thibaut by William of Vergy, seneschal of Burgundy).

91. An important discussion of these poems is William Chester Jordan, "The Representation of the Crusades in the Songs Attributed to Thibaud, Count Palatine of Champagne," *Journal of Medieval History* 25 (1999): 27–34.

92. "Dame, ensi est qu'il m'en couvient aler": *The Lyrics of Thibaut de Champagne*, ed. and trans.

Kathleen J. Brahney (New York: Garland Publishing, 1989), no. 54.

93. For the definition of *chansons de croisade*, a retrospective genre classification, as songs of polemic and exhortation, see Jordan, "Representation of the Crusades," 29, n. 13; and Pierre Bec, *La lyrique française au moyen âge (XIIe-XIIIe siècles)*, 2 vols. (Paris: A. and J. Picard, 1977), 1: 150–58. Although all three poems under discussion here bear directly on the crusade, it should be noted that two have been classified as *chansons de croisade* (nos. 53 and 55 in the Brahney edition), while the third (no. 56) has been placed in the category of *sirventes*, a contemporary classification that encompassed polemical songs on serious subjects.

94. *Lyrics of Thibaut de Champagne*, no. 53, stanza I, line 2; stanza II, lines 16–17. All English translations are Brahney's unless otherwise noted.

95. *Lyrics of Thibaut de Champagne*, no. 53, stanza I, line 4; stanza III, line 21.

96. *Lyrics of Thibaut de Champagne*, no. 53, stanza IV, lines 27–28.

97. *Lyrics of Thibaut de Champagne*, no. 55, stanza I, lines 1–4.

98. *Lyrics of Thibaut de Champagne*, no. 55, stanza II, lines 10–13.

99. *Lyrics of Thibaut de Champagne*, no. 56, stanza III, lines 21–24.

100. *Lyrics of Thibaut de Champagne*, no. 56, stanza V, lines 41–48.

101. *Registres*, nos. 4718, 6064.

102. *Lyrics of Thibaut de Champagne*, no. 53, stanza I, lines 1–4. Brahney translates Thibaut's specific "croiz d'Outremer" with the general phrase "the Crusade cross."

Chapter 6. The Appeal to Peter of Brittany: Crusaders and Jews in Western France

1. *Registres*, nos. 3363–66.

2. Peter had been guardian of Brittany for John since the death of Alice of Brittany in 1221. See Sidney Painter, *The Scourge of the Clergy: Peter of Dreux, Duke of Brittany* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1937), 28, 99.

3. *Registres*, no. 2813.

4. *Registres*, no. 3366.

5. In June 1234 Peter expelled the bishop of Saint-Malo from his diocese. In November 1234 Peter offered to meet with representatives of the Breton bishops in Rome to settle the discord between him and them. See *Registres*, nos. 1975, 2178.

6. For John of Soissons, see *Registres*, no. 4315 and Philip Mouskes, *Chronique rimée de Philippe Mouskes*, ed. [Frederic] de Reiffenberg, 2 vols. (Brussels: Académie royale des sciences, des lettres et des beaux-arts de Belgique, 1836–38), 2: 630; for John of Mâcon, see *Registres*, no. 4204. For Peter's recruitment plans, see *Registres*, no. 4027.

7. *Registres*, no. 4027.

8. Hyacinthe Morice, *Memoires pour servir de preuves à l'histoire ecclesiastique et civile de Bretagne*, 3 vols. (Paris: C. Osmont, 1742–46), 1: col. m.

9. The literature on the violence in western France in 1236 is surprisingly sparse. See Léon Brunschvicg, "Les juifs de Nantes et du pays nantais," *Revue des études juives* 14 (1887): 84–85, and "Les juifs d'Angers et du pays angevin," *Revue des études juives* 29 (1894): 233–35; Arthur de la Borderie, *Histoire de Bretagne*, 6 vols. (Rennes and Paris: Plihon and Hommay, 1896–1914), 3: 337–38; Gérard Nahon, "Les ordonnances de Saint Louis sur les juifs," *Nouveaux cahiers* 6 (1970): 23; Robert Chazan, *Medieval Jewry in Northern France: A Political and Social History* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 135; and William Chester Jordan, *The French Monarchy and the Jews: From Philip Augustus to the Last Capetians* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989), 71–72.

10. Solomon Grayzel, *The Church and the Jews in the XIIIth Century*, rev. ed. (New York: Hermon Press, 1966), 327.

11. Hyam Maccoby, *Judaism on Trial: Jewish-Christian Disputations in the Middle Ages* (East Brunswick, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1982), 161.

12. Solomon ibn Verga, *La Vara de Yehuda*, introduction, Spanish translation, and notes by María José Cano (Barcelona: Riopiedras Ediciones, 1991), 269.

13. Grayzel, *Church and the Jews*, nos. 87–88. These letters are also printed in *The Apostolic See and the Jews*, ed. Shlomo Simonsohn, 8 vols. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1988–91), nos. 154–55. References will be to Grayzel's edition, and all English translations of these letters in the pages that follow, unless otherwise noted, are Grayzel's.

14. Grayzel, *Church and the Jews*, no. 87.

15. *Apostolic See and the Jews*, nos. 44, 144.

16. Grayzel, *Church and the Jews*, no. 87.

17. Grayzel, *Church and the Jews*, 327.

18. Grayzel, *Church and the Jews*, no. 88.

19. Maurice P. Sheehy, *Pontificia Hibernica: Medieval Papal Chancery Documents Concerning Ireland, 640–1261*, 2 vols. (Dublin: M.H. Gill, 1962–65), no. 214; *Registres*, nos. 2203–10; *Bullarium Franciscanum*, ed. Johannes H. Sbaralea, 4 vols. (Rome: Typis sacrae congregationis de propaganda fide, 1759–68), no. 146; *Bullarium Ordinis Praedicatorum*, ed. Thomas Ripoll, 7 vols. (Rome: Ex typographia Hieronymi Mainardi, 1729–39), no. 112.

20. Grayzel, *Church and the Jews*, no. 87.

21. Grayzel, *Church and the Jews*, no. 87.

22. Grayzel, *Church and the Jews*, no. 88.

23. Grayzel, *Church and the Jews*, no. 87.

24. *Registres*, no. 3945.

25. *Registres*, nos. 4025–26, 4265.

26. *Registres*, no. 3945.

27. *Registres*, no. 4527.

28. *Registres*, no. 3945.

29. This was the sanction Gregory had threatened to impose upon those who set out in advance of the general passage to the Holy Land in his letter of 28 September 1235: *Epistolae selectae saeculi XIII e regestis pontificum Romanorum*, ed. Karl Rodenberg, *Monumenta Germaniae historica*, 3 vols. (Berlin: Weidmann, 1883–94), 1: no. 663.

30. *Registres*, no. 4107.

31. *Registres*, no. 4204.

32. *Registres*, no. 3945.

33. The Holy Land crusader Guy of Rochefort, for example, appointed to act as his *executores* the laymen Reginald of La Pérate and A. of Bois-Saint-Genis. They petitioned the curia on Guy's behalf about 740 marks they claimed he was owed from crusade revenues collected in the dioceses of Saintes and Poitiers: *Registres*, no. 5130.

34. In April 1238 William of Cordelle accused some *executores* in France of coercing crusaders they considered unsuitable for combat into redeeming their vows: *Registres*, no. 4222.

35. J. F. Niermeyer and C. Van De Kieft, *Mediae Latinitatis lexicon minus*, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2002), article: Quaestuarii; Charles du Cange, *Glossarium mediae et infimae Latinitatis*, rev. ed. Léopold Favre, 10 vols. (Niort: L. Favre, 1886), article: Quaestionarius.

36. This description of the activities of *questuarii* is based on a papal letter of 1235 warning the bishop of Hildesheim, who was preaching the Holy Land crusade in the province of Mainz, about the dangers they posed to "the business of the cross": *Epistolae saeculi*, 1: no. 664.

37. *Registres*, no. 3945.

38. *Registres*, no. 4533.

39. On this episode, see John R. Maddicott, *Simon de Montfort* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 24–25.

40. *Registres*, no. 4315.

41. Before departing for Acre John sold the county of Mâcon to Louis IX for 10,000 *l.*: *Layettes du trésor des chartes*, ed. Alexandre Teulet et al., 5 vols. (Paris: H. Plon, 1863–1909), no. 2776. For John's death, see *Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr, de 1229 à 1261, dite du manuscrit de Rothelin*, in *RHC Occ*, 2: 531.

42. *Registres*, no. 5305.

43. *Registres*, no. 4265.

44. When in 1237 Peter returned to the title he had enjoyed at the outset of his career, Peter, knight of

Braine, he had added to his landed wealth only the fortresses of Brie-Comte-Robert, Fère-en-Tardenois, and Champtoceaux, as well as the lordship of Macheoul, which he intended to leave to an illegitimate son: Painter, *Scourge of the Clergy*, 2, 28, 65, 102.

45. Painter, *Scourge of the Clergy*, 107.

46. *La très ancienne coutume de Bretagne*, ed. Marcel Planiol (Paris: Champion-Slatkine, 1984), 329–30.

47. In a charter of 1233, Thomas, son of Derrien, stated that he had alienated two-thirds of a tithe to the abbey of Lan vaux in order to “liberate myself from the Jews.” See Barthélémy A. Pocquet du Haut-Jussé, *Les papes et les ducs de Bretagne: essai sur les rapports du saint-siège avec un état*, 2 vols. (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1928), 1: 118. In a charter of 19 March 1235, Geoffrey, prior of Donge, was quit of all debts he owed to Creisson and Bonostru, Jews of Guérande: La Borderie, *Histoire de Bretagne*, 3: 337.

48. La Borderie, *Histoire de Bretagne*, 3: 337.

49. Evidence for careful regulation of ducal Jews appears in the assize itself, where Duke John states that his court had sold lands and pledges of Christian debtors that had fallen into his possession in order, we may assume, to compensate ducal Jews for debts they had not been able to collect: *Coutume de Bretagne*, 329. In addition, Peter of Brittany seems to have employed a Jew in his financial administration, if the testimony of a witness who supported a claim for damages the bishop of Dol made against Peter in 1235 is to be believed. See *Testes episcopi de Dolo contra comitem super dampnis factis predecessori suo et hominibus suis*, in Arthur de la Borderie, *Nouveau recueil d'actes inédits des ducs et princes de Bretagne* (Rennes: E. Prost, 1902), 37. For discussion of this testimony, see Edmond Durtelle de Saint-Saveur, *Histoire de Bretagne: des origines à nos jours*, 2 vols. (Rennes: Plihon, 1935), 1: 234, n. 2, and Jordan, *French Monarchy and the Jews*, 71.

50. Robin Mundill, however, has attempted to question the centrality given to financial considerations in explanations of the expulsion of 1290: Robin R. Mundill, *England's Jewish Solution: Experiment and Expulsion, 1262–1290* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 251–60.

51. A point stressed by Jordan, *French Monarchy and the Jews*, 71–72.

52. Jordan, *French Monarchy and the Jews*, 69.

53. Pocquet du Haut-Jussé, *Les papes et les ducs de Bretagne*, 1: 133.

54. These financial issues were, first, that of “infeudated tithes” (i.e. tithes that had fallen into the hands of laypeople), and second, that of *tierçage*, the church's claim on one-third of the goods of a deceased person. See *Registres*, no. 4878.

55. This was clause six: “We swear to observe this assize so decreed in good faith in perpetuity; and if ever it happens that we act contrary to this ordinance, the bishops of Brittany, collectively or individually, may excommunicate us and place our lands in their diocese under interdict, notwithstanding any privilege obtained or to be obtained”: *Coutume de Bretagne*, 330.

56. For example, we know that two of the most prominent Breton magnates who went on the crusade, Ralph of Fougères and Andrew of Vitry, both exercised lordship over Jews. A charter issued by Duke John in March 1239 granted Ralph the same jurisdiction over his Jews that Andrew was accustomed to exercise over his: *Le cartulaire de la seigneurie de Fougères*, ed. Jacques Auberge (Rennes: Oberthur, 1913), no. 29.

57. In particular, Peter of Brittany was the obvious beneficiary of clause five of the assize, which nullified debts contracted in Brittany with Jews who lived in his lands: *Coutume de Bretagne*, 330.

58. *Querimoniae Turonum, Pictavorum, et Santonum*, in *RHGF*, 24: nos. 171 (Ernaud of Botine, a knight, accused of killing a male Jew), 1410 (John of Menard, accused of beating a male Jew), 1429 (Bartholomew of Maupetit, accused of beating a female Jew), 1575 (John “the Good,” accused of having “risen up” against the Jews), 1588 (Americus François, accused of attacking a female Jew while she was bathing), 1637 (the husband of Petronilla Loquete, a crusader, accused of having killed “in the killing of the Jews”).

Chapter 7. The Appeal to Earl Richard: Crusaders and Jews in England

1. Christopher Tyerman argues that papal crusade policy in the late 1230s must have appeared “downright perverse” to English nobles who wanted to crusade to the Holy Land: Christopher Tyerman, *England and the Crusades, 1095–1588* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 106.

2. Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, ed. Henry Richards Luard, 7 vols., RS 57, 3: 481.
3. Simon Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade, 1216–1307* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 10–16; Tyerman, *England and the Crusades*, 4.
4. For the bishops' crusade, see Nicholas Vincent, *Peter des Roches: An Alien in English Politics, 1205–1238* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 229–58.
5. Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade*, 11.
6. Hugh Mackenzie, "The Anti-Foreign Movement in England," in *Anniversary Essays in Medieval History by Students of Charles Homer Haskins*, ed. Charles H. Taylor and John L. La Monte (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1929), 183; Michael T. Clanchy, *England and Its Rulers, 1066–1272*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 175.
7. Clanchy, *England and Its Rulers*, 175; Vincent, *Peter des Roches*, 303.
8. Roger of Wendover, *Chronica sive flores historiarum*, ed. Henry O. Cox, 5 vols. (London: Sumptibus societatis, 1841–44), 4: 228.
9. Mackenzie, "Anti-Foreign Movement," 194–96; Vincent, *Peter des Roches*, 303–4; Clanchy, *England and Its Rulers*, 177.
10. Mackenzie, "Anti-Foreign Movement," 198.
11. Roger of Wendover, *Flores historiarum*, 4: 229.
12. Vincent, *Peter des Roches*, 304; Clanchy, *England and Its Rulers*, 177.
13. Mackenzie, "Anti-Foreign Movement," 200.
14. English translation by John A. Giles, *Matthew Paris's English History*, 3 vols. (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1852–54), 1: 232. For the passage in Latin, see Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 3: 611.
15. Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 4: 47.
16. William E. Lunt, *Financial Relations of the Papacy with England to 1327* (Cambridge, Mass.: Medieval Academy of America, 1939), 190–91.
17. For example, Matthew's discussion of the preaching of the Holy Land crusade in England in 1235 somehow winds its way back to the aid of 1228: Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 3: 374.
18. *Councils and Synods with Other Documents Relating to the English Church*, ed. Frederick Maurice Powicke and Christopher R. Cheney, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964–81), 2: 289.
19. *Registres*, no. 3944.
20. Vincent, *Peter des Roches*, 468.
21. Vincent, *Peter des Roches*, 368.
22. *Registres*, no. 3944.
23. *Registres*, no. 3946.
24. For the order to the archbishop of Bordeaux, see *Registres*, no. 3937.
25. *Registres*, no. 3528.
26. Rome, Archivio segreto Vaticano, Registra Vaticano 18, fol. 36or. (*Registres*, no. 4094).
27. Frederick Maurice Powicke, *The Thirteenth Century, 1216–1307* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953), 97, 586–87, 397.
28. Robert C. Stacey, *Politics, Policy, and Finance under Henry III, 1216–45* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 99–103.
29. In December 1237 the emperor won his great victory over the Lombards at Cortenuova.
30. Henry's closeness to the legate at this time is stressed by Stacey, *Politics, Policy, and Finance*, 136–38.
31. Stacey, *Politics, Policy, and Finance*, 95.
32. *Historia diplomatica Frederici secundi*, ed. Jean L. A. Huillard-Bréholles, 6 vols. (Paris: H. Plon, 1852–61), 5: 164.
33. *Registres*, no. 4268.
34. *Registres*, nos. 4273–74 (papal protection of goods and family), 4276 (confirmation of King Henry's concession that, if Richard dies, the income from his lands until the following Michaelmas will be spent on pious purposes for the remedy of his soul), 4277 (Richard's clerks and chaplains may celebrate the divine office even in places under interdict), 4278 (no sentence of interdict or excommunication may be pronounced upon Richard, his family, or his property without manifest cause), 4279 (four of Richard's clerks allowed to hold multiple benefices).

35. *Registres*, nos. 4268–72. The text states that Richard should be granted “legacies in aid of the Holy Land, and what can be had from the twentieth and the thirtieth or from the redemption of vows in the said kingdom.” While the twentieth is certainly Innocent III’s levy of 1215 for the Fifth Crusade, the thirtieth is harder to identify. William Lunt and Simon Lloyd assert that it was the clerical thirtieth that Gregory requested from the English clergy on behalf of the Latin empire, but the request for this tax was not made until November 1238, some seven months after the grant to Richard of Cornwall in question here. See Lunt, *Financial Relations*, 195; Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade*, 149. Instead the thirtieth may derive from Gregory’s request for an indeterminate aid from English prelates in 1237: *Registres*, no. 3946.

36. For the revolt, see Noël Denholm-Young, *Richard of Cornwall* (New York: William Salloch, 1947), 34–37; but see also the important revisionist account of Stacey, *Politics, Policy, and Finance*, 118–31.

37. Noël Denholm-Young, “The Taper Constitution’ Attributed to 1244,” *English Historical Review* 58 (1943): 418.

38. *Calendar of the Patent Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office, 1232–1307*, 8 vols. (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1898–1908), 3: 173; Stacey, *Politics, Policy, and Finance*, 123.

39. *Patent Rolls*, 3: 209.

40. *Patent Rolls*, 3: 222.

41. *Close Rolls of the Reign of Henry III Preserved in the Public Record Office, 1227–72*, 14 vols. (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1902–38), 4: 58; Denholm-Young, *Richard of Cornwall*, 39, n. 6.

42. *Registres*, no. 4608.

43. *Registres*, nos. 4605–7.

44. *Registres*, no. 4608.

45. Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 3: 485–86, 491.

46. *Registra Vaticano* 19, fol. 65r. (*Registres*, no. 4672), *Registres*, nos. 4673–87.

47. *Registra Vaticano* 19, fol. 65r. (*Registres*, no. 4672).

48. As reported in the papal reply to the king’s petition: *Registres*, no. 4965.

49. Giles, *Matthew Paris’s English History*, 1: 239; Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 3: 620.

50. *Registres*, nos. 4955–61 (privileges), 4965 (funding).

51. Gregory even augmented the original grant by giving the legate permission to compel unsuitable crusaders to redeem their vows, a power Cardinal Otto had not had at his disposal before: *Registres*, no. 4965. Cardinal Otto advertised his new authority in a circular letter of 15 February 1240 to English bishops and archdeacons: see Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 4: 6–7.

52. *Registres*, nos. 5092–5121.

53. Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 4: 4.

54. Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 4: 4–5.

55. *Registres*, no. 5050.

56. When the chancery registered a letter sent to Canterbury and York, it usually made a full copy of the version sent to Canterbury, then simply noted in the next register entry that a letter had been written “in the same fashion” (*in eundem modum*) to York. This practice reflected Canterbury’s precedence over York in the ecclesiastical hierarchy. It is unlikely, therefore, that a copy of this letter was sent to Canterbury but simply not registered.

57. David Abulafia, *Frederick II: A Medieval Emperor* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 342–43.

58. Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 4: 71; Tyerman, *England and the Crusades*, 104. The English chronicler Thomas Wykes says that Richard went to the East with “pecuniam innumerabilem”: *Chronicon vulgo dictum chronicon Thomae Wykes (A.D. 1066–1289)*, in *Annales monastici*, ed. Henry Richards Luard, 5 vols., RS 36, 4: 86.

59. For the collection of the grant, see Lunt, *Financial Relations*, 430–34.

60. For what follows, see John R. Maddicott, *Simon de Montfort* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 22–30.

61. Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 4: 7.

62. Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade*, 181.

63. *A Northamptonshire Miscellany*, ed. Edmund King (Northampton: Northamptonshire Record

Society, 1983), 45; Tyerman, *England and the Crusades*, 200, 212; Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade*, 189.

64. Tyerman, *England and the Crusades*, 200.

65. *Charters of Norwich Cathedral Priory*, ed. Barbara Dodwell, 2 vols. (London: Pipe Roll Society, 1974–85), 2: no. 140.

66. *Patent Rolls*, 3: 231.

67. *Calendar of the Liberate Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office, 1226–72*, 6 vols. (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1917–64), 1: 471, 384, 471.

68. *Patent Rolls*, 3: 220; *Liberate Rolls*, 1: 380, 402, 407.

69. Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 3: 624.

70. *Liberate Rolls*, 1: 444, 449, 461, 464.

71. *Liberate Rolls*, 1: 378.

72. For example, Robert of Musters, Roland of Bray, Gerald of Peaumes, Giles of Clifford: *Liberate Rolls*, 1: 379, 384, 463, 2: 29.

73. *Liberate Rolls*, 2: 31.

74. *Liberate Rolls*, 1: 400, 384.

75. *Cartularium monasterii de Rameseia*, ed. William H. Hart and Ponsonby A. Lyons, 3 vols., RS 79, 1: no. 34; Tyerman, *England and the Crusades*, 216.

76. *Patent Rolls*, 3: 222.

77. *Registres*, no. 4744.

78. *The Beauchamp Cartulary Charters 1100–1268*, ed. Emma Mason (London: The Pipe Roll Society, 1980), nos. 382–83; Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade*, 160.

79. Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade*, 173.

80. For John of Neville's preparations, see Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade*, 173 (marriage), Appendix 5 n. 1 (forest bailiwick), and Appendix 5 (negotiations at Northampton).

81. *Close Rolls*, 3: 363–64, 367; Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 3: 368–69.

82. Robert Grosseteste, *Roberti Grosseteste episcopi quondam Lincolniensis epistolae*, ed. Henry Richards Luard, RS 25, 114–15.

83. *Annales prioratus de Dunstaplia*, in *Annales monastici*, 3: 144; Tyerman, *England and the Crusades*, 226–27.

84. *Close Rolls*, 4: 95; Tyerman, *England and the Crusades*, 225.

85. *Registres*, no. 4507.

86. *Northamptonshire Miscellany*, 45; Tyerman, *England and the Crusades*, 200, 212; Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade*, 189.

87. Solomon Grayzel, *The Church and the Jews in the XIIIth Century*, rev. ed. (New York: Hermon Press, 1966), no. 89 (*The Apostolic See and the Jews*, ed. Shlomo Simonsohn, 8 vols. [Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1988–91], no. 156).

88. *Close Rolls*, 4: 489.

89. Cecil Roth, *A History of the Jews in England*, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964), 6; John A. Watt, "The English Episcopate, the State, and the Jews: The Evidence of the Thirteenth-Century Conciliar Decrees," *Thirteenth-Century England II: Proceedings of the Newcastle upon Tyne Conference*, ed. Peter R. Coss and Simon D. Lloyd (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1987), 137–47; John A. Watt, "The Jews, the Law, and the Church: The Concept of Jewish Serfdom in Thirteenth-Century England," *Studies in Church History*, subsidia 9 (1991): 153–72; Zefira E. Rokeah, "The State, the Church, and the Jews in Medieval England," *Antisemitism Through the Ages*, ed. Shmuel Almog, trans. Nathan H. Reisner (New York: Pergamon Press, 1988), 100–4; Robin R. Mundill, *England's Jewish Solution: Experiment and Expulsion, 1262–1200* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 54–58.

90. R. Barrie Dobson, *The Jews of York and the Massacre of March 1190* (Borthwick Papers 45, York: University of York, 1974), 17–37.

91. For a succinct account of these reforms, see Roth, *History of the Jews*, 28–32.

92. Stacey, *Politics, Policy, and Finance*, 143–47.

93. *Close Rolls*, 4: 312, 334; Robert C. Stacey, "1240–60: A Watershed in Anglo-Jewish Relations?" *Historical Research* 61 (1988): 136–39.

94. *Patent Rolls*, 3: 173. In 1240, Richard also received 1000 marks from the third on chattels: *Close Rolls*, 4: 197.
95. *Patent Rolls*, 3: 217.
96. Lunt, *Financial Relations*, 196.
97. Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 4: 43–44.
98. Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 4: 44; *Liberate Rolls*, 1: 473.
99. According to Matthew Paris, there was some debate over which route to take: Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 4: 56. For the embarkation date, see *Annales Dunstaplia*, 151; Denholm-Young, *Richard of Cornwall*, 41.
100. Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 4: 7,44; Maddicott, *Simon de Montfort*, 29.
101. Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 4: 89.
102. Giles, *Matthew Paris's English History*, 239; Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 3: 620.

Chapter 8. The Constantinople Crusade

1. Philip Mouskes, *Chronique rimée de Philippe Mouskes*, ed. [Frédéric] de Reiffenberg, 2 vols. (Brussels: Academie royale des sciences, des lettres et des beaux-arts de Belgique, 1836–38), 2: 621.
2. Matthew Paris says that Baldwin “departed to the western countries to ask advice and assistance from the Roman Church.” English translation by John A. Giles, *Matthew Paris's English History*, 3 vols. (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1852–54), 1: 48. For the passage in Latin, see Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, ed. Henry Richards Luard, 7 vols., *RS* 57, 3: 386.
3. *Registres*, no. 3363.
4. *Registres*, nos. 3395, 3397.
5. For Geoffrey of Courlon, the visit to Paris was the key element of Baldwin’s western trip, not the visit to Rome: see Geoffrey of Courlon, *Chronique de l’abbaye de Saint-Pierre-le-Vif*, ed. G. Juilliot (Sens: C. Duchemin, 1876), 514.
6. “enfantin en ses paroles”: *Récits d’un ménestrel de Reims au treizième siècle*, ed. Natalis de Wailly (Paris: Librairie Place Renouard, 1876), 225.
7. Philip Mouskes, *Chronique rimée*, 2: 622–23; Jean Longnon, *L’empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée* (Paris: Payot, 1949), 179; Jean Richard, *Saint Louis: roi d’une France féodale, soutien de la Terre sainte* (Paris: Fayard, 1983), 164–65.
8. Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, *Albrici monachi Triumfontium chronicon*, ed. Paul Scheffer-Boichorst, *MGH SS*, 23: 947.
9. John was the nephew of Conon of Béthune, the Fourth Crusader who for a time served as regent of the empire.
10. *Registres*, nos. 3938, 3937, 3944.
11. Philip Mouskes, *Chronique rimée*, 2: 626, 642; Longnon, *L’empire latin*, 179.
12. Philip Mouskes, *Chronique rimée*, 2: 626–33.
13. *Epistolae selectae saeculi XIII e regestis pontificum Romanorum*, ed. Karl Rodenberg, *Monumenta Germaniae historica*, 3 vols. (Berlin: Weidmann, 1883–94), 1: nos. 724 (12 March 1238) and 725 (17 March 1238). Both letters chastise the emperor for refusing the Constantinople crusaders free and secure transit through his lands.
14. Philip Mouskes, *Chronique rimée*, 2: 661.
15. *Registres*, no. 4219.
16. In 1233, in fact: Andrew Dandolo, *Andreae Danduli ducis Venetiarum chronica per extensum descripta aa. 46–1280*, ed. Ester Pastorello, *Rerum Italicarum scriptores, Nova series*, ed. Giosuè Carducci et al., 34 vols. to date (Bologna: N. Zanichelli, 1900–present), 12.1: 295.
17. *Registres*, nos. 4608, 4605–21, 4672–87.
18. *Registres*, no. 5305.
19. *Registres*, nos. 5296, 5305.
20. *Registres*, no. 4641.
21. *Registres*, nos. 3903, 3936, 3941, 4206, 4209–17, 4635, 5075, 4631, 4633.
22. *Registres*, nos. 4268–72 (Richard of Cornwall), 4630 (Thibaut of Champagne), 3945, 4025–26,

4265 (Peter of Brittany), 3528 (Henry of Trubleville), 3916, 4204 (Hugh of Burgundy), 4105 (Henry of Bar), 3923 (Amalric of Montfort), 4315 (John of Soissons), 4204 (John of Mâcon), 4585 (bishop of Nevers).

23. *Registres*, no. 4519–22.

24. *Registres*, no. 4965; Ms. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 5993a, fol. 275r.

25. *Registres*, no. 4315 (John of Soissons); John of Mâcon died in the course of the Barons' Crusade: *Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr, de 1229 à 1261, dite du manuscrit de Rothelin*, in *RHC Occ*, 2: 531.

26. *Registres*, no. 5305.

27. The archbishop of Reims was Henry of Dreux, the count of Bar's brother-in-law: see the genealogical chart, "Un puissant lignage: les Dreux," in Richard, *Saint Louis*, 614.

28. *Registres*, nos. 3903, 3941.

29. *Registres*, nos. 4662–67.

30. There seems to be no further mention of the French thirtieth for the Latin empire after the initial request for it. Therefore, the argument that the tax was not paid must be from silence. However, it is improbable that, if the tax were paid, no reference to its collection would have been made in the many subsequent papal letters concerning Baldwin's funding package, in the contemporary chroniclers who took an interest in his affairs, like Philip Mouskes, or in the works of close followers of papal taxation, like Matthew Paris.

31. Of the approximately 1,500,000 *l.t.* the French crown is estimated to have spent on Louis's first crusade, 950,000 *l.t.* derived from ecclesiastical levies: William Chester Jordan, *Louis IX and the Challenge of the Crusade: A Study in Rulership* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), 80.

32. Philip Mouskes, *Chronique rimée*, 2: 662.

33. *Itinera, dona et hernesia anno domini M. CC. XXIX, inter ascensionem et omnes sanctos*, in *RHGF*, 22: 589, 611; Mouskes, *Chronique rimée*, 2: 663.

34. *Itinera, dona et hernesia*, 593–94.

35. Previous estimates of the strength of Baldwin's crusade do not pay sufficient attention to his fundraising difficulties. See, for example, Longnon, *L'empire latin*, 181; Richard, *Saint Louis*, 165; John V. A. Fine, *The Late Medieval Balkans: A Critical Survey from the Late Twelfth Century to the Ottoman Conquest* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1987), 132; Peter Lock, *The Franks in the Aegean, 1204–1500* (London: Longman, 1995), 64.

36. Louis sent an official to count Baldwin's crusade. The record of the cost of the official's trip survives, his estimate of the size of the crusade does not. See *Itinera, dona et hernesia*, 596.

37. Alberic counted 1500 knights in the French wing of the Barons' Crusade and 800 in Richard of Cornwall's contingent. He does not seem to have included the expeditions of Simon of Montfort and William of Forz in his estimates. See Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, *Chronicon*, 946, 948.

38. Philip Mouskes, *Chronique rimée*, 2: 663–64; Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, *Chronicon*, 946. For the bishop of Sees, see *Registres*, no. 4012.

39. Philip Mouskes, *Chronique rimée*, 2: 663–64; Longnon, *L'empire latin*, 182.

40. John Fine has argued that Asen allowed the crusaders to pass, without formally withdrawing from the Nicaean alliance: Fine, *Late Medieval Balkans*, 132.

41. For the Cuman alliance, see Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, *Chronicon*, 947.

42. Longnon, *L'empire latin*, 183.

43. As Baldwin himself is said to have explained to King Henry III of England. In the words of Matthew Paris (Giles, *Matthew Paris's English History*, 1: 295; *Chronica majora*, 4: 54–55): "[Baldwin] also stated that he had laid siege to a very large city not far from Constantinople [Tzurulum], and that, if it should submit to his rule, the whole adjacent country for three day's journey round would fall into his power, and that the approach to Constantinople would be laid open and free from danger, and that the war prospered in his hands."

44. George Acropolites, *Die Chronik*, ed. and trans. Wilhelm Blum (Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 1989), 106.

45. Longnon, *L'empire latin*, 183.

46. Longnon, *L'empire latin*, 178.

47. Richard Spence, "Gregory IX's Attempted Expeditions to the Latin Empire of Constantinople: The Crusade for the Union of the Latin and Greek Churches," *Journal of Medieval History* 5 (1979): 163.

Chapter 9. The Barons' Crusaders in the Holy Land

1. These assumptions are expressed negatively, in discussions of the shortcomings of the Barons' Crusade. See, for example, René Grousset, *Histoire des croisades et du royaume franc de Jérusalem*, 3 vols. (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1934–36), 3: 373–74; Sidney Painter, "The Crusade of Theobald of Champagne and Richard of Cornwall," in *A History of the Crusades*, 2nd ed., ed. Kenneth M. Setton et al., 6 vols. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969–89), 2: 463–64; Joshua Prawer, *Histoire du royaume latin de Jérusalem*, trans. G. Nahon, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Paris: CNRS, 2001), 2: 270; and Michel Balard, "La croisade de Thibaud IV de Champagne (1239–1240)," *Les Champenois et la croisade*, ed. Yvonne Bellenger and Danielle Quéruef (Paris: Aux amateurs de livres, 1989), 90–92. The only modern account to eschew the catalogue of faults is Reinhold Röhricht, "Die Kreuzzüge des Grafen Theobald von Navarra und Richard von Cornwallis, nach dem heiligen Lande," *Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte* 26 (1886).
2. *Historia diplomatica Frederici secundi*, ed. Jean L. A. Huillard-Bréholles, 6 vols. (Paris: H. Plon, 1852–61), 5: 140, 4: 872, 5: 359–61.
3. A point noted by Painter, "The Crusade of Theobald of Champagne," 471.
4. Painter, "The Crusade of Theobald of Champagne," 464, 485.
5. Balard, "La croisade de Thibaud IV de Champagne," 94.
6. Grousset, *Histoire des croisades*, 3: 392.
7. Peter Jackson, "The Crusades of 1239–41 and Their Aftermath," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 50 (1987): 47.
8. R. Stephen Humphreys, *From Saladin to the Mongols: The Ayyubids of Damascus, 1193–1260* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1977), 10–13, 240; Peter M. Holt, *The Age of the Crusades: The Near East from the Eleventh Century to 1517* (London: Longman, 1986), 60–66.
9. For the civil war and the baronial feuding, see Peter Edbury, *John of Ibelin and the Kingdom of Jerusalem* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1997), 40–50; Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1174–1277* (London: Macmillan, 1973), 203–7.
10. English translation by Janet Shirley, *Crusader Syria in the Thirteenth Century: The Rothelin Continuation of the History of William of Tyre with Part of the Eracles or Acre Text* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 38; for the Old French, see *Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr, de 1229 à 1261, dite du manuscrit de Rothelin*, in *RHC Occ.*, 2: 526.
11. *Anonymi continuatio appendicis Roberti de Monte ad Siebertum*, in *RHGF*, 18: 345; "great crusade": English translation by Shirley, *Crusader Syria*, 123; for the Old French, see *L'estoire de Eracles empeureur et la conquête de la terre d'Outremere*, in *RHC Occ.*, 2: 413.
12. Reinhold Röhricht, "Annales de Terre sainte," *Archives de l'Orient Latin* 2 (1884): 440; William of Nangis, *Chronicon*, in *RHGF*, 20: 548; *E Mari historiarum auctore Johannis de Columpna OP*, in *RHGF*, 23: 110.
13. Shirley, *Crusader Syria*, 54; *Continuation Rothelin*, 550–51. The poet's identity is not known.
14. One chapter of this chronicler's work bears the title "Of the wickedness of Frederick, emperor of Germany." See Shirley, *Crusader Syria*, 37.
15. Shirley, *Crusader Syria*, 39; *Continuation Rothelin*, 528.
16. Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, ed. Henry Richards Luard, 7 vols., RS 57, 3: 615.
17. English translation by John A. Giles, *Matthew Paris's English History*, 3 vols. (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1852–54), 1: 234–35. For the passage in Latin, see Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 3: 615.
18. *Historia diplomatica*, 5: 359.
19. *Registres*, no. 4741.
20. Compare with Röhricht, "Die Kreuzzüge des Grafen Theobald von Navarra und Richard von Cornwallis," 70, in which Matthew's account is accepted at face value.
21. *Historia diplomatica*, 5: 474; Philip Mouskes, *Chronique rimée de Philippe Mouskes*, ed. [Frederic] de Reiffenberg, 2 vols. (Brussels: Academie royale des sciences, des lettres et des beaux-arts de Belgique, 1836–38), 2: 667–68.
22. *Continuation Rothelin*, 528–29.
23. Ms. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 5993a, fol. 78v.
24. *Continuation Rothelin*, 529.
25. For Thibaut's arrival, see "Annales de Terre sainte," 440.

26. Shirley, *Crusader Syria*, 39; *Continuation Rothelin*, 529.
27. *Eracles*, 413; *Continuation Rothelin*, 529.
28. Ms. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 5993a, fol. 46V.
29. Born in 1218, Hugh was a contemporary of Louis IX. For Hugh as a contestant for the leadership, see Philip Mouskes, *Chronique rimée*, 2: 661. For Hugh's career to 1239, see Ernest Petit, *Histoire des ducs de Bourgogne de la race capétienne*, 9 vols. (Paris: A. Picard, 1885–1905), 4: 41–89; for his wealth and standing, see Jean Richard, *Saint Louis: roi d'une France féodale, soutien de la Terre sainte* (Paris: Fayard, 1983), 65–66.
30. Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, *Albrici monachi Triumfontium chronicon*, ed. Paul Scheffer-Boichorst, in *MGH SS*, 23: 946.
31. John of Joinville, *Histoire de Saint Louis*, ed. Natalis de Wailly (Paris: Société de l'histoire de France, 1868), 118.
32. Painter, "The Crusade of Theobald of Champagne," 471.
33. *Continuation Rothelin*, 540.
34. Peter Edbury has argued that although Walter ruled Jaffa, he was not actually the count of Jaffa: see Edbury, *John of Ibelin*, 80. For an opposing view, see Hans Eberhard Mayer, "John of Jaffa, His Opponents, and His Fiefs," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 128 (1984): 143.
35. The following account of Ayyubid politics in the wake of al-Kamil's death synthesizes Prawer, *Histoire de Jérusalem*, 2: 263–65; Humphreys, *From Saladin to the Mongols*, 239–58; and Jackson, "The Crusades of 1239–41," 39.
36. For the Jazira, see Holt, *The Age of the Crusades*, 26.
37. Humphreys, *From Saladin to the Mongols*, 258–59.
38. Shirley, *Crusader Syria*, 41; *Continuation Rothelin*, 531–32.
39. *Continuation Rothelin*, 532. See also the anonymous letter cited in Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 4: 25: "You should know that Damascus is not taken, as was said before, but all have returned to Acre." *Eracles*, 414, however, speaks only of Ascalon.
40. Grousset, *Histoire des croisades*, 3: 378; Painter, "The Crusade of Theobald of Champagne," 473; Prawer, *Histoire de Jérusalem*, 2: 271–72; Jean Richard, *The Crusades, c. 1071-c. 1291*, trans. Jean Birrell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 322.
41. Jackson, "The Crusades of 1239–41," 40–41.
42. Jackson, "The Crusades of 1239–41," 40.
43. For the date of the march south, see *Continuation Rothelin*, 532.
44. *Continuation Rothelin*, 533.
45. Shirley, *Crusader Syria*, 43; *Continuation Rothelin*, 535.
46. Shirley, *Crusader Syria*, 43; *Continuation Rothelin*, 535.
47. *Continuation Rothelin*, 540–41, stresses that Henry and Amalric had a raid in mind, and that the target of the raid was cattle. *Trades*, 414, offers a strange account of the crusaders deciding to send a force of 400 knights to Gaza to take on 1050 "Turks." See also Jackson, "The Crusades of 1239–41," 41.
48. One contemporary annalist numbered 400 knights in the raiding party: *Annales monasterii de Theokesberia*, in *Annales monastici*, ed. Henry Richards Luard, 5 vols., RS 36, 1: 114. *Continuation Rothelin*, 539, estimated 670 knights.
49. *Eracles*, 414; *Continuation Rothelin*, 539; Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 4: 25. Among the lesser crusading lords were Girard of Aubeville, Robert of Bove, Stephen of Sevinghen, Philip of Nanteuil, Matthew of Marly, Giles of Arsies, Guy Mauvoisin, William of Senlis, Richard of Beaumont, Simon of Clefmont, John of Barres, and Robert Malet.
50. *Continuation Rothelin*, 540.
51. Shirley, *Crusader Syria*, 48; *Continuation Rothelin*, 541.
52. Christopher Marshall, *Warfare in the Latin East, 1192–1291* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 178.
53. Compare with Grousset, *Histoire des croisades*, 3: 381, and Marshall, *Warfare in the Latin East*, 179, who both assume al-Hijawi had the raiders completely surrounded before revealing the presence of his troops. In fact, the subsequent escape of several raiders from the valley shows that he did not.
54. Shirley, *Crusader Syria*, 49; *Continuation Rothelin*, 543.

55. For this entire sequence of events, see *Continuation Rothelin*, 543–44. For other barons who fled, see *Les gestes des Chiprois*, in *Recueil des historiens des croisades: documents Arméniens*, 2 vols. (Paris: Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres, 1869–1906), 2: 726. See also *History of the Patriarchs of the Egyptian Church*, ed. and trans. Antione Khater and O. H. E. Khs-Burmester (Cairo: Institut français d'archéologie orientale, 1974), 4/2:197.

56. It is hard to imagine that they really wanted to chase down the Egyptian cavalry at this stage of the proceedings, as asserted in the *Continuation Rothelin*, 545.

57. *Continuation Rothelin*, 546.

58. Marshall, *Warfare in the Latin East*, 178.

59. *Continuation Rothelin*, 548–49; *Eracles*, 415; Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 4: 25.

60. Ibn al-Furat, *Ayyubids, Mamlukes, and Crusaders*, ed. and trans. U. and M. C. Lyons with historical introduction and notes by Jonathan Riley-Smith, 2 vols. (Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons, 1971), 2: 62; al-Maqrizi, *A History of the Ayyubid Sultans of Egypt*, trans. R. J. C. Broadhurst (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1980), 251; Jackson, "The Crusades of 1239–41," 41.

61. To judge by the answers he received from the authorities in Acre: Ms. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 5993a, fol. 78v.

62. Thibaut's negotiations with Hamah have traditionally been placed after the battle of Gaza: see, for example, Röhrich, "Die Kreuzzüge des Grafen Theobald von Navarra und Richard von Cornwallis," 77–78; Grousset, *Histoire des croisades*, 3: 383–85; Painter, "The Crusade of Theobald of Champagne," 478. Jackson, "The Crusades of 1239–41," 42–43, however, has proposed re-dating the discussions to the period before the battle, September–November 1239, on the basis of (1) reports of al-Muzaffar of Hamah's imminent conversion circulating in the West in the summer of 1239; (2) Ibn Wasil's account of al-Muzaffar spreading the rumor of his conversion in the early autumn of 1239 in order to disguise his efforts to prevent Ismail from seizing Damascus; (3) the report in *Eracles* that John of Mâcon died at Tripoli during or just after the negotiations, combined with western sources dating his death to 3 November 1239. The most direct evidence for these negotiations is in fact *Eracles*, which is the only Syrian Frankish source to discuss them. It clearly places the negotiations after the battle of Gaza: *Eracles*, 415–16. Moreover, to accept a pre-Gaza date for the negotiations, one must assume that the crusaders were able to make contact with al-Muzaffar from Acre, march up to Tripoli (more than 100 miles to the north), send an envoy from there to Hamah, wait for a response, march back down to Acre, decide on a leader, hold a two-day war council, and set off on the march south for Ascalon, all in a two-month span. Then one must further assume that the crusaders were essentially inactive for six months after the Gaza defeat, from November 1239 to May 1240. The crusaders may well have made preliminary contact with al-Muzaffar prior to the battle of Gaza, but the weight of evidence and probability favor a post-Gaza date for the main negotiations that culminated in the march to Tripoli.

63. Grousset, *Histoire des croisades*, 3: 384.

64. *Eracles*, 416; *Gestes des Chiprois*, 726.

65. *Eracles*, 416.

66. Shirley, *Crusader Syria*, 54; *Continuation Rothelin*, 550.

67. Shirley, *Crusader Syria*, 54; *Continuation Rothelin*, 550.

68. Grousset, *Histoire des croisades*, 3: 385–86; Humphreys, *From Saladin to the Mongols*, 262–65; Jackson, "The Crusades of 1239–41," 43.

69. Ismail may have been in touch with the crusaders as early as April or May 1240, as Jackson ("The Crusades of 1239–41," 43) suggests. The substantive negotiations leading to an agreement between the parties, however, clearly took place after Ismail learned of Ayyub's success in Cairo: Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 4: 65, reports that the messenger bringing news of the treaty to England passed Richard of Cornwall's fleet on its way to Syria, which suggests that the agreement was finalized sometime in July–August 1240.

70. For the terms of the Franco-Damascene alliance, see the full discussion, with reference to all relevant Arabic, Latin, and Old French sources, in Jackson, "The Crusades of 1239–41," 44.

71. Humphreys, *From Saladin to the Mongols*, 266.

72. In a letter to Robert of Sandford, preceptor of the Temple in England: Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 4: 65.

73. *Continuation Rothelin*, 552–53; Humphreys, *From Saladin to the Mongols*, 266–67; Jackson, "The Crusades of 1239–41," 45.

74. *History of the Patriarchs*, 4/2: 217; *Ayyubid Sultans of Egypt*, 258; *Continuation Rothelin*, 553;

Jackson, "The Crusades of 1239–41," 43–44.

75. *Continuation Rothelin*, 554.

76. Humphreys, *From Saladin to the Mongols*, 265.

77. Jackson, "The Crusades of 1239–41," 46–47.

78. Jackson, "The Crusades of 1239–41," 47, nn. 90–91.

79. Hans Eberhard Mayer, *The Crusades*, 2nd ed., trans. John Gillingham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 257.

80. It has been suggested that the Hospitallers favored an agreement with Egypt because they wished to win the good will of Frederick II: Marie Luise Bulst, "Zur Geschichte der Ritterorden und des Königsreichs Jerusalem im 13. Jahrhundert bis zur Schlacht bei La Forbie am 17. Okt. 1244," *Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters* 22 (1966): 202.

81. *Continuation Rothelin*, 553.

82. During his captivity Philip wrote a poem that he sent to the crusader camp: *Continuation Rothelin*, 548.

83. *Continuation Rothelin*, 554; Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 4: 79–80, 140.

84. The main source for Richard's expedition is a letter he wrote to his friends in England shortly after departing Syria, which Matthew Paris copied into the *Chronica majora*: Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 4: 138–44.

85. Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, *Chronicon*, 946, 948, estimated that about half as many knights participated in Richard's crusade as fought on the French expedition.

86. There is no evidence for William of Forz's activity in the Holy Land. For Simon, there is only indirect testimony in the form of a petition several leading Frankish barons sent to Frederick II requesting that he appoint Simon as his governor (*bail*) for the kingdom of Jerusalem until Conrad came of age: see "Acte de soumission des barons du royaume de Jérusalem à Frédéric II," ed. Reinhold Röhrich, *Archives de l'Orient Latin* 1 (1881): 402–3.

87. Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 4: 140.

88. Jackson, "The Crusades of 1239–41," 48.

89. Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 4: 141.

90. While traveling through France *en route* to the Holy Land, Richard kept in contact with Frederick: Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 4: 47.

91. *Eracles*, 421.

92. Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 4: 141–43; Jackson, "The Crusades of 1239–41," 49–50; Mayer, *The Crusades*, 257.

93. This crucial point is made by Jackson, "The Crusades of 1239–41," 49.

94. Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 4: 144–45, 211, who calls Richard's actions "laudable" and recounts an episode in the war between England and France in 1242, when Richard, arriving at the French camp to discuss a truce, was greeted like a long-lost brother by the French barons.

95. On the fortifications at Ascalon, see Denys Pringle, "King Richard I and the Walls of Ascalon," *Palestine Exploration Quarterly* 106 (1984): 142–46; Marshall, *Warfare in the Latin East*, 101–4.

96. Sidney Painter reluctantly reached the same conclusion in much the same terms half a century ago. See Painter, "The Crusade of Theobald of Champagne," 464.

Conclusion

1. *Registres*, no. 4741.

2. *Registres*, no. 4741.

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